Indonesia: Jihadi Surprise in Aceh
Asia Report N°189
20 Apr 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The discovery in late February 2010 of a jihadi training camp in Aceh came as a surprise in three ways. It revealed a major mutation in Indonesian jihadi ranks: a new coalition had emerged that rejected both Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the best-known such organisation in the region, and the more violent splinter group led until his death in September 2009 by Noordin Top. It had chosen Aceh as a base, despite the antipathy of Acehnese to radical Islam. And it was led by Dulmatin, one of South East Asia’s most wanted terrorists, whom officials in both Indonesia and the Philippines believed was in Mindanao.
By mid-April police had arrested 48 coalition members, killed eight, including Dulmatin, and were looking for about fifteen others. The group’s existence and the government response show that despite enormous gains made in counter-terrorism efforts since the first Bali bombs in 2002, intelligence remains weak; monitoring of prisons and ex-prisoners remains a problem; police handling of “active shooters” needs improvement; and corruption continues to be a major lubricant for terrorist activities in Indonesia.
Dulmatin’s return to Indonesia, probably in late 2007, set in motion what became known as the lintas tanzim or cross-organisational project. Several influential jihadi leaders independently had reached the conclusion that JI had become too passive, abandoning jihad for religious outreach, and Noordin’s group had no plans beyond preparing for the next attack. One influential cleric who joined the group, Oman Rochman alias Aman Abdurrahman, argued that Indonesians should follow the teachings of Jordanian radical scholar Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and wage jihad to establish Islamic law but in a way that did not cause Muslim casualties. For both Aman and other leaders, including Dulmatin, it was critical to establish a secure base from which operations could be launched and the nucleus of an Islamic state established. The enemy should be defined not simply as anyone from the U.S. or allied countries, but as anyone who obstructed the application of Islamic law – and that meant that many Indonesian officials were high on the list.
One of Aman’s followers, through prison visits, had ties to some of Dulmatin’s closest associates – JI members who had joined Noordin, and men from another jihadi organisation called KOMPAK who had trained in Mindanao. He also had ties to Aceh, having once been stationed with the police there, and it was he who suggested that Aceh could be the secure base. Another Acehnese member of Aman’s study group recruited about twenty Acehnese, hoping they would bring in others; most were local followers of a well-known salafi cleric in Aceh Besar district. The man the jihadis wanted badly to recruit, however, was an Acehnese cleric with a proven track record of mobilising mass demonstrations in support of Islamic law and sending his students out on vigilante raids against vice. His school was a base for the Aceh branch of the Islamic Defenders Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI), a national group that in Jakarta is known for its thuggish attacks on bars, brothels, restaurants open during Ramadan, deviant sects and “unauthorised” churches. The lintas tanzim project succeeded in recruiting some FPI members but not their leader.
In the end, Dulmatin and the others went along with the idea of setting up a secure base in Aceh, believing that since the rebel Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) had fought the Indonesian army there for more than 30 years, it had suitable terrain; alone among Indonesian provinces, it was authorised to apply Islamic law and many community leaders were pro-sharia; and a number of hardline groups that had set up shop in Aceh after the 2004 tsunami were potential allies. In fact, community support was negligible and the coalition was doomed from the start. The experiment ended with a series of police raids in Aceh and Jakarta in February, March and April.
The failure of this initiative raises the question of where Indonesian jihadism goes next. Three streams are alive, if not particularly well. One is the JI variant, which teaches jihad, advocates military training, but says the faithful currently lack the resources to take on the enemy and therefore should focus on building up their ranks through dakwah (religious outreach). The second is the network led by the late Noordin Top focused on the use of suicide bombings to terrorise the U.S. and its allies. The third was represented by the coalition, but also by its individual components: KOMPAK, Darul Islam, disgruntled JI members and others. Like Noordin, it was ready for jihad now, but only as the means to the end of applying Islamic law in full. If Noordin favoured bombings, the coalition members preferred targeted assassinations, as less likely to result in Muslim deaths. Further mutations and realignments will almost certainly occur; it is not impossible that the coalition’s failure will lead some to reconsider their distaste for Noordin’s tactics.
Dulmatin’s involvement in the Aceh group also underscores the possibility of cross-border jihadi cooperation. Dulmatin wanted the Aceh training camp to be a centre for mujahidin from across the region, but it remains unclear exactly what kind of cooperation he envisaged with his Abu Sayyaf and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) colleagues in Mindanao.
To the Government of Indonesia
1. Take immediate measures to enforce existing regulations in prisons, especially with respect to those convicted of terrorism, including by banning the use of mobile phones and otherwise restricting prisoners’ ability to have unmonitored conversations; screening printed material; and ensuring that religious study groups inside prison do not become vehicles for radicalisation of other prisoners.
2. Take immediate measures to improve methods for defining high-risk detainees, and ensure that they are better monitored while still detained and after their release. Anyone who previously worked with Noordin Top should automatically be considered high-risk. Penalties for recidivism should be increased in cases involving terrorist activity, including through making recidivists ineligible for routine sentence reductions.
3. Strictly enforce Indonesian tax laws and regulations with respect to publishers of jihadi material.
4. Appoint a special task force within the police to focus on apprehension and prosecution of document forgers, particularly forgers of passports and Indonesian identity cards (KTPs), with special attention to syndicates operating in cooperation with Indonesian immigration personnel.
5. Ensure that the new anti-terror body is led by a civilian and has the capacity to commission and use academic studies and surveys on extremist movements, including local case studies, so that policy can be based on hard data rather than unproven assumptions such as that poverty breeds radicalism.
6. Undertake internal and external assessments of police handling of “active shooter” cases where the target was killed rather than arrested; and identify training and equipment needs to increase the likelihood that high-value targets in the future can be captured alive.
7. Consider a ban on paramilitary training by non-state actors, or at least subject such training to strict regulation and control.
8. Undertake a detailed review in cooperation with Philippine counterparts of when and how Dulmatin returned, to identify security and intelligence weak points and make recommendations for their improvement.
Jakarta/Brussels, 20 April 2010