Syria Under Bashar (II): Domestic Policy Challenges

This report is also available in Arabic.
To access the Executive Summary and Recommendations of this report in French, please click here.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Bashar al-Assad’s presidency has failed to live up to the hopes for far-reaching domestic reform that greeted it in 2000. After a brief opening, Syria clamped down on dissent, and economic change remains painfully slow. Many who once viewed Bashar as a potential partner, open-minded, and Western-oriented, now perceive him as, if anything, more ideological than and just as tied to the Baathist regime as his father. Both assessments are overly simplistic and poor guides to dealing with a Syria that is at a crossroads. Syrian officials hint at significant steps in mid-2004, including possible changes in the Baath Party hierarchy and doctrine and moves toward a more open and inclusive political system. Scepticism is in order, as such pledges have repeatedly been made in the past only to be ignored. But with reform now a strategic imperative, Syria should turn hints into reality and the international community should find ways to encourage and to assist it.  

There is good evidence that Bashar came to office aware that bold economic measures were needed to rationalise public administration, curb corruption and otherwise modernise the country. But his legitimacy and power base are closely tied to the Baathist system. However much he may understand that his plans cannot succeed with the current regime, he fears that he may not long survive without it. It is not a question of merely ridding the system of remnants of his father’s rule. The system has been shaped by powerful constituents – a political/economic elite entrenched in the public sector, the army, security services and a vast, lethargic bureaucracy accustomed to benefit from the status quo. Far more than his father, Bashar has to share authority with multiple power centres, as Syria’s “pluralistic authoritarianism” becomes less authoritarian, more pluralistic. An aspiring reformist, the President realised that his longevity was tied to the stability of the regime he sought to reform.

In the past, foreign policy dividends – income generated by aid from Iran in the 1980s, from the Gulf in the early 1990s, and from illicit trade with Iraq since then – made up for domestic shortfalls. Those days are gone. Syria urgently needs domestic change. Its economy is plagued by corruption, ageing state industries, a volatile and under-performing agricultural sector, rapidly depleting oil resources, an anachronistic educational system, capital flight and lack of foreign investment.

The image of a regime that owes its durability solely to repression and a narrow, sectarian base is wide of the mark; the Baathists built support from a cross-section of Syria’s socio-economic and religious groups. Still, the regime is by no means immune to internal challenge should the economy continue to deteriorate. At the least, a flagging economy will gradually undercut its legitimacy and undermine its support, and shrinking economic resources will reduce the availability of rents and economic privileges that have been used to ensure backing from key groups.

Syria’s foreign reserves should not be used as a pretext to defer reform but rather to put in place the safety net necessary to protect the population from hardships that will inevitably accompany restructuring. To be effective, however, economic reform must be accompanied by political liberalisation. Without greater accountability, transparency and a freer media, it will be extremely difficult to break the cycle of corruption and inefficiency. And with fewer economic resources to distribute, it is all the more important to build a stronger domestic consensus through greater public participation.

Any reforms will, no doubt, be gradual and carefully managed; even so, some argue that they will spark unrest and open the door to radical Islamism. While the history of the Muslim Brotherhood’s violent activities in Syria certainly is cause for concern, the available evidence suggests that the rise of militant Islam has been nurtured by a repressive, closed system that prevents free expression and association and has badly damaged the bond of trust between citizens and state. The stifling of political participation and the discrediting of official ideology leads to a vacuum that radical Islamic discourse is best equipped to fill.

This report is published simultaneously with another on Syria’s foreign policy challenges.* The two subjects are interconnected. A strengthened domestic Syrian consensus, including national reconciliation and renewed political legitimacy for its leadership, will make it possible for Syria to play a more effective and confident role on the regional scene. Conversely, what happens internationally affects Bashar’s domestic standing and ability to push through reform.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Syria:

1.   Promote national dialogue and reconciliation by:

(a)  issuing a general amnesty for political activists, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood, in Syria and in exile, who have not engaged in violence and allowing the return of exiled opposition figures who have not engaged in violence;

(b)  convening a national conference of political parties, opposition figures and political activists to discuss the process of national reconciliation and commit to non-violence and the forsaking of extra-judicial retribution for prior abuses; and

(c)  removing the ban on the Kurdish language, allowing Kurds to organise their own cultural activities and revoking census results so as to extend full and equal citizenship rights to all Kurdish “non-nationals” (maktumin) and their offspring.

2.   Begin political liberalisation by:

(a)  lifting the state of emergency;

(b)  giving civil society and political organisations the space to organise and establishing a more transparent legal framework that enables NGOs to be recognised and operate more freely; and

(c)  encouraging freer media coverage of public policy issues.

3.   Accelerate economic reform by:

(a)  drawing up and implementing an administrative reform plan and making economic management more transparent, including by initiating a strong anti-corruption campaign and taking steps to reduce collusion between state and businesses;

(b)  establishing a transparent tender mechanism for public procurement and one-stop licensing procedures; and

(c)  drawing on foreign exchange reserves to help finance job-creation and poverty alleviation programs.

To Members of the Syrian Opposition:

4.   Promote political change only through non-violent means, and in particular:

(a)  repudiate any past resort to violence and pledge not to engage in extra-judicial retribution for past regime abuses; and

(b)  pursue an open dialogue with the Baath Party, avoiding inflammatory rhetoric.

To the European Union (EU), its Member States, and Japan:

5.   Bolster reformers within the Syrian leadership by promoting administrative and institutional reform, focusing on the presidency and on ministries or ministerial secretariats led by reformists.

6.   Offer assistance to help cushion hardship caused by economic liberalisation, for example by providing funds and expertise to assist the Syrian Agency for Combating Unemployment.

7.   Provide assistance for civil society development and capacity-building and press Syria on human rights issues – including individual cases and measures such as lifting the state of emergency – and, in the case of the EU, identify mechanisms to follow up on the clause on democratic principles and human rights in the Association Treaty.

To the U.S. Government:

8.   Lift opposition to Syria entering negotiations aimed at joining the World Trade Organisation.

9.   Increase people-to-people contacts, particularly in the area of education.

Amman/Brussels, 11 February 2004