International Crisis Group
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Iraq: Dysfunctional government, elections, and the U.S. troop withdrawal

1. The current situation
2. What should be done
3. Crisis Group reporting and analysis
4. Maps and geographical information

Photo: Residents look at a burnt vehicle at the site of a bomb attack in Baghdad 's Sadr City April 29, 2009. REUTERS/Kahtan al-Mesiary

updated September 2009

1. The current situation

The resurgence in deadly bombings in Baghdad as well as disputed territories over the last few months has highlighted the fragility of security. This violence, coupled with a political situation that remains highly dysfunctional, leaves a lot of uncertainty as to Iraq’s viability following parliamentary elections in January 2010 and especially after the U.S. combat troop withdrawal, which is to be completed by August 2010. The country continues to struggle with massive corruption and deep political divisions. One of the most destabilising conflicts concerns disputed territories and hydrocarbon resources to which both the federal government and the Kurdistan regional government lay claim. Al-Qaeda in Iraq, which was pushed on the defensive during the post-2007 U.S. “surge”, remains active in some areas and is working to stoke ethnic tensions, just as it fuelled sectarian tensions several years ago. In order to prevent an outbreak of deadly ethnic conflict after it pulls out its forces, Washington must craft an exit strategy that encourages Iraqi leaders to reach a series of political bargains on power, resources and territory. The Obama administration should make sure that the peace it leaves behind is sustainable.

Late 2008 and early 2009 brought signs of relative improvement; sectarian violence decreased and security began to stabilise. While bombing attacks have continued, the death toll has declined. The 31 January 2009 provincial elections were a relative success, with a lower turnout than the 2005 elections but few violent incidents reported amid tight security. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki emerged stronger, his nationalist rhetoric resonating with the non-Kurdish electorate. The Obama administration announced the pullback of U.S. forces, with all combat brigades to be withdrawn by August 2010 and all troops to leave by the end of 2011. As planned, U.S. forces had withdrawn from urban centres by 30 June 2009.  

Yet during the period of reduced sectarian tension, the political situation remained problematic, with only token reconciliation and no movement toward genuine accommodation. Fundamental conflicts over the division of power, the allocation of disputed territory (particularly oil-rich Kirkuk), and how to manage resources and share oil income, simmer without prospect of early resolution. Relations have deteriorated between the federal government and the Kurdistan regional government and there is a serious risk that their political conflict will escalate into a destructive military confrontation along the sensitive “trigger line” between federal army troops and Kurdish peshmerga fighters.

A series of devastating bombings took place in August 2009,  particularly in Baghdad and in disputed areas around Mosul. The coordinated bombings of government ministries in Baghdad on 19 August, which killed over a hundred people, underscored the Iraqi security forces’ inability to secure the capital following the U.S. pullout from urban centres, and could pose problems for Maliki in his re-election bid. The bombings also triggered a diplomatic spat between Baghdad and Damascus over the former’s demand that the Syrian government hand over two Baathists implicated in the attacks. Kurdish and Arab political leaders traded blame for the attacks around Mosul, although the perpetrators have not been identified.The attacks highlighted the need for a political settlement on disputed territories and, in the interim, a set of confidence-building steps, such as joint patrols by federal troops and Kurdish peshmergas.

The Crisis Group Middle East Report N°82, Iraq's Provincial Elections: The Stakes (27 January 2009), provides an in-depth background analysis of the lead-up to the polls held in January 2009. While praising the relatively open politics that enabled the elections, the report also illustrates the limited progress in laying the foundations for sustainable peace and a functioning state.

For detailed analysis of the escalating tensions between the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan regional government and detailed recommendations for addressing the conflict, see Crisis Group’s Middle East Report N°88, Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line (8 July 2009).

For Crisis Group's monthly update on the conflict in Iraq since September 2003, see the CrisisWatch database.

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2. What should be done

In its most recent report, Iraq and the Kurds: Trouble Along the Trigger Line (8 July 2009), analysing the escalating tensions between the Iraqi government and the Kurdistan regional government, Crisis Group made the following recommendations:

To the Government of Iraq and the Kurdistan Regional Government:

1.  Restart negotiations over issues of key concern, including:

a) unfreeze the five leadership committees in Baghdad and resume discussions on the questions under their remit concerning disputed territories, power sharing and constitutional reform, security and peshmergas, foreign policy and economics and oil/gas;

b) hold discussions on disputed territories as part of the task force established under UN auspices and institute confidence-building steps in individual districts, as per UNAMI’s recommendations in its April 2009 report on disputed internal boundaries; and

c) support political actors in Kirkuk in negotiations, mediated by UNAMI, in furtherance of the objectives of Article 23 of the September 2008 provincial elections law concerning power sharing, voter rolls and property issues in Kir­kuk, with a view to holding elections in Kirkuk governorate at the earliest opportunity.

2.  Agree to take no further unilateral steps in disputed territories, such as issuing new oil and gas contracts, and give clear instructions to military forces on the ground to remain in designated separate areas, except in those cases when both sides agree to joint operations against violent groups outside the political process.

3.  Refrain from inflammatory rhetoric concerning mutual relations, the status of disputed territories and the issuance of oil and gas contracts in these areas, especially in the run-up to elections in the Kurdistan region on 25 July 2009 and in all of Iraq on 30 January 2010.

4.  Agree to open channels of communication and coordinated action, including:

a) a channel for frequent communication between Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and Kurdistan region President Masoud Barzani or their designated senior representatives;

b) the appointment of a non-voting official from each side to, respectively, the Iraqi cabinet and the KRG’s council of ministers to promote early flagging of disputes.

c) a joint military coordination centre for non-urban areas in Kirkuk governorate for early warning and fact-based communications along the trigger line (to work in co-operation with the already existing joint police coordination centre in Kir­kuk city); and

d) joint army-peshmerga checkpoints and patrols in all disputed territories, based on the Diyala experiment, guided by a joint security committee in each governorate and coordinated by a joint committee that includes political representatives of the KRG and federal government.

To the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq:

5.   Support negotiations between Iraqi stakeholders on disputed internal boundaries by providing technical expertise and political advice at all levels where such negotiations are taking place (see above).

6.  Move Iraqi stakeholders through these negotiations, and especially should they threaten to reach a dead end on their individual tracks, toward a grand bargain combining the issues of power, resources and territories, as proposed in the UN’s report on disputed internal boundaries.

To the U.S. Government:

7.  Exercise strong pressure on Iraqi parties and deploy political, diplomatic, military and financial resources to ensure a responsible troop withdrawal from Iraq that leaves behind a sustainable state, including through a peaceful and durable accommodation of its Arab and Kurdish populations.

8.  Provide, in particular, full backing to UNAMI in mediating between Iraqi stakeholders on these key issues.

9.  Continue to apply pressure on Iraqi army and pesh­merga units not to take unilateral steps in disputed territories, and strengthen mechanisms aimed at improving communications and security cooperation to reduce chances of violent conflict.

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3. Crisis Group reporting and analysis

Crisis Group reports

For a full list of our reporting on the conflict in Iraq, please see our Iraq country page. Our most recent reports include:

A February 2006 report by Crisis Group, In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency, examined various publications by Iraqi insurgent groups. Click here for a selection of images from those publications.

See also our related Middle East Initiative, a global advocacy initiative designed to stimulate renewed momentum for a comprehensive settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

For a concise history of the situation in Iraq, see Crisis Group's "Iraq conflict history".

Recent opinion articles by Crisis Group staff

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4. Maps and geographical information

Although much of Iraq is covered by desert, the area between Euphrates and Tigris rivers is fertile, and the north is mainly mountainous.  Iraq is bordered by Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Turkey.

Map of Iraq (UN Cartographic Section) (PDF)

Iraq and neighbouring countries (UNHCR) (PDF)

 

 

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