Colombia's Borders: The Weak Link in Uribe's Security Policy

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

President Alvaro Uribe's security strategy is driving the conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) toward the country's extremely fragile borders. The goal is to force the insurgents to negotiate by making them take military losses, but the border regions are the weak link, since relations with Venezuela and Ecuador are not strong enough to absorb the pressure of an ever more intense armed conflict and associated drug eradication measures. The Uribe administration needs to engage its two neighbours in far stronger terms to forge a joint policy to contain the conflict and advance Andean security and border development cooperation.

Having evicted the FARC from areas near Bogotá with an aggressive campaign that began in mid-2003, the army is now operating with much less certain results in the southern jungle strongholds -- some of Colombia's most remote regions -- where the insurgents have historically exercised unchallenged control.

Meanwhile, despite ongoing demobilisation negotiations, there is overwhelming evidence that the far-right paramilitary groups (AUC) have not withdrawn from their fiefdoms on the Atlantic coast. Indeed, over the last three years, the AUC has expanded its grip on strategic regions, including departments bordering on Venezuela.

These border regions which are increasingly the focus of military attention have historically been forgotten by the central government. Compared with the rest of the country, they show consistently higher levels of poverty and structural underdevelopment. Effective abandonment of state responsibility has increased their vulnerability, and many have become platforms for illegal activity, including gun running, drug trafficking and contraband.

The illegal armed groups (including the ELN, the smaller of the left wing insurgencies) frequently cross over into Venezuela and Ecuador, either to escape an army sweep, to rest and restock supplies, or to raise funds through extortion and kidnapping of wealthy Venezuelans and Ecuadorians. Further contributing to the climate of criminality on the frontier, drug cartels have linked up with the armed groups to move chemical precursors for drug processing into Colombia and ship refined illegal drugs back across the borders for export to the U.S. and Europe.

It is no coincidence that the largest centres of illicit crops have traditionally been in these border regions. Joint Colombian-U.S. counter-narcotics policy has focused on eradicating illicit crops through aerial spraying. Since the accelerated eradication started in 2001, this supply-end policy has not been complemented by equivalent programs to develop rural regions hard-hit by poverty, structural socio-economic imbalances and aggressive counter-narcotics measures.

The governments of Presidents Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Lucio Gutierrez in Ecuador are both concerned about the impact of Colombia's conflict on the institutional stability and security of their countries. While each came to office favouring a negotiated solution, they now distance themselves, focusing on their own grave internal political situations.

Disengagement and reliance on band-aid measures to deal with the spillover effects of Colombia's troubles, however, will neither provide constructive long term solutions to the problems that fuel the armed conflict nor keep their own societies safe.

Colombia will not be able to resolve its conflict without extensive support from Ecuador and Venezuela. To get that support, it will need to take its neighbours concerns and needs seriously and offer them genuine cooperation in the planning and execution of both military and counter-drug activity and of development programs in the sensitive border regions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Colombia:

1.          Develop an integrated security policy for the border regions with Ecuador and Venezuela to complement implementation of the current military campaign (Plan Patriota) and Plan Colombia including:

(a)       social and economic programs targeted at reducing poverty in border regions as part of a nationwide rural development strategy;

(b)       support for local government requests for funding of basic infrastructure projects such as roads and bridges as part of that rural strategy;

(c)       greater attention to the plight of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other humanitarian consequences; and

(d)       an on-going, intense high-level dialogue with Ecuador and Venezuela about all aspects of the security problem affecting the border areas designed to achieve increased cooperation on both military/law enforcement and socio-economic/ humanitarian aspects, including promotion of cross-border trade and development initiatives.

2.          Consult with the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments in advance on large-scale military operations that might affect the security and humanitarian situation in the border regions and design and implement joint plans with each neighbour on how to cope with such consequences.

To the Governments of Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela:

3.          Increase police and judicial cooperation with regard to the border areas in order to stem cross-border criminal activity such as kidnapping, extortion, contraband and arms and drug trafficking, in particular by:

(a)       sharing intelligence and coordinating police operations;

(b)       carrying out more rigorous controls at legal and illegal border crossings alike; and

(c)       agreeing on a common list of controlled substances.

To the Government of Ecuador:

4.          Fund more integrated development programs, conduct more anti-narcotics operations along the northern border and strengthen measures against money laundering.

5.          Investigate and prosecute any suspected involvement of military and civilian personnel in channelling weapons, explosives and chemical precursors to illegal armed groups in Colombia.

To the Government of Venezuela:

6.          Take effective military and law enforcement action against illegal Colombian armed groups on Venezuelan territory.

7.          Implement the government's international obligations to refugees by ensuring that state agents respect their rights and by improving the efficiency of the refugee determination process.

To the U.S. Government:

8.          Strengthen anti-narcotics policy by:

(a)       increasing funding to Colombia substantially for alternative livelihood and rural development programs in border regions as a means of supporting sustainable alternatives to illegal drug cultivation;

(b)       designing and implementing a truly regional approach, taking into account the cross-border nature of the drug business and minimising the negative humanitarian, ecological, political and security effects of current counter-drug policy in Colombia on Ecuador and Venezuela.

To the United Nations:

9.          Ensure adequate funding for the office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other UN agencies to help Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela work more cooperatively and effectively on the problems of displaced persons and refugees resulting from the Colombian conflict.

To the Community of Andean Nations (CAN):

10.      Fund creation of special Border Integration Zones (BIZ) as proposed in 2001 as a concrete contribution to implementing the Andean Peace Zone and the Andean Common External Security Policy.

To the European Union:

11.      Fund development initiatives focusing on Colombia´s borders, for example, the BIZ, as a first step towards real Andean economic integration.

To the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank (IADB):

12.      Include in the Country Assistance Strategies for Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela specific consideration of border region problems and prioritise funding of projects directed at those problems, including cross-border initiatives.

Quito/Brussels, 23 September 2004