A Way Forward for Zimbabwe
1. The Current Situation
2. What Should Be Done
3. History of the Crisis
4. Crisis Group Analysis
5. News and Other Reporting
6. Important Documents and Websites
Picture: President Mugabe and Prime Minister Tsvangirai make a rare show of unity at a press conference, Harare, 23 December 2009. REUTERS
updated June 2011
Overview
The situation in Zimbabwe is deteriorating again under a new wave of political violence organised by Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF party that threatens to derail the Global Political Agreement (GPA). Mugabe’s calls for early elections have raised fears about a return to 2008’s violence, and the country faces the prospect of another illegitimate vote unless credible, enforceable reforms can first be implemented. Without stronger international pressure on ZANU-PF, the tenuous current coalition may collapse, triggering further violence and grave consequences for southern Africa.
The GPA was signed by the three political parties (ZANU-PF, and the two wings of the former opposition, MDC-T and MDC-M) in September 2008, after Mugabe was “re-elected” in an uncontested run-off following violence that caused Tsvangirai (who led the first round) to withdraw. It was intended to provide a foundation for response to the multiple political and economic crises, but it has become a battleground for control of the country’s future. As in 2008, ZANU-PF’s ability, in partnership with the unreformed security sector leadership (the “securocrats”), to thwart a democratic transfer of power remains intact. The state media is still grotesquely unbalanced, and the criminal justice system continues to be used as a weapon against ZANU-PF opponents, in particular the MDC-T.
The centrepiece of GPA reforms is a parliament-led constitution-making process under the direction of the Constitution Parliamentary Affairs (Select) Committee (COPAC). That body launched an outreach program in the latter half of 2010, but several civil society organisations and the MDC-T criticise it for falling far short of being inclusive and open and accuse ZANU-PF of having captured and manipulated the process. Both MDC parties argue that COPAC must finish its work before elections are held, but ZANU-PF says elections can proceed with or without a new constitution and links its cooperation on democratic reforms to removal of targeted international sanctions, over which the parties have no control.
The lack of political progress has been coupled with an alarming upsurge in political violence organised by ZANU-PF. The March 2008 elections were followed by an unprecedented campaign of violence targeting MDC-T, including at least 300 politically motivated murders, that eventually forced the party to withdraw from the June second-round vote. Violence has risen again following the early 2011 visit of the SADC facilitators, including arrest of MDC-T supporters and attacks on party and civil society figures. There are also reports of youth militia deployments across the country ahead of the constitutional referendum, including induction of many of these young people into the police and army through ZANU-PF’s control of security force recruitment and the civil service. This correlates with allegations about deployment of army officers into rural areas to coordinate intimidation, though these are vehemently denied by Defence Minister Emmerson Mnangagwa.
The facilitation team recognises that it needs a constant presence in Zimbabwe. Its roadmap should propose an audit of what has and has not been done, what the parties can and cannot achieve. If further power-sharing is inevitable, a pragmatic assessment of the current arrangement’s failure is needed. The guarantors and facilitation team have relied on the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC), set up by the GPA – four members from each of the three signatory parties – for evaluations, but it has not fulfilled its mandate, due to inadequate monitoring capacity, no enforcement leverage and problems navigating the distorted balance of power within government. In recognition of its poor performance, the SADC troika recommended strengthening the facilitation team’s monitoring and reporting capacity, so it could work closer with the JOMIC. The annual progress review the Periodic Review Mechanism should provide in consultation with the guarantors has not been done, though the party leaders recently agreed to correct this. The guarantors must ensure a comprehensive review.
Concise monthly summaries of the situation in Zimbabwe are available in Crisis Group's monthly bulletin, CrisisWatch.
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In its briefing, Zimbabwe: Engaging the Inclusive Government (20 April 2009), Crisis Group made the following recommendations:
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Donors should pursue a “humanitarian plus” assistance strategy that covers the priority areas in the government’s Short Term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP), including revival of the education, health and water sanitation sectors, as well as a functioning civil service, and reconstruction of basic infrastructure. Zimbabwe should be treated as a post-conflict society in need of some front-loaded aid. Donors might also create a contact group, both to support the political process and to coordinate aid flows.
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SADC countries, most significantly South Africa, should also provide more direct assistance but require strict compliance with the GPA and avoid in particular direct support to the Reserve Bank, which remains in the control of Mugabe loyalist, Gideon Gono, and could be expected to divert it to ZANU-PF patronage networks.
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Support is also needed for programs to reform politicised legal institutions, including the judiciary, and strengthen civil society that has been deeply fractured in recent years, including religious, press, labour, academic, women’s and youth groups. SADC and the Commonwealth secretariat might work together to build parliament’s legislative and oversight capacities.
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To counter the greatest and very real stability risk – an attack against Prime Minister Tsvangirai or a military coup – a strategy is needed to retire virtually all members of the security sector senior leadership. Persuading them to go peacefully will not be easy: the generals fear the post-Mugabe era. The government could create leverage with a law that offers immunity to senior generals from domestic prosecution for past political crimes (excluding crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide) in return for retirement. At the same time, it should create a panel tasked to recommend the modalities for setting up transitional justice mechanisms such as a truth commission and vetting processes as part of security sector and other administrative reforms.
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The U.S., EU and others could, in accordance with their laws, sweeten the deal by removing targeted sanctions on those who accept and comply. The new South African president, working with the SADC mediation team, should negotiate with the generals, making clear that those who do not step aside risk prosecution for their crimes domestically or internationally.
For the policy briefing in full, please click here.
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Zimbabwe’s March 2008 elections are the latest episode in the country's deepening political and economic crisis. The policies, corruption and repressive governance of President Robert Mugabe – in power for 28 years – and his ZANU-PF party bear primary responsibility for the severe economic slide, growing public discontent and Zimbabwe's international isolation.
Mugabe, with his ZANU party, came to power in 1980 as Africa’s most feted leader, after a UK-brokered agreement ended a protracted guerrilla war against the white minority government of Ian Smith. The early 1980s were marked by a five-year brutal repression in Matabeleland and Midlands against the minority Ndebele population that supported rival ZAPU. ZAPU was later forced into a merger, leaving Mugabe head of a de facto one party state, under ZANU-PF, by 1987.
State violence escalated since early 2000, when Mugabe lost a constitutional referendum on presidential powers and controversial land reforms, as the people voted in clear protest. The forcible acquisition of mostly white-owned farms by ZANU war veterans – beginning in the 1990s – also spiked after that electoral defeat, Mugabe’s only, crippling the economy and leading to chronic shortages of basic commodities. In the context of spiraling inflation and 80 per cent unemployment, the government launched “Operation Murambatsvina” in 2005 to forcibly clear urban slums, depriving over 18 per cent of the population of their homes or livelihoods.
The opposition party Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) entered the political scene in 2000, but failed to break Mugabe’s majority in the 2000 parliamentary elections. Elections in 2002 and 2005 were marked by gross manipulation and suppression of dissent. The MDC split in November 2005 over whether to boycott elections for the newly formed senate.
After a brutal government crackdown on the opposition in March 2007, the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) mandated South African President Mbeki to mediate between the government and the MDC – aiming to secure a new constitution and free and fair conditions for elections. Talks stalled in January 2008, when Mugabe called snap polls for March despite the MDC's call for postponement until new constitution adopted.
On 29 March 2008, Zimbabwe held combined presidential and parliamentary elections marred by extensive pre-poll manipulation. Only "friendly" countries and institutions were invited to observe the polls and most Western media were barred. Despite the skewed playing field, Zimbabwe's people clearly signaled their rejection of the status quo: for the first time, ZANU-PF lost control of parliament to the MDC, which made unprecedented gains in rural areas.
Yet rather than let democracy run its course, Mugabe and his hardline supporters moved to force victory, withholding the results of the presidential election and launching a countrywide campaign of violence and intimidation. Tsvangirai withdrew from a second round presidential run-off set for 27 June over election violence, leaving Mugabe open to claim his sixth term in office on 29 June. Amid rising international condemnation, talks between ZANU-PF and the two MDC factions began on 24 July under the mediation of South African President Mbeki. After stop-start negotiations, a power-sharing deal between Mugabe and Tsvangirai was eventually signed on 11 September. Yet implementation has quickly stalled and as the humanitarian situation for the majority of Zimbabweans continues to worsen, a new political approach urgently required. For more detail on recent developments, see The Current Situation above.
Zimbabweans continue to face economic turmoil and corruption, severe food shortages and the collapse of vital services. HIV/AIDS among adults stands at over 20 per cent, while a mounting cholera epidemic has left over 1,500 dead. By January 2009 the annual inflation rate stood at over 200 million per cent – the world's highest by far – making day-to-day life for Zimbabweans increasingly difficult. The government’s sticking plaster approach – including removing ten zeros from the Zimbabwean dollar in August 2008 – has done little to stem the economic crisis. Up to a third of the population is thought to have fled over recent years, and remittances from the growing diaspora have become a lifeline for many remaining.
For more information, see our Zimbabwe conflict history
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Crisis Group's publications on Zimbabwe
For a month by month report on developments in Zimbabwe since September 2003, see Crisis Group's CrisisWatch Database.
Other Crisis Group resources
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News sources with regular coverage of events in Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe news sources
Reports & articles by other organisations
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The Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) launched an initiative in March 2007 to facilitate a negotiated political solution.
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Communique, 2008 Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Sandton, South Africa, 9 November, 2008
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Communique, 2008 Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Lusaka, 13 April 2008
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Communique, 2007 Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Lusaka, 16-17 August 2007
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Communique, 2007 Extraordinary SADC Summit of Heads of State and Government, Dar es Salaam, 28-29 March 2007
The U.S., the EU, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland have placed targeted sanctions on Mugabe’s regime.
In 2005, Mugabe’s government launched Operation Murambatsvina, which purported to eradicate "illegal dwellings" and "illicit activities". The UN report below documents the impact of the destruction that followed.
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Report of the Fact-Finding Mission to Zimbabwe to assess the Scope and Impact of Operation Murambatsvina by the UN Special Envoy on Human Settlements Issues in Zimbabwe Mrs. Anna Kajumulo Tibaijuka, 25 July 2005.
Zimbabwe Legal Documents
Websites
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