Iraq: Can Local Governance Save Central Government?

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

With much territory beyond the Interim Government's control, sectarian and ethnic forces threatening to pull the country apart, and national elections likely to be postponed or held in parts of the country only, the best -- perhaps only -- way to hold Iraq together is to concentrate on local governance.

Because seats in the National Assembly are to be allocated proportionately on a single national electoral district basis, it will be impossible to set some aside for areas where voting does not take place. Non-participation in Sunni Arab areas would have a devastating, long-lasting impact, not least because it would entail Sunni Arabs' effective exclusion from the process of drafting a permanent constitution, a task assigned to the new Assembly. Regardless of whether there can be elections for that National Assembly by 31 January 2005, elections for provincial councils in the eighteen governorates should proceed, if necessary on a rolling basis, with votes held in different areas as they become sufficiently secure: if national elections have to be postponed, they should be held only when legitimate provincial council elections are able to take place in the remaining governorates.

Local government is no substitute for central government, and there is a great need to recreate a sense of national identity. But in the context of rising violence, a growing sectarian and ethnic divide, and doubts on the feasibility and impact of national elections, the best way for now to protect the centre from centrifugal tendencies is, paradoxical as this may seem, to strengthen government at the various local levels. This means not only electing local governments but effectively empowering them, particularly on budgetary matters, and improving communication between national ministries and local councils. Without such steps, the isolated central state and the neglected local councils will both lose relevance and be unable to hold a fragile country together.

Establishing effective, representative local institutions should have been an early priority for the occupation forces and its Iraqi allies, but it wasn't. The U.S.-led occupation mostly viewed local governance as secondary, and Prime Minister Iyad Allawi's administration acts as if it is a threat. The occupation forces lacked a clear plan, did not consider local governance a main concern, and subordinated it to their shifting national agenda. Responsibility was given either to military commanders, who lacked experience or to the U.S. Agency for International Development, which had expertise but insufficient means and saw its strategy sidelined by short-term political considerations. The result was an inconsistent, ad hoc, stop-and-go process. Reconstruction funds were unevenly allocated. Military commanders appointed governors quickly without popular input and then sought to establish municipal and governorate councils with only minimum local participation.

Just when many Iraqis were nevertheless beginning to seize the opportunity to join the provincial, municipal and neighbourhood advisory councils established by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), the process was hastily diverted by a new U.S. agenda. Concerned over worsening security and its loss of legitimacy, the CPA made transfer of sovereignty the priority. Provincial and municipal councils were to play a pivotal role in selecting a transitional National Assembly. When the transitional assembly in turn was abandoned, the CPA lost interest in the new local councils but Iraq was left with an imperfect, largely illegitimate process.

The CPA's unfocused approach deprived local councils of credibility required to become effective. They received no real powers and could never shake the taint of having been fashioned by foreigners in exercises that fell short of real democracy. The CPA's choice to pursue quasi-elections, not direct local elections under UN supervision and not to devolve genuine powers, made the councils increasingly irrelevant. The Interim Government, eager to retain its meagre power, is more suspicious of than interested in local governance. As a result, neither central nor local authorities possess the legitimacy needed to hold Iraq together.

It is that reality which has to change, and giving priority to the early election of properly representative and empowered local governments can lead the way.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Interim Government of Iraq and any Successor Government:

1.  Prioritise direct elections to provincial councils:

(a)       conduct them, with UN technical assistance, wherever possible no later than January 2005, and thereafter on a rolling basis as additional areas become secure, even if elections to a national assembly must be postponed; and

(b)       postpone elections to a national assembly if they cannot be held in January 2005 across the entire country and conduct them as soon as possible, along with remaining provincial elections.

2.  Implement CPA Order 71 on Local Governmental Powers, and encourage provincial councils to take on budgetary responsibilities by the time they are fully elected.

3.  Set up automatic revenue transfers to provincial, municipal and district governments based in part on population to enable them to deliver essential services but conditioned on written annual plans that reflect public input on priorities, and ensure through careful auditing that funds are spent according to these plans.

4.  Set up formal, regular and transparent coordination mechanisms between national ministries and directorates-general, on the one hand, and provincial, municipal and district councils, on the other.

To Provincial Councils:

5.  Appoint a governor, deputy governor and police chief, and proceed as soon as technically possible with elections to councils at the town, neighbourhood, district and sub-district level within each governorate.

6.  Work with local directorates-general to produce an annual strategic plan for the area under each council's jurisdiction based on input from other governmental bodies, technical experts and the public, and publish this, along with regular updates on the council's work.

7.  Facilitate public access to council sessions, council members and complaints mechanisms so that every citizen can receive information and petition representatives.

To the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq:

8.  Provide personnel and resources to assist in the 2005 elections, and make a judgment on the feasibility of holding national elections by the end of January sufficiently in advance of that date to permit a timely adjustment of schedule.

9.  Advise local councils and civic institutions on best practices of democratic governance, including transparency, accountability and inclusiveness, based on experience acquired in other transitional societies.

10.  Expand capacity-training programs for local government and party officials.

11.  Make public and discuss with council representatives the use of UN funds in Iraq.

To the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom and Other International Donors:

12.  Establish a separate development fund, managed through the UN Assistance Mission, to finance priority investments in infrastructure by provincial, municipal and district councils.

Baghdad/Amman/Brussels, 27 October 2004