International Crisis Group
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Nepal's Faltering Peace Process

1. The current situation
2. What should be done
3. Crisis Group analysis and commentary 
4. Nepal online and in other media

Photo: Nepal's President Ram Baran Yadav and Prime Minister Madhav Khumar Nepal at the first Republic Day anniversary in Kathmandu, 28 May 2009.

Updated November 2009

1. The current situation

Nepal’s peace process is in danger of collapse. The fall of the Maoist-led government in May 2009 has brought in an unstable 22-party ruling coalition, led by the centrist Communist Party of Nepal (Unified-Marxist-Leninist), UML, that is largely incapable of addressing the major outstanding issues of the peace process, including thorny issue of integrating Nepal’s two standing armies. All moderate politicians, including the Maoists, still publicly maintain their commitment to the peace process, and outright return to war remains unlikely in the short term. But the increasing polarisation has fed the more extremist element on both sides, and private talk of a return to war has grown louder, mainly led by generals of the National Army (NA). Nepal’s major political players must now work to rebuild the common purpose, and to bring the Maoists back into government to prevent a possible return to conflict.

The immediate cause for the Maoists leaving government was the party’s failed attempt to remove the then Army Chief General Rookmangud Katwal. General Katwal, an avowed anti-Maoist, was accused of continuing a recruitment drive for the NA, and actively blocking the reintegration of former Maoist combatants into the NA, both violations of the 2006 peace agreement. When President Yadav on 4 May overturned the Maoist order to sack Katwal, Pushpa Kamal “Prachanda” Dahal stepped down as Prime Minister, and the Maoists resigned from government. Prachanda immediately after resigning said that his party would not oppose the peace process, but the Maoists have taken an aggressive stance in opposition. They have boycotted parliament over lengthy periods, and have launched large-scale anti-government street protests across the country, that have often ended in violent clashes with police. Even after Katawal’s retirement in September, the issue remains a bone of contention with the Maoists pressing for clearification whether the President’s move was constiutional.

The Maoists’ position as head of government had, however, become increasingly untenable over the months leading up to May. The party had been ineffective in office, and had alienated powerful constituencies. The Maoists had also face dogged opposition from the start, and serious doubts over whether they could genuinely commit to pluralistic politics and renounce armed revolution never ceased. The doubts may sound compelling, but they ignore that a real debate is taking place within the party and that the Maoist movement is engaged in an evolutionary process that has already seen a major shift since the end of the “people’s war”.

The 22-party coalition that in mid-May replaced the Maoist-led government is inherently unstable and has already been marred by infighting. It is headed by the centrist UML Party, with UML veteran Madhav Kumar Nepal serving as Prime Minister. It took the UML weeks to negotiate the entry of major partners into cabinet, and several smaller allies have yet to join. The Tarai-based Madhesi Janadhikar Forum originally joined the government, but split into two factions in early June, with one faction withdrawing its support for the government. Divided as it is, the government lacks both the will and capacity to achieve anything significant, especially on the peace process.

The most pressing issue remains that of integrating the National Army (NA) and the Maoist People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Some 23,000 former Maoist fighters are still housed in UN-monitored cantonments across the country. The CPA stipulates that at least some of these should be integrated into the NA, something both the NC and UML have continued to oppose. The NA has also recently adopted a more overt and aggressive political role, and has retained its full strength as a largely autonomous force since the republican transition.

The Constitutional Assembly has a mandate to complete the drafting of a new constitution by May 2010, but the political deadlock has ensured that little progress has been made over the last few months.

Continued strong international backing will be crucial to revitalising the peace process. While India was one of the key driving forces behind moving the peace process forward from 2005, New Delhi has shifted position since the Maoist victory in the CA elections of April 2008. Worried by the Maoists’ close ties to China, India’s intervention in Nepal’s internal politics became increasingly apparent, and played a significant role in eventually forcing the Maoists out of government. Such short-term interference must be eschewed in favour of longer-term guardianship of the peace process.

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2. What should be done?

In its most recent report, Nepal’s Future: In Whose Hands? (13 August 2009), Crisis Group made the following recommendations:

RECOMMENDATIONS

To All Political Actors Party to the Peace and Constitutional Processes:

1.  Recognising that political consensus and a broad-based government are essential to the peace process,

a) work without delay to form a national unity government, acknowledging that the democratic mandate to lead it still rests with the Maoists;

b) give shape to the proposed high-level political coordination committee for purely peace process-related issues, ensuring it has a clear agenda, regular meetings and the necessary support to monitor and implement decisions;

c) prioritise cooperation at the local level, in particular by working together to make local peace committees effective bodies for dispute resolution and pursuit of reconciliation;

d) work urgently towards a deal on the long overdue re-establishment of local government bodies or all-party mechanisms alongside formation of a national government; and

e) put in place an overall peace process monitoring mechanism.

2.  Build confidence by:

a) adhering to the principle of consultation and consensus, focusing on practical measures to monitor and implement existing agreements;

b) recognising that unfulfilled commitments on all sides have contributed to a loss of trust and agreeing that reciprocity will be needed to move forward;

c) addressing the serious and substantive concerns over the president’s role by agreeing a clarification of his powers and ensuring his ceremonial office does not become a competing political power centre;

d) dealing with critical areas unaddressed by past agreements, in particular by developing plans for broader demilitarisation of armed groups, criminal mafias and party youth militias, not just the PLA; and

e) keeping the constitutional process on track and minimising the knock-on effects of delays that have already occurred.

3.  Support the Army Integration Special Committee (AISC) in its task of determining options for the integration and rehabilitation of Maoist combatants by:

a) cooperating in reconstituting the AISC, recognising the need to offer balanced representation to major parties and to move promptly to substantive discussion of the major sticking points;

b) encouraging the technical subcommittee to continue its work while recognising that it is not in a position to resolve major political questions;

c) clarifying requests for international support to the AISC and its technical subcommittee, in particular by fully exploiting the capacity of the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN) to channel technical assistance; and

d) tackling the most contentious questions, in particular by discussing the numbers of combatants that could be integrated into the Nepalese Army or other forces, seriously considering benchmarks and timetables for substantive progress and being realistic about the near impossibility of meeting the latest six-month deadline.

4.  Make the most of international assistance, bearing in mind the risks of fading patience, by:

a) making full use of the UN and other international actors’ good offices as well as facilitating the work of UNMIN and ensuring it can complete its role in Nepal as soon as possible;

b) setting and adhering to benchmarks to achieve this, offering international backers evidence of progress and more solid indications that remaining elements of the peace deal are moving towards implementation; and

c) demonstrating in practice that unity across parties is the best way of preventing external intervention and prolonged, potentially intrusive, political engagement.

5.  Cooperate in boosting the legitimacy of the state and political parties by:

a) increasing internal democracy, building on successful examples such as the internal elections carried out by the UML’s general convention and the Nepali Congress’s parliamentary party;

b) bringing an end to party youth wings’ illegal activities, developing local mechanisms to ensure inter-party disputes do not lead to violent clashes and denouncing the use of violence for political ends;

c) without barring constructive debate, using party disciplinary measures to rein in senior leaders who make destabilising public comments that undermine the peace process; and

d) putting repeated commitments to greater inclusiveness and socio-economic transformation into practice, paying particular attention to the prospects for establishing new standards for implementing the goals of UN Security Council resolution 1325 on women’s participation in peacebuilding.

To the Government of Nepal:

6.  Abide by the constitutional requirement to take important decisions on the basis of consensus among the major parties, including those not in government.

7.  Address public security concerns by recognising that political consensus is essential to restoring law and order and using all appropriate mechanisms, national and local, to build all-party support for effective policing and ending of political interference in operational matters.

8.  Address critical questions of justice and impunity by pursuing investigations and prosecutions, responding substantively to the most serious documented allegations of war crimes and basing new legislation on disappearances and the truth and reconciliation commission on wide consultation and international standards.

9.  Demonstrate commitment to establishing effective democratic control over the Nepalese Army (NA) and respecting the provisions of the November 2006 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and Interim Constitution (IC) by:

a) bringing the NA under meaningful democratic control, including establishing parliamentary oversight, fully auditing expenditure and developing the constitutionally mandated work plan for democratisation and right-sizing of the army;

b) respecting the unambiguous ceasefire commitment to refrain from recruitment and weapons purchases;

c) carefully considering the conflict and development risks of increasing security budgets and focusing instead on fulfilling the constitutional commitment to determining the appropriate size of the NA and devising a sensible plan for reaching it;

d) issuing and enforcing clear orders to the NA to advise on national security policy when requested but refrain from expressing opinions on broader constitutional and political issues; and

e) making a first step towards full human rights vetting by refusing promotion to those accused of grave violations unless and until credible independent investigations have been carried out.

To the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist):

10.  Recognise that concerns over Maoist strategic intent are genuine and well founded and can only be addressed by concrete steps such as:

a) giving more solid guarantees of commitment to political pluralism both in theory (for example by reconsidering the proposal to ban political parties accused of supporting feudalism and imperialism) and in practice (for example by taking stern action against cadres who threaten, assault or obstruct members of other parties);

b) clarifying the specific questions raised by the Shaktikhor video, which appeared to substantiate charges of deception over combatant numbers and plans to use “democratisation” to politicise the national army; and

c) reaffirming the ceasefire and CPA conditions on ceasing all political violence, in word and deed.

11.  Convince other parties and the people at large of genuine intent to abide by the peace process, for example by:

a) ending the militarised structure and paramilitary activities of the Young Communist League (YCL), including its occupation of public buildings as de facto barracks;

b) promptly discharging ineligible personnel in the cantonments in line with repeated public promises, cooperating with government and international efforts to design and successfully deliver appropriate rehabilitation packages;

c) implementing other unfulfilled past commitments such as the return of seized property; and

d) cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed during the conflict and ceasefire periods.

To the International Community, in particular India, China, the U.S., EU, UN and Donors:

12.  Publicly support the peace process and underline international expectations for its successful conclusion by:

a) emphasising the need for all parties to adhere to all aspects of the CPA, IC and other agreements;

b) supporting effective governance, while recognising that this will only be possible under a broad-based national government and urging all parties to make the compromises necessary to achieve this;

c) underlining that significant development and budgetary assistance is at risk should stable governance not be established;

d) pressuring all parties to use only non-violent methods to pursue protests and to avoid excessively disruptive tactics such as blocking the functioning of the CA; and

e) continuing to urge investigations into the worst alleged conflict abuses and offering technical support as appropriate.

13.  Strengthen international consensus and coordination by:

a) addressing the rift between India, which appears to have revised its interpretation of the peace deal, and other major players, who still support the agreements initiated and endorsed by New Delhi;

b) dispelling impressions of waste and confusion by getting a grip on the multiple, overlapping programs supporting critical areas like the constitutional process and security sector reform; and

c) maintaining a common strong emphasis on human rights, political pluralism and conflict resolution at the heart of all policies, including development aid and military cooperation.

14.  Recognising that delay in reforming the security sector is continuing to compromise all development efforts by draining resources and undermining political progress:

a) seek unambiguous assurances that affordability and accountability will be key criteria in any consideration of security sector budgets and policy, and that development funds will not be used in effect to subsidise an unsustainably large army;

b) push for democratic control of the security sector and discuss detailed plans for appropriate assistance;

c) urge prompt measures to address the pressing need for improved public security and offer support to such steps; and

d) explore ways to help train integrated NA and other security forces, in particular by offering conversion training for former PLA combatants, including at officer level if requested, and joint training to integrated units on working under democratic control, respect for human rights, etc.

To the Government of India:

15.  Given the enduring tradition of intimate Indo-Nepal links, use the special relationship constructively to secure both Nepal and India’s core interests without attempting to dictate, for example by:

a) making a clear, public recommitment to the fundamentals of the peace process;

b) offering public endorsement of the principle of PLA integration into the NA and other security forces, if agreed by Nepal’s parties and in the manner of their choosing;

c) building on India’s leading example of successful civilian control of the military and unique army to army links to offer support in areas such as building a functional defence ministry and training army officers and civil servants to work effectively alongside one another;

d) sending firm messages to the Indian army to support government policy on Nepal and communicate appropriate messages to counterparts in the NA;

e) considering positive steps to support security sector reform, including training for former Maoist combatants joining the security forces and assistance in reshaping policing to meet the needs of federalism and improved public accountability; and

f) supporting the UN’s role and using Indian influence constructively to assist in creating the conditions for the winding up Security Council-mandated operations.

To Members of the United Nations Security Council:

16.  The Security Council should underline its commitment to supporting the peace process but also its concern about weakening consensus and delays in addressing key steps by:

a) considering a Security Council visit to Nepal to understand the complex situation and hear directly from the main political actors how they propose to address challenges;

b) encouraging member states represented in Kathmandu to scrutinise progress, offer support as necessary and report publicly on progress or concerns;

c) making stronger public messages of support for UNMIN’s mission and for Nepal’s parties in taking prompt steps to conclude the peace process and restructure UN involvement to reflect the longer term needs of a successful post-conflict transition; and

d) engaging more closely with India to narrow differences in perspective and build more solid common ground on outside support for the peace process.

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3. Crisis Group analysis

Select Crisis Group's publications on Nepal

Click here for a full list of all Crisis Group Nepal reports. Many of our reports have also been translated into Nepali, they are available here: http://www.crisisgroup.org/nepali.

For a month-by-month report on developments in Nepal since September 2003, see Crisis Group's CrisisWatch database.


Other Crisis Group resources

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4. Nepal online and in other media

Relevant websites


Articles and reports

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