International Crisis Group
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Burma/Myanmar: Normalising Aid Relations

1. The current situation
2. What should be done
3. Crisis Group analysis and commentary

Photo: A boy displaced by Cyclone Nargis stands in his tent with a Red Cross bag from Thailand at a refugee camp in Kyondah village, Myanmar May 22, 2008. REUTERS/Stan Honda/Pool

updated November 2008

1. The current situation

On 2 May 2008 a massive cyclone struck Yangon city and the Ayeyarwady delta in Myanmar (also known as Burma), leaving some 138,000 dead or missing and prompting an enormous humanitarian crisis. The government’s initial response to the cyclone shocked the world: international aid agencies and local donors were refused access, putting many lives at further risk. But – little reported by the international media – access subsequently improved significantly. While there are still problems, the cooperation between the Myanmar authorities and the international community has been unprecedented.

It is now vital that donors ensure the relief and recovery operations are properly funded. They should also take the opportunity presented by the post-Nargis opening to expand aid beyond the immediate disaster to tackle Myanmar’s wider humanitarian and developmental crisis, including lifting political restrictions on aid.

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon met Myanmar’s leader Senior General Than Shwe on 24 May, winning a promise of full access for foreign aid workers. Since June humanitarian access to the country has improved markedly, with visas and travel permits being easier and faster to obtain than before, and the government by and large making efforts to facilitate aid. The UN reported improved cooperation after a joint ASEAN-UN-Myanmar assessment team visit to disaster-affected areas in mid-June, following ASEAN diplomatic efforts. Improved access for aid and aid workers led UN Emergency Coordinator John Holmes to conclude in July that, “This is now a normal international relief operation.”

However, the humanitarian situation remains desperate. Officially 138,000 people are dead or missing, but the actual death toll may be closer to 200,000, and over 800,000 have been displaced.  The joint NGO-UN appeal for $482 million for post-Nargis recovery and rehabilitation has been only half funded.

But the suffering caused by the cyclone is just one part of a broader, country-wide developmental crisis.  90 per cent of the population are already living on less than 65 cents per day according to the UN, and more than a third of children under five are malnourished. While government repression and economic mismanagement are primarily responsible for the situation, 20 years of sanctions and aid restrictions have made matters worse, while completely failing in their objective of bringing about political change. Myanmar receives twenty times less aid than other least developed countries, and the activities of international agencies such as UNDP and the World Bank are restricted by Western countries for political reasons.

It is vital that aid commitments continue beyond the immediate disaster, focusing on the long-term goals of raising socio-economic standards and bringing about better economic policy and governance. Aid will also have socio-political implications: it should be seen not just as a means of alleviating suffering, but as a way of opening up a closed country.

Political change remains elusive. The military regime continues to put its own survival and political interest first, as evidenced by the decision to proceed with the constitutional referendum on May 10 and 24, just weeks after Nargis struck. The government reported an incredible 92.48 per cent approval with a 98.1 per cent turnout. The constitution forms part of what Myanmar insists is its own seven-step "roadmap" to democracy, which aims to secure a leading role for the military in a nominally democratic system after elections in 2010. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon in October 2008 expressed his frustration that the junta has not adopted UN proposals aimed at bringing democracy to the country. He also pointed out that only negotiated political solutions would work.

Following the protests of September 2007, where at their peak tens of thousands of people marched daily, and the following brutal government crackdown, the security situation within Myanmar has remained tense. The UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari has visited Myanmar on many occasions to assess the situation and encourage "national reconciliation". In August 2008, Gambari was criticised by the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) for not being able to establish dialogue between the military and the opposition. In September 2008, Gambari admitted that, “…the tangible results of my last visit fell below our expectations”, after his fourth visit of the year to the country. This was corroborated in the same month by UNSG Ban Ki-Moon who said that, “…we have not seen the political progress I had hoped for.”

U Win Tin, prominent political dissident and member of NLD (and Myanmar’s longest-serving prisoner at 19 years) was released from jail along with 9,000 other prisoners in September 2008. However, Amnesty International claim there are 2,100 political prisoners with several dozen on trial for their part in the 2007 protests. These include NLD leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi, who has now spent more than 13 years under house arrest.

For more information, see the policy report Crisis Group released on 20 October 2008, Burma/Myanmar After Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations.

2. What should be done

In its most recent October 2008 Policy Report Burma/Myanmar After Nargis: Time to Normalise Aid Relations, Crisis Group made the following recommendations:

  • The UN Secretary-General needs to remain personally involved and strengthen UN efforts to work on economic reform and development; as well as enhancing cooperation between the UN and the region on a broader human developmental agenda.
  • The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) should support the Tripartite Core Group and the Joint Assessment (PONJA) mechanism beyond the post-Nargis emergency relief phase into the recovery and rehabilitation phase and beyond. It should expand its engagement, in coordination with the UN and other agencies, in support of sustainable human development. It should further integrate Myanmar into ASEAN economic cooperation.
  • Regional Governments should upgrade the current informal discussions between Indonesia, China, India, Myanmar and UN to involve senior officials from each capital. They should impress upon the military leaders that cooperation on a broader humanitarian agenda is an opportunity for Myanmar to ease the standoff with the U.S. and Europe and gain support for the longer-term development of the country. They should work to facilitate the delivery of aid according to international standards, and adjust national trade and investment policies towards Myanmar to support broad-based economic growth.
  • Western Governments should not impose further punitive measures while the international community works with Myanmar to tackle the worsening humanitarian situation in the country. It is also crucial to lift political restrictions on aid (including restrictions imposed on UN agencies and the international financial institutions), and repeal economic sanctions that affect vulnerable groups
  • Donors and Aid Agencies should substantially increase aid for sustainable human development. They should commit to a common set of operational principles, form a Myanmar Aid Consortium to improve strategy, coordination, fundraising and monitoring, and work with the Myanmar government to establish a formal consultative mechanism.
  • The Myanmar Government should support the transition of the Tripartite Core Group and PONJA into more permanent mechanisms for aid coordination. It should agree to negotiations with aid agencies on general procedures for enhanced aid operations, and permit access by international aid agencies to vulnerable populations throughout the country, including in conflict zones.

3. Crisis Group analysis

Crisis Group publications on Burma/Myanmar:

Other Crisis Group resources

For more background on the situation in the country, see our Burma/Myanmar conflict history.

For more information on the September 2007 protests and their aftermath, see our previous Burma/Myanmar advocacy page A Call for Regional Action.

For a month-by-month report on developments in Myanmar since September 2003, see Crisis Group's CrisisWatch database.