Handing Back Responsibility to Timor-Leste’s Police
Asia Report N°180
3 Dec 2009
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The United Nations should hand over formal control of the Timor-Leste police as soon as possible. A protracted process that began in May has taken a bureaucratic approach to assessing whether they are ready to take charge, but the reality on the ground is that the Timorese police have long operated under their own command. Without an agreed plan for reforming the country’s police after the 2006 crisis, the UN and the government have made a poor team for institutional development. A longer handover may further damage relations between the UN’s third-largest policing mission and the Timor-Leste government, which has refused to act as a full partner in implementing reforms. The UN has a continued role to play in providing an advisory presence in support of police operations. For this to work, the government must engage with the UN mission and agree upon the shape of this partnership. To make any new mandate a success, they need to use the remaining months before the current one expires in February 2010 to hammer out a detailed framework for future cooperation with the police under local command.
Timor-Leste still needs the UN and stepping back is not the same as leaving too early. There is domestic political support for a continuing albeit reduced police contingent, at least until the planned 2012 national elections. A sizeable international deployment can no longer be left to operate without a clear consensus on the task at hand. Any new mandate should be limited, specific and agreed. The UN can provide units to underwrite security and support the Timorese police in technical areas such as investigations, prosecutions and training. These would best be identified by a comprehensive independent review of police capacity, and matched with key bilateral contributions, including from Australia and Portugal. In return, the Timorese should acknowledge the need to improve oversight and accountability mechanisms. The UN and its agencies must continue to help build up these structures and in the interim monitor human rights.
The UN took a technocratic approach to the highly politicised task of police reform. Sent in to restore order after an uprising in 2006, the UN police helped shore up stability in the country but then fell short when they tried to reform the institution or improve oversight. They are not set up to foster such long-term change and were never given the tools to do so. The Timorese police were divided and mismanaged at the top; the UN misplaced its emphasis on providing hundreds of uniformed officers to local stations across the country. It neglected the role played by the civilian leadership in the 2006 crisis and the need to revamp the ministry overseeing the police as part of a lasting solution. The mismatching of people to jobs, short rotations as well as the lack of familiarity with local conditions and languages clipped the ability of international police to be good teachers and mentors. Without the power to dismiss or discipline officers, the mission could not improve accountability. The government declined to pass laws in support of the UN role, sending a defiant message of non-cooperation down through police ranks.
In the absence of a joint strategy, structural reform has been limited. The government appointed a commander from outside the police ranks, compromising efforts to professionalise the service. It has promoted a paramilitary style of policing, further blurring the lines between the military and police. The skewed attention to highly armed special units will not improve access to justice, and the ambiguity it creates risks planting the seeds of future conflict with the army. Timorese leaders are attuned more than any outsider to the deadly consequences of institutional failure. To avoid this, Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão, an independence hero, now heads a joint defence and security ministry. Political quick fixes based on personalities may keep the police and the army apart in the short term, but they add little to more lasting solutions that respect for rule of law might provide.
For the international community, this struggle over command of the police between the UN and one of its member states contains many lessons. The slow drawdown of UN police in Timor-Leste is not the prudent exit strategy it may appear. The mission has been neither a success nor failure. Unable to muster consensus on a long-term police development strategy, it leaves behind a weak national police institution. The mission’s most enduring legacy might be in the lessons it can teach the Security Council not to over-stretch its mandates. The UN should think carefully about stepping in and taking control of a local police service, particularly, as in the case of Timor-Leste, when large parts of it remain functioning. Complex reforms of state institutions cannot be done without the political consent of those directly involved.
1. Take steps to support the rapid resolution of as many pending police certification cases as possible, including passing any necessary legislation, and ensure that those with outstanding or future criminal convictions are removed from the Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL).
2. Develop a strong, independent oversight capacity for the police, either through overhauling the police’s internal disciplinary functions by making its operations fully transparent and public or, if necessary, developing a separate police ombudsman body.
3. Implement the proposed new police rank structure to improve professionalisation and decrease potential for political manipulation of the police service.
4. Avoid the militarisation of policing and clearly demarcate in law and policy the role of the police and army as well as the conditions and procedures by which soldiers can aid civilian authorities in internal security or other situations.
5. Ensure that executive policing responsibilities are handed over to the Timorese police as soon as possible, spelling out the steps to hand back formal authority to the PNTL, maintaining a limited advisory and support presence for the UN police in operational areas identified as priorities by the government.
6. Reorient future mission mandates towards maintaining a limited advisory presence for the UN police in those operational areas identified by the government and bolstering security in advance of the next elections in 2012, and clarify the conditions necessary before a future full withdrawal of the international policing contingent.
7. Focus the future mission, bilateral efforts and government programs on solving existing training needs, equipment shortfalls, and fixing administrative processes identified in the joint assessments from the national to sub-district level.
8. Commit to a fully independent review of policing capacity in Timor-Leste to be performed before the final withdrawal of the UN police contingent.
9. Set realistic goals for a future mandate extension for UNMIT and recognise the limited capacity of UN police to play an ongoing development role with their Timorese counterparts.
10. Support an independent review of policing capacity commissioned by the Government of Timor-Leste and UNMIT, and commit to linking future development efforts to needs identified in the review under a common framework.
11. Insist on a long-term capacity-building strategy centred on building institutional values of rule of law, professionalism and human rights.
12. Conduct a thorough lessons learned exercise on UNMIT’s executive policing mandate, UN police’s development role, and the incomplete security sector review in order to inform future missions.
Dili/Brussels, 3 December 2009