International Crisis Group
text only version

1. The current situation
2. What should be done
3. Crisis Group analysis
4. Congo online and in other media

Photo: A Congolese soldier holds a RPG in front of the office of opposition presidential candidate President Bemba in Kinshasa, November 2006. Goran Tomasevic/REUTERS.

updated 16 June 2009

1. The current situation

Numerous ceasefire agreements and military operations have failed to stabilise eastern Congo and civilians continue to suffer the consequences. The Rwandan-Congolese joint military operation earlier this year, though an important step did not produce significant results against the Rwandan Hutu rebels, and integration of the former CNDP insurgency has been precarious. What is needed now is for the international community to work with the Congolese and Rwandan governments to support and implement a genuine and comprehensive peacebuilding strategy that should focus on a comprehensive disarmament strategy for Rwandan Hutu rebels in both North and South Kivu, resuming security system reform in the Kivus and the Orientale province, and political engagement dedicated to improving governance through increased economic transparency, equitable taxation, decentralisation and local elections.

Following the breakdown of the January 2008 “Goma agreement”, which involved negotiations between the government, renegade general Laurent Nkunda and Mayi-Mayi militias, North Kivu was again engulfed by violence in late August 2008. Fighting escalated after Nkunda’s CNDP rebels launched a fresh counter-offensive on army bases and, after FARDC's collapse, moved to the outskirts of the regional capital Goma in October. International diplomatic efforts managed to stave off an advance on the city and UN Special Envoy Ousegun Obasanjo and Great Lakes Envoy Benjamin Mkapa, facilitated engagement between Kinshasa and CNDP. After a period of increasing Rwanda-Congo tension, much welcomed progress in relations was reported on 5 December when military and political cooperation was announced.

Talks between Kinshasa and Kigali in late 2008 led to the preparation of a joint military plan to disarm the FDLR, integrate CNDP combatants into the national army and neutralise Nkunda.   The military chief of staff of the CNDP, General Bosco Ntaganda, decided to work with Rwanda and Congo against the FDLR.   Ntaganda, who is under an arrest warrant for war crimes issued by the International Criminal Court, did so apparently after receiving Kigali's encouragement as well as financial support from Kinshasa and assurances that he will be protected against international justice.  On 16 January 2009, Ntaganda announced that Nkunda was removed as the CNDP’s chairman. The CNDP said it would remove all its roadblocks in North Kivu and requested promulgation of the amnesty law. PARECO and Mayi-Mayi groups made similar declarations.

Operation Umoja Wetu, the joint military offensive launched on 20 January 2009 against the Rwandan Hutu rebels of the FDLR did not fundamentally weaken the rebels in North Kivu. The operation lasted only 35 days and was limited to North Kivu, despite an important FDLR presence in South Kivu. The integration of the Tutsi-led insurgents from the CNDP into the national army is fragile. Over 850,000 IDPs are still unable to return safely to their areas of origin.

The most positive outcome of this initiative was the further political isolation of the FDLR, which had to face an unprecedented Congo-Rwanda coalition. On the ground, the operation initially pushed the FDLR westward, farther from Rwanda. Its command and control structure was temporarily disorganized, and it was dislodged from important bases, but the combatants mainly dispersed in small groups in nearby forests without suffering major casualties. The armed group still has up to 6,000 fighters and only 578 Hutu rebel combatants had been repatriated from 1 January to 30 April 2009. MONUC and the FARDC should have filled the vacuum left by the joint operation and assured a progressive restoration of state authority. Instead, in the absence of FARDC planning and adequate coordination with MONUC, FDLR units regrouped and started to reoccupy their former positions while retaliating violently against civilians. This was followed by Rwandan requests to renew joint military operations. Kinshasa unsurprisingly rejected these requests.

As early as 13 February, Human Rights Watch reported that retaliatory FDLR attacks killed over 100 Congolese civilians and that attacks against civilians in North Kivu continued to increase in March and April. By 10 April, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) reported that in the first quarter of 2009, attacks against aid workers had risen by 22 per cent compared to the same period in 2008.

On 7 April MONUC and the Congolese army agreed to establish a joint command structure to expand the operation against the FDLR in North and South Kivu. But the efficiency of this joint effort will be undermined by tensions between various army units and by a struggle for leadership in integrated units between former members of the CNDP and regular army officers. 

On 22 February Congo and CNDP delegations announced in Goma that they had negotiated a preliminary agreement addressing the former insurgents’ political concerns. A final agreement was then signed on 23 March after a month of closed-door negotiations. The CNDP agreed to end its insurgency, become a political party and have its fighters join the police and army. In return, it obtained key concessions including the release of prisoners, promulgation of a comprehensive amnesty law, creation of a national reconciliation mechanism, and integration of CNDP officials into the North Kivu administration.

The integration of rebel groups into the Congolese army has not proceeded smoothly. Elements of the CNDP have fled to the hills of Busumba and Ruvunda in North Kivu as a result of dissatisfaction with their integration. CNDP rank and file were not convinced the Kigali-Kinshasa deal was in their interests and were particularly unhappy with the dismantling of the administrative, taxation, customs and duties structure established by the movement that had guaranteed them a steady income for three years.

The return of the FDLR to previous positions is likely to jeopardise progress made on the integration into the FARDC of CNDP forces, who will be angered at the absence of strong determination by the high command to address the problem and who will not easily accept orders to move from the Kivus to other provinces. If that happens the other armed groups might also pull out of the process.

On paper, the government gave the CNDP almost everything it could wish for.  CNDP representatives obtained key positions in the security forces and in the political institutions of North Kivu.  Indeed, the CNDP are the de facto government in the “petit nord”, the southern part of the province.  In reality, implementation of the agreement between the CNDP and Kinshasa will require a degree of goodwill and efficiency heretofore unknown in the Congolese government.  Moreover, major international scrutiny will be required to bring to light new tensions among local communities that may result from the fact Kinshasa accorded a key position to Rwandaphones in the petit nord.

As of 18 April, the official end-date of the fast-tracked integration program, two battalions, led by Colonel Sultani Makenga and Colonel Claude Mucyo, had refused the process. No measures are in place to deal with the several hundred demobilised Rwandan soldiers who joined the CNDP or traded their uniforms for Congolese ones during the joint operation and did not return to Rwanda. Ex-CNDP will wear FARDC uniforms but will reject transfer outside of North Kivu and maintain their military control of the “petit nord”. 

The reconciliation process that the agreement is supposed to have created ignores necessary judicial requirements.. The amnesty law passed on 7 May 2009 by the Congolese parliament excluded war crimes and crimes against humanity, but negotiations were also under way to have Nkunda transferred to a third country, which would allow him to escape trial. Bosco Ntaganda, under an ICC arrest warrant as indicated above, is now FARDC deputy commander for the anti-FDLR operation, but even a joint demarche by Kinshasa and Kigali to the ICC would not result in the lifting of the arrest warrant. Unrealistic promises to CNDP officers could also be undermining fast-tracked integration.

The opportunity offered by the dramatic policy shifts of the Congo and Rwanda in the Kivus should not be wasted. These shifts have created the most conducive regional political environment for peacebuilding there in two decades.  At the same time, the FDLR issue remains unsolved and struggle for power in North Kivu raises new uncertainties. The gains made since November 2008 will be wasted if there is not a concerted international effort to craft a strategy that addresses both the short- and longer-term causes of the instability.

For recent Crisis Group reporting on the situations in Ituri and in North Kivu, see Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, Africa Report N°150, 11 May 2009,  Congo: Four Priorities for Sustainable Peace in Ituri, 13 May 2008, and Congo: Bringing Peace to North Kivu, 31 October 2007.

For a month by month report on the conflict in the Congo since September 2003, see Crisis Group's CrisisWatch database.

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2. What should be done

In its latest report Congo: A Comprehensive Strategy to Disarm the FDLR, Africa Report N°151, 9 July 2009, Crisis Group made the following recommendations:

To the Government of Congo:

1.  Suspend operation “Kimia II” and refrain from any further military offensive against the FDLR at this time, shifting priority to protecting the Kivu population against FDLR attacks and reprisals by establishing protected areas close to rebel-held territory and controlling major roads day and night.

2.  Participate in the planning and implementation of a new FDLR disarmament strategy as described below.

3.  Actively pursue normal relations with Rwanda, notably by establishing cross-border development projects within the framework of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries and by jointly analysing the region’s traumatic history within the framework of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), so as to foster reconciliation between Congolese and Rwandans.

To MONUC:

4.  Reinforce the training given FARDC brigades and assign military mentors to Congolese units.

5.  Insert civilian specialists into the joint FARDC-MONUC military planning unit and facilitate the design of civil-military cooperation projects aimed at protecting civilians and building confidence between civilians and Congolese security forces.

6.  Ensure the 3,000 reinforcements authorised by UN Security Council Resolution 1853 are speedily deployed in eastern Congo.

7.  Reinforce the Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) section with specialists in intelligence and psychological operations, as well as legal experts who can develop cases for prosecution of crimes committed during the Congo’s violent conflicts.

To the members of the international facilitation of the Nairobi communiqué (AU, EU, U.S., UN):

8.  Establish a mechanism for strategic management of FDLR disarmament and demobilisation composed of military and civilian MONUC personnel, Congolese and Rwandan officials, specialists from facilitation countries, and liaison officers with Interpol, the International Criminal Court and the World Bank, to formulate a new FDLR disarmament strategy and to coordinate the activities of all international entities – military and civilian – involved in its implementation. This strategy should include:

a)  intensive counter-propaganda and other sophisticated psychological operations targeting the FDLR rank and file for voluntary disarmament;

b)  offers of third country relocation to those who do not wish to return to Rwanda or settle in Congo;

c)  action within the scope of national laws to limit the ability of the FDLR political leadership living in countries such as France, Belgium, Germany, the U.S., Canada, Cameroon, Zambia and Kenya to operate freely, including, where such a possibility exists under their domestic law, investigation and prosecution of leadership members for complicity in war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in eastern Congo;

d)  selection and training of eight battalions of the Congolese national army (the FARDC) dedicated to cordon and search operations in support of special forces operations, with offensive military actions against the FDLR not to be undertaken before this training is completed and a clear military doctrine has been established for the force; and

e)     operations by Rwandan special forces focusing on neutralising the FDLR command and control structure.

To the Government of Rwanda:

9.  Participate in the planning and implementation of a new FDLR disarmament strategy as described above.

10.  Submit a revised list of FDLR leaders suspected of participation in the 1994 genocide.

11.  Take part in technical discussions under the auspices of UN Special Envoy Obasanjo with FDLR officers not included in the list with respect to the conditions of their repatriation or relocation under international supervision.

12.  Actively pursue normal relations with the DRC, notably by establishing cross-border development projects within the framework of the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries and by jointly analysing the region’s traumatic history within the framework of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), so as to foster reconciliation between Congolese and Rwandans.

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3. Crisis Group analysis

For more information on the background to the conflict in the Congo, see the DR Congo conflict history on our databases and resources page.

Crisis Group's most recent reporting on DRC

All of Crisis Group's reports and briefings on the Congo can be found here.

Crisis Group articles and opinion pieces

On 29 January, Crisis Group released a Conflict Risk Alert related to the situation in DR Congo, click here to read it.

On 25 November 2008, Crisis Group submitted a memo to the UN Security Council on the situation in DR Congo, click here to read the full statement.

Crisis Group has produced "Congo Re-erupts", a multimedia presentation on the situation in North Kivu. Click here to view the presentation.

For a month by month report on the conflict in the Congo since September 2003, see Crisis Group's CrisisWatch database.

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4. Congo online and in other media

Relevant Websites

UN IRIN, Democratic Republic of Congo

Reuters AlertNet, Democratic Republic of Congo

International Committee of the Red Cross, Democratic Republic of Congo

International Rescue Committee, Democratic Republic of Congo

Médecins Sans Frontières, Democratic Republic of Congo

BBC Country Profile, Democratic Republic of Congo

New York Times, Congo Resources

Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo

Amnesty International, Democratic Republic of Congo


Articles and Reports

Coghlan, B. et al., "Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An ongoing crisis", International Rescue Committee (January 2007)

Médecins Sans Frontires, "Ituri - Civilians still the first victims: Permanence of sexual violence and impact of military operations", October 2007.

Human Rights Watch, "Renewed Crisis in North Kivu", Volume 19, No. 17 (a), October 2007.


Watch video on Congo

The U.S. PBS program "Now" covered DR Congo in the 15 May show "Can the U.N. Keep the Peace?". The full video is available on their website.

The public TV newscast website Worldfocus has a range of frequently updated videos on DR Congo.

The Hub, an online media site for human rights, has an extensive collection of videos on DR Congo.

CBS news program 60 Minutes, "War Against Women: The Use Of Rape As A Weapon In Congo's Civil War", broadcast January 2008.

CNN's news program "The Killing Fields: Africa's Misery, the World's Shame" broadcast a report on the Congo in October 2006. Click here to watch the video.

ABC's news program Nightline broadcast a report on the Congo in November 2005, prepared with Crisis Group's assistance.  Click here to watch the video.

Click here for video images of the Congo. TV journalists can contact Kimberly Abbott in Washington DC at +1 202 785 1601 for more information or additional footage.

"Democracy in the Rough", is a PBS Wide Angle production filming on the ground as the Democratic Republic of Congo holds its first elections in 45 years – an election supported by more than $450 million from the United Nations.

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