The Syrian conflict since 2011 is a constellation of overlapping crises. Each of its global, regional and sub-national dimensions demands a tailored response set within an overarching framework. Instead, chronic violence and worsening suffering have killed more than 250,000 people, fueling radicalisation, refugee flight and a self-sustaining war economy. Outside stakeholders must learn from the way the Syrian conflict has repeatedly dashed unrealistic expectations on all sides. Crisis Group pursues a comprehensive approach for achieving a sustainable decline in violence and, ultimately, a political settlement. We also seek to correct dominant narratives that focus on jihadism and migrant flows, which are the symptoms, rather than the causes, of the problem.
Since the Syrian uprising began in 2011, Ankara has been drawn ever deeper into the crisis. Its approach will likely hold steady for now. But the choices it makes next matter for the fate of millions of Syrians.
Tit-for-tat strikes continued between Iran-backed groups and Israel, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) continued to battle regime in north west and Türkiye signalled potential operation in north.
In south, Iran-aligned forces and Israel exchanged attacks. Notably, Israeli airstrike 1 March killed three, including Iranian adviser in Banias town, Tartous province. Missiles from Nawa town, Deraa province 16, 17 March targeted Israeli-occupied Golan Heights; Israeli retaliatory strikes 17, 19 March struck targets near capital Damascus. Israel stepped up attacks late March: airstrike 26 March killed seventeen, including advisor of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and Iranian-backed fighters, in Deir ez-Zor and Al-Bukamal; Israel 29 March killed dozens of Hizbollah and regime soldiers in Aleppo province. After hiatus since mid-Feb, Iranian-backed groups 26 March resumed attacks on U.S. forces by launching drone at base at Conoco gas field.
In north west, deadly clashes between HTS and regime continued. Notably, regime 7 March launched thirteen drones at HTS positions, killing civilian and HTS member near Darat Izza; HTS ambush 17 March killed two regime soldiers in western Aleppo governorate. Meanwhile, protests against HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Golani late Feb erupted across Idlib and Aleppo provinces, sparked by reports of torture in HTS prisons. HTS 5 March opened fire on protestors in Darat Izza town, Aleppo province. HTS-backed Syrian Salvation Govt next day released 420 detainees.
In north east, Türkiye threatened new invasion. Turkish President Erdoğan 4 March vowed to launch new operation in Iraq and northern Syria to implement 30-40 km deep security corridor along border. Signs of intra-Kurdish tensions re-emerged after assailants 1-11 March burnt offices of Kurdish National Council (KNC), part of Turkish-backed Syrian National Coalition, in Aleppo and Hasakah provinces; KNC blamed reported Democratic Union Party (PYD)-affiliate, Revolutionary Youth movement.
In east, tribal militias and SDF clashed. Tribal militias, backed by regime and Iran, intensified attacks on SDF; attack 15 March killed SDF member in Diban town, Deir ez-Zor province. Unidentified drones 6 March killed three Iran-backed forces near al-Mayadeen town, Deir ez-Zor. Islamic State (ISIS) attack 6 March reportedly killed eighteen truffle foragers in Deir ez-Zor province.
Banks are hesitant to change their banking operations [in Syria] when they know that permissions could expire imminently.
Turkey is highly unlikely to compromise on troop withdrawal [from northern Syria].
It's important to remember that [Syrian president] Assad's return to the Arab League is a symbolic measure to begin the process of ending his regional isolation.
The U.S. and Europe have made it clear that they do not agree with Arab states normalizing with the Assad regime, but there doesn’t seem to be much they can do about it.
The UAE has, since 2021, embarked on a policy of diminishing tensions with other countries in the region, and normalizing with Assad is part of that.
If the UN fails to extend its operation [in Syria] via these [Turkish border] crossings, donor states should bypass the UN and do bilateral assistance themselves.
The League of Arab States welcomed President Bashar al-Assad to its May summit, reinstating Syria’s membership, which it had suspended in 2011. The regime may look to have shrugged off the international opprobrium it earned for its brutality in repressing its opponents. But has it?
The rebels who control north-western Syria are dealing harshly with ISIS cells but have not yet crushed them entirely. The best way to stop jihadists from rebounding is to consolidate the area’s ceasefire. Outside powers can also help by sending more humanitarian aid.
Its self-declared caliphate is gone, but ISIS continues to stage attacks and intimidate the public in much of its former domain. The forces fighting the group need to hinder the militants’ movement between Syria’s regions – and, above all, to avoid debilitating conflicts with one another.
To prevent ISIS from resurging, forces fighting the group should stop it from moving across regions and avoid conflict with one another. This timeline catalogues some of the major ISIS attacks and counter-ISIS operations from 2017 to February 2022.
The UN Security Council is considering renewing an understanding whereby UN agencies transport aid to Idlib, an area held by Syrian rebels. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Richard Gowan, Dareen Khalifa and Ashish Pradhan explain why the arrangement remains essential.
This week on Hold Your Fire! Richard Atwood talks to experts Dareen Khalifa and Jerome Drevon about ISIS in Syria after the death of its leader Abdullah Qardash, the precarious calm that prevails across the country and the evolution of al-Qaeda’s former affiliate in the north west, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Aleppo was devastated by bombing and shelling during the Syrian war. It remains unsafe, with residents subject to shakedowns by the regime’s security forces and various militias. Damascus and its outside backers should curb this predation as a crucial first step toward the city’s recovery.
Turkey is increasingly relying on airpower in its fight against the PKK. New parties have been drawn into the conflict as it spreads to new theatres in Iraq and Syria, which, for now at least, complicates potential efforts to settle things down.
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