Responsibility to Protect
In its efforts to help prevent conflict worldwide, the International Crisis Group has consistently drawn upon the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the principle that sovereign states, and the international community as a whole, have a responsibility to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes. Crisis Group President Gareth Evans served as co-chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that first developed the R2P concept in 2001.
1. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): a primer
2. Key documents
3. Speeches and publications by Gareth Evans, Crisis Group President, on R2P
4. Crisis Group reporting on R2P-related issues
5. Speeches, book and publications on R2P by Crisis Group staff
6. Application of R2P to particular situations
8. Other organisations working on R2P
What is R2P?
The responsibility of states, and where they fail the international community, to protect civilians from mass atrocity crimes.
Why does R2P matter?
Because it's the right thing to do: our common humanity demands that the world never again sees another Holocaust, Cambodia, Rwanda or Bosnia.
Because it's in every country’s interest: states that can't or won't stop internal mass atrocity crimes are states that can't or won't stop terrorism, weapons proliferation, the spread of health pandemics and other global risks.
What kind of action does R2P require?
Overwhelmingly, prevention: through measures aimed in particular at building state capacity, remedying grievances, and ensuring the rule of law.
But if prevention fails, R2P requires whatever measures – economic, political, diplomatic, legal, security or in the last resort military – become necessary to stop mass atrocity crimes occurring.
Whose responsibility is R2P?
For individual states, R2P means the responsibility to protect their own citizens, and to help other states build their capacity to do so.
For international organisations, including the UN, R2P means the responsibility to warn, to generate effective prevention strategies, and when necessary to mobilise effective reaction.
For civil society groups and individuals, R2P means the responsibility to force the attention of policy-makers on what needs to be done, by whom and when.
How and why did the idea of R2P originate?
Throughout the 1990s controversy raged — particularly over Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo — between supporters of a "right of humanitarian intervention" and those who argued that state sovereignty, as recognised in the UN Charter, precluded any intervention in internal matters.
The R2P concept was aimed at bridging that gap. It originated with the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, in 2001, and became a central theme in the recommendations of the UN High-Level Panel, A More Secure World, in 2004 and of the UN Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, in 2005.
What is current status of the R2P idea?
The world's heads of state and government unanimously accepted the concept of R2P at the UN World Summit in September 2005. The Security Council has also accepted the general principle.
But the task remains, as each new danger of mass atrocity crimes threatens, to translate that principled acceptance into effective action — at the international, national and community level.
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A. The Responsibility to Protect (2008), book by Gareth Evans (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). For mroe information, please click here.
About the book (from the jacket cover):
“Never again!” the world has vowed time and again since the Holocaust. Yet genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other mass atrocity crimes continue to shock our consciences—from the killing fields of Cambodia to the machetes of Rwanda to the agony of Darfur.
Gareth Evans has grappled with these issues firsthand. As Australian foreign minister, he was a key broker of the United Nations peace plan for Cambodia. As president of the International Crisis Group, he now works on the prevention and resolution of scores of conflicts and crises worldwide. The primary architect of and leading authority on the Responsibility to Protect (“R2P”), he shows here how this new international norm can once and for all prevent a return to the killing fields.
The Responsibility to Protect captures a simple and powerful idea. The primary responsibility for protecting its own people from mass atrocity crimes lies with the state itself. State sovereignty implies responsibility, not a license to kill. But when a state is unwilling or unable to halt or avert such crimes, the wider international community then has a collective responsibility to take whatever action is necessary. R2P emphasizes preventive action above all. That includes assistance for states struggling to contain potential crises and for effective rebuilding after a crisis or conflict to tackle its underlying causes. R2P’s primary tools are persuasion and support, not military or other coercion. But sometimes it is right to fight: faced with another Rwanda, the world cannot just stand by.
R2P was unanimously adopted by the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit. But many misunderstandings persist about its scope and limits. And much remains to be done to solidify political support and to build institutional capacity. Evans shows, compellingly, how big a break R2P represents from the past, and how, with its acceptance in principle and effective application in practice, the promise of “Never again!” can at last become a reality.
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B. "The Responsibility to Protect" (2001), report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, co-chaired by Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun. Vol. I. Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, xiii+91pp. Vol. II. Supplementary Volume: Research, Bibliography, Background, xiv+410pp.
The synopsis of the report reads as follows:
The Responsibility to Protect: Core Principles
(1) Basic Principles
A. State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies with the state itself.
B. Where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.
The foundations of the responsibility to protect, as a guiding principle for the international community of states, lie in:
A. obligations inherent in the concept of sovereignty;
B. the responsibility of the Security Council, under Article 24 of the UN Charter, for the maintenance of international peace and security;
C. specific legal obligations under human rights and human protection declarations, covenants and treaties, international humanitarian law and national law;
D. the developing practice of states, regional organisations and the Security Council itself.
The responsibility to protect embraces three specific responsibilities:
A. The responsibility to prevent: to address both the root causes and direct causes of internal conflict and other man-made crises putting populations at risk.
B. The responsibility to react: to respond to situations of compelling human need with appropriate measures, which may include coercive measures like sanctions and international prosecution, and in extreme cases military intervention.
C. The responsibility to rebuild: to provide, particularly after a military intervention, full assistance with recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, addressing the causes of the harm the intervention was designed to halt or avert.
A. Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect: prevention options should always be exhausted before intervention is contemplated, and more commitment and resources must be devoted to it.
B. The exercise of the responsibility to both prevent and react should always involve less intrusive and coercive measures being considered before more coercive and intrusive ones are applied.
The Responsibility to Protect: Principles for Military Intervention
(1) The Just Cause Threshold
Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure. To be warranted, there must be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to occur, of the following kind:
a. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or
b. large scale "ethnic cleansing", actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.
(2) The Precautionary Principles
A. Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims concerned.
B. Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.
C. Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.
D. Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.
(3) Right Authority
A. There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to authorise military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than it has.
B. Security Council authorisation should in all cases be sought prior to any military intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request such authorisation, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the Secretary-General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.
C. The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where there are allegations of large-scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context seek adequate verification of facts or conditions on the ground that might support a military intervention.
D. The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of resolutions authorising military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is otherwise majority support.
E. If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time, alternative options are:
I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure; and
II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organisations under Chapter VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorisation from the Security Council.
F. The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action, concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation — and that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.
(4) Operational Principles
A. Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match.
B. Common military approach among involved partners; unity of command; clear and unequivocal communications and chain of command.
C. Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.
D. Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.
E. Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective.
F. Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organisations.
A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility
, United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004.
The Panel recommended acceptance of R2P as an "emerging norm":
201. The successive humanitarian disasters in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo and now Darfur, Sudan, have concentrated attention not on the immunities of sovereign Governments but their responsibilities, both to their own people and to the wider international community. There is a growing recognition that the issue is not the "right to intervene" of any State, but the"responsibility to protect" of every State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe — mass murder and rape, ethnic cleansing by forcible expulsion and terror, and deliberate starvation and exposure to disease. And there is a growing acceptance that while sovereign Governments have the primary responsibility to protect their own citizens from such catastrophes, when they are unable or unwilling to do so that responsibility should be taken up by the wider international community — with it spanning a continuum involving prevention, response to violence, if necessary, and rebuilding shattered societies. The primary focus should be on assisting the cessation of violence through mediation and other tools and the protection of people through such measures as the dispatch of humanitarian, human rights and police missions. Force, if it needs to be used, should be deployed as a last resort.
202. The Security Council so far has been neither very consistent nor very effective in dealing with these cases, very often acting too late, too hesitantly or not at all. But step by step, the Council and the wider international community have come to accept that, under Chapter VII and in pursuit of the emerging norm of a collective international responsibility to protect, it can always authorize military action to redress catastrophic internal wrongs if it is prepared to declare that the situation is a "threat to international peace and security", not especially difficult when breaches of international law are involved.
203. We endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of genocide and other largescale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent.
The High-Level Panel also specifically addressed the question of principles governing the use of force: see paragraphs 204-209.
D. In Larger Freedom, the 2005 Report of the UN Secretary-General, submitted to heads of state and government attending the 2005 World Summit session of the UN General Assembly, recommended endorsement of the R2P principle:
135. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty and more recently the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, with its 16 members from all around the world, endorsed what they described as an "emerging norm that there is a collective responsibility to protect" (see A/59/565, para. 203). While I am well aware of the sensitivities involved in this issue, I strongly agree with this approach. I believe that we must embrace the responsibility to protect, and, when necessary, we must act on it. This responsibility lies, first and foremost, with each individual State, whose primary raison d'être and duty is to protect its population. But if national authorities are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens, then the responsibility shifts to the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other methods to help protect the human rights and well-being of civilian populations. When such methods appear insufficient, the Security Council may out of necessity decide to take action under the Charter of the United Nations, including enforcement action, if so required. In this case, as in others, it should follow the principles set out in section III above.
He also recommended the adoption by the Security Council of the guidelines governing the use of force, see paragraphs 122-126.
World Summit Outcome Document , September 2005. Heads of state and government attending the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly agreed as follows:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.
F. The UN Security Council, in
Resolution 1674 (28 April 2006), a thematic resolution on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, "reaffirmed" paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document:
4. Reaffirms the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;
G. UN Security Council
Resolution 1706 (31 August 2006), calling for the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Darfur, applied the R2P principle to a particular context for the first time:
Recalling also its previous resolutions [...] and 1674 (2006) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirms inter alia the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 United Nations World Summit outcome document....
H. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, the 12 January 2009 Report of the UN Secretary-General, advanced a three pillar strategy for operationalising the R2P principle endorsed at the 2005 World Summit of the UN General Assembly. The three pillars span the protection responsibilities of the state, the provision of international assistance and capacity-building to vulnerable states, and the promotion of timely and decisive action where prevention fails.
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"Crimes Against Humanity and the Responsibility to Protect"
Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to Crimes Against Humanity Initiative, Hague Intersessional Experts Meeting Dinner, The Hague, 11 June 2009.
"NATO and the Responsibility to Protect"
Presentation by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to Shadow NATO Summit, Options for NATO: Presssing the Re-Set Button on the Strategic Concept, Session on NATO’S Role and Relevance in the 21st Century (BASIC, Bertelmans Stiftung, ISIS Europe, NATO Watch), Brussels, 31 March 2009
"The Responsibility to Protect in Environmental Emergencies"
Presentation by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to American Society of International Law (ASIL) 103rd Annual Meeting, Washington DC, 26 March 2009
"The Responsibility To Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once And For All"
Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to the Institute for Public Policy Research, London, 15 December 2008. Similar presentations have been given in recent weeks to the University of Sydney on 24 October, American University of Beirut on 10 November, Royal Irish Academy on 21 November, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies on 27 November, Toronto Munk Debate on 1 December, Harvard Kennedy School of Government on 4 December, and Geneva Centre for Security Policy on 12 December 2008.
"Operationalising R2P in Coercive Peace Operations"
Presentation by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to Working Group on Peace Operations and the Protection of Civilians, ICRC and IIHL Conference on ‘International Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and Peace Operations, San Remo, 5 September 2008
"The Responsibility to Protect: Meeting the Challenges"
Lecture by Gareth Evans, President, the International Crisis Group, to 10th Asia Pacific Programme for Senior Military Officers, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore, 5 August 2008
"The Responsibility to Protect and The Use of Military Force"
Presentation by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to Seminar on International Use of Force, World Legal Forum, The Hague, 11 December 2007
"Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect: Four Misunderstandings, Three Challenges and How To Overcome them"
Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to SEF Symposium 2007, The Responsibility to Protect (R2P): Progress, Empty Promise or a License for ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, Bonn, 30 November 2007
"Preventing Mass Atrocities: Making the Responsibility to Protect a Reality"
Keynote Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group and Co-Chair, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, to United Nations University/International Crisis Group Conference on "Prevention of Mass Atrocities: From Mandate to Realisation", New York, 10 October 2007
"The Responsibility to Protect: Creating and Implementing a New International Norm"
Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to Human Rights Law Resource Centre, 13 August 2007 and Community Legal Centres and Lawyers for Human Rights, Sydney, 28 August 2007
"The Limits of State Sovereignty: The Responsibility to Protect and the 21st Century"
Eighth Neelam Tiruchelvam Memorial Lecture by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES), Colombo, 29 July 2007
"The Unfinished Responsibility to Protect Agenda: Europe's Role"
Panel Presentation by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to EPC/IPPR/Oxfam Policy Dialogue on Europe's Responsibility to Protect: What Role for the EU?, Brussels, 5 July 2007
"The International Responsibility to Protect: The Tasks Ahead"
Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group and Co-Chair of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, to Seminar Africa's Responsibility to Protect, The Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town, 23 April 2007
"From Principle To Practice – Implementing The Responsibility To Protect"
Keynote Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group and Co-Chair of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, to Egmont (Royal Institute of International Affairs) Conference and Expert Seminar From Principle to Practice: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, Brussels, 26 April 2007, Gareth Evans
"Responsibility to Protect in 2007: Five Thoughts for Policy Makers"
Presentation by Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group, to Panel Discussion on The Responsibility to Protect: Ensuring Effective Protection of Populations under Threat of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, Program to Commemorate 1994 Rwandan Genocide, United Nations, New York, 13 April 2007
"Preventing Mass Atrocities: Making 'Never Again' a Reality, Gareth Evans"
Lecture by Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group and Co-Chair of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, in Joan B. Kroc Distinguished Lecture Series, Institute for Peace and Justice, University of San Diego, 12 April 2007
"The Responsibility to Protect: The Power of an Idea"
Keynote Address by Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group and Co-Chair of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, to Human Rights Center, UC Berkeley International Conference on the Responsibility to Protect: Stopping Mass Atrocities, University of California, Berkeley, 14 March 2007
"Making Idealism Realistic: The Responsibility to Protect as a New Global Security Norm"
Address by Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group, to launch Stanford MA Program in International Policy Studies, Stanford University, 7 February 2007
"Conflict Prevention: Ten Lessons We Have Learned"
Closing Keynote Address by Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group, to the University of Toronto Peace and Conflict Society Conference, Before the Crisis Breaks: Conflict Prevention, Crisis Management and Preventive Diplomacy in the 21st Century, Toronto, 4 February 2007
"The Responsibility to Protect: From an Idea to an International Norm"
Keynote Opening Address by Gareth Evans, President of International Crisis Group and Co-Chair of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, to Chicago Council on Global Affairs et al Conference on The Responsibility to Protect: Engaging America, Chicago, 15 November 2006
"A Rule-Based International Order: Illusory or Achievable?"
2006 Dankwart A. Rustow Memorial Lecture by Gareth Evans, President of International Crisis Group and former Foreign Minister of Australia, Graduate Center, City University of New York, 19 September 2006
"International Law at the Coalface"
Remarks by Gareth Evans at Melbourne Journal of International Law Annual Reception, Melbourne, 22 August 2006
"Conflict Prevention and Development Cooperation: From Crisis to Peaceful Governance"
Keynote Address by Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group, to Seminar on Channels of Influence in a Crisis Situation — How can Development Cooperation Support Conflict Resolution and Democracy?, sponsored by Crisis Management Initiative, Finnish Parliament and Foreign Ministry, and Democracy Cooperation Forum of Finnish Political Parties, Helsinki, 9 May 2006
"Crimes Against Humanity: Overcoming Global Indifference"
2006 Gandel Oration for B’nai B’rith Anti-Defamation Commission by Gareth Evans, President of International Crisis Group, University of New South Wales, Sydney, 30 April 2006
"From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect"
Keynote Address by Gareth Evans, President of International Crisis Group and Co-Chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001, to Symposium on Humanitarian Intervention, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 31 March 2006
"The United Nations and Conflict Prevention"
Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to the Dag Hammarskjold Centenary Seminar co-hosted by IFRI and Swedish Embassy, Paris, 17 October 2005
" Conflict or Co-existence? "
Keynote Address by Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, to Forum 2000 Conference, Our Global Co-existence: Challenges and Hopes for the 21st Century, Prague, 10 October 2005
"UN Reform and Collective Security: A Summit in Danger of Collapse"
Notes for Panel presentation by Gareth Evans, President of International Crisis Group, to DPI-NGO Conference, New York, 8 September 2005
"UN Reform: Why It Matters for Africa"
Address to Africa Policy Forum by Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group and Member of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Addis Ababa, 26 August 2005
"The Responsibility to Protect: Evolution and Implementation"
Keynote Address by Gareth Evans, President of International Crisis Group and Co-Chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, to LSE/KCL Conference on Ethical Dimensions of European Foreign Policy, London, 1 July 2005
"Halting Genocide: Intervention and Legitimacy"
Address by Gareth Evans, President of International Crisis Group and Member High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, to Geneva Centre for Security Policy Forum on Global Peace and Security: Challenges and Responses, Geneva, 18 May 2005
"After the Tsunami: Prospects for Collective Security Reform in 2005"
Keynote Address by Hon Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group and Member of the UN Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Regional Outlook Forum 2005, Singapore, 6 January 2005
"Global and Regional Security: Our Shared Responsibility"
Annual Day Lecture, by Hon Gareth Evans, President, International Crisis Group, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, 15 December 2004
"No more Rwandas or Darfurs: The International Responsibility to Protect"
Address by Gareth Evans, President of International Crisis Group, to Sydney Peace Foundation, University of Sydney, 3 September 2004
"International Law and the United Nations: The Use of Military Force"
Keynote Address by Gareth Evans to Heinrich Boll Foundation, 5th Annual Foreign Policy Conference, The Role of International Law and the United Nations in a Globalizing World, Berlin, 24 June 2004
"When is it right to fight? Legality, legitimacy and the use of military force?"
2004 Cyril Foster Lecture delivered by Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group, at Oxford University, 10 May 2004
"Uneasy Bedfellows: 'The Responsibility to Protect' and Feinstein-Slaughter's 'Duty to Prevent'"
Commentary by Gareth Evans, Co-Chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, on Lee Feinsten and Anne-Marie Slaughter, "The Duty to Prevent" (Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2004), The American Society of International Law Conference, Washington DC, 1 April 2004
"The Responsibility to Protect: Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention"
Address by Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group and Co-Chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, to The American Society of International Law, 98th Annual Meeting, Panel on "Rethinking Collective Action", Washington DC, 1 April 2004
"Shifting Security Parameters In The 21st Century"
Paper delivered by Hon Gareth Evans AO QC, President of the International Crisis Group and Foreign Minister of Australia 1988-96, to Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR) 9th Annual Conference- The Gulf: Challenges of the Future, Abu Dhabi, 12 January 2004
"Waging War and Making Peace"
2003 Annual Hawke Lecture by Gareth Evans. Bob Hawke Prime Ministerial Centre, University of South Australia, Adelaide (Australia), 18 September 2003
"The Responsibility to Protect and September 11"
Address by Gareth Evans to UNU/Canadian Government Seminar on The Responsibility to Protect, 16 December 2002
"The Responsibility to Protect: Humanitarian Intervention in the 21st Century"
2002 Wesson Lecture in International Relations Theory and Practice, by Gareth Evans, Stanford University, 27 February 2002
"Conflict Prevention and Intervention"
Presentation by Hon Gareth Evans AO QC, President of International Crisis Group and Co-Chairman of International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, to American Society of International Law 95th Annual Meeting, Washington DC, 6 April 2001
"Preventing Deadly Conflict: The Role And Responsibility Of Governments And NGOs"
Public Lecture by Hon Gareth Evans AO QC, President, International Crisis Group, for the Centre for Study of Human Rights, London School of Economics, 2 February 2001
Book and Publications
The Responsibility To Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once And For All
Book by Gareth Evans (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008). For more information, including on how to order, please click here.
Sri Lanka: "Falling Down on the Job", in Foreign Policy, 1 May 2009
"The Urge to Protect" , European Voice, 10 October 2008.
"The Responsibility to Protect: Holding the Line" , openDemocracy, 8 October 2008
"Les opinions publiques sont pour une intervention au Darfour" , with Andrew Stroehlein, Le Temps, 10 April 2007.
"A Responsibility to Protect: The World’s View" , with Andrew Stroehlein, openDemocracy, 5 April 2007.
"From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect", Wisconsin International Law Journal (2006) Vol. 24 No. 3, 101-120.
"Crimes Against Humanity: Overcoming Indifference" , Journal of Genocide Research (2006), 8(3), September, 325-339.
"The Responsibility to Protect: Unfinished Business" , G8 Summit 2006: Issues and Instruments (The Official Summit Publication), 17 July 2006.
"Responsibility to Protect: Never Say Never Again" , The Advertiser, 3 May 2006.
"The Responsibility to Protect: Moving Towards a Shared Consensus" in The Responsibility to Protect: Ethical and Theological Reflections, Semegnish Asfaw, Guillermo Kerber and Peter Weiderud (eds), World Council of Churches, France, 2005.
"The Dogs that Never Barked", Los Angeles Times, 22 November 2005.
"Global and Regional Security: Our Shared Responsibility" , Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Regional Outlook Forum 2005, Trends in Southeast Asia Series: January 2005
"Why nobody is doing enough for Darfur" , Financial Times, 3 August 2004.
"The world should be ready to intervene in Sudan",
International Herald Tribune, 14 May 2004.
"The Rwandan Genocide: Memory Is Not Enough" , (with Stephen Ellis), 8 April 2004.
"Building peace – and a belief in the future" , Global Agenda, 20 January 2004.
"The Responsibility to Protect: When is it Right to Fight?", Progressive Politics, July 2003, vol. 2.2.
"Humanity did not justify this war" , Financial Times, 15 May 2003.
"The Responsibility to Protect", Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2002, vol. 81, no 6: 99-110.
"Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Responsibility to Protect", NATO Review, Winter 2002.
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In its recommendations and reporting on conflict prevention worldwide, Crisis Group has frequently engaged with the international community's Responsibility to Protect. Our reports on Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe have all directly invoked R2P, for other examples see Application of R2P to Particular Situations below.
After more than three years of atrocities instigated by the Khartoum government, Darfur stands as a test-case of whether the international community is prepared to translate its political commitment to the Responsibility to Protect into effective action. Our reporting on Darfur includes:
The responsibility to protect civilians in northern Uganda rests primarily with the Ugandan government, but its army has repeatedly failed to prevent LRA attacks and even its own troops from abusing civilians, which Crisis Group has argued justifies a Security Council-led response. Reporting on Uganda includes:
The situation in Zimbabwe provides the international community with a clear instance of its Responsibility to Protect. Crisis Group has invoked R2P not only to assist the victims of Murambatsvina, but more broadly, to encourage active efforts by the international community to use all reasonable tools at its disposal to cope with the political, economic and social problems in Zimbabwe.
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Crisis Group President Gareth Evans has written and spoken extensively on the R2P since first co-chairing the ICISS commission in 2000-2001. His speeches and publications on this subject are listed above, here.
Speeches and publications by other Crisis Group staff related to R2P are collected here:
"Canada Should Lead In Darfur: ‘Responsibility To Protect’ More Than A Slogan",
David Mozersky (Crisis Group) with Allan Rock, The Toronto Star, 24 October 2006
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The Responsibility to Protect and the Situation in Gaza, December 2008/January 2009
Application of R2P to the Georgia/Russia Conflict, August 2008
Application of R2P to the Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Crisis, May 2008
The Responsibility to Protect and the Situation in Gaza, December 2008/January 2009
Should R2P be invoked in the context of the crisis in Gaza?
The principles of R2P have some application in the present situation, but there is a more immediately relevant and helpful way of defining the responsibilities of the parties to the present conflict, and those of the wider international community to resolve it.
The Gaza crisis is better characterized as a conflict involving major breaches of international humanitarian law which must be stopped, than as an "internal" situation in which a sovereign state is either committing, or allowing to be committed, mass atrocity crimes against its own people.
Under international humanitarian law (IHL), which is derived both from treaties and customary international law, a party to a conflict has obligations to civilian populations. These include prohibitions of murder, cruel treatment, torture, humiliating and degrading treatment; attacks that do not discriminate between military and civilian targets, and attacks that may be expected to cause incidental death or injury to civilians, excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated. International humanitarian law provisions clearly apply to the conduct of both parties to the present conflict in Gaza – to Israel, as an occupying power, and Hamas.
Under the "responsibility to protect" principles adopted as paras 138-139 of the 2005 UN General Assembly World Summit Outcome Document, sovereign states have the responsibility to protect their own populations from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity". R2P was established essentially to galvanize international action in situations where the international community had previously resisted involvement based on the notions of sovereignty and non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. Whatever else has inhibited effective international action in relation to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, it has not been unwillingness to interfere in "Israel’s internal affairs".
Does the government of Israel have a "responsibility to protect" the people of Gaza?
To the extent that Israel is an "occupying power" under international humanitarian law (because, notwithstanding its purported disengagement in 2005, it retains control over the borders and air space of Gaza, regulates the regulation of the flow of people and goods into the territory, and has the capacity and will to engage in military incursions at its discretion) it has in effect the responsibilities of a sovereign state towards the people of Gaza, including the responsibility not to commit against them -- or allow others to commit -- acts of "genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity and war crimes" (as described in paras 138-139 of the 2005 UN General Assembly World Summit Outcome Document).
In the present Gaza conflict, the immediate policy imperative is to ensure an effective ceasefire. International engagement to achieve that is likely to be more effectively mobilized by directly invoking concern about breaches of international humanitarian law than by wrestling with the complex definitional issues that are involved in the application of R2P.
Does Hamas have a "responsibility to protect" the people of Gaza under the World Summit Outcome Document?
To the extent that Hamas has any of the characteristics of the government of a sovereign state it may be arguable that it has the same responsibility to protect the people of Gaza (just as might be suggested with Fatah in the West Bank), by not committing, or allowing others to commit, mass atrocity crimes there. But while Palestine as a whole could possibly be regarded as having some characteristics of a sovereign state (having been recognized as such by a number of countries) -- even though it lacks a number of others (including having a government in effective control of its whole territory) – it is difficult to even begin to make the argument that Gaza itself is such a state.
Again, in the present Gaza conflict, the immediate policy imperative is to ensure an effective ceasefire. And, again, action to achieve this is more simply mobilized in the context of concern about breaches of international humanitarian law by both sides. Wrestling with the complex definitional issues that are involved in the application of R2P is, in this context, where international attention is fully engaged and the level of concern very high, likely to prove more of a distraction than a help.
16 January 2009
Application of R2P to the Georgia/Russia Conflict, August 2008
See the article by Gareth Evans, "Russia and the 'Responsibility to Protect'", published in The Los angeles Times, 31 August 2008.
The Georgia-Russia Crisis and the Responsibility to Protect
An abbreviated version of this note is incorporated into Crisis Group's report Russia vs Georgia: The Fallout, and appears on the website of the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, www.globalr2p.org
The Russian government has argued that its military operations in Georgia in August 2008 were conducted for humanitarian purposes. Russia’s President Dmitry Medvedev, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, and UN Ambassador Vitaly Churkin have described Georgia’s actions against populations in South Ossetia as “genocide.” Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov argued that Russia’s use of force was an exercise of its responsibility to protect. In an interview with the BBC, Lavrov noted that President Medvedev had been clear:
[U]nder the Constitution [the President] is obliged to protect the life and dignity of Russian citizens, especially when they find themselves in the armed conflict. And today he reiterated that the peace enforcement operation enforcing peace on one of the parties which violated its own obligations would continue until we achieve the results. According to our Constitution there is also responsibility to protect – the term which is very widely used in the UN when people see some trouble in Africa or in any remote part of other regions. But this is not Africa to us, this is next door. This is the area, where Russian citizens live. So the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the laws of the Russian Federation make it absolutely unavoidable to us to exercise responsibility to protect
This invocation of R2P by a senior Russian official – not only as a principle enshrined in the Russian Constitution but also the term as it is understood in the context of the United Nations – reflects both the moral force of the responsibility to protect as a new normative framework to address global concerns.
But there is a risk that the norm will be misapplied by governments to justify their unilateral actions in situations that cannot properly be characterized in R2P terms, or where the threat involved, while of an R2P character, is not such as to justify the use of military force.. And in this instance, R2P – the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity as agreed to by all UN member states in the General Assembly 2005 World Summit Outcome Document – is in fact misapplied. R2P does not provide a legitimate basis for Russia’s military actions in Georgia.
The Russian government’s invocation of the 2005 GA Outcome Document’s agreement on R2P is unpersuasive for the following reasons:
The primary ground stated for intervention – ‘to protect Russian citizens’ – is not an ‘R2P’ rationale
The statement by Foreign Minister Lavrov blurs the distinction between the responsibilities of a state to protect its populations inside its borders, and the responsibilities that a state maintains for populations outside its borders. The responsibility to protect norm is about the responsibility of a sovereign state to protect populations within its own borders, and of other states to assist it to do so, but also to take appropriate action if it is manifestly failing to do so.
The 2005 GA Outcome Document does not address the question of an individual country taking direct action to protect its nationals located outside its own borders. When such action has been taken in the past – as it often has been – the justification has been almost invariably advanced in terms of ‘self-defence’ (since 1945, under Art 51 of the UN Charter). Without discussing this further here, it may be noted that the credibility of this justification depends significantly on two factors:
(a) how the people in question acquired the citizenship in question: skepticism may well be appropriate when a country first confers its citizenship on a large number of people outside its borders, and then claims that it is entitled to intervene coercively to protect them; and
(b) the nature and scale of the threat to a country’s citizens located elsewhere: whether military action under Article 51 is justified is a question of case by case analysis, taking into account the precautionary criteria that, according to the the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his In Larger Freedom report, should apply to any use of force, and which are discussed further below, i.e. serious of risk, primary motive, last resort, proportionality and balance of consequences.
Applying the R2P norm, no compelling case has been made by Russia that the threat to the South Ossetian population was of a nature and scale as to make necessary or legitimate the use by it of military force.
To assess the necessity and legitimacy of any military action purportedly undertaken to protect populations from mass atrocities that the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, and Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his In Larger Freedom report to the 2005 World Summit all recommended that the Security Council adopt precautionary principles. Although UN member states failed to agree on their inclusion in the 2005 GA Outcome Document, some or all of these principles are arguably implied within the R2P agreement, and the invocation of R2P in the context of the Georgia-Russia crisis proves their continued relevance. The Global Centre believes that each must be explicitly satisfied before any incursion could be accepted as legitimate under the responsibility to protect. Applying them to Russia’s Georgia incursion, it is not at all clear that any of them are satisfied:
(a) Is there an imminent or actual threat of genocide or other mass atrocity crime?
It is not at all clear whether ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity’ were being committed, or imminently about to be, by Georgia against South Ossetians, Claims and counter-claims abound, and – while Georgia’s actions in attacking Tshkinvali might well be thought to be an unjustified over-reaction to the provocations it cites -- the available evidence is not of the weight or clarity that is needed to justify a conclusion that it was ‘manifestly failing’ to protect its population from these atrocity crimes, in a way that would prima facie justify the use of coercive military action by others in response. Early evidence in these situations is often fragmentary, and there will not always be the time or opportunity to mount any kind of proper impartial investigation, but there has to be something more than the bald assertions made here by Russia.
Is the primary purpose of the intervention to prevent or other halt such mass atrocities?
While one purpose of the Russian military intervention may have been to protect South Ossetian civilians under attack, it is highly questionable whether that was the primary motive: others appear to have been to establish full Russian control over both South Ossetia and Abkhazia (in the latter of which there was not even claimed to be a threat of mass atrocity crimes); to dismantle Georgia’s entire military capability; to scuttle its NATO ambititions; and to send a clear signal to other former parts of the Soviet Union as to what would and would not be tolerated by Moscow.
(c) Would peaceful measures be inadequate to ensure protection of the population at risk?
While there is not always time in fast-moving situations to fully work through alternative strategies – as distinct from making a reasonable judgment as to whether they would or would not be likely to be effective – an immediate Security Council call for Georgia to cease its military action does not seem to have been out of reach, and would have placed Tblisi under great pressure to comply. Russia did urge the Security Council on the evening of 7 August to call for a cease fire, but disagreement over whether the statement should refer to Georgia’s territorial integrity led to Council inaction: with a little more flexibility on all sides, this issue could probably have been finessed, given the concern with which Georgia’s military action was regarded by US and other Council members. Russia’s position on the ‘last resort’ issue is weakened by its later attacking Georgian territory outside South Ossetia and Abkhazia after Georgia had already signed a ceasefire agreement presented to it by the OSCE mediators.
(d) Is the action proportional, narrowly tailored to achieve the result of halting or averting mass atrocity crimes?
The introduction of some 20,000 troops and 100 tanks not only into South Ossetia but into Abkhazia and Georgia proper appears manifestly excessive. The Russian naval blockade in the Black Sea as well as aerial bombings of Gori, Poti, the Zugdidi region and an aviation plant in Tblisi went well beyond the necessary minimum.
(e) On balance, would the intervention do more good than harm?
This is very difficult to argue here, on the present state of the evidence about refugee outflows, and unrestrained reprisal actions by South Ossetian separatists against Georgians, quite apart from concerns about wider implications for regional and global stability.
In the absence of UN Security Council approval, there is no legal authority for an R2P- based military intervention
The 2005 GA Outcome Document makes it clear beyond argument that any country or group of countries seeking to apply forceful means to address an R2P situation – where another country is manifestly failing to protect its people and peaceful means are inadequate – must take that action through the Security Council. Very difficult situations can arise in practice where action widely thought appropriate or necessary in the fact of actual or threatened mass atrocity crimes is blocked by one or more vetoes in the Council. But this was not the case here: no effort was made by Russia to seek Security Council approval.
The Russia-Georgia case highlights the dangers and risks of states, whether individually or in a coalition, interpreting global norms unilaterally and launching military action without UN Security Council authorization. The sense of moral outrage at reports of civilians being killed and ethnically cleansed can have the unintended effect of clouding judgment on the best response, which is another reason to channel action collectively through the United Nations. The Russian references to similar action by other P5 members in other theaters may reinforce doubts about those other instances but does not justify the Russian actions in Georgia. Indeed they reinforce the dangers of vigilante justice across borders.
The Russian military operations in Georgia were not carried out consistently with the responsibility to protect as agreed by the heads of state and government sitting in September 2005 as the United Nations General Assembly. To comply with the terms of the 2005 GA Outcome Document, if populations are threatened by mass atrocity crimes, Russia should have worked through the United Nations, using appropriate peaceful diplomatic and humanitarian means to help protect populations thought to be at risk, with force only being considered as a last resort, and with the approval of the Security Council.
Protection of civilian populations in South Ossetia and elsewhere in the region remains an urgent concern. All parties have an obligation to such populations during armed conflicts under international humanitarian law including the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. Georgia and Russia must also uphold their obligations as parties to relevant international human rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights. If the doctrine of the responsibility to protect is to mean anything in this context, it is not as a basis to justify unilateral force but as a reminder that the longstanding principles of international human rights and humanitarian law must be upheld.
18 August 2008
Application of R2P to the Burma/Myanmar Cyclone Crisis, May 2008
See the article by Gareth Evans, "Facing Up to Our Responsibilities", published in The Guardian 12 May 2008.
Crisis Group's policy report Burma/Myanmar After Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations, released on 20 October 2008, also discusses the application of R2P to the cyclone crisis.
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The Supplementary Volume to the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001), containing associated research essays and bibliography, is available here. The ICISS research essays are divided into three sections: "Elements of the Debate", "Past Humanitarian Interventions", and "Morality, Law, Operations and Politics".
Acharya, Amitav, "Redefining the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention", Australian Journal of International Affairs, no.56, 2002, p.373. [Link for purchase]
Amnéus, Diana, "Swedish State Practice 2004-5: The Responsibility to Protect", Nordic Journal of International Law, vol. 75, no. 2, 2006, pp. 311-315. [Link for purchase]
Ashford, Mary-Wynne, "The Responsibility to Protect", Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 19, no. 1, January 2003, pp. 35-38. [Abstract]
Bannon, Alicia L., "The Responsibility To Protect: The U.N. World Summit and The Question of Unilateralism", Yale Law Journal, no. 115, 2006, pp. 1157-1164. [Article]
Bellamy, Alex J., "Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit", Ethics & International Affairs, vol. 20, no. 2, June 2006, pp. 143-169. [Abstract]
Bellamy, Alex J. and Paul D. Williams, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur", Security Dialogue, vol. 36, no. 1, 2005, pp. 27-47. [Abstract]
Bellamy, Alex J., "Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq", Ethics & International Affairs, vol.19 no. 2, September 2005, pp. 31-54. [Abstract]
Brunnée, Jutta and Stephen J. Toope, "The Use of Force: International Law After Iraq", International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 53, no. 4, October 2004, pp. 785-806. [Abstract]
Chandler D., "The responsibility to protect? Imposing the 'Liberal Peace'", International Peacekeeping, vol.11, no.1, Spring 2004, pp. 59-81. [Abstract]
Clough, Michael, "Darfur: Whose Responsibility to Protect?", Human Rights Watch, January 2005. [Article]
Cohen, Roberta, "Strengthening Protection of IDPs; The UN's Role", Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, no.7, 2006, pp. 101-110. [Article]
Cohen, Roberta, "Humanitarian Imperatives are Transforming Sovereignty", Northwestern Journal of International Affairs, Winter 2008. [Article]
Day, Graham and Christopher Freeman, "Operationalizing the Responsibility to Protect – The Policekeeping Approach", Global Governance, no.11, 2005, pp. 139-147. [Link for purchase]
Deutscher, Matt, "The Responsibility to Protect", Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol.21, no.1, January-March 2005, pp. 28-34. [Abstract]
DLA Piper US LLP and U.S. Committee for Human Rights in North Korea, “Failure to Protect: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in North Korea”, 30 October 2006. [Report]
Hamilton, Rebecca J., "The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine – But What of Implementation?", Harvard Human Rights Journal, no.19, 2006, pp. 289-297. [Article]
Holt, Victoria and Tobias Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, the Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations, Henry L. Stimson Center, St. Martin Press, 2006. [Complete document]
Kioko, Ben, "The Right of Intervention Under the African Union’s Constitutive Act; Non-Interference to Non-Intervention", International Review of the Red Cross, no. 85, 2003, pp. 807-825. [Article]
Levitt, Jeremy I., "The Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver Without A Dam?", Michigan Journal of International Law, no. 25, 2003, pp. 153-177. [Article]
MacFarlane, Neil, Carolin Thielking and Thomas Weiss, "The responsibility to protect: is anyone interested in humanitarian intervention?", Third World Quarterly, vol. 25, no. 5, July 2004, pp. 977-992. [Link for purchase]
Mepham, David and Alexander Ramsbotham, Safeguarding Civilians: Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect in Africa (Institute for Public Policy Research, 2007)
Morada, Noel, "R2P Roadmap in Southeast Asia: Challenges and Prospects", UNISCI Discussion Papers no. 11, May 2006, pp. 59-70. [Article]
Murithi, Tim and Kenneth Mpyisi (eds.), "Conflict Prevention and the 'Responsibility to Protect' in Africa?", African Security Review vol 16, no 3, September 2007 [Whole issue dedicated to R2P (PDF)]
Pace, William R. and Nicole Deller, "Preventing Future Genocide: A Responsibility to Protect", World Order, no. 36, 2006, pp 15-30. [Article]
Powell, Kristiana, "The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect", The North-South Institute Working Paper, May 2005. [Working Paper]
Powell, Kristiana and Stephen Baranyi, "Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect in Africa", The North-South Institute Policy Briefing Paper, August 2005. [Briefing Paper]
Prins, Gwyn, "Lord Castlereagh's return: the significance of Kofi Annan's High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change", International Affairs, vol. 81, no. 2, March 2005, pp. 373-391. [Abstract]
Puley, Greg, "The Responsibility to Protect: East, West and Southern African Perspectives on Preventing and Responding to Humanitarian Crises", Project Ploughshares Working Paper 05-5, September 2005. [Working Paper]
Schabas, William A., "Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge for the United Nations", Minority Rights Group International Report, 2006. [Report]
Slaughter, Anne-Marie, "The Grand Themes of UN Reform", American Journal of International Law, no. 99, 2005, pp. 619-631. [Article]
Thakur, Ramesh, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge University Press, 2006).
Thakur, Ramesh, “In defence of the responsibility to protect”, The International Journal of Human Rights, vol. 7, no. 3, October 2003, pp. 160-178. [Link for purchase]
Thakur, Ramesh, "Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect: Experiences from ICISS", Security Dialogue, vol. 33, no. 3, 2002, pp. 323-340. [Abstract]
Thakur, Ramesh, "Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect", Behind the Headlines, no. 62, 2004, pp. 1-16. [Link for purchase]
Warner, Daniel, "Responsibility to protect and the limits of imagination", International Journal of Human Rights, vol. 7, no. 3, October 2003, pp. 154-159. [Link for purchase]
Von Horn, Helge, "The Responsibility to Protect and the Root Causes of Conflicts", Medicine, Conflict and Survival, vol. 21, no. 1, January-March 2005, pp. 44-47. [Abstract]
Warner, Daniel, "The Responsibility to Protect and Irresponsible, Cynical Engagement", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 32, no. 1, 1 February 2003, pp. 109-121. [Link for purchase]
Weiss, Thomas G., "The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipolar Era", Security Dialogue, vol. 35, no. 2, 2004, pp. 135-153. [Abstract]
Wills, Siobhán, "Military Interventions on Behalf of Vulnerable Populations: The Legal Responsibilities of States and International Organizations Engaged in Peace Support Operations", Journal of Conflict and Security Law, vol. 9, no. 3, 2004, pp. 387-418. [Abstract]
Wills, Siobhán, “The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ by Peace Support Forces under International Human Rights Law”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 13, no. 4, December 2006, pp. 477-488. [Abstract]
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