The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia
Africa Report N°184
15 Feb 2012
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The decision in October 2011 to deploy thousands of troops in Somalia’s Juba Valley to wage war on Al-Shabaab is the biggest security gamble Kenya has taken since independence, a radical departure for a country that has never sent its soldiers abroad to fight. Operation Linda Nchi (Protect the Country) was given the go-ahead with what has shown itself to be inadequate political, diplomatic and military preparation; the potential for getting bogged down is high; the risks of an Al-Shabaab retaliatory terror campaign are real; and the prospects for a viable, extremist-free and stable polity emerging in the Juba Valley are slim. The government is unlikely to heed any calls for a troop pullout: it has invested too much, and pride is at stake. Financial and logistical pressures will ease once its force becomes part of the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia (AMISOM). But it should avoid prolonged “occupation” of southern Somalia, lest it turn local Somali opinion against the intervention and galvanise an armed resistance that could be co-opted by Al-Shabaab, much as happened to Ethiopia during its 2006-2009 intervention.
The intervention was hastily approved, after a string of cross-border kidnappings, by a small group without sufficient consideration of the consequences, at home as well as in Somalia. Military leaders were apparently convinced it would be a quick campaign, but the Kenyan Defence Forces (KDF) promptly ran into difficulties on the unfamiliar terrain. Somali allies failed to deliver and began squabbling, while Al-Shabaab, rather than confront Kenyan tanks and armoured personnel carriers head-on, predictably reverted to guerrilla warfare – something the KDF was poorly trained and equipped to fight. Irrespective of whether its troops are “rehatted” into AMISOM, there is a real prospect Kenya will find itself with undependable allies, enmeshed in a protracted counter-insurgency campaign against a resilient and experienced enemy.
The involvement in Somalia was partly motivated by a desire to inoculate North Eastern Province from the chaos across its border, ease a huge refugee burden and curtail the radical influence of Al-Shabaab, but the unintended consequences may prove destabilising. The venture could reopen old wounds, foment new inter-clan discord, radicalise Kenyan Somalis and undermine recent social, economic and political advances. The North Eastern Province is now the soft underbelly in the war against Al-Shabaab. New evidence suggests the radical Islamist movement is intent on destabilising the province, and part of its strategy is to outflank the KDF and wage a low-intensity guerrilla campaign there and in other areas behind Kenyan lines. A string of deadly grenade attacks in Garissa and elsewhere, initially dismissed as the work of local malcontents, now is seen to have a pattern. Most of the venues targeted have been bars frequented by government and security officials and poorly-defended government outposts.
Furthermore, the intervention taps into deep-seated Kenyan fears of Somali encroachment and corresponding Somali qualms that Kenya seeks to assert control over territory that was once part of colonial Kenya. Al-Shabaab is trying to exploit Kenyan-Somali grievances against Nairobi and making pan-Somali appeals, although without much apparent success to date. For Kenya’s venture to have a positive outcome, its leadership will need to define its goals and exit strategy more clearly, as well as work effectively with international partners to facilitate reconciliation and the development of effective local government mechanisms in the areas of Somalia where its forces are active, as part of a larger commitment to ending Somalia’s conflicts and restoring stability to the region.
While this briefing is an independent treatment of the Kenyan intervention in Somalia, some elements, in particular issues related to Al-Shabaab, Kenyan Somalis, and North Eastern Province, have also been discussed in earlier Crisis Group reporting, most recently the briefing Kenyan Somali Islamist Radicalisation (25 January 2012). Crisis Group will publish shortly a briefing on the wider issues involved in restoring peace to Somalia.
To the Kenyan Government:
1. Provide clearly articulated, measurable goals and an exit strategy for its intervention in Somalia and ensure that any major offensives, either individually or as part of AMISOM, are accompanied by a political strategy to win the support of local clans and social groups and stabilise those areas in which they are present;
2. Resist the temptation to seek spectacular gains; target Kismayo port both to deny Al-Shabaab critical funds with which to pay and resupply its forces and to force the clans of Kismayo to reassess their interests; but do so only with deliberation, avoiding costly urban conflict whose civilian casualties would damage the goals of countering terrorism and radicalisation and after allowing time for measures such as an economic blockade (with exceptions for humanitarian aid) and attrition from combat on multiple fronts to work;
3. Develop a mechanism with AMISOM to coordinate the activities of allied local administration security forces;
4. Initiate – with international partners, including the UN, U.S., UK and others – local peace and reconciliation conferences immediately; allow them to feed into larger conferences only after most local disputes have been resolved;
5. Develop a plan with regional and other international partners, as well as genuine representatives of local clans and social groups, for administering Kismayo; and consider requiring an international partnership with the local government for transparent management and oversight of the port and airport, much as was done in Liberia; and
6. Convene an international working group to prepare the political, technical and administrative modalities of a mechanism to assume responsibility for revenue collection at Kismayo port and airport for a five- to ten-year period, including an oversight board with mixed international and Somali composition but controlled by the former and supported by experts (forensic accountants) and international customs officers, much as was done in Liberia; and ensure that the revenue is used to develop all of Lower and Middle Juba, as well as Gedo equitably.
Nairobi/Brussels, 15 February 2012