War Criminals in Bosnia’s Republika Srpska: Who are the People in Your Neighbourhood?
Europe Report N°103
2 Nov 2000
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Five years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords, which brought an end to almost four years of bloody war in Bosnia, many of those believed to have carried out some of the war’s worst atrocities remain at large. The continued presence in the municipalities of Republika Srpska (RS) of individuals suspected of war crimes – some indicated either publicly or secretly by the International War Crimes Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – represents a significant obstacle to the return of ethnic minority refugees. It also undermines seriously Bosnia’s chances for building central institutions, generating self-sustainable economic growth, and achieving the political transformation necessary to begin the process of integration with the rest of Europe. Moreover, the continued commitment of most war crimes suspects to the goal of a Greater Serbia, and their willingness to use violence to achieve it, could – in the long term – provoke renewed conflict in Bosnia and continued instability in the Balkans.
In many RS municipalities, individuals alleged to have committed violations of international humanitarian law during the 1992-1995 war – mass murder, ethnic cleansing, and mass rape – remain in positions of power. They continue to work in the police force, hold public office, exercise power through the legal and illegal economy, or influence politics from behind the scenes. In eastern Republika Srpska in particular, many of these “small fish,” who served in the local Serb wartime administrations and military units that carried out the policies of ethnic cleansing, remain a frightening force, often actively working to prevent refugee return and moves towards ethnic reconciliation.
2000 has seen a number of organised violent incidents directed against returning refugees (and in one case against the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR)) in Zvornik, Bratunac, Srebrenica and Janje. The systematic armed attacks on Bosniak returnees and their property – particularly in Janje and Srebrenica – demonstrate the continued presence of paramilitary groups in the region, whose aim is to maintain instability and discourage refugee return. Many of those involved in wartime ethnic cleansing have links with these groups, as well as with military and paramilitary elements in Serbia proper. SFOR’s reluctance to give priority to making arrests has played a major role in slowing implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, and has needlessly prolonged the international community presence.
Following the April 2000 Bosnian municipal elections, a number of individuals with questionable war records assumed positions as municipal assembly members, speakers and mayors. At least four of the recently elected Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) assembly members have already been referred to local authorities for arrest and trial under the “Rules of the Road” established by the ICTY in The Hague. In one of the worst municipalities, Bratunac, seven of the thirteen recently elected Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) candidates are allegedly connected with war crimes. This municipality continues to represent a centre for Serb radical national politics in the region, a fact demonstrated vividly during a violent May 2000 attack on a bus convoy of Bosniak women.
This report names individuals in eighteen Republika Srpska municipalities and the Brcko District who are alleged to have committed indictable acts or supervised those who did so, and are therefore potentially indictable for war crimes under the criteria established by the ICTY. Yet they continue to play a prominent role in their respective areas, and present significant barriers to the implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords. Senior international officials know about them. Many meet frequently with international officials and representatives of SFOR.
The influence of potential war criminals at the municipal and entity level is an open secret among international officials. The issue is often avoided, since it exposes contradictions between the international community’s commitment to justice and the rule of law, on the one hand, and the temptations of political expediency, on the other. And yet the persistence of radical politics in eastern RS follows logically from the fact that the international community permitted the SDS of indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic to participate in post-Dayton “democratic” elections. As one mayor in RS noted, “the SDS as a party protects war criminals because to do otherwise would call its entire concept into question.” More significantly, the failure to arrest Karadzic himself has sent a message to his wartime colleagues and political successors that they can obstruct return, actively work against Dayton implementation, exploit nationalist sentiments, and remain untouchable.
While acknowledging the moral imperative to apprehend war criminals, some policymakers have disputed the practical urgency of the issue, arguing that war criminals play a marginal role in local politics. This report shows this assumption to be flawed. In addition to the numerous individuals discussed below, Karadzic himself continues to operate behind the scenes, taking part in the day to day running of the SDS. The continued anti-Dayton activities of the SDS, as well as Karadzic’s continued leadership role, argue for excluding the party from participation in Bosnian political life. If this is impracticable to achieve in the short remaining time before the 11 November elections, the possible banning of the party should remain actively on the international authorities’ agenda with benchmark performance tests being set and enforced.
The continued freedom and influence of many individuals alleged to have been involved in war crimes has a debilitating influence on the prospects for long term peace and stability in Bosnia. Bosnia will never achieve the rule of law and inter-ethnic reconciliation until many more suspected war criminals appear before the ICTY or locally authorised courts. Only then will the local debate on war crimes pass from a debate about evils committed by ethnic groups to a debate on evils committed by individuals.
Unfortunately, the ICTY lacks the resources to even begin to fully carry out its mandate. The overall number of indictments – both public and secret – remains disturbingly low: measured in tens rather than hundreds. A number of war crimes cases have already been referred by The Hague to local courts and more can be expected, but these cases have simply shown up the inability of the Bosnian justice system, as presently constituted, to handle war crimes cases. The report makes a number of recommendations designed to give the ICTY the support it needs both to do its intended job and to make an impact on the general public – both in Bosnia and throughout the former Yugoslavia.
The report also sets out a number of other measures the international community can undertake to improve the situation, with little risk or additional expenditure. Much of what is needed is simply a rationalisation of existing international community efforts, with the primary focus on increased efficiency within the scope of existing mandates and resources.
This report does not purport to be a comprehensive list of those who allegedly committed war crimes in RS; nor is there any suggestion that war crimes were committed only in RS, or only by Serbs and not Croats and Bosniaks (i.e. Muslims). But it is a particular matter of concern that Bosnian Serb authorities – in contrast to those of other ethnic groups – have yet to arrest a single Serb war crimes suspect, and have extended only minimal co-operation to the ICTY. The continued presence in positions of some prominence of so many people suspected of grave crimes remains a major obstacle to peace building.
If the report leads to more effective international action against not only alleged Serb war criminals, but those of other ethnic groups as well, Bosnia can only benefit. Only with the disappearance from public and political life, by one means or another, of the forces of extreme nationalism still determined to tear the country apart at the seams, will the country and its people fully emerge from the horror of the last decade.
International Criminal Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia (ICTY):
1. Funding for the ICTY should be increased through the UN to the extent necessary to enable it to:
a) significantly increase its caseload;
b) conduct trials in Bosnia; and
c) significantly extend its outreach activity.
2. NATO governments should order the immediate arrest of Radovan Karadzic.
3. With the active support of the French and US governments, NATO should make a renewed effort to arrest all indicted war criminals in Bosnia before the end of 2000.
4. NATO governments should place war crimes evidence and information gained via electronic surveillance at the disposal of the ICTY.
5. The Council of Ministers should – within the context of its current efforts to develop a central court – authorise the creation of a special war crimes tribunal, with an ethnic balance similar to that of Bosnia’s Constitutional Court, operating under the ICTY’s “Rules of the Road.”
6. The tax administrations, financial police and criminal police of Republika Srpska and the Federation should investigate the financial activities of indicted war criminals to determine if their assets were obtained through illegal means, and if so, seize these holdings under applicable local criminal law.
Office of the High Representative (OHR):
7. OHR should – in co-operation with OSCE – take all steps available to exclude the SDS and its officials from participation in Bosnian political life, including setting and enforcing performance benchmarks by elected SDS officials (if the party is not banned from participation in the November 2000 general elections).
8. OHR should use the powers at its disposal to preclude individuals reasonably suspected of war crimes, including former members of wartime Crisis Staffs, from holding positions as directors or members of the board of directors of public companies.
9. OHR, in co-operation with the Independent Media Commission (IMC), should seek ways to broadcast local language proceedings of the ICTY trials throughout Bosnia on television.
10. The OHR anti-fraud unit should expand its anti-corruption activities to include investigations of the sources of income of suspected war criminals.
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE):
11. OSCE should – in co-operation with the OHR – decertify the SDS and its candidates from participating in any further elections, including the November 2000 general elections.
12. OSCE should more actively use its powers to exclude from candidacy for public office any individual suspected on reasonable grounds of involvement in war crimes.
13. OSCE should require candidates to submit information on war time activities as part of the registration process for candidacy.
14. OSCE should monitor more closely the personal financial disclosure documentation provided by local politicians.
UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMiBH):
15. UNMiBH should seek to further improve the efficiency and speed of implementation of its screening checks of police, and act decisively to remove from police functions individuals suspected on reasonable grounds of involvement in war crimes.
Sarajevo/Washington/Brussels, 2 November 2000