Spoiling Security in Haiti

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Haiti is ensnared in a deep political, social and economic crisis, despite 7,400 UN military and police peacekeepers and the resumption of multilateral aid. The security situation is explosive, especially in the capital. By finally deploying country-wide, the United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH) has prevented even greater levels of violence, but the transition is fragile, and a perhaps overly ambitious electoral calendar compressed into the last quarter of 2005 faces many challenges. MINUSTAH needs to get and exercise new executive authority over law enforcement and security forces if the situation is to be saved.

Many powerful spoilers in Haiti have much to gain from fomenting violence, insecurity and political instability. Out of a desire to seek, keep or maximise power, income, authority, or position, these individuals and groups do not want the transition to succeed. They want to prolong a status quo that suits their interests. A key objective of both the transitional government and the international community, therefore, should be to neutralise these spoilers, not only in relation to the coming elections but also to advance the long-term process of democratisation.

Among the spoilers are warring gangs who dominate much of the slums of Port-au-Prince and receive varying degrees of political and criminal support. Many are manipulated by factions sympathetic to former President Aristide and his Lavalas movement, others by anti-Aristide groupings, elements of the business elite, drug-traffickers or other criminal organisations -- all of which have a clear interest in delaying the elections and in destabilisation. Although no longer an effective military force, another group of spoilers are armed former rebels and members of the Haitian Armed Forces (ex-FAd'H), who are an intimidating presence in the countryside. Thousands of weapons remain in the hands of all these groups. A systematic program of demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) must start at once and be coupled with police, judicial, political and economic reforms.

The human rights situation is still alarming, with concern focusing on growing allegations of summary executions, violence against women, kidnapping and other criminal acts by elements within the Haitian National Police (HNP), the absence of government investigations into these violations, and a dysfunctional and politicised justice system. How to strengthen and reform the HNP, which is also under tremendous pressure in the poor neighbourhoods from urban gang violence, is one of the most urgent challenges. Both the HNP and MINUSTAH must quickly address the force's paralysing deficiencies in resources and capabilities, including the lack of reliable intelligence, poor training and total absence of gender training, divided loyalties, unqualified personnel and conflicting mandates.

A deeply polarised society and the collapse of state institutions and state authority over the past decade opened the way for the emergence of violent groups with roots both in social conflict and political feuds, and lately with apolitical but deadly drug gangs. Underlying much of the violence is the chronic failure to tackle the poverty, social deprivation and exclusion that endanger most of the population.

Haiti's pressing challenges, therefore, include social and economic revival, environmental threats, jobs, social services and credible elections. Guaranteeing adequate public security is the precondition for addressing all these and requires significant advances on four fronts:

• DDR of the ex-FAd'H and their insurgent partners;
• neutralisation of the urban gangs and their incorporation into appropriate DDR programs;
• curbs on crime, especially in Port-au-Prince; and
• a purge of the criminals from the HNP.

The UN needs to redefine its method of working with its Haitian counterparts, particularly the transitional government, in order to reverse the deterioration in fundamental areas of security and individual rights. If the government cooperation MINUSTAH requires cannot be assured under the existing mandate, the Security Council must pass a resolution providing the necessary authority and resources, and a clear roadmap for moving forward.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To Haiti's transitional government:

1.  Develop and implement, in cooperation with MINUSTAH, a comprehensive and integrated public security strategy to establish the rule of law and ensure minimum security conditions for the electoral process.

2.  Define and implement urgently an in-depth reform of the Haitian National Police (HNP) as Haiti's sole internal security institution, to be acceptable to and implemented in conjunction with CivPol, addressing the following issues:

(a)  respect for human rights norms;

(b)  effective mechanisms to monitor adherence to the internal code of conduct;

(c)  adoption of a standard uniform with badge, name and photo identification to be worn visibly by each officer;

(d)  standardisation and registration of weapons;

(e)  in-depth vetting by CivPol, including the 200 former military incorporated in the HNP in January 2005 and those incorporated following the establishment of the transitional government in 2004;

(f)  implementation of a community-policing approach; and

(g)  increase in the number of HNP officers by training some new cadets abroad, as in 1994-1995, and by boosting the capacity of the civilian police academy.

3.  Undertake a comprehensive DDR program with MINUSTAH support, encompassing all armed groups including former military personnel, ensuring that no further payments are made before weaponry has been relinquished and individuals have been vetted.

4.  Complement police reform by adopting, with the support of the international community and civil society, including women's groups, sustainable prison and judicial reforms, and, as a transitional measure, request international judges to assist in expediting trials with a high political profile involving major crimes.

5.  Use regular budget and donor project funding to generate immediate local employment, with full participation of women, through public works’ projects, including roads, schools, health clinics, irrigation programs and erosion prevention.

To the UN Security Council and MINUSTAH:

6.  Expand CivPol (including the Formed Police Unit) from the current level of 1,622 to at least 4,600 preferably francophone officers, with a special emphasis on recruiting female officers.

7.  Authorize expansion of the mandate to provide for CivPol executive authority over the HNP, to include, at a minimum:

(a)  vetting of existing and future personnel;

(b)  oversight of operations -- including of detentions -- and investigation of major abuses;

(c)  establishment of a more effective inspector general's office;

(d)  issuance of binding recommendations, including suspension of personnel suspected of major crimes; and

(e)  supervision of training, including gender training.

8.  Increase the military component with additions including a rapid reaction force, and intelligence and command structures, to assure adequate security during the upcoming electoral period and the installation of the new government.

9.  Establish an integrated rule of law team consisting of the head of CivPol and judicial, human rights and prison sector directors to assist in meeting immediate transition period requirements, assuring coordination of justice sector technical assistance and enhancing protection of citizen rights.

10.  Accelerate the joint CivPol-Human Rights Section investigations into alleged executions and other major human rights violations perpetrated by the HNP and other armed groups since October 2004.

11.  Provide for international judges during the transition to preside over or participate in high profile political cases involving major crimes, including the results of CivPol-Human Rights Section investigations.

12.  Carry out a forced disarmament campaign against any groups that do not participate in the negotiated disarmament process, including former military personnel, and, simultaneously, work closely with the National Disarmament Commission to ensure implementation of a comprehensive DDR strategy.

13.  Step up collection of reliable intelligence with other international actors, mainly the U.S., Canada and France, on drug traffickers and other armed groups who constitute threats to the transition.

14.  Organize a joint HNP-MINUSTAH operation to remove illegal groups and restore the authority of the government in the main ports of the country.

15.  Improve internal coordination between CivPol, and MINUSTAH's military and other civilian components.

To other members of the international community:

16.  Accelerate disbursement of pledged funds, especially those with immediate potential to create jobs and improve living conditions.

17.  Provide MINUSTAH with additional francophone civilian police.

18.  Ensure that a single donor takes the lead in an integrated rule of law process and guarantees, in conjunction with MINUSTAH, its overall coordination and implementation as part of longer-term judicial reform.

Port-au-Prince/Brussels, 31 May 2005