Demobilising the Paramilitaries in Colombia: An Achievable Goal?

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The target of disbanding the paramilitary United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC) by the end of 2005, set when the government of President Alvaro Uribe signed the Ralito I accord with the far-right group nearly a year ago, remains problematic. The government will need to get much tougher, including with credible threats to use force, if negotiations that opened in July 2004 are to succeed. The international community should offer more cooperation if the serious questions that remain about the project can be resolved in a way that respects rule of law and promotes the ultimate goal of ending the long conflict.

The signing of the Ralito II agreement in May 2004 and the opening of talks in the newly established neutral Zone of Location (ZDU), are positive steps, particularly following the near-breakdown earlier in the year, ceasefire violations and continued AUC drug trafficking. While little substance was addressed in the agreement, and a precise timetable for the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) of AUC fighters has yet to be fixed, Ralito II nonetheless provides the Uribe administration an opportunity to move the process forward during its remaining two years in office.

But to achieve real, sustainable progress, the government still needs to develop a legal framework and political strategy for collective demobilisation of all armed groups. Since the April 2004 disappearance and probable murder of its leader, Carlos Castaño, the AUC has become increasingly assertive. Under the new chief, Salvatore Mancuso, the paramilitaries say they are unwilling to accept any jail time for war crimes or extradition of their leaders to the U.S. on drug-trafficking charges, even as their narcotics involvement has continued unabated, and international concern over possible impunity for past crimes has deepened. The domestically controversial, government-endorsed appearance by Mancuso and two other paramilitary commanders before the Colombian Congress on 28 July 2004 increased this concern. They used the platform to reiterate the AUC proposal to retain a counter-insurgency role after demobilisation by maintaining control of vast regions of the country -- a blatantly self-interested proposition that would allow it to keep illegally acquired land and other property as well as its drug operations.

These demands must be rejected. The only previous experience, in Medellín, shows the dangers of a short-sighted and incomplete approach to DDR. Paramilitaries who were disarmed and ostensibly reintegrated into society there have kept control of numerous city neighbourhoods. Key issues -- their source of income (drugs), continuing contacts with non-demobilised AUC members, and reparations for the victims of their past crimes -- remain unresolved.

The international community has been largely absent from the negotiations, in part due to its distaste for the paramilitaries' links to drug trafficking and involvement in atrocities, but also because of lack of transparency in the process itself. Initial government-proposed legislation on so-called alternative sentencing was criticised for implying the paramilitaries would enjoy impunity for past grave misdeeds. Only the Organisation of American States (OAS) has stepped forward, accepting the role of monitoring and providing information on the ceasefire. It has put its credibility on the line in associating with a controversial beginning to the peace process but if it is to make a serious contribution, its capacity and political will to monitor the ceasefire in all Colombia as well as its inadequate funding will have to be addressed.

The Uribe administration's recent positive response to feelers for ceasefire talks from the smaller of the two insurgent groups (the ELN) could lead it to develop a more comprehensive approach to DDR that provides the foundation for collective demobilisation of all armed groups. In spite of serious differences over how to bring a ceasefire into force and the agenda of future peace talks, negotiations might eventually prove easier with the ELN than the AUC because the group is not as deeply involved in drug trafficking. However, the larger insurgent organisation (FARC) is unlikely to be a passive witness to the demobilisation of either the AUC or the ELN.

If there is to be a definitive agreement with the paramilitaries, the government must threaten them credibly with military consequences should they break the ceasefire and refuse to concentrate and disarm all their forces, end drug trafficking and other criminal activities and pay reparations. Increased activity of the Centre for Integral Action (Centro de Accion Integral) -- the Ministry of Defence entity charged with coordinating police, army and intelligence units tasked to pursue, capture or destroy the non-complying AUC leadership or other paramilitary leadership -- would send a good message.

The alternative sentencing legislation is to be reconsidered shortly by the Congress. While amendments already have improved the original proposal, more is needed, particularly to assure at least some jail time for war crimes, confiscation of illegally acquired assets and both reparations and a greater voice for victims. U.S. extradition remains a potential deal breaker. Any compromise -- such as the serving of U.S. convictions in Colombian prisons -- must come only after substantial progress has been achieved toward actual demobilisation and disarmament of the AUC, full disclosure of its links to drug trafficking, its verified disengagement from that activity and satisfactory disposition of illegal assets.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Colombia:

1.  Negotiate with the AUC -- provided it fully respects the ceasefire and this is verified by the OAS -- based on a strategy that sets precise targets for demobilisation of significant numbers of units starting immediately after signature of an agreement that requires complete demobilisation by the end of 2005.

2.  Ensure that any agreement with the AUC:

(a)  respects internationally accepted legal norms;

(b)  provides adequate reparations for the victims of paramilitary violence; and

(c)  requires an end to its drug-trafficking operations, full disclosure of narcotics networks and financial flows and forfeit of illegally obtained assets.

3.  Design in the shortest possible time a comprehensive approach to disarmament of all armed groups including:

(a)  a legal framework with clear provisions for punishing war crimes and crimes against humanity, for victim reparation, for return of illegally obtained assets and for reintegration of former combatants;

(b)  effective social, economic and security programs to benefit the majority of Colombians, especially in rural areas; and

(c)  involvement of civil society and victims in the public debate.

4.  Designate as soon as possible zones where all paramilitary fighters are to concentrate under protection of the government's armed forces, facilitate the presence there of the OAS monitoring mission, and provide for protection of civilians at the local level, particularly in those zones, by establishing offices for the public prosecutor, attorney general, and ombudsman.

5.  Combat, with specifically designated units coordinated by the defence ministry's Centre for Integral Action, the leadership structures of those parts of the AUC and other non-AUC paramilitary forces that do not disengage from drug trafficking or comply with the ceasefire.

6.  Negotiate demobilisation of the ELN with the facilitation of Mexico and the support of the Catholic Church and civil society organisations and seek if possible to conduct these talks separate from but simultaneous with the AUC negotiations and within the same legal and institutional framework.

7.  Assign funds to the mayor's office in Medellín to improve and strengthen the reintegration program for the Cacique Nutibara Bloc (BCN) and expand state presence (police, judicial authorities) in the neighbourhoods where it was demobilised.

To the AUC:

8.  Comply with the ceasefire, including by giving clear orders to that effect to all troops on the ground, and cooperate with OAS efforts to monitor it.

9.  Accept and promptly act upon the government request to concentrate all forces in designated areas.

10.  Disengage from drug trafficking and produce proof of this, including full disclosure of trafficking networks, financial holdings and land and other assets derived from drug trafficking and other illegal revenues.

11.  Cease all violent acts against civilians, including threats and intimidation against local officials, and release all kidnapping victims.

12.  Contribute to truth and reconciliation by publicly acknowledging responsibility for grave crimes and disclose fully all relevant information.

To the ELN:

13.  Cease all hostilities, including kidnapping, free all kidnap victims, negotiate demobilisation with the government and prepare to concentrate forces in a zone designated by the government.

To the OAS:

14.  Start urgently to monitor AUC compliance with the ceasefire, expand this mission across the country, and inform the Colombian authorities and population, the OAS permanent council and international public opinion promptly about any breach.

15.  Prepare, in conjunction with the UN, to monitor an ELN cessation of hostilities if requested by the government.

16.  Strengthen the capacity of the in-country office of the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights to facilitate civilian access to all available protection and remedies and disseminate lessons learned from other DDR processes in the region.

To the U.S. Government:

17.  Provide initial support to the OAS in its efforts to monitor AUC compliance with the ceasefire and insist on full compliance by the AUC and its disengagement from drug trafficking.

18.  Assist the government to demobilise the AUC, if the conditions are consistent with international legal standards, reject impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity and include disengagement from drug trafficking, and provide similar assistance, under the same conditions, with respect to demobilisation of the ELN.

19.  Maintain extradition requests for paramilitary leaders wanted on charges of drug trafficking and consider possible compromises only if substantial progress is achieved toward actual AUC demobilisation and disarmament and there is verification of AUC disengagement from drug trafficking, including full disclosure of all links to that activity and of illegally acquired assets.

20.  Support training of special Colombian armed forces units directed at the leadership structures of those paramilitary forces which refuse to participate in demobilisation negotiations, violate the ceasefire, refuse to concentrate in the ZDUs in a timely fashion or continue to engage in drug trafficking.

To the UN:

21.  Continue to provide good offices and facilitate efforts to advance talks between the government and the ELN and assist, in conjunction with the OAS and others, in monitoring any future ELN ceasefire and DDR process.

To the European Union:

22.  Assist the government in a serious demobilisation effort with the AUC and any such future effort with the ELN, pursuant to the same conditions as recommended to the U.S. above.

To the Mexican Government:

23.  Continue to provide good offices to establish a framework for negotiations between the government and the ELN.

Bogotá/Brussels, 5 August 2004