Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain’s Rocky Road to Reform
Middle East Report N°111
28 Jul 2011
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Following a spasm of violence, Bahrain faces a critical choice between endemic instability and slow but steady progress toward political reform. The most sensible way forward is to launch a new, genuine dialogue in which the political opposition is fairly represented and to move toward changes that will turn the country into a constitutional monarchy. In order to create an environment in which such talks could succeed, the regime should take immediate steps to address the human rights crisis, including by releasing political leaders jailed for peacefully expressing their views, and reverse the alarming sectarian polarisation that has occurred.
In February and March 2011, Bahrain experienced peaceful mass protests followed by brutal repression, leaving a distressing balance sheet: over 30 dead, mostly demonstrators or bystanders; prominent opposition leaders sentenced to lengthy jail terms, including eight for life; hundreds of others languishing in prison; torture, and at least four deaths in detentions; trials, including of medical professionals, in special security courts lacking even the semblance of due process of law; over 40 Shiite mosques and other religious structures damaged or demolished; the country’s major independent newspaper transformed into a regime mouthpiece; a witch hunt against erstwhile protesters who faced dismissal or worse, based on “loyalty” oaths; serious damage to the country’s economy; a parliament left without its opposition; and much more. More significant for the long term perhaps, the violence further polarised a society already divided along sectarian lines and left hopes for political reform in tatters, raising serious questions about the island’s stability.
The regime – a Sunni monarchy headed by the Al Khalifa family – gave a pseudo-legal cast to the repression it unleashed by issuing a “law of national safety”, emergency legislation that permitted some of the human rights violations listed above. And it enveloped itself in the protective embrace of its neighbours, fellow members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), avowedly to ward off a victory by the perceived proxies of Iran, its own Shiite population.
As the crisis escalated in the second half of February and first half of March, two parallel battles unfolded within the opposing camps: a reformist crown prince wagered his political future on reaching out to a pragmatic segment of the (mostly Shiite) opposition, angering more hard-line regime elements, including the septuagenarian uncle of the king, who is the world’s longest-sitting unelected prime minister. In turn, the largest licensed opposition society, Al-Wifaq, risked alienating its popular base, including many of the protesters gathered at the central Pearl roundabout in Manama, by agreeing to engage in informal, semi-secret talks with the crown prince.
While mostly calling for political reform leading to a constitutional monarchy in the uprising’s early days, protesters steadily began to embrace the more radical demand for the regime’s replacement with a democratic republic, and they began to radiate throughout the capital to bolster this demand. Feeling threatened, the regime lashed back. This spelled the end of talk about dialogue and reform and weakened dialogue’s main protagonists. Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad appears marginalised within the royal family, at least for the time being; Al-Wifaq is struggling to hold onto its popular base, as it seeks to keep reform prospects alive while opposition leaders remain in jail and repression continues.
Under pressure from its Western allies, mostly the U.S. and UK, and seeking to recover from the shock to its economy, King Hamad bin Isa lifted the emergency law on 1 June, agreed to an independent international investigation of the events of February and March and ordered a “national consensus dialogue”, which began on 5 July. While on their face these are positive developments, the lifting of the state of emergency and the start of a national dialogue appear designed more to placate these same allies than to significantly alter the regime’s approach toward its own citizens.
Repression has eased but not ended, and none of the worst excesses – the lengthy prison sentences for political offences, job dismissals based on participation in peaceful protests, mosque destruction – have been reversed. Foreign troops remain on Bahraini soil, with the prospect of a prolonged GCC military presence at some level. And the “national consensus dialogue” appears to strive for neither consensus among an inclusive group representative of society nor genuine dialogue between opponents; so far it has been instead an exercise in make-belief. The only positive development that has the potential to trigger a course correction is the independent commission, headed by international war crimes expert Cherif Bassiouni, but it is not expected to complete its work until the end of October.
There is reason to fear that Bahrain is heading for prolonged political stalemate, enforced by a heavy security presence backed by foreign troops and punctuated by protests when circumstance permits. The consequences could be costly. Already, divisions between Sunnis and Shiites are deeper than ever; many Shiites have a family member or friend killed or in jail. By oppressing Shiites as a group, the regime is erecting communal boundaries; by closing off any avenue of political participation and targeting even moderate opposition groups such as Al-Wifaq, it is laying the groundwork for a potential future uprising. In this tense atmosphere, any further provocation or violent action could trigger an explosion; unfortunately, hardliners in both the Shiite and Sunni communities as well as within the regime seem to be preparing for precisely this.
Further repression and violence will not unlock this complex political equation or defuse this combustible situation. The better alternative is for the parties to find a path to dialogue and inter-communal accommodation, paving the way for a constitutional monarchy that treats its subjects as citizens with full political rights. As a first step, the regime should take a series of confidence-building measures, including freeing those arrested for their participation in peaceful protest, ending its stigmatisation of the Shiite community and halting the practice of destroying or damaging Shiite mosques and prayer houses.
Backed by Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, the regime will not contemplate such measures in the absence of a combination of pressures. Some are likely to occur no matter what. Already, the regime is aware of mounting economic cost after investments shrank, businesses suffered a downturn in their profits, banks began contemplating the possible relocation of their operations, and major events were cancelled, such as Formula One’s annual Grand Prix. But this alone is unlikely to produce a change, as it seems to believe it can survive economically as long as oil prices remain high, and Saudi Arabia maintains financial support.
Should it remain inflexible, the royal family also in all probability will confront pressure in the form of renewed protests by those who have been discriminated economically and marginalised politically, mostly members of the majority Shiite population. This could well be effective, but only if opposition leaders can persuade their followers and other protesters to continue to pursue peaceful means.
Finally, Western states and notably the U.S. have a key role to play. Washington, which has enormous assets and interests in the Gulf, including Bahrain, would do well to step up its efforts, in coordination with influential allies such as the UK, to persuade the regime to loosen the reins and institute meaningful reform. Failing such steps, and facing an Al Khalifa family unresponsive to its entreaties, the U.S. should also be prepared to take more dramatic action, including a reduction in its military support. For its part, the opposition should seek to reassure the royal family, and the Sunni community that largely supports it, that it seeks an expansion of political rights, not the monarchy’s overthrow, and that it accepts the concessions offered by the crown prince in mid-March as the starting point for negotiations.
To the Government of Bahrain:
1. Establish an environment for direct dialogue leading toward meaningful political reform, including by:
a) freeing all those jailed for the peaceful expression of their views, including those already sentenced and especially including opposition leaders;
b) ending all trials by special security courts and retrying those convicted by such courts in regular criminal courts;
c) ceasing destruction of Shiite mosques, on any ground, and providing licenses regulating their construction; and
d) reinstating those dismissed for participation in peaceful protests, absence from work during the height of the crisis or other reasons linked with the February and March events.
2. Start a genuine and broad-based dialogue with the opposition, participated in by leaders (including those currently in prison) of all political groups, licensed or unlicensed, with a view to reaching agreement on meaningful political reform, based on the seven points agreed to by the crown prince on 13 March.
3. Distance itself publicly from sectarian rhetoric, prohibit government officials and state-owned news channels from using such rhetoric and actively discourage all citizens from employing it.
4. End sectarian discrimination in government recruitment, including in the security services, army and National Guard, as well as the diplomatic service and senior government positions.
5. Provide full access to the Bassiouni commission of investigation, make public its findings once it completes its work and implement its recommendations.
6. Hold accountable members of the security forces found to have broken the law or otherwise to have committed abuses of human rights in dealing with popular protests.
To Bahraini Opposition Groups:
7. Keep protests peaceful and refrain from inflammatory rhetoric.
8. Participate in dialogue with the regime, assuming it is genuine, as well as with non-Shiite political societies such as the National Unity Gathering, with a view to reaching agreement on meaningful political reform.
9. Make clear that they seek an expansion of political rights not the monarchy’s overthrow and accept the concessions offered by the crown prince in mid-March as the starting point for negotiations.
To Youth Activists:
10. Keep protests peaceful and refrain from inflammatory rhetoric.
To Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council:
11. Withdraw troops deployed in Bahrain at the earliest possible time and, until then, keep them from any role in internal policing.
12. Insist that Bahrain adhere to international human rights standards.
13. Refrain from inflammatory sectarian rhetoric.
To the U.S. and other Western Governments:
14. Press Bahrain to adhere to international human rights standards and publicly criticise the government for violations, including but not limited to arbitrary arrest, incommunicado detention, torture, excessive use of force and suppression of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly.
15. Press Bahrain to release unconditionally anyone detained solely in connection with pro-democracy and anti-government protests, unless there is evidence they may have been responsible for a recognisable criminal offense.
16. Encourage both the government and opposition to engage in direct and genuine dialogue with a view to reaching an agreement on meaningful reform within the framework of a constitutional monarchy.
17. Suspend security assistance, including commercial sales of military and police equipment, until the government ends its human rights violations and takes genuine steps toward meaningful political dialogue.
To the Government of Iran:
18. Distance itself publicly from sectarian rhetoric and prohibit government officials and state-owned news channels from resorting to such rhetoric.
Manama/Washington/Brussels, 28 July 2011