The Perils of Private Security in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok

Jakarta/Brussels  |   7 Nov 2003

Untrained, unaccountable, and politically affiliated private security forces in Indonesia have the potential to cause conflict in the run-up to the 2004 elections.

The International Crisis Group’s latest report, The Perils of Private Security in Indonesia: Guards and Militias on Bali and Lombok,* focuses on civilian security groups on these two neighbouring islands, examining how they arose to carry out protection and crime-fighting functions that the police were unable or unwilling to undertake. Their existence, however, serves to weaken police credibility and undermines the state as the final guarantor of security in a democratising country.

“These private security forces often exacerbate rather than reduce security problems, especially when they are linked to particular religious, ethnic, or political groups”, says Sidney Jones, ICG’s South East Asia Project Director. “The lack of any system of control, supervision, or regulation over them means they all too easily become a law unto themselves”.

Following the fall of Soeharto in 1998, dependence on civilian groups increased as a result of the breakdown in law and order, combined with a general distrust of the police and military. A massive decentralisation program also encouraged the notion that local communities should take responsibility for their own security.

In Bali traditional ritual guards emerged to fill the security void and eventually were taken on by the police as a civilian auxiliary. But they are also seen as the protectors of President Megawati Soekarnoputri’s political party and as an ethnically-based force that aims to protect Bali from the influence of non-Balinese migrants from elsewhere in Indonesia.

In Lombok private militias emerged when the police failed to prevent a dramatic rise in crime following the onset of the 1997-1998 Asian economic crisis. Tied to powerful religious leaders on the island, the Lombok groups involved more than 200,000 men at their height in 1998-1999. While the influence of the most-feared groups has declined, there is reason to believe that the 2004 election campaign could give them renewed importance and lead to violence.

The Indonesian government and donors interested in assisting police reform should work toward the disbanding of these private security organisations. Not only are they are as likely to create conflict as to prevent it, but they can also turn into a buffer between the police and the community – thus working against the whole idea of community policing.

“The trick is to encourage the disbanding of these organisations without jeopardising freedom of association, and to improve the capacity of the police, so that fighting crime and protecting the community do not have to be taken on by groups with an ethnic, religious, or political affiliation”, says Sidney Jones.