Myanmar: Aid to the Border Areas

To access the Executive Summary and Recommendations of this report in French, please click here.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The desolate political stalemate which has prevailed since the military suppression of the pro-democracy movement in 1988 continues unabated. Daw Aung San Suu Kyi remains in custody, and there is no sign that the National Convention reconvened in May 2004 will produce any meaningful change. Without movement on these two fronts the new way forward advocated by ICG in its last Myanmar report[1] -- steering a course between sanctions and over-eager engagement -- will have few attractions for the international community.

As difficult as the existing political environment continues to be, there are, however, some actions that can and should be taken to help a limited and particular part of the country known as the Border Areas. This report, which should be read in conjunction with earlier ICG reporting on minority issues,[2] lays out in detail why these areas are different and discusses how expanded international assistance could be implemented without strengthening the present oppressive government.

The report argues that such assistance could not only help consolidate lasting peace in the Border Areas and lay the foundations for a more open, democratic system. It could also reduce refugee flows and the dangers from cross-border threats such as the spread of drugs and AIDS, and environmental damage from deforestation.

The remote, mountainous areas along the borders with Thailand, Laos, China, India and Bangladesh, largely populated by ethnic minorities, have long suffered from war and neglect, which have undermined development. They are desperately poor though they contain more than a third of the country's population and most of its natural resources. They also link it to some of the world's fastest growing economies. The prospects for Myanmar's peace, prosperity and democracy are, therefore, closely tied to the future of these regions and their mainly ethnic minority populations.

While the international community focuses on the need for regime change in Yangon, it has tended to disregard the need to integrate ethnic minority communities into the broader society and economy. Foreign aid for the Border Areas should be seen and pursued as complementary to diplomatic efforts to restore democracy and help unite the long-divided country.

Until recently, development of the Border Areas was hindered by the many insurgencies. The fighting closed minds to local cooperative solutions and reinforced underlying social and economic problems. However, since 1989, ceasefires have proliferated between the military government and former insurgent groups. Although these are neither in effect everywhere nor have they yet developed into genuine lasting peace, they have had a significant impact at elite as well as grassroots levels. In conjunction with new, though flawed, government development programs in previously neglected areas, they are one dimension of the military regime's strategy that supports longer-term reform. Border Areas development thus is a rare instance where there is some convergence of interests within a highly polarised and conflict-ridden environment.

The ceasefires have normalised life in many previously war-torn areas, allowing people to work and travel relatively freely again. There has also been a decrease in the most severe types of human rights abuses in these areas although violations still occur. Governance structures are extremely weak, however, and other forms of structural violence persist, often compounded by new exploitive and unsustainable economic practices by the former combatants.

Many villages are still inaccessible except by foot or river and lack both government services and access to markets. Population growth, worsened by conflict-induced movements, has put increasing pressure on already marginal lands, and deforestation is taking its toll. The Border Areas thus face a series of inter-linked crises, which, if allowed to fester, could undermine any progress in the country for decades to come.

The difficult political and operational environment in Myanmar greatly complicates the task, but donors have for too long ignored the needs of the mainly ethnic minority groups who inhabit the Border Areas. This has not only delayed improvements in human security and welfare but also lessened the prospects of genuine national reconciliation and meaningful political reform, which ultimately depend on social justice and empowerment of these marginalised communities.

ICG recognises that governments that place their faith in sanctions and other measures to isolate the military government and achieve regime change may find it difficult to provide developmental assistance to the extent this requires some cooperation with representatives of that regime. Some donors may also take a different view about the extent to which such assistance can be provided effectively to local people and through their institutions without strengthening the repressive government in Yangon.

But despite otherwise strong differences over strategy and tactics, developmental as well as humanitarian help should be supported by all the main protagonists inside the country as well their friends abroad. Although the linkages between peace, prosperity and democracy are complex, international help for the Border Areas provides an important organising principle and practical means for their realisation.

Their long history of civil conflict, social and economic backwardness, and ethnic minority composition are indicative of deep seated problems. Special measures over many years, regardless of who or what system is dominant in far away Yangon, are required if these communities are to become capable of equally contributing to and benefiting from the state.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To International Aid Agencies, their Governments and Other Donors:

General Principles

1.  Increase significantly and exceptionally assistance for the Border Areas and give aid agencies more freedom to operate there with respect to the nature of projects and cooperation with technical departments of the government, without prejudice to national policies that impose political limitations on such projects and contacts elsewhere in the country.

2.  Relax restrictions that limit funding to narrowly defined humanitarian projects in order to allow institution of broader sustainable livelihood programs with a longer timeframe.

3.  Pay particular attention to ethnic minority participation in aid and development processes.

Coordination

4.  Set up a broadly inclusive aid coordination mechanism that can help develop a plan for the Border Areas, elicit donor funding, and negotiate with the government to establish an environment conducive to effective implementation.

5.  Utilise better the comparative advantages of different aid agencies through an overall division of labour between UN agencies, international financial institutions and international NGOs.

6.  Strengthen cooperation between development and human rights protection agencies.

7.  Take extreme care to ensure that international agency work does not crowd out existing local networks and development activities, but rather builds on and reinforces them.

Partnerships

8.  Cooperate with and provide selective assistance to government technical departments to the extent this is necessary to help expand social services and improve implementation of progressive policies that help local communities without strengthening military control.

9.  Bring the ceasefire groups into the planning and execution of aid programs, for example, by establishing local UN offices in the special regions and supporting local development departments where they exist.

10.  Work with local civil society organisations as much as possible in order to reach remote and insecure areas and minimise the risk of crowding out local initiatives.

11.  Place emphasis in all partnerships on promoting poverty alleviation and community development, and increasing understanding of those concepts in the country.

Programming

12.  Make available additional resources for socio-economic baseline surveys, as well as conflict impact assessments for particular programs and areas.

Direct Interventions

13.  Provide emergency relief in areas such as eastern Shan state and along the Thai border where populations facing acute food insecurity and health threats need it urgently; so as to avoid emergence of a dependency culture, however, keep such programs short-term and plan to merge them into sustainable longer-term development activities where and when this can be done without strengthening political repression from Yangon.

14.  Undertake major efforts in recent conflict zones, particularly in the southeast, to overcome the legacy of war, including landmine clearance, rehabilitation of productive land, resettlement of displaced populations, and reintegration and productive employment of former soldiers.

15.  Help the majority of poor households in the Border Areas who depend on subsistence farming on increasingly marginal land by instituting programs to:

(a)  improve agricultural technologies and land development;

(b)  facilitate access to land, micro-credit and other inputs; and

(c)  develop cottage industries for income diversification.

16.  Assist the many communities that need help with basic education of children, youth and adults by training local teachers, participating in the revision of curricula to fit local needs, and emphasising the use of local languages.

 Enabling Environment

17.  Construct assistance programs with the objectives of exposing government officials to international development and human rights concepts and standards, promoting pro-poor policies, and raising awareness among local communities about their rights and opportunities.

18.  Place high priority on helping local communities by increasing the space for people to organise outside the state, strengthening the capacity of individual organisations and networks, and increasing the capacity for civil society structures genuinely independent from government control to forge linkages with local authorities.

19.  Position aid programs to help overcome decades of violence and growing mistrust by bringing different groups together and increasing communication and cooperation across social, political and religious divides.

Yangon/Brussels, 9 September 2004