Guinea: Uncertainties at the End of an Era

Africa Report N°74 19 Dec 2003

The full report is available in French.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Rumours about the president’s health and the prospective early end of his time in office have placed Guinea in a state of alarming uncertainty. Its government and its political elite must now work closely with the international community in order to stabilise the country in the mid-term if it is not to risk the same fate as its West African neighbours and drift into civil war. While no one doubts that President Lansana Conté will be reelected on 21 December, it is high time for Guinea to prepare for a political transition through its first transparent and democratic elections as soon as Conté leaves office.

The population is suffering heavily from the social and economic crisis, and the leadership continues to suppress critical voices through intimidation and state violence. Despite a heritage of voter apathy closely related to the history of police violence in the country, public passivity should no longer be taken as given. The more the government suppresses popular discontent, the greater the risk of radicalisation.

Guinea and its international partners have to keep the country out of West Africa’s volatile regional crisis in order to minimise the danger of a possible civil war. The present report warns of the danger of a drift toward violence, including because of the government’s involvement in the Liberian conflict, and provides recommendations to reduce these risks.

The presidential elections on 21 December – which seem certain to lead to Conté’s re-election – will not solve the country’s deep-rooted problems. Due to the manipulation of the electoral system as well as the legal opposition’s weaknesses and its internal divisions, the political process remains deadlocked. The lack of an official successor to Conté opens the door to a range of ambitions. While the various clans close to the president’s entourage are keen to ensure the continuity of the regime in order to preserve their privileges, their internal quarrels constitute an important element of instability. Many observers feel that only the armed forces will be able to guarantee a political transition and to maintain civil order.

The question, however, is whether the military can master its internal differences and agree on a transitional candidate. A disagreement about Conté’s successor could exacerbate its generational and ethnic divisions. The succession crisis could then turn out to be more violent and more durable than the one sparked in 1984 when Guinea’s first president, Sékou Touré, died. The ambiguous relations between the leadership and the military are another element of uncertainty. Even if the army is kept under careful watch, the president’s illness and popular discontent have weakened the government, and there is danger of a coup d’état.

The risk of violence goes beyond a possible succession crisis in the capital. It is connected as well to the spread of fighting in the Mano River region over recent years and more particularly to President Conté’s considerable involvement in the Liberian conflict. His championing of the Liberian rebels has contributed to rising tensions between the communities of the Forestière region, an area bordering Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. The large number of weapons and irregular combatants circulating in this region is one of the principal elements of concern. These armed groups with their unpredictable allegiances could serve the interests of politico-military elites who seek to create disorder and or to take power by force.

It does need to be kept in mind that Guinea has stabilising factors that distinguish it from its neighbours. These include the restructuring of the security forces, the absence of hate media and a sense of nationalism, which, however, does not dissipate interethnic resentment. Key international actors have demonstrated a political will, though sometimes in ambiguous ways, to preserve stability in the country.

Guinea, like the entire sub-region, seems to have reached a turning point. At risk from both local destabilisation and the nation-wide implications of the succession crisis, the issue of the succession to the current government is highly uncertain. ICG draws attention to these risks and reiterates that armed violence will continue to affect the Mano River region until there is a regional solution.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Guinean Government:

1.  Take appropriate measures to safeguard the transition from the current authoritarian regime to a democratically elected government after President Lansana Conté has left power, in particular:

a) promote reconciliation efforts among the forest communities through the establishment of an independent commission to investigate the atrocities committed there since the early 1990s; and

b) Open up political space urgently by permitting the media to express different views on the country’s future.

2.  Continue to restructure the military and expand these efforts to include the police forces and the gendarmerie.

3.  Cease immediately all support to all foreign armed groups, particularly the LURD.

To Guinea’s Principal Supporters, in Particular France and the U.S., and Major Donors:

4.  Reconsider current attitudes towards Guinea and, in consideration of the new political balance in the region after the departure of Liberian President Charles Taylor as well as mounting domestic tensions, develop a policy based on a democratic transition and Guinean disengagement from regional conflicts; in particular:

a) review existing programs of military cooperation with a view to creating a Guinean army that operates under civilian rule of a democratic government, and insist on civics training as part of the education of military personnel;

b) condition continuation of military cooperation upon cessation of all support to Liberian armed groups; and

c) demand clear guarantees for Guinea’s democratic opening before providing development aid.

To the Security Council:

5.  Express concern about Guinea’s support for LURD, inform the Guinean government that it is in violation of UN Security Council Resolution 1478 on the weapons embargo against Liberia, and insist that it comply with the resolution.

To UNICEF and UNHCR:

6.  Ensure that refugee camps do not serve as recruitment bases for any rebel movement.

To the European Union:

7.  Continue to utilise Article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, which authorises the EU to initiate a political dialogue with a view to reinforcing the respect of human rights and democracy in a signatory country, and request the Guinean government to develop a list of appropriate measures in order to guarantee a transition to a democratically elected government.

Freetown/Brussels, 19 December 2003