Time to Rethink the Kimberley Process: The Zimbabwe Case
Thierry Vircoulon, On the African Peacebuilding Agenda |
4 Nov 2010
On 11-12 September 2010, Zimbabwe auctioned diamonds from the controversial Marange mines. There was little international condemnation, especially compared to the controversy over the first sale of Marange diamonds in August. Since an export ban was imposed on diamonds from Marangein November 2009, the Kimberley Process (KP) has permitted Zimbabwe to hold two auctions, although the country has not been able to guarantee that widespread human rights violations in the mines and smuggling have stopped. Criticised by both those who favour and those who oppose the ban, this unusual compromise demonstrates that the KP’s narrow definition of conflict diamonds is inadequate, and that the body must expand its authority if it is not to lose its credibility and legitimacy as the diamond-trade watchdog.
A. Zimbabwe: Still Trying for Democracy
Zimbabwe, a landlocked country of some 12.5 million inhabitants, is stuck in a decade-long political crisis and struggling to move from dictatorship to democracy. For 28 years from independence in 1980, Robert Mugabe ruled uninterrupted. During the first ten years, the country was a major tobacco producer and a main food supplier for the region. Starting in the early 1990s, however, the de facto one-party state implemented various measures to increase its grip on power, including a crack-down on civil liberties, and by the last years of the century, the increasingly mismanaged economy had started to crumble.
The economic problems and political repression triggered opposition, as the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai threatened to end ZANU-PF’s domination. The defeat of Mugabe’s proposed constitutional referendum on presidential powers and controversial land reforms in 2000 was a clear sign of the changing political landscape. The ZANU-PF government reacted brutally to the growing opposition by suppressing press freedom, intimidating the opposition and launching a forced distribution of white-owned commercial farms. The latter campaign led to massive flight of white farmers, serious food shortages and the beginning of the collapse of the agriculture-based economy. The result was hyperinflation, unemployment and deteriorating living conditions.
Zimbabweans became increasingly disillusioned with the country’s leadership, but, relying heavily on fraud and intimidation, Mugabe was reelected in 2002 and ZANU-PF won a two-thirds majority in the 2005 parliamentary elections. In that same year, the government launched “Operation Restore Order” to forcibly clear informal housing structures and businesses, especially from the capital, Harare, resulting in the displacement of 700,000 mostly poor supporters of the opposition. The U.S., UK, European Union (EU), Switzerland, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand reacted to the worsening political situation by imposing travel restrictions against and freezing financial assets of senior Zimbabwean officials and banning the sale of arms to Zimbabwe.
2008 was a landmark year. In the March presidential elections, the Tsvangirai received the most votes, but not enough to win outright in the initial round. Ahead of the scheduled late June run-off, the government and ZANU-PF organised massive violence against opposition party members and supporters, causing Tsvangirai to withdraw. Under international pressure and with the assistance of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a transitional power-sharing arrangement -- the Global Political Agreement -- was hammered out and eventually signed in September. Mugabe retained the presidency, and Tsvangirai became prime minister.
Despite initial skepticism, the unity government succeeded in stabilising the economy and ending the widespread repression. However, while the parties have agreed that the end of the inclusive, transitional government should be based on the completion of the process to produce a new constitution, a referendum on that document and new elections, democracy remains elusive: the political reform provided for in the agreement has not been carried out, and ZANU-PF maintains control over the security services.
B. The Discovery of Marange
The Marange mine in eastern Zimbabwe is the most recently discovered (2006) of the country’s three major diamond fields and already produces six million carats per year. Its discovery unleashed a diamond rush of 15,000 to 20,000 unlicensed artisanal miners and uncontrolled smuggling; international diamond buyers streamed in.
Shortly after the mining boom started, British-registered African Consolidated Resources (ACR), which had taken up the exploration rights from De Beers a few months earlier, began operations. However, its license was soon revoked by the state-owned Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC) and its mines shut. Despite a subsequent court ruling in its favour, police prevented ACR from resuming operations. The dispute took a new twist in September 2010, when another court reversed the earlier decision, arguing that ACR had fraudulently acquired the mining rights. The state now intends to prosecute the company for unlawful acquisition.
C. Marange Fields: Violence, Smuggling and Corruption
In early 2007, the police were sent to Marange to take control of the diamond fields. By mid-2007, illegal mining was believed to have been brought under control; however, by the fourth quarter of 2008, tens of thousand illegal diamond miners were reappearing. To restore and maintain order and to ensure access of the ZANU-PF elites to the diamond fields, the army deployed more than 800 soldiers in October 2008, in Operation “Hakudzokwi Kumunda”, which resulted in more than 200 deaths.
The Marange fields were turned into a military stronghold. Operations were taken over by soldiers, who either mined themselves or forced residents, including children, to work for them. While violence peaked with the military takeover in 2008, the police and army have continued to commit human rights violations, including the use of forced labour and torture against both diamond workers and local communities.
The same security forces are also responsible for widespread smuggling out of Zimbabwe, generally through Mozambique, a non-KP member. Vila de Manica, just over the eastern border, where the illegal trade is conducted openly with the complicity of Zimbabwean and Mozambican officials, has become the main transit point for Marange’s undocumented diamonds. Middlemen, miners and soldiers bring the diamonds out, after which they are exported to international cutting and polishing centres.
It is not just the soldiers stationed at the mines who benefit. While the military controls some 90 per cent of the Marange fields, the rest is operated by mining companies. The revenue from sales benefits only a few individuals connected to the military and the companies. The two firms authorised to operate in the mines since November 2009 are Canadile Miners Private Ltd and Mbada Diamonds (aka Condurango). Both are equal partnerships with Marange Resources Private Ltd (Marange Resource), a ZMDC subsidiary. Mbada is owned by Mauritius-registered Grandwell Holdings, a subsidiary of the New Reclamation Group from South Africa. Canadile belongs to the South African Core Mining and Mineral Resources Ltd. The third company allowed to mine the fields is Unki, a recent joint venture of a little-known Chinese firm, Anjin Investment, and Marange Resources.
Mines Minister Mpofu (ZANU-PF) admitted in early 2010 that the process of awarding concessions to the two South African companies has been opaque and not in conformity with proper procedures. Unki was also established in a non-transparent way, without disclosing the nature of the joint venture or the identity of its board members. Two of the three parent companies are not known in the diamond industry. New Reclamation Group normally deals with recycling and scrap metal; while little information is available on the Chinese company, it is said to have no prior experience in diamond mining. The Zimbabwe government needs to make the contents of the contracts public if it is to regularise the deals.
The industrialisation of diamond mining in Marange by Canadile and Mbada was seen as part of the solution of bringing it into compliance with international standards, but the two companies have become part of the opaque business. The ten-member boards of directors of both include individuals with close personal and family ties to ZANU-PF and almost no one with diamond mining experience. Mbada’s chairman, Robert Mhlanga, is Mugabe’s former personal helicopter pilot, the cousin of Minister Mpofu, who was allegedly involved in the diamond trade in the Democratic Republic of Congo during the war in the late 1990s, when Zimbabwean troops fought there. On Canadile’s board is Lovemore Kurotwi, a retired major who reportedly played a senior role during the infamous Matabeleland massacre in the 1980s.
Minister Mpofu is said to have handpicked the five boards seats assigned to ZMDC. Mbada’s board includes Mpofu’s sister-in-law, Sithengisisco Mpofu, and his personal assistant, Dingiswayo Ndlovu. Beauty Moyo, his sister-in-law, and Alvin Ncube, his nephew, are on Candile’s board. The ZANU-PF elites directly benefit from these joint-ventures, though some, including Minister Mpofu, are under targeted Western sanctions.
D. The Involvement of the Kimberley Process
Out of concern for the situation in and around the Marange diamond fields, a Kimberley Process Review Mission was sent in June of 2009. It concluded that Zimbabwe was in non-compliance with KP minimum requirements and called for withdrawal of the army and ending of the illegal mining and sale of diamonds. At the annual KP plenary in November 2009, civic groups called for Zimbabwe’s expulsion from the Kimberley scheme, but a joint work plan was agreed instead. Its objective is to bring Zimbabwe into compliance with minimum KP standards.
The country was given six months to fulfill requirements, including gradually withdrawing the army; ending illegal mining by setting up an adequate security infrastructure and engaging potential investors; and curbing smuggling by tightening border control and developing a joint strategy with Mozambique, among others. In an innovation for the KP, whose embargoes normally cover a country’s entire diamond exports, it banned diamonds from Marange but not from the other two fields.
Abbey Chikane, the KP monitor responsible for supervising compliance with the work plan, concluded in his June 2010 report, that Zimbabwe had met the minimum requirements. This contrasted with reports by human rights organisations of continued violence, including torture, beating and rape, by armed forces and the continuation of widespread smuggling for the benefit of a few individuals connected to the military and ZANU-PF. The revelation of those discrepancies was followed by state-sponsored intimidation. Farai Maguwu, director of the Centre for Research and Development, a civil and political rights organisation, was arrested in early June for allegedly providing false information about Marange to Chikane. Following international pressure, including a public call for his release by the president of the World Diamond Council, he was freed on 12 July and the charges dropped on 21 October.
Despite many calls by civic groups, some member states, and industry representatives to continue the export ban, the KP agreed in St. Petersburg in July to allow Zimbabwe to conduct two supervised Marange diamonds auctions. It was also decided that a KP review team would be sent to Marange to determine whether full export could be resumed. This came after KP members had failed to reach a decision in mid-June, when most African countries, India, China and Russia advocated lifting the export ban, and the U.S., Canada and Australia opposed. The compromise came about only after the MDC joined ZANU-PF in urging the West to drop its opposition, arguing that Zimbabwe badly needed the revenue to rebuild its devastated economy and pay for government expenditures.
The compromise also resulted from the KP’s limited legal basis to put pressure on the Zimbabwe government. The process’ founding document defines conflict diamonds as those “rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments …” The Marange stones do not fit this definition.Permission for Zimbabwe to conduct two sales should be understood in this context as well as a way to keep it inside the KP by easing pressure. The decision to ban only Marange diamonds rather than impose a full embargo had the same rationale. The KP can monitor Marange and work with the government to make production compliant with security, human rights and transparency standards only as long as Zimbabwe agrees to continue participation.
The first public auction, on 11 August, sold 900,000 carats of diamonds, estimated to be worth $46 million, with the government receiving $30 million. Surat Diamond Sourcing Limited of India (SDSL), a major importer of rough diamonds recently formed by diamantaires from Surat India, bought 83 per cent. Other buyers are said to have come from Russia, the U.S., Lebanon and Israel. The U.S.-based Rapaport Diamond Trading Network advised its more than 10,000 international diamond buyer and supplier members to boycott, as it was impossible to be certain whether the violence in the mines had ended, and threatened to expel and blacklist anyone taking part in the auction. The government seemed unimpressed, citing the ease with which it could find buyers in Asia and Russia.
At the second auction, on 11-12 September, at least 400,000 carats of diamonds were sold to buyers reportedly from India, the United Arab Emirates and Belgium. In mid-October, however, two major European banks, ABN Amro and the Antwerp Diamond Bank, announced they would not finance any transactions involving diamonds from Zimbabwe.
E. The Kimberley Process: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?
The two authorised sales of Marange diamonds make clear the Zimbabwe government has no reason to feel threatened by a Western diamond import ban. In the diamonds world, too, emerging powers are challenging the rules and becoming more influential. Buyers, especially from India, have been more than willing to fill the gap resulting from the absence of most Westerners. Chinese buyers could also potentially compete, since Beijing joined New Delhi in strongly urging that the export ban be lifted during the negotiations leading to the St. Petersburg compromise. With world diamond production falling by 24 per cent since 2009 and increased competition, buyers are becoming readier to push human rights and governance standards aside. Marange is already a major producer, and new deposits are still being discovered in the country, so Zimbabwe’s importance as an exporter is likely to grow.
In an environment in which some governments of diamond-producing countries are reluctant to comply fully with the KP standards, and some governments of diamond-buying countries are willing to ignore the contribution the diamond trade is making to insecurity, human rights violations and conflict, the KP’s regulator role is being challenged. This is all the more so in situations where, as in Zimbabwe, it actually has no legal basis to ban diamonds exports, but has to rely on the voluntary agreement of the diamond exporting government. In fact, expelling Zimbabwe from the KP scheme as has been suggested by civic groups, may not legally be possible and in any event might only allow new actors, such as Indian diamond buyers, to push more aggressively into the market without any human rights consideration.
The Marange affair reveals two contradictory trends: the emergence of new voices within an industry previously dominated by one major company, De Beers, and the politicisation of the KP. While the KP was established only to prevent rebel groups from profiting from diamonds, some have suggested extending the definition of conflict diamonds to take governance issues (such as corruption, political oppression and violence) into consideration. This would shift the focus of the process. The question is whether authoritarian regimes under international sanctions such as Zimbabwe should be prevented from using diamonds as a financial lifeline or whether only rebel groups should be targeted.
The KP has to make decisions about the conflict diamond definition, about how to improve transparency in the industry (for instance, requiring full disclosure of all contracts), about how to adjust to the industry’s new configuration and above all about the political issues behind the diamond trade. Otherwise, it risks becoming increasing irrelevant.
Appendix A: Map of Zimbabwe
Source: United Nations Cartographic Section
KP-Joint Work Plan, Zimbabwe, November 2009
Appendix C: Chronology
April: African Consolidated Resources Ltd. (ACR) receives exploration rights to the Marange fields.
September: Diamond rush in the Marange fields starts.
December: ACR starts mining and is shortly after shut down.
January: Police are sent to control the Marange fields
Spring: KP review mission is sent to Marange.
Late October/early November: Operation “Hakudzokwi Kumunda” is launched.
June: KP Review Mission is sent to Zimbabwe.
- KP plenary meeting is held in Namibia: Zimbabwe and KP agree on Joint Work Plan.
- Joint ventures are formed.
March: KP Monitor undertakes first visit to the Marange fields.
May: KP Monitor undertakes second visit to the Marange fields.
June: KP members meet in Israel.
July: KP members meet in Russia and reach compromise decision on Marange.
August: The first public auction is held.
September: The second public auction is held.
November: KP plenary meeting is held in Israel.
Appendix D: Chart
(click to expand)
 The Kimberley Process is a ten-year old initiative by governments, industry, and civil society to end the trade in conflict diamonds -- rough diamonds used by rebel movements to finance wars against legitimate governments. Directly resulting from the gruesome conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, in which diamonds were used to finance the rebellion, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme imposes extensive requirements on its members (the KP has 49 members, representing 75 countries—the European Community counts as an individual participant) to enable them to certify shipments of rough diamonds as conflict-free. KP membership is voluntary and members are supposed to fulfill the commitments in order for their diamonds to be certified.
 The MDC was founded as an opposition party to ZANU-PF in 1999 by a wide range of civic groups and trade union organisations under the leadership of Tsvangirai, a former union leader.
 By 2002, 80 per cent of the population was below the poverty line, up from 35 per cent in 1995, and by mid-2005, income per capita had fallen to the 1953 level. Life expectancy at birth fell from 49 in 1994 to 43.4 in 2007 (Crisis Group Africa Report N° 122, Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate? 5 March 2007; Crisis Group Africa Report N° 70, Zimbabwe: Political and Security Challenges to the Transition, 3 March 2010; “Progress Report on the Millennium Development Goals 2002”, Government of Zimbabwe, 2004; Human Development Report, UN Development Programme (UNDP), 1997 and 2005).
 Crisis Group Africa Report N° 93, Post-Election Zimbabwe: What Next? 7 June 2005.
 Crisis Group Africa Report N° 122, Zimbabwe: An End to the Stalemate? 5 March 2007.
 The River Ranch kimberlite field near the South African border and Murowa in south-central Zimbabwe are the other two mining sites. They are both privately owned and operated and in full compliance with the KP. See “Review Mission to Zimbabwe, 30 June–4 July 2009, Final Report”, Kimberley Process.
 “Zimbabwe, Diamonds and the Wrong Side of History”, Partnership Africa Canada, March 2009; David Farira, “Eerie silence at Zimbabwe mine”, BBC, 4 December 2008.
 “Review Mission to Zimbabwe”, op. cit.; “Second Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe, 24 May–28 May, 2010 Report”, Kimberley Process.
 Translation: “Operation you would never go back to the diamond fields”.
 Tichaona Sibanda, “Diamond rush pits ZANU-PF heavyweights against each other”, SW Radio Africa, 24 November 2008; “Deliberate Chaos”, Human Rights Watch, June 2010; “Diamonds in the Rough”, Human Rights Watch, June 2009.
 Mozambique is currently considering joining the KP.
 “Second Fact Finding Mission”, op. cit.; Alex Bell, “Zimbabwe: Army leading smuggling operations out of Chiadzwa”, SW Radio Africa, 26 July 2010; “Illicit trade Zimbabwean blood diamond trade continues”, The Budapest Report, 5 August 2010; Sarah Childress, “Diamond trade regulatory loophole in Mozambique”, The Wall Street Journal, 6 November 2009.
 “Return of the Blood Diamond”, Global Witness, 2010.
 “First Fact Finding Mission to Zimbabwe”, Kimberley Process, 21 March 2010. .
 “Second Fact Finding Mission”, op. cit.
 Alex Bell, “Mpofu admits issuing mining permits without ‘proper procedure’”, SW Radio Africa, 22 March 2010.
 “First Fact Finding Mission”, op. cit.
 KP-Joint Work Plan, Zimbabwe, November 2009; “First Fact Finding Mission”, op. cit.
 Crisis Group telephone interview, ZANU-PF official, October 2010; Jon Swain, “Bob’s dirty diamonds”, Zim Daily, 5 April 2010.
 “Zimbabwe cabal seizes diamond riches to buy power”, The Sunday Times, 29 November 2009; “The Chiadzwa Gang: Shady individuals and fugitives”, The Zimbabwean, 25 June 2010. The Matabeleland massacre resulted in the death of between 10,000 and 20,000 members of the Ndebele minority at the hands of the largely ethnic Shona state security forces.
 “Return of the Blood Diamond”, op. cit.
 “The Chiadzwa Gang”, op. cit.
 Crisis Group telephone interview, ZANU-PF official, October 2010.
 The initial diamond rush prompted an earlier KP review mission to Marange in 2007, which concluded that Zimbabwe met minimum requirements. These include establishment of a system of internal controls to ensure that no conflict diamonds are exported and imported, according to the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Preamble.
 “KP Review Mission to Zimbabwe”, op. cit.
 See Appendix B below for the KP-Joint Work Plan, Zimbabwe, November 2009.
 Questions have been raised about how to be assured that Marange diamonds are not transported to the other mining sites, from where exports are legal. Mine Minister Mpofu stopped all diamond exports for the period of the ban on the Marange diamonds. They resumed at the end of August 2010, after the first group of Marange diamonds were certified. In addition, the other diamond fields are relatively small compared to Marange, so a sudden increase in their exports would indicate a transfer had taken place.
 Abbey Chikane formerly was president of the South African Diamond Board. He is the brother of Frank Chikane, who was director general in the office of then President Mbeki, and of Kagiso Chikane, who is the chief executive of the mining company African Renaissance Holdings. “Rights activist claims diamond watchdog linked to ZANU-PF”, The Zimbabwean, 16 June 2010).
 “Kimberley Process: Demand End to Abuses in Diamond Trade”, Human Rights Watch press release, 1 November 2010.
 Address by the president of the World Diamond Council, inter-sessional meeting of the Kimberley Process, Jerusalem, 21 June 2010.
.Patience Rusere, “Harare Magistrate Drops Charges against Zimbabwe Diamond Activist Farai Maguwu”, Voice of America, 21 October 2010.
 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Preamble.
 KP does not have the legal basis for taking into consideration human rights violations when they are not tied to conflict by rebel movements aimed at undermining governments.
 Caroline Mvundura, “India purchases 83 percent of Zim gems: report”, Zim Online, 18 August 2010.
 Savious Kwinika, “Zimbabwe slams ‘lunatic group’ for banning its diamonds”, The Christian Science Monitor, 17 August 2010.
 “Zim flogs 400 000 carats at secret auction”, Zim Online, 16 September 2010; Avi Krawitz, “Zimbabwe sells 500,000 carats of Marange rough”, Rapaport, 14 September 2010.
 Vusimuzi Bhebhe, “EU banks ban Zim diamond transactions”, The Zimbabwean, 15 October 2010.
 Mahesh Langa, “Surat diamond barons in $1.2-bn Zimbabwe deal”, Hindustan Times, 24 October 2010.
 Sandra Nyaira, “Zimbabwe Says New Diamond Deposits Discovered In Three Districts”, Voice of America, 11 October 2010.
 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Preamble recognises the “devastating impact of conflicts fuelled by the trade in conflict diamonds on the peace, safety and security of people in affected countries and the systemic and gross human rights violations that have been perpetrated in such conflict”.
 The president of the World Diamond Council has already made some suggestions how the KP might be reformed. Address by the president of the World Diamond Council, op. cit.