China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?

Seoul/Brussels  |   1 Feb 2006

Expecting China to compel North Korean compliance on the nuclear standoff only gives Pyongyang more time to develop its nuclear arsenal.

China and North Korea: Comrades Forever?,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, examines Beijing’s influence over Pyongyang, which is far less than outsiders tend to believe. China shares the goal of North Korean denuclearisation, but attaches even greater importance to maintaining stability and ensuring regime survival.

“To harness China’s close relationship with North Korea, international strategies have to take into account China’s priorities and limitations”, says Peter Beck, Crisis Group’s North East Asia Project Director.

China’s political ties to North Korea may not be as close as the “lips and teeth” once proclaimed by Chinese leaders, but bilateral economic relations are now more important than ever. Since North Korea undertook modest economic reforms in 2002, China has emerged as its economic lifeline, accounting for 40 per cent of trade, crucial infrastructure investment, and a tidal wave of consumer goods washing over North Korean markets.

However, there is virtually no circumstance under which China would use its economic leverage to force North Korea’s compliance on the nuclear issue. Even though the crackdown on North Korea’s banking activities in Macao in September 2005 demonstrated that China is not completely immune to outside pressures to rein in bad behaviour, Beijing is unlikely to shut down the North’s remaining banking activities in the country.

China’s core national interest in North Korea’s survival is the same – or even stronger – as during the Cold War. The potential cost of conflict or collapse in North Korea is simply too great. Moreover, strategic suspicions of U.S. intentions towards a unified Korea are still powerful domestic forces to which China’s leaders give heed.

China also has reasons related to its own quest for reunification with Taiwan – not to mention human rights issues in Xinjiang and Tibet and economic interests in Sudan and elsewhere – for opposing aid conditionality and infringements on sovereignty and being generally reluctant to embrace sanctions.

“Beijing’s need to maximise leverage over the U.S. to resolve the Taiwan issue and to maintain regional confidence in its commitment to conflict prevention makes cutting off its neighbour impossible”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director. “This seriously limits Beijing’s influence. China cannot really bring a more cooperative North Korea to the table or enforce what is agreed there”.