Thailand's Emergency Decree: No Solution
Asia Report N°105
18 Nov 2005
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Muslim-majority region of southern Thailand continues to experience a relatively low-level insurgency but a state of emergency imposed on three provinces is no solution to the conflict that has claimed more than 1,000 lives since January 2004. The decree has deepened mistrust of the security forces, worsened public discontent with the government's approach to the insurgency and heightened the risk of human rights abuses. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra should take immediate steps to moderate the decree or risk plunging the area into worse violence.
The Executive Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situations took effect on 19 July 2005 in Narathiwat, Pattani and Yala and was renewed for three months on 19 October. While it was designed to be a softer version of martial law, many see it as harsher. Far from helping to restore trust between the government of Prime Minister Thaksin and the Malay Muslims, the decree has further eroded it.
The head of the government-appointed National Reconciliation Commission says the decree gives security forces a "licence to kill". Two provisions, one granting law enforcement officers immunity from prosecution and the other suspending the jurisdiction of administrative courts to prosecute officials for human rights violations, leave citizens with no redress for abuses. Despite some legal safeguards, the decree leaves loopholes that heighten the risk of arbitrary detention and mistreatment of detainees. In practice, the government's powers are the same as they were under martial law, but with less accountability.
One particular problem that has emerged is blacklisting, where police and soldiers go to villages with lists of suspects, often based on weak intelligence and weaker evidence. Those on the lists are told to surrender or face arrest or worse. While the government denies such lists are being used, village headmen confirm the practice.
Three incidents demonstrate the depth of fear and alienation in areas designated "red zones" -- those suspected of being insurgent strongholds. One involves the death of an imam, where suspicion of the government is preventing any official investigation. The second involves the flight to Malaysia of 131 villagers, and the third relates to mysterious murders that led angry villagers to capture and detain soldiers who were later killed by local militants.
A by-product of the deteriorating situation has been a sharp downturn in relations between Thailand and Malaysia, related to Bangkok's long-running accusation that its neighbour turns a blind eye to Thai separatist militants taking refuge in northern states and aggravated in recent months by inept handling of the "refugee" issue.
Thus far, there is no evidence of outside involvement in the violence, despite mounting speculation. However, there are legitimate concerns that if the violence worsens, it might be exploited by jihadi groups to establish a new area for training and recruitment, as has happened in other conflict zones in South East Asia.
The only clear impact of the emergency decree has been increased alienation of Malay Muslims. Despite the absence of any demonstrable strategic gain from the emergency decree, the cabinet renewed it. Unless relations between the security forces and southern Muslims begin to improve, however, and until reports of abuses and disappearances can be properly investigated, the growing alienation may turn into sympathy, support and even recruits for the insurgency.
1. Repeal Sections 16 and 17 of the decree that exclude access to administrative courts and grant enforcement officials immunity from prosecution.
2. Amend Sections 11 and 12 on arrest and detention to affirm explicitly constitutional rights such as immediate access to a lawyer of choice and to inform family of arrest and detention.
3. Move ahead as quickly as possible with plans to establish a centre with forensic capability to investigate disappearances.
4. Support expansion of the joint initiative of the National Reconciliation Commission, the Lawyers Council and the National Human Rights Commission to provide legal aid and human rights monitoring in the southern provinces.
5. Examine, with the National Reconciliation Commission, mechanisms for continuing regular consultations with southern community and religious leaders after the Commission's mandate ends, perhaps by setting up a smaller permanent body based in the south.
6. Expand the initiative already being implemented by some local commanders and recommended by the National Reconciliation Commission to establish councils of community and religious leaders to advise and assist officers with community liaison.
7. Expand cultural awareness, and particularly Malay language training, for officers stationed in the Fourth Army region.
8. End the blacklisting of suspects; treat suspect lists as internal documents, and make arrests only on solid evidence, not vague suspicions.
9. Continue the initiative of encouraging voluntary surrenders of low-level militants but ensure that surrenders are genuinely voluntary and not connected to blacklists.
Jakarta/Brussels, 18 November 2005