Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria

This report is also available in Arabic. To access its Executive Summary and Recommendations in Hebrew, please click here.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri's tragic assassination capped a series of events that carry the potential of fundamentally altering not only Lebanon's future, but also Syria's and the broader regional landscape as well. For now, most international and Lebanese actors have acted with welcome wisdom; the prospect of Syria's long-overdue withdrawal from Lebanon and of Lebanese elections free from outside interference appears closer than ever. But risks of serious violence remain very real. The Syrian regime, sensing its survival at stake, may lash out using its remaining instruments and allies in Lebanon and beyond; the U.S., feeling its broader regional goals within striking distance, may well over-reach, triggering violent reactions from Syria, Hizbollah or militant Palestinian groups; Lebanon's political class, notoriously fractured, could create fresh opportunities for outside interference and pave the way for domestic chaos. What happens in Lebanon likely will have momentous regional implications -- certainly on Syria and Hizbollah, possibly on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and even Iraq. But dealing with those matters before getting the question of Lebanon right is the surest way to get it all wrong.

Whatever the intent, Hariri's assassination heightened pressure on Syria, bringing together once disparate actors and objectives: the U.S., which had given priority to ending Syrian support for militant Palestinian groups, Hizbollah and the Iraqi insurgency; France, which was most interested in Lebanon and still invested hopes in Syria's president; and Lebanese activists, who traditionally had been unable to agree on much. Because Hariri's influence far exceeded Lebanon's confines, and he embodied its links with much of the outside world, his killing accelerated the -- at least temporary -- convergence of the Syrian regime's multiple foes on a set of demands: complete withdrawal of Syria's military and intelligence (mukhabarat) from Lebanon; the truth on Hariri's assassination; and free Lebanese elections under international supervision.

The Lebanese opposition, in the main, has sought to stress national unity, de-emphasise the underlying confessional dimension and avoid overly provocative positions that could alienate the powerful Hizbollah or the large Shiite community. Hizbollah has tried both to evince solidarity with Syria and urge a national dialogue, in effect acknowledging that Syria's time in Lebanon is over, that it has nothing to gain from civil conflict and that its priority is to preserve its position in the domestic arena. After some hesitation, Washington also displayed noteworthy restraint, intent on working closely with the French, focusing for now on the Lebanese arena and resisting the temptation to drag in broader (and evidently connected) regional and international dimensions, such as disarming Hizbollah, prosecuting the war against terrorism or changing the regime in Damascus.

Writing in early 2004, Crisis Group argued that, in order to avert a U.S.-Syria crisis, both needed to alter their approach, Washington by clearly articulating what it expected and what Damascus could expect in return; Syria by unequivocally demonstrating a decision to change course. But while neither paid heed, it is hard to dispute that a U.S. strategy of firm pressure and refusal to negotiate its demands appears to have paid off. The Baathist regime is more isolated than ever, on the verge of losing a major regional asset, and with serious questions about how long it can survive as is. From the perspective of the Bush administration, this is the time to squeeze, not to talk.

Still, neither the U.S. nor the rest of the international community can afford indifference to how Syrian and Lebanese actors react. That Syria should and will leave Lebanon is now certain but not how it departs and what it leaves behind. Many of the most apocalyptic post-withdrawal scenarios -- chaos and civil war; full-scale confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah -- appear, today, either no longer relevant or exaggerated from the start. But ingredients of violence remain. Seen from Syria's vantage, sudden excitement over Lebanon's sovereignty is just the latest U.S. ploy to destabilise it and usher in a new regional order; although significantly weakened, its regime retains instruments and allies to create havoc in the region should it conclude its survival is at risk. Seen from Hizbollah's perspective, the withdrawal is only chapter one; what comes next on U.S. and Israeli agendas is its disarmament which, in the short run at least, it is likely to resist, if necessary by force. Seen from the angle of Lebanon's fractious groups -- whether in the opposition or loyal to Damascus -- the end of Syria's presence means re-opening issues suppressed since the close of the civil war, from sectarian relations and the distribution of power through to Hizbollah and Palestinian refugees. All these are combustible elements that disgruntled Lebanese and outside actors will be tempted to exploit. In a country awash with weapons, accustomed to being a theatre for proxy wars between Arabs, Palestinian and Israelis, and on the verge of a major redistribution of power and resources, the means and motivations for violence abound.

The temptation for the U.S. in particular to use the current situation to achieve larger objectives is understandable. But it also is dangerous, for none more than the Lebanese. The guiding principle ought to be to separate the reestablishment of Lebanon's full sovereignty, independence and stability -- including the holding of free elections without delay and with international monitors and an international investigation into Hariri's assassination -- from broader issues that could impede achieving that goal. That will require the U.S. to curb its appetite, Lebanon's opposition to maintain its moderation, and Syria to avoid a scorched-earth policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To Lebanese Political Forces, Including the Opposition and Hizbollah:

1.  Adopt a joint platform, including the following immediate, sequential steps:

(a)  formation of an interim government tasked with organising elections;

(b)  passage of a new electoral law based on the qadha (Lebanon's smallest administrative district) system and division of Beirut according to the 1960 law, and official invitation to the international community to dispatch observers sufficiently ahead of election day;

(c)  agreement that unimplemented aspects of the 1989 Taef Accord and Security Council Resolution 1559, including Hizbollah's status, will be addressed following elections and resolved through dialogue and consensus; that Lebanon will take Syrian concerns into account while shaping its policies toward Israel, and close relations will be conducted with Syria on the basis of equality between sovereigns; and that the Taef Accord will serve as the basis for future political arrangements;

(d)  agreement to prosecute any person found responsible for Hariri's assassination by the UN investigation and to allow international observers at the trial;

(e)  holding of elections by the end of May 2005, or at most with very minimal delay thereafter;

(f)  suspension of heads of intelligence services, pending the outcome of the UN investigation; and

(g)  full withdrawal of Syrian military and intelligence personnel by the end of April 2005.

2.  Engage, once free elections have been held and a new government established, in broad discussions on unimplemented aspects of the Taef Accord and Security Council Resolution 1559, on the basis of the following principles:

(a)  respect for the Blue Line separating Israel and Lebanon in accordance with Security Council resolutions and commitment not to initiate attacks against Israeli targets, including in the Shab'a farms;

(b)  deployment of the army to the Israeli border;

(c)  gradual integration of Hizbollah's military wing as an autonomous unit under Lebanese army control, agreement by Hizbollah to abide by decisions of the elected government and relocation of its rockets twenty to 30 kilometres from the border as a prelude to handing them over to government control; and

(d)  full disarmament of Hizbollah in the context of progress toward Israeli-Lebanese and Israeli-Syrian peace agreements.

To the United States Government:

3.  Adopt a low-profile, behind-the-scenes approach, supporting a peaceful institutional transition and free elections and, if it is agreed to by the Lebanese parties, the sequence of steps outlined above.

4.  Urge Israel not to intervene through words or actions and, in particular, to cease intrusive violations of Lebanese airspace and territorial waters in accordance with Security Council Resolution 425.

5.  Re-emphasise that the immediate priority is Syria's withdrawal, while making clear that acts of violence in Lebanon traced to Syria will invite further sanctions.

6.  Re-emphasise that the issue of Hizbollah's final status is to be resolved by the Lebanese and that it is prepared to treat the organisation as a legitimate political party once it disarms and ceases all violent activity.

7.  Engage with Syria, following its full withdrawal and Lebanese elections, in discussions on issues of concern, including Iraq, support for militant Palestinian groups, bilateral relations and prospects for Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations.

To the European Union:

8.  Use economic leverage to press the Lebanese government and the loyalist bloc to hold timely, free and fair elections.

9.  Dispatch an election monitoring team sufficiently in advance of election day, provide funds to Lebanese non-governmental election observer groups and stand ready to dispatch observers to an eventual trial of those suspected in Hariri's assassination.

10.  Maintain its current stance regarding non-inclusion of Hizbollah on its terrorism list, subject to reconsideration should the organisation engage in such activity, and use contacts with the organisation to encourage its full integration into the Lebanese political system.

11.  Hold off ratification of the EU-Syria Association Agreement until Syria has withdrawn fully from Lebanon and free and fair elections have been conducted there.

12.  Begin working on a Paris III Conference to handle Lebanon's public debt to be held after Syria's withdrawal and the formation of a new Lebanese government.

To the Syrian Government:

13.  Implement its commitment to full withdrawal of military and intelligence personnel from Lebanon, consistent with Security Council Resolution 1559, by the end of April 2005, and refrain from replacing them with proxies.

14.  Desist from any steps to stir instability or violence in Lebanon, including by covert action or through pro-Syrian proxies.

15.  Establish normal diplomatic relations with Lebanon, including embassies in both capitals, and release Lebanese prisoners.

16.  Place all its security and intelligence agencies under civilian control by establishing a civilian National Security Council.

17.  Clarify its position on the Shab'a farms in a formal communication to the Security Council after its withdrawal from Lebanon and the holding of free elections in that country.

18.  Promote domestic political reform by lifting the state of emergency, legalising opposition parties, issuing an amnesty for political prisoners, and convening a national conference of political parties, opposition figures and activists to discuss national reconciliation and steps toward pluralistic elections.

To the Israeli Government:

19.  Avoid any intervention in Lebanese affairs, including through statements, and cease intrusive violations of Lebanon's airspace and territorial waters in accordance with Security Council Resolution 425.

20.  Consider after Syrian withdrawal, elections and a new Lebanese government, and provided adequate, verifiable assurances are received with respect to it, an arrangement under which Syria formally states that the Shab'a farms are Lebanese; Hizbollah turns over all rockets to the Lebanese army and redeploys twenty to 30 kilometres north; Lebanon's army moves to the border; and Israel withdraws from Shab'a.

21.  Test Syria's peace overtures after its withdrawal and Lebanese elections, while refraining from pressing for a peace agreement with Lebanon until there is progress on peace with Syria.

To the UN Security Council and Secretariat General:

22.  Keep the emphasis for now on the part of Security Council Resolution 1559, concerning full withdrawal of Syrian troops and intelligence personnel, and regularly monitor and verify that withdrawal.

23.  Carry out a thorough investigation of the Hariri assassination and ensure prosecution of any persons found responsible.

24.  Reiterate all parties' obligation to observe the Blue Line in accordance with Resolution 425, and denounce any intrusions of land, airspace or territorial waters.

25.  Streamline the multiple activities related to Lebanon and clarify the role and mandate of UN envoys.

Beirut/Amman/Brussels, 12 April 2005