End of the Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch

Africa Report Nº81 5 Jul 2004

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The considerable progress Burundi has made over the past year in consolidating its three-year transition risks ending in a dangerous political vacuum if strong commitments are not made immediately to the electoral process outlined in the 2000 Arusha agreement. Such a vacuum can only result in the discrediting and even failure of the entire peace process and the withdrawal of the former CNDD-FDD rebel movement from the government, which it only joined in December 2003.

The international community needs to help break this political deadlock by providing experts to fine-tune the draft of the post-transition constitution, by disbursing funds pledged at a recent donors conference and especially by supporting the implementation of the global ceasefire agreement meant to go in tandem with free, fair and peaceful elections.

But Burundi’s political leaders and parties must also live up to their responsibilities and commitments by adopting the constitution. Lack of political will rather than a shortage of time is the real issue.

Arusha set 31 October 2004 as the deadline for elections, and tensions are growing in the lead-up to this new phase in the peace process. At the last regional summit on Burundi on 5 June 2004, the transitional government proposed rescheduling the elections to October 2005. Regional leaders rejected this ploy, insisting that conditions already agreed on be respected.

Burundi has become much safer, and for the first time in more than a decade, the country could be headed towards a genuine end to conflict. Since the signing on 16 November 2003 of the comprehensive ceasefire agreement between the transitional government and CNDD-FDD rebels headed by Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza, both sides have demonstrated total respect for the cessation of hostilities. Bujumbura Rurale is the only province where members of the PALIPETHUTU-FNL (FNL) still clash with government forces, which now include members of the FDD.

FNL, the sole remaining rebel group in the field, is incapable of derailing the process. It has been seriously weakened by the operations of forces under the new integrated high command of the Burundi army (FAB) and the FDD. This offensive and the acceleration of the peace process forced the FNL to declare publicly a unilateral truce on 21 April 2004 and seek contact with the international community. Nevertheless, the group still refuses to enter negotiations with the transitional government. At the 5 June 2004 summit, regional leaders imposed sanctions on the FNL, but these will not resolve the issue. Successful implementation of the ceasefire agreement appears to be the only way to push the FNL to the negotiating table.

An integrated military high command responsible for carrying out the reform of the army has been working since January 2004 on a plan to integrate former FDD rebels. The Ceasefire Monitoring Commission (CMC) has proposed a joint operational plan (POC) for disarmament and demobilisation.

Both sides have demonstrated willingness to implement part of the plan by separately disengaging and assembling their forces and respecting the cessation of hostilities. But the process is running out of steam because of lack of commitment and funds to carry out the actual integration. Emphasis is on disarmament and demobilisation, not the more important integration of former rebels into the national army. The World Bank-backed disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DR) effort faces political issues it cannot resolve over use of donor funding in such programs. The transitional government and donors must cooperate to fund the army’s return to barracks and the FDD’s to assembly points so integration can finally begin.

On 1 June 2004, the African Union peacekeeping mission in Burundi became a UN mission, an indication that there is now no going back on the peace process. This new mission must support implementation of the ceasefire agreement and harmonise it with the political process.

Political parties and politico-military movements failed to adopt the draft constitution at a 12 April 2004 meeting called by President Domitien Ndayizeye, and entrenched interests are blocking negotiations. The UN, under the aegis of the Implementation Monitoring Commission (IMC), must assemble a team of national and international experts as soon as possible to work with the parties and movements and come up with a document they can adopt by consensus. The international experts should be those who drew up the Arusha agreement.

Respect for ethnic balance is one of the incontrovertible achievements of the Arusha agreement, but this should not become a guarantee of the political status quo. By enshrining the concept of ethnic balance while encouraging political debate, Arusha makes it possible to avoid this eventuality.

The international community must renew its commitment to Arusha and the comprehensive ceasefire by insisting on total respect for the framework they establish. The political calendar governing the end of the transition period must, therefore, be in step with that of army reform. This harmonisation should be negotiated via a realistic road map that would create a political-military environment conducive to successful elections.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the government of Burundi :

1.  Commit firmly to concluding the transition with elections by 31 October 2004 and to this end, avoid a constitutional vacuum by working to create a consensus and adopting the post-transition constitution as soon as possible.

2.  Work with the United Nations to develop a political and military road map leading to the end of the transition and that gives priority to steps required for the organisation of elections such as passage of an electoral law, establishment of an electoral commission and creation of a new voting registry.

3.  Develop with donors a plan of financial support for moving beyond the transition process that is detailed, realistic and frees up funds to support military integration, returning the army (FAB) to barracks and assembling CNDD-FDD forces in cantonments.

4.  Establish the conditions of security and stability necessary to hold elections by:

a) creating a new police force;

b) beginning to disarm militia and the general population; and

c) speeding up the integration of former rebels into the army.

To donors and other members of the international community:

5.  Support implementation of the global ceasefire agreement by backing the integration process to create a new national army.

6.  Begin disbursing funds pledged at the January 2004 donors conference in Brussels.

7.  Impress upon Burundi’s political class the urgency of having a post-transition constitution in place to facilitate the holding of elections by 31 October 2004.

8.  Work to convince the FNL to enter into negotiations with the government.

To the African Union :

9.  Make a critical assessment of the first ever peacekeeping operation of the African Union, which has just been replaced by the UN mission.

10.  Support the regional initiative launched at the 5 June 2004 summit with a view to obtaining a consensus on a post-transition constitution.

11.  Insist on respect for the sanctions imposed on the FNL, while supporting the start of negotiations between it and the transitional government.

To the United Nations:  

12.  Assist in the process of assembling CNDD-FDD forces in cantonments and returning the army (FAB) to barracks and apply the same criteria for DR to both.

13.  Bring together Burundian and international experts who worked in the Arusha process to assist in fine-tuning the draft of a post-transition constitution to be in place as soon as possible.

14.  Complete deployment of the full peacekeeping mission as soon as possible.

Nairobi/Brussels, 05 July 2004