North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout

Seoul/Brussels  |   13 Nov 2006

Though the resumption of six-party talks is welcome, serious bilateral negotiations between Pyongyang and Washington are also needed if there is to be any hope of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

North Korea’s Nuclear Test: The Fallout,* the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, examines the North Korean nuclear standoff in light of the events of October 2006, which included Pyongyang’s test of a device, the world’s strong condemnation as expressed in UN Security Council Resolution 1718, and the resumption of six-party talks. The revival of a diplomatic process is an encouraging sign, but it will likely face the same pitfalls as earlier rounds unless the U.S. engages directly with North Korea and puts a serious negotiating package on the table.

“North Korea’s major security concern – its driving preoccupation – is the U.S., and if there is going to be any real progress, we need direct talks between those two countries”, says Peter Beck, Director of Crisis Group’s North East Asia Project.

Although the Security Council was quick to impose sanctions on North Korea, differences immediately appeared in the interpretation of the resolution. China, Russia and South Korea favour more limited action and the U.S. and Japan are pushing for tough enforcement. The meeting in Beijing that led to the planned resumption of the six-party meetings talks at the end of last month in effect demonstrated the utility of direct talks. It remains to be seen, however whether the U.S. is prepared to alter its stance significantly to demonstrate persuasively to its partners that it is going the extra mile to offer North Korea both a substantive and a face-saving basis for reversing its decision to defy the international community by developing nuclear weapons.

President George W. Bush has said that bilateral talks with North Korea did not work in his predecessor’s administration. In fact, they achieved a welcome halt of some years in the nuclear program and remain crucial in dealing with Pyongyang. The U.S. should now:

• appoint a full-time senior envoy for North Korea, empowered to oversee all issues relating to that country and to negotiate both at the six-party talks and bilaterally;
• agree with the Security Council a timetable to ease sanctions if North Korea meets requirements to freeze its nuclear program and readmit international inspectors;
• focus on the nuclear issue, even if this means postponing other important concerns;
• provide North Korea with a detailed plan of the steps it must take to end its weapons program and what benefits it will receive in return; and
• discuss proliferation risks in the region with key powers and ensure an understanding about the implementation of Resolution 1718 sufficient to keep pressure on North Korea, without causing splits among those involved in the renewed six-party talks.

“Of course, Pyongyang may not be willing to forego nuclear weapons regardless of outside incentives and disincentives, but we will not know unless Washington sits down with the North to address the regime’s deep-seated security anxieties”, says Robert Templer, Crisis Group’s Asia Program Director.