The Kurdish Question, Kirkuk, and the Formation of the new Iraqi Government

Joost Hiltermann  |  24 Mar 2005

Presentation by Joost R. Hiltermann, Crisis Group's Middle East Project Director, at EPRI/TEPAV, Ankara, 24 March 2005

The removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein catalysed a number of dramatic and historical changes in Iraq. The emergence of Shiite political power is one of them; the onset of democratic practices -- in a neighbourhood in which autocracy is the rule -- another. For purposes of this presentation, the key phenomenon is the crystallisation of the struggle between two powerful currents of nationalism -- that of the Arabs versus that of the Kurds.  It is this struggle in particular that prompted the delay in the formation of the new Iraqi government after the general elections in January. And it is this struggle that will colour Iraqis' efforts to draft a permanent constitution. At its core stands the disposition of Kirkuk -- the governorate and city claimed by the Kurds as their rightful heirloom after decades of alternating negotiations and insurgency.

The Kurds say that independence was promised them by the major powers following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and that this promise was betrayed; that they have fought for their independence intermittently since that time; that breakdowns in negotiations with the central government typically were precipitated by disagreement over the status of Kirkuk (for example, in 1974, in 1984-85, and in 1991); that the Kurds suffered grievously for their willingness to fight for their national rights generally and Kirkuk in particular -- in the 1988 counter-insurgency Anfal campaign (during which civilians living in Kirkuk-area villages were especially targeted for mass execution) and the chemical bombardment of Halabja that same year; and that the Kurds are therefore entitled to Kirkuk, which they wish to incorporate into their Kurdish region within a federal Iraq.

Regardless of the legitimacy of these claims, the outsized Kurdish victory in the January elections and the disproportionate power it gave them at the national level has enabled them to press their presumed rights at key points in the political transition. The near-total absence of Sunni Arabs from the polls, added to the high turn-out of Kurds (generated by their well-oiled political party machine), catapulted the latter overnight into political king makers with more than 25 % of the vote, behind the Shiite-based United Iraqi Alliance with just shy of 50% of the vote. With their victory in hand, the Kurds then benefited from the 2/3-majority requirement in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) regarding the Transitional National Assembly's election of a Presidency Council, which gave them a virtual veto.

Their newly won power in Iraq is enabling the Kurds almost to dictate their terms concerning the federal structure of the Iraqi state and the disposition of Kirkuk. It is limited by three principal factors. One, the Bush Administration has told them unequivocally that Kurdish independence is not in the cards; two, the Kurds may today constitute a plurality but certainly not (yet) a majority in Kirkuk city and governorate; and three, at the end of the day, the Kurds remain a minority in Iraq and will therefore need to seek accommodation with the central government. A fourth factor, the threat of Turkish intervention, fizzled as a result of the dismal electoral showing of the Turkoman community on which Ankara had staked much hope. The government of Turkey, having already come around to the idea that the establishment of a federal Kurdish region on its border might not necessarily constitute an existential threat, has now embraced that scenario more fully, expressing a greater willingness to work with the Kurds to bring it about. That said, a Turkish red line over Kirkuk remains: Ankara will not countenance the incorporation of Kirkuk city and governorate into the Kurdish region, as in its view this would put the Kurds on the path toward economic strength and, thus, political independence.

What the Kurdish leadership says it wants is a federal Kurdish region with broad powers, its own security forces, and extended boundaries (i.e., beyond the former "Green Line"), including Kirkuk governorate. Their key negotiating points in Baghdad have been: their right to a federal region, the return of the situation in Kirkuk to the status quo ante (prior to the 1968 seizure of power by the Ba'ath), ownership over their region's natural resources, red lines concerning the Iraqi army's access to the Kurdish region, and their right to be allocated certain government positions.

Although in the short term the Kurds showed a willingness and ability to slow down the formation of the government in an effort to extract maximum gain, they are actually in a rush to settle their historical claims. They understand full well that the central government will not always be weak (its army and security forces are currently being rebuilt) and that their leverage will diminish over time. Moreover, they also realise that in the long term their protector, the United States, is likely to favour its alliance with the central government (as well as with Turkey) over its friendship with them. In sum, time is not on their side.

This is why they have sought to advance their agenda in the following ways:

1. Press for "normalisation" in Kirkuk. With this they mean a swift return to the way things used to be before Arabisation: a return of the displaced, a restoration of the governorate's original boundaries (re-incorporating predominantly Kurdish and Turkoman districts lobbed off by the Ba'ath regime), a re-naming exercise, and removal (with compensation and aid) of the "imported" Arabs. The vehicle chosen for this effort is the Art. 58 Commission, established by the interim Iraqi government in January 2005 to head off a Kurdish threat to boycott the elections.
   
2. Create further facts on the ground: Extend Kurdish control over the administration, agencies and institutions of Kirkuk, and speed up the return of Kurds, including of de-ruralised Kurds (displaced from Kirkuk-area villages in the 1980s) to Kirkuk city. The January elections entrenched Kurdish control in the provincial council, where they took 26 seats against the (divided) opposition's 15. A temporary limit on the Kurds' demographic expansion may have been reached, as some displaced families who returned to Kirkuk over the past year have started going back to Suleimaniyeh and Erbil where the necessary infrastructure, schooling and health facilities are available.
   
3. Threaten to secede: While Kurdish leaders have made clear they are working toward establishing a Kurdish region within a federal Iraq and no more, they have used the existence of a Kurdish referendum movement to drive home the point with their non-Kurdish political partners that if their demands are not satisfied, the option to secede remains.
   
4. Carry out a charm offensive in Kirkuk: The Kurds say they are seeking to convince the Arabs, Turkomans and ChaldoAssyrians in Kirkuk that they, the Kurds, are a better bet, as a majority, to live under than the central Iraqi government, pointing to their treatment of Turkomans and ChaldoAssyirans in the KRG as evidence.
   
5. Play America 's faithful ally: The Kurds have proven to be a reliable U.S. ally, and in return they have enjoyed American protection. The U.S. needs the secular Kurdish bloc to prevent the ascendancy of militant Shiism in Iraq (via the government, constitution, institutions, etc.). Unwilling to upset this relationship at this juncture, the U.S. has allowed the Kurds to create facts on the ground in Kirkuk.
   
6. Remain unified: Realising they could not make a convincing case for a federal Kurdish region as long as they were divided, the KDP and PUK have forged a strategic alliance vis-à-vis the central government in Baghdad. This alliance has held, but the difficult work of reintegrating the two parallel Kurdish administrations has only just begun. The main sticking point is the integration of the two rival militias and security services under KRG command.

In their incremental effort to seize Kirkuk, the Kurds have faced a determined but fragmented local opposition. The Turkoman, Arab and ChaldoAssyrian parties in Kirkuk are at odds with one another almost as much as with the Kurds, in most cases began organising only after the fall of the regime, lack cohesion and membership, and have failed so far to forge a common vision and strategy on Kirkuk. Some are reportedly arming themselves, but U.S. forces have succeeded in keeping the peace until now, and in the event of an outbreak of violence, loosely organised groups would encounter heavily armed, disciplined and battle-hardened Kurdish militias.

If the Kurds succeed in incorporating Kirkuk (whole or in part) into the Kurdish region -- by force or through their political weight in the constitution-making process -- the future looks unstable. A better solution would be to grant Kirkuk governorate a special status within a federal Iraq, either for an interim period of, say, ten years, or permanently (in the constitution). Kurdish leaders, having publicly abjured independence (for now), logically should not need Kirkuk inside the KRG (as a stepping-stone toward independence), if we assume a fair solution to the question of oil revenues. Representatives of the other communities have indicated that a special status for Kirkuk is something they can accept. To reach this compromise, a proactive and robust role by the international community will be required, for example via the appointment of a U.N. Special Rapporteur, assistance in constitutional negotiations (for example, by providing comparative examples of revenue-sharing), and by laying down clear red lines when needed.