Improving Security Policy in Colombia
Bogotá/Brussels |
29 Jun 2010
Colombia’s new government has to improve security policy to tackle the guerrilla tactics of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as well as their broadened participation in drug trafficking and newly forged alliances with other illegal armed groups.
Improving Security Policy in Colombia , the latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, analyses FARC’s response to government military pressure during the past eight years and the emergence of alliances between the insurgents and other illegal armed groups. While the current administration has made important but insufficient achievements in the struggle against FARC, the country’s next president, Juan Manuel Santos, faces considerable challenges in consolidating security gains.
“The incoming Santos administration should acknowledge that Colombia has not reached the post-conflict phase yet and that it needs to implement an integrated conflict resolution strategy”, says Silke Pfeiffer, Crisis Group’s Colombia/Andes Project Director. “Otherwise there is a serious risk that security consolidation efforts may be undermined”.
President Álvaro Uribe’s eight-year military campaign against FARC, the country’s largest insurgent organisation, has produced tangible results but did not break the back of the insurgency. While FARC has lost thousands of fighters due to deaths in combat, captures and desertions, it is estimated to still have 8,000-10,000 troops. FARC has resorted to guerrilla tactics and the massive use of antipersonnel mines as well as snipers. It has broadened its participation in drug trafficking in Colombia and other parts of Latin America, particularly Panama, Venezuela, Brazil and Ecuador.
A number of FARC units have formed alliances with other illegal armed groups, including paramilitary successors and new illegal armed groups (NIAGs), such as Rastrojos and Paisas. Most of these alliances are centred on drug trafficking. While often temporary and fragile, as with Colombia’s second-largest insurgent group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), they add a new dimension to the conflict. There is mounting evidence that Colombia’s security forces lack a strategy to confront this new threat. As part of an integrated conflict resolution strategy, the incoming government should reassess current security policy and the efforts to consolidate the gains achieved under Uribe.
The Santos administration must increase Colombia’s law enforcement and military capability against all illegal armed groups. This strategy should be based on in-depth analysis of the new tactics of, and alliances among, the different armed groups, including FARC, and their impact on citizen security. Increased protection of civilians, especially among vulnerable groups such as indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, is essential. The new government also has to strengthen institutions, expand the rule of law, rigorously protect human rights and reduce poverty.
“The Uribe administration’s military successes against FARC have led the government to turn a blind eye to new threats posed by NIAGs and FARC, which has been weakened but not defeated”, says Markus Schultze-Kraft, Crisis Group’s Latin America Program Director. “Security consolidation can only take root if Colombia tackles its pervasive problems of organised violence, criminality and illegality in an integrated manner”.