Iraq's Transition: On a Knife Edge

Baghdad/Brussels  |   27 Apr 2004

Fundamental change in Iraq is needed soon if the widening gap separating the occupation's governing institutions from the Iraqi people is to be narrowed and a spreading insurgency is to be overcome. 30 June will be an essential turning point, though it will not bring the full transfer of sovereignty that many Iraqis expect.

Iraq's Transition: On a Knife Edge ,* the latest report by the International Crisis Group, recognises that the options available in Iraq today are few and bad, a measure of the staggering misjudgements that have plagued U.S. post-war management from the start. The broad plan sketched out by UN Special Adviser Lakhdar Brahimi, the apparent willingness of the U.S. to delegate at least some political responsibility to the UN, and the decision to loosen the de-Baathification decree are all steps in the right direction. Huge challenges remain, and although 30 June was initially an arbitrary deadline, it now represents a key opportunity to be seized, as long as it is defined properly.

"The fiction that 30 June will be about 'transferring sovereignty' should be given up", says Joost Hiltermann, Middle East Project Director for ICG. "As a legal matter, sovereignty is already vested in the Iraqi state and 'embodied' in its interim institutions, as provided by UNSCR 1511. But as a practical matter, the sovereign power exercised by the new Iraqi government will remain incomplete".

The answer is not to scrap the 30 June date, as some have suggested, but to redefine what will happen on that day, and the lead up to it, as a serious redistribution of power - more substantial even than the present Brahimi plan proposes - between the U.S., the UN and the new Iraqi institutions. Four interrelated steps are required.

First, political responsibility should be handed over to the UN, acting through a Special Representative empowered to break deadlocks within or between Iraqi institutions. Secondly, a Provisional Government of technocrats should be appointed by the UN Special Representative, marking a clear break in character and membership from the Interim Governing Council. Thirdly, to widen political participation, a National Conference of Iraqis should be convened to elect a Consultative Assembly, which would vote on the composition of the government and could block any decrees that it passes. Fourthly, security arrangements should be redefined by a Security Council Resolution which re-authorises the U.S.-led Multinational Force from 30 June 2004 until an elected government takes office and decides on its future, but which also requires joint approval from the U.S. command and the Iraqi Provisional Government for major offensive operations.

What Iraqis should be getting after 30 June, is more power - and the space to create a more inclusive and cohesive polity - but still necessarily incomplete sovereign power until proper general elections are held. To minimise the friction associated with such a transition, residual civilian powers should be exercised during the transitional period by the UN, not the U.S.

"With each false start and failed plan, realistic options for a successful and stable political transition have become narrower and less attractive", says Robert Malley, Middle East and North Africa Programme Director at ICG. "Getting it right this time is urgent and vital. There may not be any opportunities left".