Colombia: Presidential Politics and Peace Prospects

This report is also available in Spanish.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

President Álvaro Uribe's quest for re-election in 2006 by amending the constitution so a sitting president can run is a risky endeavour that could weaken democratic institutions. In the face of unabated armed conflict with two insurgent groups, pending demobilisation of thousands of paramilitary fighters, and a flourishing narcotics industry, Colombia must sustain its military and police defences beyond the forthcoming election. However, it must also consolidate the rule of law by ending impunity and make strong headway in rural development and in protecting especially vulnerable groups in order to engage the insurgents on political grounds.

Over the next four years, Colombia needs to secure a monopoly of legitimate force across its territory, expand substantially its public services in previously abandoned or conflict-affected rural areas, and construct a better strategy to conduct serious peace negotiations. Uribe is both the country's strongest political figure and its most controversial. His real accomplishments, especially on security, have been diminished by serious blemishes, including the questionable decisions to seek constitutional amendment to permit his own re-election and to defend a highly contentious bill aimed at demobilising and reintegrating into society the extreme right paramilitary, the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC).

While maintaining an emphasis on strengthening the Colombian state's military and security capacity is undoubtedly necessary, the military option by itself is insufficient to end the armed conflict. Without greater balance to the government's near stand-alone military approach toward the largest insurgent organisation, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a second Uribe term could once more miss opportunities essential to bringing Colombia closer to peace.

AUC demobilisation is a parallel challenge which hinges on congressional adoption of the still weak draft Justice and Peace Law. It presumably would benefit the incumbent but Uribe must be careful not to submit to political blackmail from the AUC. There is a danger that a partial demobilisation could occur in a way that fails to dismantle fully the paramilitary structures, clashes with strong domestic demands for justice and avoids international human rights obligations, particularly with respect to victims' rights to truth, justice and reparation. Despite agreeing to a ceasefire in December 2002, the AUC has subsequently killed more than 2,000 people, and its share of the country's recent kidnappings has increased compared to that of the ELN and FARC. Deeply troubling, the paramilitaries are growing stronger, politically and economically.

Since early 2005, the FARC has again increased the frequency and viciousness of attacks on military as well as civilian targets. It can be expected to do everything in its power to undermine Uribe's re-election by demonstrating that his "democratic security policy" has not deprived it of the ability to strike widely around the country. The FARC also appears to be exercising greater influence over the National Liberation Army (ELN), which partly explains the government's repeated failures to move forward on negotiations with that much smaller insurgent group.

Hopes to succeed both in counter-insurgency and counter-drug efforts, to end the conflict and strengthen democracy must not be tied exclusively to the re-election of Uribe, regardless of whether or not the constitutional court eventually authorises his candidacy. In anticipation that the president will be permitted to run, his administration should seek now to strengthen the country's democratic institutions to ensure a fair playing field for opposition candidates and political party reforms. If the court rules against him, Uribe should press for a consensus among major parties to continue a strong security policy, though one matched by more attention to rural living conditions and negotiations with the insurgents.

It is vital for the government to complement its overwhelmingly military strategy toward the FARC and ELN with a political pillar that addresses longstanding structural inequities in rural Colombia that, in turn, benefit the insurgencies, the paramilitaries and the drug traffickers. The core elements of that pillar include strengthening the rule of law, rural public infrastructure and rural economic and social development. A national rural strategy can be implemented only where secure space has been won but not having the approach nationally known, funded and ready to go is a debilitating factor both politically and militarily.

As part of the political strategy the government should accept the utility of talks to achieve a prisoners/hostages swap with the FARC as a first step toward peace negotiations; and should press ahead seriously with the resumption of a rapprochement with the ELN (that with Mexican facilitation had looked promising until recently) with the ultimate aim of demobilising and reinserting its members into society.

The FARC has suffered enough military blows in the last several years to know it has no chance to achieve power through armed force. Engaging it politically now while keeping up military pressure is more promising than putting all efforts into massive offensives whose effectiveness and sustainability are open to serious question -- especially as the FARC retains the resources to conduct a guerrilla war for the foreseeable future.

Simple continuity in the present security policy will lead Colombia into a political dead end regardless of who becomes the next president.

Recommendations

To the Government of Colombia:

1.  Implement the provisions in the statute on the political opposition in a full and timely manner so as to guarantee fair presidential and congressional elections in 2006.

2.  Announce now that the constitutional court's decision on whether a sitting president can stand for re-election will be fully accepted regardless of its content.

3.  Address the weaknesses of the political party system and undertake reforms that strengthen the parties' representation across the country, public financing, transparent auditing, and commitment to responsible security and rural development policies.

4.  Support a final version of the legislative framework for demobilisation of armed groups (the Justice and Peace Law) that fully respects international human rights norms, promotes an end to impunity and has the strongest possible protections for victims' rights to truth, justice and reparation, and in particular ensures that:

(a)  any reductions of jail terms for demobilised combatants are dependent on complete and truthful confessions, including full disclosure of past engagement in illegal armed activity and illegal drug trafficking, structures of the groups in which they were part, the assets the groups use, and the location of bodies of the disappeared;

(b)  those guilty of crimes against humanity and other atrocities must serve significant time in jail;

(c)  priority is given to collective demobilisation of units, and leaders' benefits are revoked if their units engage in ceasefire violations or new criminal acts;

(d)  adequate time periods (well beyond the proposed 30 days) are available to investigate the criminal past of those seeking benefits or who refuse to confess and, where appropriate, to begin prosecutions;

(e)  in the absence of special courts, local district courts can independently investigate demobilised combatants, penalise promptly any interference in the judicial process, including by withdrawing benefits, and instigate rigorous law enforcement measures against such interference; and

(f)  illegally acquired lands and assets are forfeited and available for victim reparation measures undertaken through the National Commission of Reparation and Reconciliation.

5.  Implement the Justice and Peace Law, once it is passed, promptly and rigorously, paying special attention to guaranteeing victims' rights to truth, justice and reparation to a maximum degree.

6.  Take increased law enforcement and judicial measures against AUC members who violate the ceasefire, are not seriously engaged in demobilisation negotiations, and/or traffic in drugs.

7.  Investigate notifications from the OAS mission in Colombia on AUC ceasefire violations and report publicly on actions taken by the armed forces and law enforcement agencies.

8.  Complement strong military pressure on the FARC and ELN by designing and implementing a political strategy, including:

(a)  seriously engaging the FARC in a prisoners/hostages swap as a first step toward negotiations on peace and demobilisation;

(b)  seriously going forward with attempts at establishing direct peace and demobilisation negotiations with the ELN, with international facilitation; and

(c)  a nationwide rural development strategy, including public infrastructure and social services and alternative development programs in coca and poppy growing regions, to be implemented regionally as soon as security permits.

9.  Protect vulnerable populations, including women, indigenous groups and Afro-Colombian communities, more effectively against FARC, ELN and AUC attacks, including by seeking arrangements that would respect their demilitarised zones if they agree to reveal violations by the FARC, ELN or AUC and international verification of the absence of armed groups in their community is available.

10.  Improve reintegration programs for demobilised ex-combatants by increasing support to communities and municipalities, including support for women-led initiatives, so as to guarantee the effectiveness of such measures, the severing of ties between the ex-combatants and their armed groups, and the protection of civilian populations in regions where AUC or other contingents have been demobilised.

To the United States and the European Union and its Member States:

11.  Condition disbursement of financial aid for the demobilisation and reintegration of the AUC and other armed groups upon full and prompt implementation of a Justice and Peace Law which is in accord with international human rights standards.

12.  Give particular consideration to monitoring government funding of the Victims Reparations Fund from assets seized from the AUC, drug traffickers and other illegal groups.

To the Political Parties:

13.  Establish single party lists for the 2006 congressional elections as stipulated by the political reform of 2003.

14.  Implement appropriate democratic mechanisms to achieve internal party unity, including in the selection of presidential candidates, so as to build and enhance solid programmatic bases for the 2006 elections; and develop transparent mechanisms that demonstrate the absence of ties to armed groups and provide for audit of any private campaign financing.

15.  Adopt electoral programs that combine a strong security policy with a political policy that encompasses rule of law, national rural development and negotiations with armed groups.

To the FARC, ELN and AUC:

16.  Abide by international humanitarian law and in particular cease targeting of civilians, kidnappings, blockades and sieges of civilian communities and use of land mines.

17.  In the case of FARC, respond promptly and positively to a new government initiative for negotiating a prisoners/hostages swap and refrain from interfering in any new government/ELN rapprochement.

18.  In the case of ELN, respond promptly and positively to a new government initiative to establish peace negotiations with international facilitation and immediately release kidnapping hostages and halt kidnapping as a sign of good will once the government has issued its proposal.

19.  In the case of AUC, irrespective of possible prosecution of some members of its negotiating team, press ahead with planned demobilisations, comply with the ceasefire and cooperate fully with the authorities in implementing a Justice and Peace Law or face the withdrawal of benefits contemplated in the law.

To the OAS:

20.  Notify the government promptly of AUC ceasefire violations, request it to take appropriate action and report to the Permanent Council on the adequacy of its responses.

Quito/Brussels, 16 June 2005