Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No Quick Fixes

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Fierce battles rage in southern Afghanistan, insurgent attacks in the east creep towards the provinces surrounding Kabul and a new campaign of terrorist violence targets urban centres. The country’s democratic government is not immediately threatened but action is needed now. This includes putting more international forces into the battle zones but insurgencies are never beaten by military means alone, and there are no quick fixes. Diplomatic pressure on Pakistan is needed, and the government of President Karzai must show political will to respond to internal discontent with serious efforts to attack corruption, work with the elected National Assembly and extend the rule of law by ending the culture of impunity. Afghanistan needs a renewed, long-term effort to build an effective, fair government that provides real security to its people.

The desire for a quick, cheap war followed by a quick, cheap peace is what has brought Afghanistan to the present, increasingly dangerous situation. It has to be recognised that the armed conflict will last many years but the population needs to be reassured now that there is a clear political goal of an inclusive state. Actions to fight the insurgency must be based on and enforce the rule of law with priority given to the reform of the police and judiciary. Short-term measures such as reliance on ill-trained and poorly disciplined militias, harsh, ad hoc anti-terrorism legislation and discredited power brokers from past eras will only undermine the long-term goal of building sustainable institutions. Political strategy talk seems to focus increasingly on making a deal with the Taliban. That is a bad idea. The key to restoring peace and stability to Afghanistan is not making concessions to the violent extremists but meeting the legitimate grievances of the population – who for the most part have eagerly supported democratisation.

The intervention in Afghanistan has been done on the cheap. Compared even to many recent post-conflict situations (Bosnia, Kosovo) it was given proportionately many fewer peacekeepers and less resources – and Afghanistan has never been a post-conflict situation. Even the numbers do not tell the full story since force protection, rather than the creation of durable security, remains the first priority for some NATO members. Those prepared to go south and east to confront the Taliban – mainly the U.S., UK, Canada, the Netherlands, Romania, Australia and Denmark – are to be congratulated. Others, such as Germany, Italy, Spain, France and Turkey, must be persuaded to be more flexible and remove restrictions that impede true interoperability of the international forces.

Wrong-headed choices of allies within Afghanistan and across the border have contributed greatly to the current crisis. Pakistan has been at best a most grudging ally. The Taliban and al-Qaeda found refuge there and regrouped. Actions against them by the Pakistani military government have been non-existent or ineffectual. President Musharraf has devoted more effort to consolidating alliances of convenience with Islamist parties than fighting the jihadis. International efforts to stabilise Afghanistan will be about containment at best until the international community puts real, sustained diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to tackle militant leaderships and reverse policies that feed extremism, including reform of the extremist madrasas.

Internal reform is equally essential to end nearly five years of misrule by predatory leaders and a culture of impunity. The exploding drugs trade is both a symptom and a source of instability and corruption. This state of affairs has particular implications in the south, where many of the worst provincial and district leaders have close links to the central administration. As a result, the disillusioned, the disenfranchised and the economically desperate are responding again to the call of extremists in a region radicalised through decades of conflict. Self-interested spoilers, particularly those in the narcotics trade, which has exploded in the last five years, further fuel the violence. The traffickers and facilitators – often corrupt government officials – have no desire to see their trade threatened and hence forge alliances of convenience with anti-government elements.

The police and judiciary have been woefully neglected in reconstruction efforts. The former are mostly a source of fear rather than security for citizens and are often little more than local militias. The latter is corrupt or non-existent in many parts of the country, although the new Supreme Court appointees offer a glimmer of hope. In the absence of visible justice and security, people may hark back to the Taliban’s harsh rule but they are not rejecting alternative models based on a rule of law – none have been offered to them. Democracy has not failed but representative institutions have not been given a chance to function.

Along with extending central authority, aiding economic progress and protecting women and the vulnerable, building the rule of law is central to beating the insurgents. Strict adherence to due process would emphasise that this is a conflict between a legitimate authority and rebels and show the population that no one is above the law. International forces need to recognise this too; the deaths at the U.S. base at Bagram, aggressive house searches and detentions without the benefit of law feed public disillusionment and enemy propaganda.

Fighting the insurgency and nation-building are mutually reinforcing. The Afghan government and the international community must accept that some short-term pain is inevitable and hold their nerve to pursue deep-rooted, substantive reform. The current violence is an urgent wake-up call for remedial action, not an excuse to give up at the hopelessness of it all. There is nothing inevitable about failure in Afghanistan. However, without rethinking policies, there is equally nothing inevitable about success.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To the Government of Afghanistan:

1.  Launch an anti-corruption drive, headed by the president, that includes in its targets those involved in the narcotics trade and meets international norms of transparency as required by the Afghanistan Compact, including by:

(a)  requiring all provincial governors, heads of provincial councils and members of the National Assembly to declare their assets annually;

(b)  referring those declarations for review to the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of the National Assembly) and releasing them to the public;

(c)  monthly presidential review of progress with the heads of agencies involved in anti-corruption work; and

(d)  taking legal action when impropriety is found, without regard to the position or status of the suspected offender.

2.  Revive and push ahead with the Action Plan for Peace, Reconciliation, and Justice, emphasising that it is about accounting for all eras, from the communists to the Taliban, including by:

(a)  the president immediately announcing a new timetable for implementing the five stages in the plan and demonstrating political will in driving forward with it; and

(b)  ensuring all relevant positions go before the Consultative Board for Senior Appointments to develop a vetted shortlist of nominees.

3.  Identify why the Afghan National Army (ANA) is doing poorly in retaining personnel and take remedial measures, including improving the welfare of soldiers’ family members.

4.  Seek establishment of branch offices of the military-to-military Tripartite Commission (Afghanistan/Pakistan/NATO-ISAF) in Peshawar and Quetta in Pakistan and at Regional Commands South and East in Afghanistan.

5.  Assemble a top-level team at the ministry of foreign affairs to guide the relationship with Pakistan and pursue measures including:

(a)  exchanges of visits by media and civil society representatives to improve people-to-people links;

(b)  establishment of a Tripartite Political Commission (Afghanistan/Pakistan/UN); and

(c)  regular meetings of the signatories of the Kabul Declaration on Good Neighbourly Relations (Afghanistan, China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) to work towards a regional conflict resolution plan.

6.  Put priority on policing by:

(a)  pushing forward with Tier III pay and rank reform and ensuring that proper procedures are used to select candidates;

(b)  ensuring Tier II officers on probation are held to tough but fair criteria for past actions and ongoing performance; and

(c)  instituting strict internal discipline in cases of abuse.

7.  Create a communications unit in the president’s office to counter militant propaganda proactively and appoint spokespersons on security matters in the south and east.

8.  Facilitate access by independent monitoring groups to information on civilian casualties, detainees and displaced persons.

9.  Charge the Policy Action Group (PAG) to:

(a)  create a rule of law working group including the ministries of interior and justice, the attorney general’s office, the Anti-Corruption and Bribery Office and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC);

(b)  assess the work and standing of all governors and security chiefs in an area and oversee a local strategy plan to overcome bottlenecks in the reform of subnational governance and courts before proceeding with an Afghan Development Zone (ADZ);

(c)  hold monthly briefings with the National Assembly’s Defence and Internal Affairs Committees; and

(d)  undertake a joint assessment of insurgents’ financing sources.

To the National Assembly:

10.  Prioritise legislation relevant to good governance, accountability and the security sector, including:

(a)  delineation of administrative boundaries, laws for district and municipal elections, and creation of a special commission on subnational governance to examine devolution of more powers and budget to the provinces;

(b)  agreement on the structure of the court system;

(c)  establishment of a special commission to examine the criminal code in its entirety, with technical expertise from the international community; and

(d)  enactment of only such anti-terrorism laws as are consistent with the rule of law.

11.  The Internal Affairs and Defence Committees should make oversight of the police and army a priority, and the ministers of defence and interior should provide a full accounting of their structures and need for resources to the National Assembly.

To the U.S. and Other Allied and Donor Governments:

12.  Insist that due process is followed on senior appointments and in police reform.

13.  Emphasise rule of law in commitments by:

(a)  embedding substantial numbers of police trainers in every province;

(b)  providing significantly more funds for the judicial sector; and

(c)  aiding capacity-building of the new representative institutions, including the Provincial Councils and the National Assembly committees, and ensuring their voice is heard in decision-making.

To NATO/ISAF Governments:

14.  Ensure sustained diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to try in court or hand over Taliban leaders, to end political and military sanctuary for insurgents, reform the madrasa sector and strengthen progressive and democratic forces through free and fair elections in 2007.

15.  Publicly release monthly figures on militant incursions from Pakistan.

16.  Meet the force requirements of the ISAF Operational Plan by sending additional troops and equipment urgently to Afghanistan as requested by the NATO Secretary General and conduct a fresh audit of required troop numbers and resources, with the U.S. taking the lead in increasing commitments.

17.  Remove national caveats that impede interoperability so that all international troops in Afghanistan can be used where and as needed in the country.

18.  Coordinate counter-terrorism operations with counter-insurgency operations and carry out all such operations in consultation with Afghan authorities.

19.  Ensure that all countries with troops in Afghanistan conclude appropriate status of forces agreements and standardise bilateral agreements on the treatment of prisoners with the government, subject to the approval of the National Assembly.

20.  Give relevant Afghan and international authorities all available information on narcotics cultivation and trading, including information that may be related to the activities of allied Afghan figures and groups, and facilitate Afghan institutions and security forces in implementing the national counter-narcotics strategy.

To the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan:

21.  Ensure that all parties to the conflict are called to account through impartial and independent reporting on possible violations and abuses.

Kabul/Brussels, 2 November 2006