Iraq's Kurds: Toward an Historic Compromise?
Amman/Brussels |
8 Apr 2004
Fiery rhetoric over the Kurdish question in Iraq suggests acrimony, conflict and possibly secession. But outside the battle of words fought in the glare of media attention, Kurdish leaders have indicated that an historic compromise over Kurdish autonomy and the status of Kirkuk is possible.
Iraq's Kurds: Toward an Historic Compromise?,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines the position of the Kurdish leadership, which has taken a strategic decision to settle the Kurdish question within a unitary Iraq. Noting their current political strength in the country, the report calls on Kurdish leaders to moderate their public rhetoric and inform their people of what they see as the maximum realistic solution to the Kurds' historic predicament and Kirkuk's status.
"Although such openness might create a possible backlash among the Kurdish population, postponing the revelation of a historic compromise until the moment a deal is sealed could trigger an even worse reaction", says Joost Hiltermann, ICG's Middle East Project Director.
The removal of the Ba'ath regime in 2003 opened a Pandora's box of long-suppressed aspirations, including the Kurds' demand for wide-ranging autonomy in a region of their own, encompassing the oil-rich governorate of Kirkuk. This has run up against vehement opposition from Iraqi Arabs.
A series of negotiations produced an interim constitution (Transitional Administrative Law, TAL) on 8 March 2004 that recognised a single Kurdish region effectively equivalent to what the Kurds have governed in semi-independence since 1991 (i.e., without Kirkuk), elevated Kurdish to official language status alongside Arabic, and met another Kurdish demand by providing for a census to determine the final status of Kirkuk. However, away from the give and take of the negotiations in Baghdad, the Kurds are contributing mightily to a volatile atmosphere in Kirkuk, using their numbers and superior organisation to undo decades of Arabisation.
Significantly, however, the tough TAL negotiations and the friction in Kirkuk mask a profound shift in Kurdish strategy that is yet to be broadcast and understood publicly. The top leaderships of the two principal Kurdish parties are offering Iraqi Arabs what amounts to an historic compromise: acceptance of an autonomous region as the maximum objective of the Kurdish national movement they represent and, even more importantly, a willingness to abandon the exclusive claim to Kirkuk. Regrettably, Kurdish leaders have yet to start preparing the Kurdish people for this deep strategic shift.
Another threat looms: if the U.S.-designed political transition comes unstuck in the face of spreading unrest, as the events of the past few days threaten, Kurdish leaders may alter their stance again and be tempted to protect the gains they have made since 1991 by asserting unilateral control over claimed territories, including Kirkuk. That would likely cross a Turkish "red line" and risk a grave regional confrontation, requiring international intervention.
"The occupying powers, and the international community more generally, should pay heed to the Kurds' fair demands", says Robert Malley, Director of the Middle East and North Africa Program at ICG. "Failure to meet the Kurdish desire for freedom within a unitary Iraq could well pave the way for more radical separatist elements to gain the upper hand in the Kurdish community".