Andes

Colombia needs bolder policies to cope with the violence in its border areas, because improved relations with its neighbours alone have neither effectively reduced ongoing conflict with illegal armed groups nor alleviated the plight of the local communities.

Crime and violence seriously threaten Venezuela’s medium and long-term stability, regardless of whether or not President Hugo Chávez retains power in the 2012 election.

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If the interference of criminal groups in local politics is not addressed, they could become even a bigger threat to Colombia’s local democracy and national security.

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President Juan Manuel Santos has taken welcome steps toward reform in his first ten weeks but now must put in place and execute a truly comprehensive and integrated conflict resolution strategy for Colombia to secure sustainable peace.

Colombia’s new government has to improve security policy to tackle the guerrilla tactics of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) as well as their broadened participation in drug trafficking and newly forged alliances with other illegal armed groups.

Colombia’s efforts to resolve its half-century armed conflict and growing tensions with neighbours will be shaped by the decision on whether to change the constitution to enable President Álvaro Uribe to seek a second re-election in May 2010.

President Hugo Chávez’s victory in the 15 February 2009 referendum, permitting indefinite re-election of all elected officials, marked an acceleration of his “Bolivarian revolution” and “socialism of the 21st century”.

Over seven years, the government of President Álvaro Uribe has produced important security gains, but these have been accompanied by serious human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law (IHL).

Latin America’s oldest guerrilla organisation, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), is under severe stress.

The more than 155,000 victims of Colombia’s conflict registered to date with the attorney general’s Justice and Peace Unit (JPU) – mostly those who suffered from the paramilitaries – are mainly onlookers to, not actors in, a lagging transitional justice process.