Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan

This report is also available in Arabic and in French.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The international response to the crisis in the western Sudanese region of Darfur remains limp and inadequate, its achievements so far desperately slight. The UN Security Council must, by its review deadline of 30 August 2004, endorse a new international action plan -- taking tougher measures against the Khartoum government, which has acted in bad faith throughout the crisis, and authorising the African Union (AU), with stronger international support, to follow up more decisively its efforts to improve the situation on the ground and mediate a political settlement.

History has shown that Khartoum will respond constructively to direct pressure, but this pressure must be concerted, consistent and genuine. Its sixteen-month ethnic cleansing campaign has elicited a slow-motion reaction which is having a negligible positive impact. Despite a series of high-level visitors to Khartoum and Darfur, including UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, the Sudanese government has yet to fulfil its repeated commitments to neutralise the Janjaweed militias responsible for much of the violence. The international community has yet to make clear, as it must, that there will be a decisive cost to Sudan for that failure.

The situation in Darfur also constitutes a direct and growing threat to peace prospects in Sudan's 21-year-old civil war and to the chance for one of Africa's largest and potentially richest countries to hold together. Unless much more is done quickly, on both the humanitarian and peace fronts, not only will many tens of thousands more die, but instability will spread, impacting Sudan's neighbours.

On 30 July 2004 the UN Security Council finally passed its first resolution in response to the atrocities, including killings and systematic rape, being committed in Darfur, but that resolution was most notable for what it failed to do. It placed an essentially meaningless arms embargo on the Janjaweed militias who have caused so much havoc and the rebels alike, but directed no measures at the Sudanese government for whom the Janjaweed have acted as a proxy and left officials in Khartoum confident they could continue indefinitely to deflect pressure to resolve the crisis. A "Plan of Action" signed by the UN with the government a few days later left ample room for it to avoid meaningful action within the 30-day deadline set by the Council resolution.

Months after Secretary Powell warned that significant international action could be only days away and Secretary General Annan raised the possibility of military intervention, Khartoum remains adept at saying and doing just enough to avoid a robust international response. Key officials, particularly within military intelligence, continue to undermine avenues toward peace, directing integration of the Janjaweed into official security bodies like the police, army and Popular Defence Forces (a paramilitary arm of the government), rather than disarming them.

The international community must do much more about the interconnected problems of humanitarian relief and security on the ground. As many as two million civilians in Darfur need emergency aid, but many are not receiving it because of bottlenecks created by the government and -- to a lesser extent -- the rebels. The number in need is underreported and will increase significantly in the coming months. The capacity to provide humanitarian assistance in terms of logistics, funding, personnel and transport equipment is simply not adequate to service those at risk. More pressure must also be placed on the government to comply with its repeated commitments to improve security by neutralising the Janjaweed.

The one bright spot is the AU's increasingly energetic response. The regional organisation's observers in Darfur have filed reports that demonstrate the ceasefire is being violated regularly by both sides but particularly by the government. Its some 100 observers are being joined by a force of 300 Nigerian and Rwandan troops who will protect them, and it has intensified planning for a much larger force of some 3,000 troops that it wants to use for the wider purpose of protecting civilians. The European Union (EU), the U.S. and others who have indicated a willingness to support, logistically and financially, the deployment and maintenance of such a force must convincingly demand that Khartoum accept it and its mandate.

The Darfur situation poses an ever greater threat to the nearly finalised peace agreement to end the larger and older civil war between the government and the insurgent Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). As long as Darfur festers, the chance remains for political forces in Khartoum opposed to the concessions that have been made in that negotiation to turn government policy back toward war. There is also less prospect that a final agreement with the SPLA, even if signed, could be implemented, or that there would be the necessary support in the West to provide both sides the help they need to make that agreement work.

It is vital, therefore, for the AU also to enhance its efforts to mediate the political problems at the root of the Darfur crisis. The international community must provide full support to the AU-sponsored Darfur talks, such as those scheduled to begin on 23 August in Abuja, while it helps keep the government/SPLA negotiation under the regional organisation IGAD (Inter-governmental Authority on Development) moving forward. The two sets of peace talks are very much interrelated. For example, the AU should utilise the terms of the deal that has been struck on the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile as a starting point for its work on the Darfur negotiations. The international community must support both processes robustly, and the mediation teams should find ways to coordinate closely. Had there been a comprehensive national peace process from the outset, the Darfur rebellion might well have been avoided: the need now is to maximise linkages and leverage.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the UN Security Council:

1.  Pass a resolution on 30 August 2004 that:

(a)  concludes that the Government of Sudan has not satisfactorily fulfilled its obligations within the time period established by Resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004;

(b)  imposes mandatory targeted sanctions against specific government officials most responsible for supporting the atrocities in Darfur and against the key businesses of the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), particularly those doing business abroad and those in the oil services sector;

(c)  imposes a mandatory, comprehensive and monitored arms embargo against the government;

(d)  authorises the African Union (AU) to form, lead and deploy to Darfur a mission consisting of at least 3,000 troops -- and preferably many more -- with a mandate to provide civilian protection and use force as necessary, demands that the Government of Sudan accept such a mission and cooperate with it, and indicates that if such cooperation is not forthcoming urgent consideration will be given to appropriate further action;

(e)  demands that the Government of Sudan accept deployment of a substantially enlarged contingent of UN Human Rights Monitors from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and cooperate with it; and

(f)  authorises an International Commission of Inquiry into war crimes and crimes against humanity, including systematic rape and other gender-based violence, committed during the Darfur conflict.

To the African Union (AU):

2.  Continue and expand urgent efforts to resolve the Darfur crisis, in particular by:

(a)  completing the deployment to Darfur of personnel to monitor the 8 April 2004 ceasefire agreement and the deployment of the Rwandan and Nigerian-led force to protect those monitors;

(b)  raising and deploying, under UN Security Council authorisation, an AU-led mission consisting of at least 3,000 troops -- and preferably many more -- to provide civilian protection in Darfur, using force if necessary;

(c)  being prepared to request further assistance from the UN, such as the imposition of a no-fly zone, and from member states as may be needed should cooperation not be forthcoming from the Government of Sudan or the environment in Darfur otherwise proves to be hostile; and

(d)  pursuing mediation of serious political negotiations between the Government of Sudan and the SLA and JEM movements on an agreement that addresses the root causes of the conflict.

To the U.S., EU and Others Willing to Support the AU Initiatives:

3.  Increase assistance immediately to the AU-led Ceasefire Commission charged with monitoring and facilitating implementation of the 8 April 2004 ceasefire agreement and apply pressure to all sides to implement fully their commitments under that agreement.

4.  Work with the AU to provide strong support, including funding, equipment, and transportation logistics (e.g., helicopters and other airlift capacity), for the rapid deployment to Darfur and effective operation there of an AU-led mission consisting of at least 3,000 troops mandated to protect civilians, using force if necessary.

5.  Develop contingency plans to provide appropriate military reinforcement to the AU-led mission if it encounters serious resistance.

6.  Make clear to the Government of Sudan that it cannot expect to receive the kind of peace benefit that would otherwise be its due in the event of reaching a peace agreement with the SPLA unless it meets its international commitments on Darfur and otherwise cooperates in resolving that crisis promptly.

To the UN and International Donors:

7.  Support an urgent surge in humanitarian capacity for Darfur by fully funding the UN humanitarian appeal and providing logistical support, including military transport where necessary, to enable much greater levels of assistance to be provided rapidly to a larger number of locations in Chad and Darfur.

8.  Negotiate with the Government of Sudan and the SLA and JEM movements to begin immediately cross-line humanitarian aid deliveries to civilian populations in rebel-held areas, while making contingency plans to distribute such aid in the event that access is denied.

To the Government of Sudan:

9.  Immediately implement steps to neutralise the Janjaweed militia and stabilise the situation in Darfur, in accordance with the ceasefire agreement signed on 8 April 2004, the communiqué signed with the UN on 3 July 2004, UN Security Council Resolution 1556 of 30 July 2004, and the "Plan of Action" signed with the UN on 5 August 2004. Specifically, the government should:

(a)  identify all militia groups it has armed and supported during the course of the rebellion;

(b)  cut off all material and political support to the Janjaweed;

(c)  begin to demobilise the Janjaweed;

(d)  expel all foreign elements within the Janjaweed;

(e)  dismiss senior military intelligence officials responsible for the policy of arming the Janjaweed and turning them loose against civilians; and

(f)  initiate legal action against individual Janjaweed responsible for war crimes.

10.  Allow unobstructed humanitarian access immediately to all areas of Darfur and cease using claims of security considerations as justification for obstructing the delivery of humanitarian aid.

11.  Accept the deployment in Darfur of an African Union (AU) mission consisting of at least 3,000 troops, with a mandate to provide civilian protection, and cooperate with that mission.

12.  Allow full access immediately to Human Rights Monitors from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).

To the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA), and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM):

13.  Immediately implement all provisions of the 8 April 2004 ceasefire agreement and in particular cease attacks on aid convoys to government-controlled areas, while facilitating humanitarian relief to areas under rebel control by establishing teams to assist populations to receive and make use of aid.

14.  Clarify political agendas in advance of the formal initiation of peace talks.

To the International Supporters of the IGAD Process, especially the Observer Countries (U.S., UK, Norway and Italy), the UN, AU and Arab League:

15.  Intensify collective pressures on the Government of Sudan and the SPLA to resolve the outstanding issues rapidly and sign a comprehensive peace agreement before the end of 2004.

16.  Encourage the Government of Sudan and the SPLA respectively, once the negotiations on security arrangements for that comprehensive peace agreement have been concluded and even before final signature, to involve First Vice President Ali Osman Taha and Chairman John Garang directly in the AU-facilitated negotiations on Darfur.

To the IGAD and AU Mediators:

17.  Establish close cooperation and take steps to coordinate ideas on the overlap between the two peace processes, without making progress on one dependent on the other.

18.  Use the IGAD provisional agreements on the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile as a starting point for work on the Darfur negotiations.

Nairobi/Brussels, 23 August 2004