Azerbaijan: Turning Over a New Leaf?
Europe Report N°156
13 Apr 2004
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Oil-rich Azerbaijan, which borders Iran, Turkey and Russia and is still scarred from its defeat by Armenia ten years ago, gives cause for both hope and concern. The October 2003 election of Ilham Aliyev to the presidency that his late-father, Heydar, had held almost from independence, highlighted the stark choices which now face the country. Its government is a carefully designed autocratic system, which the father and former Soviet-era politburo member began to construct in the late 1960s, with heavy reliance on family and clan members, oil revenues and patronage.
While the new President Aliyev, and indeed many in the international community, have stressed continuity and stability with this changing of the guard, fundamental challenges with broad regional implications are now front and centre. First and foremost, Azerbaijan's young and largely untested leader will need to decide whether to embrace the democratic process or try to maintain autocratic rule with just the thinnest of veneers of legitimate political competition. While it has been tempting to sweep international concerns about democracy under the carpet because of strategic concerns related to oil reserves and simmering regional disputes, such an approach would likely exacerbate instability and have high long-term costs.
The presidential election fell well below international standards. There was no genuine campaign, opposition parties were harassed and intimidated, and key opposition candidates were prevented from registering. The media was biased, and there was little opportunity for any party or group to express dissent. Opposition parties were also poorly organised and failed to back a common candidate. Immediately after the badly-flawed elections, violence erupted between the security services and opposition groups calling for a second round of balloting. Several hundred individuals were arrested, and there is today no visible political opposition in the country.
Foreign criticism was decidedly muted, and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that this was largely due to commercial energy interests and jockeying for strategic advantage in the region. While there was some U.S. and European Union (EU) criticism after the election, it was obviously too little, too late. The U.S. and EU will need to be much more vocal in their commitment to the democratic process if they hope to bolster the young reformers within both the government and the opposition.
Azerbaijan's ruling elite is increasingly divided, with several clans (largely organised along regional and patronage relationships) competing for control of a pyramidal distribution structure that allows substantial funds to be skimmed from the oil business. President Aliyev will also have to address sharp generational cleavages within the government, private sector and even his own family. Anticipating some of these struggles, his father had already started appointing younger officials to key positions. However, some of these may emerge as direct challengers to the new leader if his rule falters.
The importance of encouraging democratisation and combating corruption becomes clear when considering the challenges that Aliyev faces. Cracking down on the opposition and harshly repressing religious groups could boomerang and, combined with general socio-economic discontent, fuel a more radical political and religious opposition and unrest in the northern regions. The new president needs to place high priority on economic development beyond the petroleum sector and outside Baku. His government should consider introducing moderate religious education in schools and allow religious organisations to register. Aliyev's best hope of fulfilling Azerbaijan's commitments to the Council of Europe is to nurture a new generation of technocratic professionals while steadily dismantling the corrupt patronage network that drives the economy and political system. A credible investigation of the violence surrounding the 2003 election would be a welcome step.
Azerbaijan has a century-long secular tradition in which religion has not had a major role in political life. However, events in 2002 around a mosque in the normally sedate town of Nardaran, just north of Baku, revealed new tensions. The case showed that Azerbaijan's leaders are quick to blame almost any political disturbance on radical Islam, rather than trace their roots back to difficult social and economic conditions driven by corrupt and incompetent governance.
Despite frequent efforts by the government to manipulate religious issues, there were some genuine signs that more radical strains of Islam were developing until 2002. Since then, the security services appear to have extensively penetrated most of the radical networks.
Developing Azerbaijan as a more modern, open, democratic and less corrupt state could help facilitate resolution of the long festering conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory. A durable settlement would also be significantly advanced by closer coordination between the U.S., the EU and Russia. France, in particular, should more closely incorporate its negotiating role within EU policy toward the region.
1. Implement rapidly a program to create economic growth and reduce social inequalities outside Baku and in non-energy sectors, with a particular emphasis on improving the investment climate for businesses outside the petroleum industry.
2. Use state revenues to boost pensions and salaries while fighting corruption in the health sector.
3. Launch a credible investigation into the behaviour of law enforcement agencies during and immediately after the October 2003 presidential elections and clear the names of political opponents and chairs of election commissions who were arbitrarily arrested.
4. Facilitate registration of religious organisations by the State Committee on Religious Affairs through a more transparent and tolerant procedure and, in general, implement more democratic policies on religion.
5. Implement the Council of Europe's recommendations on treatment of political prisoners and independent media.
6. Establish a genuinely independent anti-corruption structure to investigate use of public resources for private purposes and to propose necessary reform legislation after considering recommendations from civil society and NGOs.
7. Take a higher public profile on governance matters, in particular by calling on the government to meet its commitments to the Council of Europe and embrace democratisation.
8. Condition development and security assistance to both Azerbaijan and Armenia on the continuation of regular and serious bilateral talks regarding Nagorno-Karabakh.
9. Explore more fully through discussions between Russia, NATO, OSCE, the EU and the U.S. the mechanisms and composition of a peacekeeping force that might help oversee a potential Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.
10. Support independent media in Azerbaijan more actively by funding an independent television channel and an independent printing house in Baku and by supporting regular opinion polls on important national political and economic topics.
11. Assist local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in minority-populated areas to generate employment and support community development.
12. Avoid escalating the situation in the South Caucasus by increasing military cooperation with Armenia.
13. Cooperate more actively with Azerbaijan in strengthening border controls between Azerbaijan and Dagestan.
To EU Member States and the European Commission:
14. Raise the profile of human rights issues both in public statements and during Cooperation Council meetings with the Azerbaijan government.
15. Clarify whether France is acting on behalf of the EU as co-chairman of the OSCE Minsk Group dealing with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
16. Place the Nagorno-Karabakh issue on the agenda of each EU-Russia summit and tie appropriate financial matters to constructive efforts to achieve a settlement.
17. Open a European Commission office in Baku, and establish an EU-Caucasus Chamber of Commerce with headquarters in Baku and branches in Tbilisi and Yerevan.
18. Approach expanded military cooperation in the South Caucasus with political sensitivity, understanding that any increased military presence in Azerbaijan, Georgia or elsewhere in the Caspian region could provoke a deterioration of relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia as well as with Russia and Iran.
Baku/Brussels, 13 May 2004