Mali: Peace from Below?
Africa Briefing N°115
14 Dec 2015
REUTERS/Souleymane Ag Anara
The full briefing is currently available in: French
After a summer marked by renewed clashes in northern Mali, a surprising détente began taking shape in October 2015 following a series of talks between leaders of the Coalition of Azawad Movements (CMA), the main rebel coalition, and those of the Algiers Platform, the pro-government coalition. For three weeks, negotiations took place in Anefis, the site of recent fighting and a regional hub south west of Kidal. The talks led to several “honour pacts” signed on behalf of the major nomad communities in the region. In Bamako, the pessimism of the past few months is giving way to cautious optimism. This “bottom-up” reconciliation could restart implementation of the Bamako accord signed in June, itself stalled since summer. Nevertheless, these local pacts will have to be carefully monitored as the Anefis process also carries risks, including that of the reestablishment of a militarised political-economic system that was the source of much of the violence in the north.
The Anefis meetings represent a reappropriation by some local actors of a peace process until now largely driven by external partners. There should be no mistaking who took the initiative: these are less “traditional” community leaders than politico-military leaders and businessmen at the head of armed groups. Yet, this is precisely how the Anefis pacts can reinforce the Bamako peace process: by involving major local actors and strengthening their trust in a peace otherwise largely externally imposed. The Anefis meetings have allowed for important questions concerning the north’s politico-military elite to be addressed, including issues of trafficking, power sharing, and intercommunal rivalries. These are sensitive subjects that the negotiations in Algiers were either unwilling or unable to tackle.
The peace process nevertheless remains fragile. The 20 November attack on the Hotel Radisson was a stark reminder of the persistent threat posed by radical groups excluded from the peace process. Indeed, this moment of calm should not be confused with a return to sustainable peace. The current window should be seized as an opportunity to refocus attention on the implementation of the Bamako agreement, not as an end in itself, but rather to allow for genuine change of governance in Mali. A majority of actors, however, privately admit to having given up on this goal. Consequently, the risk remains that Mali could revert back to a pattern of poor governance and violence in the north. To avoid this, Malian parties and their partners should remobilise around an intelligent and ambitious implementation of the Bamako accord that, with time, will allow for a “demilitarisation” of economics and politics in the north. For this to occur, the following measures should be taken:
- Mali and its main partners, gathered in the extended mediation team, should support local initiatives such as the intercommunal meetings, to allow for the extension of the Anefis process beyond political-military elites. In parallel, they should maintain a right to prosecute important criminals, specifically those involved in arms and drug trafficking, regardless of their participation in the process.
- The same actors should prioritise demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR). In doing so, Malian parties should adhere to the text of the Bamako accord, specifically concerning the mechanisms for the interim period, and the UN mission, MINUSMA focus on the logistical and political preparation of the DDR process.
- In Bamako, Malian parties and the international mediation team must clarify each actor’s role in the implementation and follow-up of the peace agreement. They should also restart discussions on the creation of a government of national unity in order to reinforce the peace process and facilitate the implementation of the accord.
This period of reduced tensions should, in sum, be seized upon to break with the governance problems of the past: development projects in the north must be accompanied by concrete mechanisms to fight corruption and guarantee that investments benefit local populations, rather than just the elites. The government in turn must cease the politics of division that fuel the “militarisation” of society and threaten the security of the Malian state.
Dakar/Brussels, 14 December 2015