International Crisis Group
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Pakistan's Displacement Crisis

1. The current situation
2. What should be done
3. Crisis Group resources

Picture: An internally displaced boy, fleeing military operations in the Swat valley region, rests as others stand in line for curry and bread at the UNHCR (United Nations High Commission for Refugees) Yar Hussain camp in Swabi district. REUTERS/Adrees Latif

Updated 23 June 2009

1. The current situation

The Pakistani army’s offensive against the Taliban in the country’s northwest from late April has prompted a massive humanitarian crisis with nearly three million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). It is now crucial that the government provides effective aid and assistance to the millions displaced, both to lessen the long-term humanitarian catastrophe, and to ensure that Islamist groups do not succeed in radicalising the disaffected. 

It took less than two months for the military-devised peace deal signed by Northwest Frontier Province’s (NWFP) Awami National Party-led government with Swat-based religious extremists, subsequently endorsed by Pakistan’s National Assembly and signed by President Zardari on 13 April, to unravel. Despite the NWFP government claiming the Taliban had promised to disarm in return for the imposition of Sharia law in Malakand Division, the militants almost immediately announced that laying down arms was “out of the question”. In a flagrant violation of the peace deal, the Taliban continued to expand their territory and had by 22 April taken control of large parts of the Buner district (click here for a map of NWFP and FATA). The military, under strong international pressure, especially from the U.S., launched a counteroffensive to eradicate the Taliban from their strongholds in the Malakand region.

Pakistani troops have since entered the Swat and Dir districts, claiming significant gains against the Taliban there. The operation has now continued into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)’s South Waziristan Agency, where the Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud is housed. The military campaign in Malakand Division and FATA is unlikely to end before August 2009, unless another peace deal is signed, which would be unwise in the extreme. Despite Taliban claims that the government is fighting “America’s war”, opinion polls suggest strong public approval for the operation, and all political parties, except the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami, expressed support for the operation at a 19 May conference. The army claims that close to 1600 militants and 90 soldiers have been killed since fighting began, but, in the absence of full civilian and humanitarian access to the conflict zones, no independent verification of the military’s accounts is available.

The fighting has produced a massive displacement crisis, with close to three million forced to flee their homes. Only an estimated ten per cent of these have settled in camps set up by the government or agencies. The rest are staying with host communities or informal shelters. With inadequate access to assistance from the government and international agencies, this IDP presence is placing significant strains on communities with already limited resources. Lack of coordination between military and civilian  institutions is undermining effective planning of humanitarian relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction. Religious extremist groups are already exploiting relief efforts to advance their own agenda. The international response has been slow – the UN has appealed for $543 million in aid to avert a long-term humanitarian crisis, but so far only $166 million has been committed.

The level of displacement was by no means inevitable, but is rather the result of years of failed military policy that has enabled militancy to spread. Military-sponsored peace deals in Malakand and FATA have allowed tribal-based militant groups to grow, consequently expanding the theatre of war and the number of civilians affected. If and when the military operation comes to an end, reconstruction efforts must focus on addressing the root causes of militancy in the region, not just returning to conditions before the onset of militancy.

For Crisis Group’s latest briefing on the situation in the northwest, see Asia Briefing N°93, Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities, 3 June 2009. For background on the current situation in the NWFP, read Crisis Group’s Asia Report N°164, The Militant Jihadi Challenge, 13 March 2009.

2. What should be done

In its most recent briefing, Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities, published on 3 June 2009, Crisis Group made the following recommendations:

The Pakistan government should:

  • devise a blueprint for reconstruction efforts, including revitalising war-shattered agricultural and tourism sectors;
  • develop mechanisms that will enable IDP communities to hold officials accountable for the distribution of assistance;
  • prohibit jihadi groups banned under the Anti-Terrorism Law, including those operating under changed names, from participating in relief efforts;
  • prioritise police training and other mechanisms to enhance the capacity of civilian law enforcement agencies to maintain security after the military operation ends and bring militant and local criminal networks and allied serving or retired district officials to justice;
  • rescind immediately the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation 2009, reaffirm the jurisdication of Malakand’s civil courts, the Peshawar High Court and the Supreme Court and abolish the Frontier Crimes Regulations and the Nizam-e-Adl 1999; and
  • build on political and public support for confronting militancy in NWFP by implementing without delay long-term political and constitutional reforms in the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), of which Malakand is a part, as well as in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), so as to incorporate their districts and tribal agencies, respectively, into NWFP, with full provincial rights.

The international community should:

  • urge a humanitarian pause in fighting to allow much-needed assistance to non-combatants in conflict zones, to permit them to flee and to account for civilian casualties, with the timeframe dependent on assessment of needs and available logistical and other resources and material support, as determined by the provincial government and international and local humanitarian agencies;
  • ensure that relief and reconstruction are civilian-led and empower displaced communities to determine their own needs and priorities;
  • prioritise the relief and rehabilitation of IDPs, particularly those living outside government camps, through cash transfer programs that provide income support, payment of school tuition and paid vocational training;
  • support Pakistan civilian-led plans for return of IDPs to their communities with reconstruction programs that incorporate support for the provincial government and help build the capacity of civilian police and advance justice reform with new training, equipment and mentors; and
  • encourage long-term political and constitutional reforms in PATA and FATA through support for comprehensive governance, stabilisation and rural development programs.

3. Crisis Group resources

For Crisis Group resources on the current displacement crisis and the military's campaign against the Taliban, see:

Select previous Crisis Group Pakistan reports:

For all Crisis Group Pakistan reports, click here.

For a month-by-month report on developments in Pakistan since September 2003, see Crisis Group's CrisisWatch database.

For more background on the situation in the country, see our Pakistan conflict history.

Click here for a map of NWFP and FATA