International Crisis Group
text only version

1. Current situation
2. What should be done
3. Background to the conflict
4. Crisis Group analysis
5. News and other reporting
6. Important documents
7. Maps and statistics

Photo: Afghan police stand in a line during a joint patrol with U.S. and Canadian troops in the town of Howz-E-Madad, 10 October 2007. Goran Tomasevic/REUTERS

updated September 2009

1. Current situation

Afghanistan’s 20 August presidential and provincial elections were declared “successful” by both the Afghan government and the U.S., despite the significant Taliban violence that preceded the poll date, and the claims of fraud that has followed it. At least 30 people were killed on election day alone, and several provincial candidates and campaign workers were killed leading up to the elections, while intimidation resulted in several female candidates withdrawing from the contest. Enormous resources have been poured into the elections, and it is now crucial that the international community does not repeat the mistakes from the successful 2004 elections, where the momentum was quickly lost and little was done to rebuild and strengthen institutions and the democratic framework.

While the final results will not be known until 17 September at the earliest, preliminary results released in the week following the elections indicate that a run-off between President Hamid Karzai and his main challenger and ex-Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdullah is likely. Karzai holds a slender lead, but not enough to secure the 50% of the votes needed to avoid a run-off. The possible run-off would be held in October, and could potentially mean another month-long period of instability and violence. There have also been serious questions raised about the legality of the elections, with a growing number of complaints of vote rigging and ballot stuffing mostly favouring President Karzai. The independent Electoral Complaints Commission towards the end of August said they were investigating more than 600 “serious fraud reports” that could affect the outcome of the elections. Turnout figures have yet to be released, but early estimates suggest only about 5.5 million of some 15 million registered voters cast their ballots, a much lower figure than in 2004, in particular in the insurgency-hit south. Turnout likely fell more among women than among men.

The security situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated significantly during 2009, and the weeks before the poll date saw the worst levels of violence since the invasion in 2001. At least four candidates for the provincial elections were killed, and many more attempts were made. The Taliban announced towards the end of July that they would attempt to “disrupt the elections”, and subsequently launched a wave of attacks across the country, but particularly in the southern provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. Security incidents have continued at a high level even after the polling date, with at least 40 people killed in a devastating Kandahar bomb attack on 25 August. July saw at least 71 ISAF troops killed, the highest monthly toll since 2001, and UN figures show that 1,013 civilians were killed between January and June 2009, up from 818 in the same period in 2008. The elections were preceded by a large increase in foreign troops, with the U.S. committing 21,000 extra military personell before the elections, and NATO contributing a further 5,000, all mostly deployed in the south and east.

Whatever the outcome of the elections, it is now vital that the international community does not treat the poll as a distinct event, but use the momentum and the enormous resources that have been poured into the elections to strengthen institutions and build up a robust electoral framework. After the successful 2004 elections, the international community and the Afghan government failed to build the capacity and resources of the Independent Electoral Commission, strengthening the legal framework (including replacing the inappropriate Single Non-Transferable Vote System), and produce a sustainable over registry. Failure in wider institutional strengthening, such as disarmament programs and judicial and police reforms, has also increased popular disillusionment. The lessons learned must be used to ensure a much strengthened process for the planned 2010 National Assembly and district elections.

The political system itself is also in need of serious reform. It is now highly centralised and largely based on patronage, bringing personalities rather than policies to the fore. President Karzai wields enormous powers as head of state and has encouraged an ever-growing culture of impunity. The role of political parties has become increasingly marginalised. There now needs to be a focus on how the political system can be made more functional and representative. Broad agreement is needed on a balance of power among the branches of the state, among which the relationship is now very poor, as well as on identifying which body is the ultimate constitutional arbiter, and on ensuring a more appropriate role for political parties.

For more information and background on the elections, see Asia Report N°171, Afghanistan's Election Challenges, 24 June 2009. Other recent Crisis Group reports on Afghanistan include What Now for Refugees? (31 August 2009), on how to address the needs of returning refugees and those still in neighbouring countries to prevent further instability and violence; New U.S. Administration, New Directions (13 March 2009), on how jihadi extremism in Afghanistan cannot be defeated unless the Obama administration adopts new political, economic and military policies that empower Afghan civilian institutions; and Policing in Afghanistan: Still Searching for a Strategy (18 December 2008) on the urgent need for police reform.

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2. What should be done

In its most recent report, Afghanistan's Election Challenges (24 June 2009), Crisis Group made the following recommendations:

To the Independent Election Commission (IEC):

1.  Ensure a robust, credible process by:

(a) rigorous training of election day staff particularly on new counting procedures;

(b) enforcing multi-layered checks on the results during their transport including the provision for observers to travel with the results forms and ballots;

(c) extra auditing of results from random polling booths in areas of reported high female turnout as a check on fraud given unusual registration numbers, as well as on returns from areas where little observation is possible because of insecurity;

(d) scrutinising campaign finance reports of all presidential candidates and random successful provincial council candidates; and

(e) requiring all candidates in 2010 to submit their tax returns.

2.  Combat allegations of partisanship by:

(a) the chairman and other electoral staff refraining from public statements except on technical issues; and

(b) early and robust action in case of wrongdoing or partisanship by members of staff.

3.  Ensure preparations for the 2010 elections are strengthened and community understanding of the process enhanced by holding public workshops in partnership with local civil society organisations on lessons from the 2009 polls.

To the Elections Complaints Commission (ECC):

4.  Create a more open complaints process by conducting a high-profile public awareness campaign and carrying out training for civil society organisations to aid understanding of the grounds for submissions and the required standards of proof.

To the Government of Afghanistan:

5.   Foster the confidence of voters and candidates through:

(a) ensuring firm, immediate action against government and security officials seen to be interfering with the process or intimidating electoral workers, candidates or voters;

(b) demonstrating compliance with accountable and transparent appointments mechanisms; and

(c) guaranteeing the independence of Radio Television Afghanistan and fostering its role as a public service broadcaster.

6.  Strengthen the 2010 election process by:

(a) building trust in the IEC by putting all commissioners to a vote in the Wolesi Jirga;

(b) strengthening the quality of data on illegal armed groups to ensure robust but fair vetting;

(c) driving district delineation required for planned district elections; and

(d) building in specific budgetary allocations for this and future election cycles.

7.  Ensure a more sustainable subnational government framework by tasking the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG) with supporting constitutionally mandated representative institutions, rather than parallel projects or bodies.

8.  Create a post-election strategy group including all relevant ministries, the National Assembly, civil society and major donors to lead strategic planning for the 2010 election and beyond including agreement on:

(a) the date of the 2010 poll and a sustainable electoral timetable;

(b) the creation of a robust voter registry and population data collection (census and/or civil registry); and

(c) an appropriate legal framework for elections.

To the National Assembly:

9.  Help ensure a solid and comprehensive legal framework for future elections, opening the issue to public hearings, including but not limited to:

(a) selecting an appropriate party-based or mixed electoral system to replace SNTV in the Electoral Law;

(b) clarifying Article 6 of the Political Parties Law relating to ethnic, racial and sectarian “bias” and removing unnecessary curbs on party formation and functioning, as well as setting out clear procedures regarding the bar on links to armed groups; and

(c) considering the future shape and scope of the ECC to ensure a credible and sustainable mechanism to impartially enforce electoral standards and arbitrate disputes.

10.  Issue clear guidelines to members on use of official resources in their campaigns in 2010, to be monitored by the standing committee for members’ immunities, salaries and privileges.

To the U.S., European Union and its Member States and other Donor Nations:

11.  Increase election security by:

(a) ensuring ISAF’s additional troops provided for the election remain in the areas where they are required, if necessary beyond the August polls, and are sufficient for the 2010 polls;

(b) pressing Pakistan to end cross-border movement of insurgents; and

(c) ensuring ongoing training and oversight and sufficient funds to retain the thousands of additional police recruited to help secure the polls.

12.  Support robust, ongoing democratisation by:

(a) refraining from any words or actions that might be seen as endorsing individual candidates;

(b) providing firm funding commitments for several more election cycles subject to specific goals for capacity building and sustainability, developed as part of the proposed post-election strategy group; and

(c) in the remaining time before the 2010 polls, contributing information on illegal armed groups to ensure a strengthened vetting process and demanding action on disarmament.

13.  Balance support to the branches of state by providing far greater resources and attention to representative bodies by:

(a) meeting regularly with the heads of political parties and parliamentary groupings;

(b) providing technical assistance for the Wolesi Jirga and provincial council commissions;

(c) funding women in local government initiatives; and

(d) information-sharing and feedback sessions on development proposals with the relevant provincial councils and Wolesi Jirga commissions.

To the United Nations:

14. Build confidence in the electoral process by:

(a) the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) robustly using his good offices to help mediate between parties on contentious issues on the electoral framework;

(b) maintaining pressure on government and electoral institutions to uphold standards and speaking out against violations;

(c) instructing local UN offices on appropriate forms of assistance to the process including monitoring the recruitment of district electoral staff; and

(d) encouraging the international community to help provide information on illegal armed groups to strengthen future vetting processes.

15.  Drive forward-planning, as part of the proposed post-election strategy group, for the UN’s role in future elections to retain momentum and ensure a smooth transition – including funding mechanisms – at the end of the current Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow (ELECT) project in 2010.

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3. Background to the conflict

The U.S. intervention in Afghanistan to oust the Taliban and al-Qaeda was the latest manifestation of a conflict that had been running for nearly three decades. Afghanistan was first invaded by the Soviet Union in 1979, which withdrew in 1989 after a decade of fighting with anti-communist mujahidin. With continuing factionalism among the mujahidin, the Taliban eventually seized power, controlling about 90 per cent of Afghanistan's territory and permitting al-Qaeda to operate freely from there, until U.S. and allied military action following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.

In December 2001, leaders from the Afghan opposition and diaspora met in Bonn, Germany, and drew up plans for a political transition starting with a provisional government structure, which led to the naming of Hamid Karzai as chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) on 22 December 2001. The AIA held a nationwide Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) in June 2002, and Karzai was elected president of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan (see Crisis Group’s May 2002 report, The Loya Jirga: One Small Step Forward?). In December 2003, the Transitional Authority held a second nationwide Loya Jirga in Kabul to debate a draft Constitution, which was ultimately adopted in January 2004 (see Crisis Group’s December 2003 report, Afghanistan: The Constitutional Loya Jirga). After threats of boycott, violence and claims of fraud the first ever direct presidential election on 9 October was largely succesful (see Crisis Group's November 2004 report, Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary Elections). Parliamentary and provincial elections were held in September 2005; exclusion of political parties from electoral process may compromise the strength of the legislature(see Crisis Group's May 2006 report, Afghanistan's New Legislature: Making Democracy Work).

For more background on the conflict, see Crisis Group's conflict history for Afghanistan.

For a month by month report on the conflict in Afghanistan since September 2003, check Crisis Group's CrisisWatch database.

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4. Crisis Group analysis

Crisis Group's reports

Crisis Group's previous reports on Afghanistan can be found here.

Commentary and other Crisis Group resources

For a month by month report on the conflict in Afghanistan since September 2003, check Crisis Group's CrisisWatch database.

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5. News and other reporting

News sources with regular coverage of events in Afghanistan

Useful websites

Useful websites related to the 2009 elections

Recent reports by other organisations on Afghanistan

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6. Important documents

UN documents

i) UN Security Council resolutions

ii) Reports of the UN Secretary-General

iii) UN Office on Drugs and Crime Opium Surveys

iv) Reports of Security Council Committee on Resolution 1267

Constitutional documents

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7. Maps and statistics

Afghanistan with regions and cities (CIA)

Afghanistan with population density in December 2003 (US State Department)

Opium poppy cultivation by district in 2003 (USAID)

Ethnic groups (Le Monde Diplomatique)


 

Election statistics

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