

## **MADAGASCAR: CRISIS HEATING UP?**

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>SUMMARY .....</b>	<b>i</b>
<b>I. INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>II. REASONS FOR THE DEADLOCK .....</b>	<b>2</b>
A. INSUFFICIENT AND OPPOSING PRESSURES .....	2
1. The international community: principled but weary .....	2
2. The High Authority of the Transition: a fragile support base to be treated with care.....	4
3. The indecisive army .....	5
4. The three movements and the deadlock: principles or strategy? .....	6
B. A CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS? .....	7
1. The power in the shadows.....	7
2. Patronage and business .....	8
3. The deterioration of the state .....	12
<b>III. THE IMPOSSIBLE INCLUSIVE SOLUTION .....</b>	<b>15</b>
A. FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION .....	15
1. A common objective but a lack of coordination .....	15
2. The problematic “sufficient consensus” .....	16
3. Disagreements about the summit’s objective.....	17
B. A MALAGASY PROCESS UNDER CONTROL .....	18
1. Civil society and the parties take the process in hand .....	18
2. ... but the government will not let go.....	20
3. The national conference and the legitimisation of power at any price.....	21
4. A new attempt at mediation but the same old problems: divisions and ill-feeling .....	22
<b>IV. ENDING THE CRISIS .....</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>V. CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>APPENDICES</b>	
A. MAP OF MADAGASCAR .....	26
B. GLOSSARY .....	27
C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .....	29
D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2007 .....	30
E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES .....	32

## MADAGASCAR: CRISIS HEATING UP?

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Madagascar is on edge as this report goes to press. On the previous day, 17 November 2010, a group of military officers announced a coup, stating they had set up a “military council for the welfare of the people”. The authorities claim they have the situation under control and that the plotters aimed only to disturb the constitutional referendum taking place that same day. The regime also expresses confidence that the “yes” vote on its proposed new constitution will win handily, though there are already assertions of irregularities. Behind the scenes, some insiders express greater concern about the situation. What can be said with certainty is only that these developments demonstrate the fragility of the long-running Malagasy crisis and the urgent need, as described below, to adopt a new approach to end it.

Madagascar is sinking further into a major political crisis. International and national mediation attempts failed again in 2010, while the population becomes poorer and the state’s structures crumble. The High Authority of the Transition (HAT) has initiated a unilateral process to escape the crisis that is unrecognised by the opposition and the international community – both of which still contest the regime’s legitimacy. Actors who might have helped unlock the stalemate have been unable or unwilling to do so, and some have deliberately dragged out the situation to their advantage. It is time to stop mediation attempts and concentrate on supporting credible elections on the basis of strict conditions.

Since the beginning of the year and the end of the joint international mediation, the effort to resolve the crisis has stalled in a political standoff. The regime’s handling of power is contested, and corruption is soaring. The president of the HAT, Andry Rajoelina, mixes public and private interests in the manner that he forcefully denounced when the former president, Marc Ravalomanana, was in power. The absence of rules and authority that characterises the regime aggravates such practices.

The support of many opportunistic political parties creates a misleading impression of inclusiveness about the transition process the authorities have put in place. However, the regime is in control of what is in fact a unilateral

plan and is confident that adequate financial backing is available to support it.

This scenario presents grave risks. If the authorities persist with the unilateral organisation of elections in 2011, the international community will likely refuse to recognise the new regime, and the crisis could last for several years. That would be a disaster for the country and the population. Madagascar is in a precarious equilibrium with a severe risk of social explosion and cannot afford to be isolated internationally.

Mediation attempts aimed at an inclusive transition have failed because of a refusal to compromise, and the time for them is over. The priority now is to get out of the crisis and only then initiate much needed reforms. The objective for the coming months, therefore, must be to organise credible elections with international assistance. That is the only way to restore constitutional order and revive the economy.

The three opposition political movements (*mouvances*) representing the former presidents are increasingly marginalised, and it is now clear that the regime will not back down from its transition plan – which the constitutional referendum is intended to legitimate. At the same time, the authorities claim they want credible elections, not least to earn back international recognition. For that, they need to offer the opposition the necessary guarantees of a level electoral field and keep to them.

Madagascar’s political actors and the international community should consequently adopt the following approach:

- The priority must be for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), backed by the International Contact Group, and the de facto authorities to reach agreement that international support will be forthcoming for the electoral process but only provided that the regime fulfills several commitments. These should include Rajoelina’s confirmation that neither he nor his ministers will stand in the elections; revision of the electoral timeline; transparency on contracts; the government not exceeding its caretaker mandate; promul-

gation of the amnesty law; and an audit of state finances by international financial institutions. If the commitments are violated, targeted sanctions should be reinforced, with the European Union, U.S. and others – acting through the UN Security Council if possible – implementing the African Union’s measures (such as visa bans and the freeze of assets in foreign banks).

- ❑ Credible elections, free of regime control, should be held as soon as possible. The Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) should be fully in charge and given the capacity and resources to organise them. It should, however, be reconstituted to make it acceptable to all parties, especially opposition parties, which should take up their seats on the CENI.
- ❑ The UN Secretariat should quickly send an electoral assessment mission to determine when credible polls can be held, and the timeline should be amended accordingly. Based on its assessment, the UN should then deploy a team of advisers to strengthen the CENI. This team should give robust support, especially on the revision of the voter registry, logistics, training of all involved in the process and civic education. Consideration should also be given to appointing international commissioners to the CENI to reinforce its credibility and neutrality. The UN should coordinate with other international organisations that can provide electoral help. International observers should also be deployed early.
- ❑ The International Contact Group should meet as soon as possible, so that the international community can start acting in a coordinated manner. China, a member of the group, should align its economic position with its official political stance. The opening of SADC’s liaison office in Madagascar should be accelerated to monitor the process, and its special envoy should work closely with a UN political team.

**Antananarivo/Nairobi/Brussels,  
18 November 2010**

## MADAGASCAR: CRISIS HEATING UP?

### I. INTRODUCTION

In March 2009, under pressure from demonstrations and an army mutiny, President Marc Ravalomanana yielded power to a military directorate, which immediately transferred its authority to the capital's mayor, Andry Rajoelina, leader of the protest movements.<sup>1</sup> The High Authority of the Transition (Haute autorité de la transition, HAT) has monopolised power since then, while opposition “political movements” (*mouvances*) representing former presidents of the country have called for an inclusive and consensual organisation of the de facto transition that began with Ravalomanana's fall and the HAT's takeover.<sup>2</sup> The leaders of the four political movements (the three former presidents and Rajoelina) agreed to do just that at meetings in Maputo and Addis-Ababa in 2009, but the HAT president unilaterally cancelled these agreements.

The HAT President went on to declare that the crisis would be resolved at the national level. The Joint Mediation Team that organised negotiations in 2009 was dissolved at the beginning of the year and the international community is still unable to agree a common position. In March 2010, the African Union imposed sanctions on individual members of the regime and others close to power. However, in April, France and South Africa took the initiative and organised a meeting between the four leaders in Pretoria, but this failed to find a solution. This failure strengthened Rajoelina's will to see the crisis resolved internally.

In May, he asked a coalition of civil society organisations to organise a national conference to pave the way for a constitutional referendum and legislative and presidential elections. In response to the announcement of this timeline, many political parties met to agree a common position but their initiative was soon hijacked by the HAT president and they signed a political agreement with him

on 13 August. The HAT presented this agreement as the consensus sought by the opposition and the international community and began to put the plan into practice by holding a national conference in September. Civil society made another attempt to mediate between the signatories of the agreement and the three political movements, but failed.

Pressure from the international community, the HAT, the army and the three opposition political movements led the president to review his roadmap from time to time and make small concessions that allowed him to maintain his position without ending the crisis. Meanwhile, some protagonists have benefited from the situation and deliberately prolonged it. Madagascar's political system has always been nepotistic, with a small elite monopolising power and patrimonialising the state until those excluded decide to get organised, take to the streets and overthrow the government. The handling of this transition has been no exception.

This Crisis Group report analyses the balance of forces since the beginning of 2010 and shows how this has led to deadlock and the failure of mediation attempts. It also shows the urgent need to find a way out of the crisis, which has plunged the state into a steep decline.

<sup>1</sup>For an analysis of the causes of the crisis in 2009, the recurring crises in Madagascar and the first year of mediation, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°156, *Madagascar: Ending the Crisis*, 18 March 2010.

<sup>2</sup>The word “transition” comes from Order n°2009-002 of 17 March 2009 which transferred power from the military directorate to Andry Rajoelina and gave him the job of organising a transitional regime during the following 24 months.

## II. REASONS FOR THE DEADLOCK

### A. INSUFFICIENT AND OPPOSING PRESSURES

After breaking off negotiations with the three other political movements in December 2009, the HAT president, Andry Rajoelina began work on finding a national solution to the political crisis. After announcing elections for 20 March 2010, he rejected the international community's attempts to relaunch the Maputo process.<sup>3</sup> On 4-5 March, the authorities organised a *Teny ifampierana*<sup>4</sup> workshop to try and reach agreement on a new roadmap, but the initiative was boycotted by the three political movements of the former presidents and was not supported by the international community.<sup>5</sup> However, the president decided to implement the workshop's resolutions.<sup>6</sup> On 11 March, the Council of Ministers adopted the electoral code and created the Independent National Electoral Commission (Commission électorale nationale indépendante, CENI).<sup>7</sup> Although Rajoelina announced a cabinet reshuffle and said elections would be held on 20 May, he did not seem able to implement his roadmap.

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<sup>3</sup> He refused the African Union (AU) Commission, Jean Ping's plan for ending the crisis at the beginning of February 2010 after Ping came to Antananarivo to present it. He said he was ready to discuss the situation with the opposition movements, but only on his own terms – that legislative elections would be held in May. The International Contact Group (ICG) called on him to respect the power sharing agreements and the AU Peace and Security Council threatened him with sanctions but he affirmed that he would only seek a national solution to the crisis.  
<sup>4</sup> "Find an agreement" (loose translation).

<sup>5</sup> The AU refused to send observers to the workshop, despite an invitation from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The organisation and unrepresentative nature of the workshop were widely criticised.

<sup>6</sup> Participants voted to keep Andry Rajoelina as president and Camille Vital as prime minister; include all signatories in the transitional structures in order to promote a "consensual" transition; hold elections for a constituent assembly; and draw the transition to a close 31 December 2010. "Convention nationale entre les forces vives de Madagascar", 5 March 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Creation of the CENI was disrupted by the absence of representatives from the three opposition movements and a lack of government funding. The Ministry of the Interior had used an important portion of the electoral budget on preparations for the elections scheduled for March. The CENI was set up in a non-transparent way, especially the manner in which some of its members were appointed. For example, journalists said they had not been consulted prior to the appointment of their representative, James Ramaroson, who happened to be an adviser of the prime minister, Camille Vital. "La CENI handicapée dès le départ", madagascar-tribune.com, 25 March 2010. Afterwards, the documents signed off by the Minister of the Interior did not seem to reflect the reality. For example, the voter registry seemed to be inflated and too hastily prepared. Crisis Group interview, CENI member, Antananarivo, 26 May 2010.

Since the beginning of 2010, the president has found himself increasingly isolated and subject to pressures from all sides, which have led him to change his plans on several occasions. However, these pressures were generally only partial and therefore never decisive. None of the actors in the Malagasy crisis has shown enough coordination, coherence, political will or decisiveness to impose a process capable of ending the crisis and the transition has therefore reached deadlock.

#### 1. The international community: principled but weary

During the first months of 2010, the international community seemed to want to increase the pressure on the regime.<sup>8</sup> It refused to support the government's unilateral initiatives<sup>9</sup> and consistently called for the implementation of a genuinely consensual process. In March, the AU imposed sanctions on 109 individuals linked to the regime,<sup>10</sup> the European Union (EU) prepared to suspend aid for another year<sup>11</sup> and the United States considered targeted sanctions.<sup>12</sup> However, the AU sanctions had a very limited impact on their targets, who have few connections with the continent,<sup>13</sup> especially as other international organisations

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<sup>8</sup> Donors suspended all budgetary aid in December 2008 following the excesses of former president Ravalomanana and non-humanitarian aid after Andry Rajoelina took power in March 2009. The United States suspended Madagascar from its African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) programme in December 2009. However, some donors are still present. The African Development Bank and the Kuwaiti Fund continued some of their funding, while the World Bank resumed more than half its projects (covering especially health, education, agriculture) and other donors, notably France, redirected their aid to humanitarian purposes.

<sup>9</sup> For example, only the International Organisation of La Francophonie responded positively to the Ministry of the Interior's request to send electoral experts.

<sup>10</sup> "Communiqué of the 221st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council", 17 March 2010; "Draft list of members of the institutions and individual members of the Rajoelina Camp and entities whose actions impede the AU and SADC efforts to restore constitutional order in Madagascar".

<sup>11</sup> Consultations within the framework of article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement ended on 7 June 2010, seven months after the original deadline set by the European Union, which wanted to show some flexibility and leave open the possibility of mediation. Budgetary aid and aid from the tenth European Development Fund was suspended for one year. "EU Council takes appropriate measures towards Madagascar", European Council, 7 June 2010.

<sup>12</sup> Niels Marquardt, "Une élection sans réconciliation signifie sanction", madagascar-tribune.com, 3 April 2010.

<sup>13</sup> They nevertheless made the HAT angry. It suggested to the president that he impose sanctions on members of the three other political movements, including freezing their accounts in Madagascar and preventing them from leaving the country.

did not join the AU initiative. The international community remained very divided on the question of sanctions, and this discredited the AU and mediation efforts in general.<sup>14</sup>

Despite this seemingly firm stance, the international community seemed to disengage from the process of mediation. The Joint Mediation Team (JMT)<sup>15</sup> that led negotiations in 2009 was dissolved. The United Nations mediator's mandate ended, primarily because of pressure from the AU.<sup>16</sup> After imposing sanctions, the AU stood back and let the Southern African Development Community (SADC) take responsibility for mediation,<sup>17</sup> while the HAT accused it of bias in favour of Marc Ravalomanana.<sup>18</sup> The International Contact Group (ICG),<sup>19</sup> whose task it was to support the JMT, was therefore no longer convened and did not meet again since February 2010. This prevented the international community from speaking with one voice. While some hardened their stance, France felt that implementation of the Maputo Agreement was a dead end.

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<sup>14</sup> France felt the sanctions were premature. It thought the list included people who were not responsible for blocking the process but did not include individuals from other political movements that were prolonging the crisis. Crisis Group interview, diplomats, Antananarivo, 12 April 2010. There was a feeling in some quarters that the African Union wanted to make an example of Madagascar and was guilty of double standard, considering its more flexible stance on other countries. Crisis Group interview, Antananarivo, diplomat, 26 April 2010.

<sup>15</sup> Composed of representatives of the African Union, the United Nations, the South African Development Community and the International Organisation of La Francophonie (IOF).

<sup>16</sup> Crisis Group telephone interview, United Nations official, 24 February 2010. The first year of mediation was characterised by rivalry between the two mediators.

<sup>17</sup> The president of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, could not upset SADC by withdrawing its responsibility for Madagascar, as relations between the two institutions were already tense during the first year of mediation. Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Antananarivo, 5 May 2010.

<sup>18</sup> This accusation dated from the beginning of the crisis when SADC hinted to the possibility of military intervention in Madagascar. The HAT accused Chissano of bias and subjectivity. "Une dent contre la médiation internationale", *Les Nouvelles*, 20 May 2010. The pro-HAT media also reject the mediator and regularly publish virulent criticism of him. See, for example "Joaquim Chissano – Une 'feuille de route' de tous les scandales!", *La Vérité*, 19 May 2010. However, SADC is itself divided on the issue of Madagascar. Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Angola are more hardline than other countries in the region, in accordance with their own interests. Crisis Group interview, diplomat, June 2010.

<sup>19</sup> The ICG included representatives of the United Nations, SADC, IOF, the Indian Ocean Commission (COI), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the EU, the permanent members of the UN Security Council and the African countries with seats on the Council.

China did not officially recognise the regime but continued to reach trade agreements with the authorities.<sup>20</sup>

The absence of international recognition poses problems for the regime although it refuses to acknowledge the fact.<sup>21</sup> Suspension of aid meant a major reduction of the national budget and the country became an international pariah.<sup>22</sup> Rajoelina seems to waver between hardline nationalism, rejecting international pressure and accusing others of interference, and an understanding of the importance of international support, which, for example, often encouraged him to seek advice from France when he was forced on to the back foot. The authorities also regularly take initiatives to argue their case internationally.<sup>23</sup>

It seemed clear that international partners would not support a unilaterally arranged transition, and after intense lobbying by France, Rajoelina gave in to international pressure and agreed to go to Pretoria for discussions with the heads of the three other political movements, under the aegis of the international community<sup>24</sup> and later agreed to announce he would not be a candidate in the forthcoming presidential election.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> See Section II.B.2 on economic decisions.

<sup>21</sup> The regime operates in a totally uncertain legal context. See Anacleto Imbiki, "Réflexion sur la loi fondamentale en vigueur pendant la transition 2009-2010 à Madagascar", 25 January 2010, at [www.madagascar-tribune.com/IMG/pdf/Reflexion\\_sur\\_la\\_loi\\_fondamentale\\_en\\_vigueur\\_pendant\\_la\\_TRANSITION\\_2009.pdf](http://www.madagascar-tribune.com/IMG/pdf/Reflexion_sur_la_loi_fondamentale_en_vigueur_pendant_la_TRANSITION_2009.pdf).

<sup>22</sup> Rajoelina and the Zimbabwe and Sudanese presidents, Robert Mugabe and Omar al-Bashir respectively, were the only African heads of state not invited to the Africa-France summit in Nice at the end of May 2010. (France wanted to invite the HAT president but was finally dissuaded from doing so by South Africa. Crisis Group telephone interview, diplomat, 2 June 2010.) Neither did France invite him to the party it held on 14 July and to which were invited all other heads of state that were celebrating 50 years of independence. After unsuccessful lobbying efforts, the Malagasy delegation announced it would not make a speech during the debate on the Millennium Development Goals at the United Nations in September 2010 because of the risk of a repeat of the humiliation it suffered the previous year, when the General Assembly voted against allowing Rajoelina to address the assembly. Crisis Group interview, diplomat, New York, 14 September 2010.

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Prime Minister Camille Vital's visit to Maputo and Addis Ababa in February to argue in favour of the regime's roadmap; Andry Rajoelina's visit to Paris in the same month, followed by another delegation's trip to the Ethiopian capital to present the conclusions of a national workshop before sanctions were due to be announced.

<sup>24</sup> This summit once again showed the international community's lack of coordination. Section III.A (Failure of international mediation) will examine this episode.

<sup>25</sup> Although, in March, he refused an invitation from Ramtane Lamamra, AU Peace and Security Commissaire, to go to Addis

The international community remained divided. France hoped to break the deadlock by persuading the HAT president not to stand in the presidential elections but, although other donors were supportive, they adopted a much more prudent position. Rajoelina sometimes agreed to follow the international community's recommendations, but he was equally quick to reject them when he felt he was not being "rewarded" for making concessions.<sup>26</sup> He then sought the support of other partners, some of which, including Turkey and Pakistan, recognised the regime. The lack of a common position allowed Rajoelina to plot a course between international actors and considerably reduce their influence in the search for a way out of the crisis.

The stance of international donors, who continued to favour the Maputo Agreements, also contributed to the deadlock. Most international partners continued to condition their recognition of the regime, if not on the implementation of the power sharing agreements, at least on the setting up of an inclusive process involving all four political movements. But the three political movements led by the former heads of state rejected all the president's initiatives to include them in the transitional regime because they departed from the Maputo Agreements. The position of the international community had the effect of virtually providing these actors with the right of veto over proposals for resolving the crisis.

## **2. The High Authority of the Transition: a fragile support base to be treated with care**

From the beginning of 2010, the president was increasingly openly criticised by those who had brought him to power. The divisions that began to appear soon after he had taken power now became public and intensified after the president announced that elections would be held.<sup>27</sup> Although the criticism did not go so far as to question Rajoelina's position as president, it did question the way he was managing the crisis. The result was a rapid weakening in his support base. Many also reproached the president

for his ingratitude.<sup>28</sup> However, this pressure was not decisive because although the critics were saying the same thing, they were more interested in furthering their own interests rather than seeking genuine change. No member of the HAT resigned. In addition to the salary they continued to receive, they were anxious to prevent Marc Ravalomanana's return to power, as many of them felt sure the former president would throw them in jail.

In fact, many of Andry Rajoelina's allies did not want him to soften his stance. The president's occasional initiatives in this direction were systematically rejected by the government and the HAT. They called on him to maintain a hard line and therefore contributed to the deadlock.<sup>29</sup> In February, when Rajoelina proposed the creation of the Superior Council for the Control of the Transition (Conseil supérieur de contrôle de la transition, CSCT),<sup>30</sup> and told ministers they would have to resign if they wanted to stand for election, he came under such strong pressure that he finally abandoned this proposal.<sup>31</sup>

In addition, as the HAT president himself said, members of his political movement did not want him to go to Pretoria to meet former president Ravalomanana and called on him to reject any new proposal for negotiations.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, Rajoelina's statements in favour of a government of technicians were not well received by many members of the government, who would have lost their posts in such a shake-up.<sup>33</sup> Andry Rajoelina thus often has only a narrow margin of manoeuvre if he wants to avoid upsetting those around him, a delicate position given the fact that his support base is already weak. This situation helps to explain his regular and sudden hardening of tone.

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Ababa for talks with the heads of the other three political movements.

<sup>26</sup> Crisis Group interview, presidential advisor, Antananarivo, 23 August 2010. For example, the fact that France no longer held back from criticising the government was badly received. See the French ambassador's speech on 14 July when he asked for transparency in the conduct of public finances, respect for the rule of law and dissolution of militias and of the Special Intervention Force (Force d'intervention spéciale, FIS) attached to the presidency. [www.ambafrance-mada.org/ambafrance-mada/IMG/pdf\\_14\\_July\\_2010.pdf](http://www.ambafrance-mada.org/ambafrance-mada/IMG/pdf_14_July_2010.pdf).

<sup>27</sup> See the statements by Eugène Voninahitsy and Roland Ratsiraka. "Roland Ratsiraka interpelle", *L'Express de Madagascar*, 24 February 2010. "Voninahitsy et Pety Rakotoniaina se démarquent", *L'Express de Madagascar*, 10 April 2010.

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<sup>28</sup> "He thinks that he brought us to power but it's the other way round!" Crisis Group interviews, HAT members, Antananarivo, 20 and 21 May 2010.

<sup>29</sup> Some moderates resigned, for example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ny Hasina Andriamanjato.

<sup>30</sup> The intention was to create a council to control the executive. The three political movements would together have a majority, and the government would only be a caretaker. The president wrote to the AU on 16 February, stating that he was ready to broaden the composition of the government, as long he could retain his prime minister.

<sup>31</sup> Crisis Group telephone interview, ministerial adviser, 9 February 2010. Crisis Group interview, Andry Rajoelina, HAT president, Antananarivo, 16 April 2010.

<sup>32</sup> Crisis Group interview, Antananarivo, 16 April 2010.

<sup>33</sup> Crisis Group interview, HAT member, Antananarivo, 20 May 2010.

### 3. The indecisive army

Although it had remained relatively discreet since the new regime took power,<sup>34</sup> the army began to put more direct pressure on the president. The lack of progress, the deterioration in the security and social situation and the lack of international recognition led the military to give the president an ultimatum.<sup>35</sup> An agreement must be reached by the end of April 2010.<sup>36</sup> They did not stipulate what the consequences of failure would be. This ambiguity prevailed, for although the army was unanimous about the need to take things forward, it remained divided about what measures should be taken.<sup>37</sup> Its hesitancy was due to its refusal to countenance a coup, its fear of social unrest and the lack of anyone in its ranks capable and willing enough to assume a leadership role.<sup>38</sup>

When the ultimatum expired, the president proposed setting up a government of technicians, but prepared a “Plan B” with the military, against the advice of several of his advisors.<sup>39</sup> He planned to co-opt the military into his government. Although some senior officers considered adhering to the president’s new roadmap for a while, they realised they would not retain much margin for manoeuvre in a regime that included the HAT.<sup>40</sup> The generals refused to nominate anyone for ministerial posts.<sup>41</sup> One general felt that when Rajoelina announced his decision not to stand at the elections and to dissolve his political movement in May 2010, he was trying to “redeem him-

self”. The general believed that Rajoelina hoped the armed forces would go back on their decision and he would be able to maintain his position even though he knew that some of them wanted him to step down.<sup>42</sup> There was, however, too much disagreement in the army for a common position to be reached.<sup>43</sup> The spectre raised by the absence of international recognition if they proved unable to manage the country’s affairs was an additional reason why they did not put their plans into practice.<sup>44</sup>

However, there were many rumours of attempted coups in the first part of 2010.<sup>45</sup> One of them led to the dismissal of the armed forces minister, who was accused of intending to set up a military directorate.<sup>46</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Andrianasoavina, who had helped bring Rajoelina to power, was removed from his position as head of the Special Intervention Force (Force d’intervention spéciale, FIS) after rumours that he intended to overthrow the government.<sup>47</sup>

Tension within the armed forces led to a mutiny by the National Gendarmerie Intervention Force (Force d’intervention de la gendarmerie nationale, FIGN) on 20 May, resulting in at least two deaths. Provoked by a case of corruption in the gendarmerie dating from the time of Rava-

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<sup>34</sup> The army pressed the president to appoint the prime minister from among its ranks in December 2009 but it refused to take power in September when several opposition movements suggested it should. “L’armée malgache refuse d’assumer le pouvoir par intérim”, *Le Monde* (online), 4 September 2009.

<sup>35</sup> Crisis Group interview, military officer, Antananarivo, 26 April 2010.

<sup>36</sup> It initially gave the president two days in which to announce a new roadmap but the president asked for more time to go to Pretoria. “Ultimatum des Forces armées”, *L’Express de Madagascar*, 13 April 2010. Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Antananarivo, 13 July 2010.

<sup>37</sup> Some officers wanted Andry Rajoelina to stay on as head of state, while others called on him to resign. The military also disagreed about the government’s composition: purely military or military-civilian.

<sup>38</sup> Ideally, the military would have preferred a transfer of power similar to that organised by Ravalomanana in March 2009. Crisis Group interview, general, Antananarivo, 27 April 2010.

<sup>39</sup> Crisis Group interview, colonel, Antananarivo, 6 September 2010.

<sup>40</sup> Crisis Group interview, general, Antananarivo, 12 July 2010.

<sup>41</sup> Some chanceries would have accepted a military takeover, which could have encouraged the armed forces to increase their pressure, but failure would have damaged the military’s credibility and the lack of any guarantee in the event of failure posed a problem for them. Crisis Group interview, general, Antananarivo, 12 July 2010.

<sup>42</sup> Crisis Group interview, general, Antananarivo, 12 July 2010.

<sup>43</sup> Certain senior officers supported other politicians, such as former prime minister Monja Roindefo, Didier Ratsiraka or Marc Ravalomanana.

<sup>44</sup> In addition, they did not have information on the real state of the country’s finances. Crisis Group interview, colonel, Antananarivo, 6 September 2010.

<sup>45</sup> On 18 April, an attack on the prime minister’s premises (location of a large quantity of arms and munitions) was foiled. Military and civilian supporters of Ravalomanana and also of Rajoelina were implicated. The president’s supporters wanted to prevent him from going to South Africa. Crisis Group interviews, military officers, Antananarivo, 19 and 26 April 2010.

<sup>46</sup> The minister in question had criticised the government and had read out a reform bill on the transition during a meeting of civilian and military personnel. Crisis Group interviews, military officers, Antananarivo, 19 and 26 April 2010. However, animosity between the prime minister and the armed forces minister, who initially held a higher rank, probably contributed to the minister’s dismissal. The minister argued that he had only been presenting a draft bill for a Superior Joint Mediation and Ethical Council (Conseil supérieur mixte de la médiation et de l’éthique, CSMME). This involved the establishment of a military-civilian structure.

<sup>47</sup> “L’avenir du FIS dépend de Andry Rajoelina”, *madagascartribune.com*, 13 April 2010. He had already been appointed to the board of Jirama (national water and electricity company) and as head of the Mining Brigade (Brigade minière), in order to sweeten the pill and “buy him off”, according to some observers. Crisis Group interview, military officer, Antananarivo, 26 April 2010.

lomanana, who had kindled discontent,<sup>48</sup> the case was apparently used by some opposition politicians to try and destabilise the regime.<sup>49</sup> Marc Ravalomanana has denied any role in this mutiny. However, some members of the two political movements with which he is allied and several senior officers believe that he was in fact involved.<sup>50</sup> After these events, the army returned to “relative calm”, though it always seemed possible that the gendarmerie would cause problems.<sup>51</sup> In the end, although they have not so far played a decisive role in resolving the crisis, the armed forces remain an influential actor that the authorities cannot ignore.<sup>52</sup>

#### 4. The three movements and the deadlock: principles or strategy?

Despite the breakdown of negotiations, the three main opposition movements continued to insist on implementation of the power-sharing agreements. Although they said they were not against the idea of reviewing some problematic articles, they showed very little flexibility at meetings, especially under pressure from their leaders, who were less flexible than their respective representatives.<sup>53</sup> They refuse to let the HAT organise elections on its own, especially because this would provide it with an electoral advantage. They insist on the need for transition structures

and many of their members believe it is impossible for Rajoelina to remain in power.<sup>54</sup>

However, the main opposition movements seem to be losing their momentum and are finding it increasingly difficult to mobilise popular support.<sup>55</sup> The alliance of former presidents, previously enemies, lacked credibility among their supporters.<sup>56</sup> They also suffered from an image problem because of the fact that these three former heads of state had all been overthrown.<sup>57</sup> It should nevertheless be noted that the opposition movements were not normally authorised to organise meetings and were often subjected to threats.<sup>58</sup> The authorities showed no sign of goodwill towards them.<sup>59</sup>

Moreover, the three former presidents faced increasing factionalism within their own movements. This reduced their influence but also encouraged them to remain steadfast in order to boost their credibility on the political scene. The Ravalomanana group split with the movement led by the former spokesperson of the former presidential party, the TIM (Tiako i Madagasikara), Raharinaivo Andrianatoandro, who was involved in discussions with the authorities in April and declared himself president of the party.<sup>60</sup> The Zafy group also split with the participation of the HPM (Hery Politika Mitambatra) in discussions with

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<sup>48</sup> When his government was under threat, Ravalomanana allegedly offered close to \$250,000 to three senior FIGN officers but this money was apparently never redistributed. Some gendarmes sought an explanation about what had happened to this money several times, including through the media. An inquiry had in fact been opened but nothing came of it.

<sup>49</sup> Rumours of an attack on the barracks were used to try and rally the troops against the government, as at the time of the Capsat mutiny in March 2009, but several sources indicated that it was more of a case of opposition members making direct payments to the mutineers. It had been planned that other camps would join the mutiny, but this never happened, especially for financial reasons. Crisis Group interviews, military officers, Antananarivo, 6 September 2010.

<sup>50</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Antananarivo, 12 and 15 July 2010. Some believe that the mutineers' rapprochement with the clerics close to Ravalomanana could also indicate a link with the former president.

<sup>51</sup> Crisis Group interview, general, Antananarivo, 12 July 2010.

<sup>52</sup> An observer noted that Rajoelina was “under surveillance” by the armed forces. “Invité Afrique: Jean Eric Rakotoarisoa”, Radio France internationale, 24 May 2010.

<sup>53</sup> Crisis Group interviews, members of the three opposition movements, Antananarivo, 19 April, 18 June and 12 July 2010. Some members even indicated that it was not indispensable to establish legislative bodies, or only in reduced form. However, they recognised that all the political movements wanted to place their members in these institutions.

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<sup>54</sup> Crisis Group interview, member of the Zafy movement, Antananarivo, 12 July 2010.

<sup>55</sup> During a tour of the provinces, their gatherings were poorly attended, including in the major towns. Crisis Group interviews, Toamasina, June and July 2010.

<sup>56</sup> Crisis Group interview, university professor, Toamasina, 29 June 2010.

<sup>57</sup> Crisis Group interview, member of the Zafy movement, Antananarivo, 12 July 2010.

<sup>58</sup> See, for example, at Fianarantsoa where the Special Delegation President (Président de délégation spéciale, PDS) said he would never allow a meeting of supporters of the three opposition movements. “Fianarantsoa: Pety contre les trois mouvances”, *Courrier de Madagascar*, 7 July 2010. One head of region said the central government had ordered him not to authorise demonstrations by the three opposition movements. Crisis Group interview, July 2010.

<sup>59</sup> The authorities even missed a clear opportunity to show their openness and condemn violence towards the opposition when Ambroise Ravonison was forcefully arrested and the radio station Fréquence Plus was ransacked and its journalists were beaten up by the FIS and other armed elements. Only the minister of communications condemned the violence, although Andry Rajoelina had just announced he would not be a candidate at the elections and would henceforth play the role of *Raiamandreny* (wise elder).

<sup>60</sup> After being elected by parliamentarians and regionally elected party representatives in elections contested by the former president. About 60 former deputies, senators and many regional leaders rallied to him. Ravalomanana later released a communiqué disowning him.

other parties, while members of Didier Ratsiraka's party, AREMA, also disassociated themselves from the official position held by their leader.

In fact, the deadlock is beneficial for some members of the opposition. In the opinion of several members of the "allied" political movements led by Ratsiraka and Zafy, Marc Ravalomanana seemed to be betting on a deterioration of the situation. His return to power might then seem to be a potential solution in the context of a growing popular perception that the current situation was worse than it was before, particularly for the most vulnerable socio-economic sectors of the population.<sup>61</sup> One member of the three opposition movements indicated that Ravalomanana wants to come back as a hero and that he and Rajoelina are objectively allies.<sup>62</sup> The former president is therefore not investing as much effort as previously in the fight by the three political movements and maintains the alliance without really supporting it in order to avoid the risk of being outflanked by the two other former presidents.<sup>63</sup> Members of the Zafy and Ratsiraka political movements say he has reduced his financial support for opposition campaigns.<sup>64</sup>

On the other hand, the prolongation of the crisis provides former presidents Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy with an opportunity to take centre stage in national politics.<sup>65</sup> Ratsiraka's party, AREMA, has in fact been decimated since he left the country and is very divided between those loyal to the former president and those who support the party's national secretary, Pierrot Rajaonarivelo. The participation in political affairs of Zafy, only *in situ* president of the three political movements, has been significantly reduced for quite a few years. The end of the crisis would probably signify the end of their political career, while its continuation gives them time to establish themselves more.<sup>66</sup> Unrealistic and uncompromising demands made

by representatives of the political movements during negotiations indicate that they are not in a hurry to resolve the crisis.<sup>67</sup>

## B. A CONVERGENCE OF INTERESTS?

While pressure from the international community, the HAT, the army and the three political movements has failed to progress the situation in a decisive way, other interests have directly contributed to the deadlock. Profiting from the weakness of the current regime, a "coalition of extremists"<sup>68</sup> do not want to see an end to the transition because many of them openly profit from the situation in a context of dereliction of the state, of corruption and of a social and economic crisis. For those close to the centres of power, the end of the transition would mean the end of their uncontrolled accumulation of wealth. If, as he has said during the course of recent months, Andry Rajoelina genuinely wants to move towards elections as quickly as possible, his power and his strategic vision are however too weak to overcome the factors that are causing the deadlock.

### 1. The power in the shadows

Since Andry Rajoelina took power in March 2009 and dissolved the assemblies, there are no democratic checks on government. Instead, a small group of individuals close to the presidency conduct affairs of state and short-circuit institutional decision-making mechanisms. Decisions are taken by a small number of people in a "Group"<sup>69</sup> composed of official or informal advisers of the president and a few ministers. Several members of this group have very limited political experience and are neither technocrats nor elected politicians. Instead they have been part of the president's inner circle for a long time. Others worked under previous regimes and have not hesitated to change their allegiance several times. The Group often prioritises its own financial interests<sup>70</sup> and its members do not hesitate to go beyond their remit. Some influential business people exercise a major influence over crucial decisions even though they have no official function. The HAT and the government are therefore regularly marginalised.

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<sup>61</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Antananarivo, April-September 2010. HAT members recognised that the way the transition was being managed favoured Ravalomanana's return. Crisis Group interview, Antananarivo, 21 May 2010.

<sup>62</sup> Crisis Group interview, Antananarivo, 12 July 2010.

<sup>63</sup> The alliance of convenience, a sort of "non-aggression pact", did not dispel the distrust between the three former presidents, particularly between Ravalomanana and Ratsiraka. The latter would support Rajoelina as head of the transition in the absence of another solution because this would at least prevent Ravalomanana from returning to power. Crisis Group interviews, members of the three political movements, June and July 2010.

<sup>64</sup> Crisis Group interview, member of the Zafy movement, Antananarivo, 12 July 2010.

<sup>65</sup> Didier Ratsiraka's political party, AREMA, only obtained three seats in parliament in 2002 and none in 2007, while Albert Zafy's party boycotted the last two elections.

<sup>66</sup> The alliance between the political movements is also therefore an electoral strategy, especially in the case of Ratsiraka,

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whose support is weak in the capital. The length of his time in power allows him to still enjoy support at various levels, especially in the army, within which the return of the former president could provoke a significant reaction.

<sup>67</sup> See Section III B on the national process.

<sup>68</sup> Crisis Group interview, presidential advisor of HAT, Antananarivo, 6 July 2010.

<sup>69</sup> As one of its members calls it. Crisis Group interview, HAT member, Antananarivo, 21 May 2010.

<sup>70</sup> Crisis Group interview, adviser to the HAT president, Antananarivo, 6 July 2010.

The HAT, which was supposed to be the regime's legislative, or at least consultative body, is a "big joke"<sup>71</sup> because it no longer has the president's ear<sup>72</sup> and has lost all credibility because of the abuses committed by some of its members.<sup>73</sup> For example, it was not consulted about how to resolve the crisis when the president returned from Pretoria and although the president convened the presidents of the political parties to talk with each of them on 6 May, one HAT member believed it was only a publicity stunt and that Rajoelina never intended to share power.<sup>74</sup>

Members of the government criticise the absence of debate in the decision-making process. At meetings of the Council of Ministers, ministers are often not consulted and even when they are, their opposition is not often taken into account. Documents are regularly amended after meetings have finished.<sup>75</sup> Many senior officials have been replaced, often without following legal procedures, because they were too critical or because they were seen as being too close to the former regime. They have been replaced by individuals more favourable to the HAT,<sup>76</sup> a practice that is similar to that of previous regimes and that reinforces the absence of any controls over the regime. The fact that many government officials recruit their friends and family, including the president when he chooses his advisers and ministers, promotes the emergence of patronage networks and perpetuates a nepotistic system.<sup>77</sup>

Although power has always been concentrated in this way in Madagascar and Marc Ravalomanana took all the important decisions alone,<sup>78</sup> it is even less legitimate in the case of a self-proclaimed government that has got rid of

practically all elected representatives, even in conditions that some would say were debatable.<sup>79</sup>

## 2. Patronage and business

### *New boom in corruption*

The weakening of government that is characteristic of this transitional period and the authorities' willingness to prevent institutions from playing their role promotes a general sense of impunity. While Ravalomanana centralised financial decision-making and established a system where only individuals expressly authorised would dare to help themselves, under penalty of suffering his wrath or being investigated by the Independent Anti-Corruption Office (Bureau indépendant anti-corruption, BIANCO), the current regime is too weak to bring about a similar disincentive. It is generally felt that BIANCO no longer has any dissuasive effect.<sup>80</sup> Although for a time corrupt practices diminished, the problem has now re-emerged and has become increasingly apparent since the beginning of the crisis.<sup>81</sup> This has led some to describe the current system as mafia-like.<sup>82</sup>

Corruption has especially increased in government administration. Andry Rajoelina himself publicly recognised this when he announced an audit of the ministries and the presidency.<sup>83</sup> Although Ravalomanana had installed a certain discipline in the ministries, people now have to pay for every service, which makes dealing with administrative matters difficult for those on modest incomes.<sup>84</sup> Some officials complain about the orders they receive from their managers, who sometimes ask them to extort money from companies.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Although it has been "shunted into the sidelines" and plays absolutely no institutional role, its members exert individual pressure on the president. Crisis Group interview, HAT member, Antananarivo, 25 June 2010.

<sup>72</sup> Meetings between the president and HAT members are increasingly rare and the latter even complain to the press about it. See, for example "HAT: des langues se délient", Sobika.com, 12 February 2010.

<sup>73</sup> Some HAT members are suspected of having participated in violence and forcible arrests. Crisis Group interview, HAT member, Antananarivo, 20 May 2010.

<sup>74</sup> Crisis Group interview, HAT member, Antananarivo, 20 May 2010.

<sup>75</sup> Crisis Group interviews, HAT minister and former HAT minister, Antananarivo, 14 June 2010 and 16 August 2010.

<sup>76</sup> Crisis Group interviews, senior officials, Antananarivo, 6 and 10 August and 8 September 2010.

<sup>77</sup> See François Roubaud, *Identités et transition démocratique: l'exception malgache?* (Paris-Montreal, 2000).

<sup>78</sup> See, for example, Jean-Loup Vivier, *Madagascar sous Ravalomanana. La vie politique malgache depuis 2001* (Paris, 2007)

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<sup>79</sup> Elections have often been manipulated and have always taken place under the control of central government. See Crisis Group Report, *Madagascar: Ending the Crisis*, op. cit.

<sup>80</sup> Its capacity to do its job was greatly reduced by the reduction in funds that it received from international donors.

<sup>81</sup> Several forwarding agents in the port of Toamasina confirm that there has always been bribery, but the sums paid are now higher and almost systematically extorted. Crisis Group interviews, Toamasina, 30 June and 1 July 2010. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index gave Madagascar a score of 3.4 out of ten in 2008, but this fell to 3.0 in 2009 (the same level as 2002), a score that indicates endemic corruption, and fell even further in 2010, to 2.6.

<sup>82</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Antananarivo, 22 June 2010.

<sup>83</sup> "Madagascar – Andry Rajoelina: Acte après le verbe", Madagate.com, 22 July 2010.

<sup>84</sup> Crisis Group interview, Antananarivo, 9 June 2010.

<sup>85</sup> Crisis Group interview, senior official, Antananarivo, 9 August 2010. In addition, the administration has reportedly indiscriminately increased the number of tax adjustments and levied immediate and exorbitant fines. Companies have denounced this is the result of a desire for personal enrichment because a

In addition to overcharging and fictitious public works contracts or expenditure by ministries,<sup>86</sup> individuals close to the regime use the Treasury accounts for their own personal use. They are alleged to have spent more than 100 billion Ariary (\$50 million), for their own personal ends and outside any budget heading.<sup>87</sup> To bring such practices to light, the director general of the Treasury publicly denounced these practices and organised a strike of his employees to protest against them.<sup>88</sup> On the day the 2009 accounts were closed, the Treasury received 12,000 authorisations for a total of 164 billion Ariary (\$82 million), while department employees were doing their best to maintain a balanced budget.

In addition to the administrative corruption, there has been what one magistrate has described as an “unimaginable” increase in all kinds of financial crimes. However, the perpetrators are rarely investigated. Consequently, those responsible for investigating abuses now seem discouraged and make do with issuing threats in order to avoid ridicule when their decisions are not implemented.<sup>89</sup> Corruption in the judiciary has also apparently increased rapidly.

#### “Incestuous” public-private relations

The wheeler-dealing and patronage systems in force under preceding regimes have not changed but the beneficiaries have. During Ravalomanana’s government, anyone wanting to succeed in business needed the president’s support, which encouraged those who were excluded from the system to support the capital’s mayor, Andry Rajoelina.<sup>90</sup>

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significant proportion of these sums of money apparently never arrives in the state’s coffers. Similar methods have allegedly been used for building permits. Government land and property officials complain about the unethical demands made on them. Crisis Group interviews, Antananarivo, August and September 2010.

<sup>86</sup> These abuses led the Treasury to appeal to BIANCO and to the Financial Information Service, SAMIFIN.

<sup>87</sup> False invoicing networks have reportedly been set up. The account opened for the AU summit that was to be held in Antananarivo in 2009 and other accounts have for example been used to buy jewels, to make purchases in travel agencies, while money was also transferred to a company owned by the president, or to people close to power, notably military officials. Crisis Group interviews, Antananarivo, September 2010.

<sup>88</sup> The employees, who are legally responsible, apparently wanted to draw attention to their lack of protection against prosecution. Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Antananarivo, 21 June 2010. Rajoelina himself said: “in certain ministries, things have not been done, but they have been invoiced for”. “Madagascar – Andry Rajoelina: Acte après le verbe”, Madagate.com, 22 July 2010.

<sup>89</sup> Many of those arrested reportedly pay the authorities and are then released. Crisis Group interview, magistrate, July 2010.

<sup>90</sup> Ravalomanana had stopped bestowing privileges on the Antananarivo elite that traditionally held power. The emergence of young entrepreneurs who did not form part of those networks

Although Rajoelina spoke out against poor governance by Marc Ravalomanana, the relationship between the public and private sectors under Rajoelina has been described as “incestuous” by some.<sup>91</sup> Holding power or being close to power remains a way of getting rich. One of the president’s advisers said that the reasons for the deadlock after one and a half years, “is simple, it’s because some people are doing business”.<sup>92</sup>

Rajoelina’s lack of authority limits his control over the business world. A group of people close to power are therefore able to take financial advantage of their position<sup>93</sup> and want to perpetuate a well-established money-making system and avoid ending the crisis.<sup>94</sup> The transition provides a window of opportunity to get rich quick before the rules are once again enforced.<sup>95</sup> Influence peddling therefore has become widespread.<sup>96</sup> As one observer said, “signatures are now worth gold”.<sup>97</sup>

In addition to direct requests from the authorities,<sup>98</sup> many ministers, HAT members and official or informal presidential advisers jockey for position to obtain contracts for their own companies or for the companies of friends in exchange for large commissions.<sup>99</sup> Although invitations to tender are still issued, most public procurement is not in fact made public and often benefits the same individuals. If companies outside this closed circle obtain contracts,

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poses a problem for these powerful families. See Mathieu Pellerin, “Madagascar: un conflit d’entrepreneurs?”, *Politique africaine*, no. 113, March 2009. Although the former president’s decisions were designed to serve his personal interests, they also benefited the country. For example, the construction of thousands of kilometres of roads across the country.

<sup>91</sup> Crisis Group interview, economist, Antananarivo, 15 June 2010. For the overlap of the political and economic worlds and the neo-patrimonial system in Madagascar, see Richard Marcus, “Marc the Medici? The Failure of a New Form of Neopatrimonial Rule in Madagascar” *Political Science Quarterly*, 125, no. 1, (Spring 2010).

<sup>92</sup> Crisis Group interview, Antananarivo, 23 August 2010.

<sup>93</sup> Even a former opponent of Ravalomanana and now a HAT member thinks that “the situation has got worse. With Ravalomanana, there was development, now it’s just looting”. Crisis Group interview, Antananarivo, 25 June 2010.

<sup>94</sup> Crisis Group interview, Antananarivo, 23 August 2010.

<sup>95</sup> This feeling is shared by actors in many economic sectors.

<sup>96</sup> The press regularly reports cases of influence peddling. See “Corruption et filouterie à Toamasina: Des proches du Premier ministre font la loi”, *La Gazette de la Grande Ile*, 2 July 2010.

<sup>97</sup> Crisis Group interview, journalist, Antananarivo, 17 June 2010.

<sup>98</sup> A head of region asked vanilla exporters to pay tax directly to him to finance the election campaign. Crisis Group interview, entrepreneur, Antananarivo, 18 June 2010.

<sup>99</sup> See several examples in “Rajoelina’s rainmakers”, *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 24 July 2010.

they are subjected to pressure and even threats.<sup>100</sup> The authorities also challenge existing contracts in order to seek advantages for entrepreneurs close to the regime.<sup>101</sup>

Some people who gave financial support to help Andry Rajoelina into power and to keep him there over the last year and a half continue to benefit from his generosity. Their mutual support is the foundation upon which the current system is based and it is one that ensures the convergence of interests opposed to change. However, by favouring some, Andry Rajoelina could make the same mistake as his predecessor. Many entrepreneurs in the capital, who also supported his rise to power, think that their interests are currently being harmed and complain about the monopolisation of resources by a handful of individuals. The entrepreneur Mamy Ravatomanga is one of those benefiting from the regime. Despite having no official position, some people, including those in the inner circle of power, consider him to be the real minister of finance, such is his influence over the country's affairs.<sup>102</sup> Many entrepreneurs complain about what they believe to be his control over public procurement.

These "incestuous" relations are also a feature of Customs and Excise, where several of those close to power allegedly benefit from preferential treatment. Entrepreneur, forwarding agents and customs officers affirm that some

of the inner circle control the port of Toamasina.<sup>103</sup> Several port officials confirm that the authorities put pressure (and may go as far as making threats)<sup>104</sup> so that their goods are not taxed when entering or leaving the port. Some people close to power have also tried to seize the many containers at a standstill because their owners cannot afford to pay customs duties, and have even managed to obtain official orders allowing them to do this at no cost to themselves.<sup>105</sup>

In this context, it is not surprising that executive power has the upper hand over the judiciary more than ever and that those close to the regime are never investigated.<sup>106</sup> The affair involving conflict between the associates of a company called Galana provides an example of this pressure. The president himself allegedly asked the minister of justice to shelve the affair.<sup>107</sup> Moreover, many solid cases referred to the criminal justice system by BIANCO and the Financial Information Services (SAMIFIN) have reportedly been dropped or ignored.<sup>108</sup>

#### *Selective economic decisions*

Under the pretext of bailing out the government's coffers, dangerously depleted by more than a year and a half of crisis and the suspension of international aid, the government took measures that many observers believe were demagogic and contrary to the country's interests or quite simply designed to promote personal enrichment. Decision-making mechanisms are particularly unpredictable and the methods used are described as "cowboy methods" because of the generalised use of blackmail.<sup>109</sup> Here again, economic relations differ little from those of the former

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<sup>100</sup> The Luxembourg company, SRDI, which specialises in airport security, won a contract to provide security at eight international airports across the country, in August 2010. One of the companies who lost out was Brink's, in which a subsidiary of the Sipromad group owned by Ylias Akbarali, an entrepreneur very close to the president, has a minority shareholding. After trying to reissue the invitation to tender, the authorities tried to prevent the contract with SRDI being signed. The pressure did not even end after the contract had been signed. Crisis Group interview, entrepreneur, Antananarivo, 1 September 2010. Also see "Dispute over airport security contract", *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 11 September 2010.

<sup>101</sup> The government tried to terminate Sheraton's contract to manage a five star hotel and in July 2009 even brought the Saudi prince, Alwaleed Bin Talal to invest in the project. However, it was not so easy to annul the contract and the ploy failed. The Ministry of Town and Country Planning has nevertheless prevented the hotel from opening to this day. Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Antananarivo, 4 August 2010.

<sup>102</sup> Crisis Group interview, advisor to the president of the HAT, Antananarivo, 6 July 2010. However, he has represented the government on the board of the telephone company Telma since 2009. He is said to have played a central role in the appointment of the Minister of Finance, Hery Rajaonarimampianina, who is also auditor of the Sodiat group run by Ravatomanga. "TGV bracing for a gloomy southern winter", *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 10 July 2010.

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<sup>103</sup> The port of Toamasina is said to have been almost brought to a standstill for several days because containers belonging to the inner circle were untraceable.

<sup>104</sup> The port came under pressure to replace the collector of customs because he refused to agree to some of the requests made by the authorities.

<sup>105</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Toamasina, July 2010. According to the director general of Customs, these practices have become more common in recent months. "Des conteneurs sans propriétaires", *L'Express de Madagascar*, 13 August 2010.

<sup>106</sup> Crisis Group interview, magistrate, Antananarivo, 21 June 2010. Magistrates interpreted the replacement of the mayor of Toamasina by a PDS as a political message. "We are scared of doing our job". Crisis Group interview, magistrate, July 2010.

<sup>107</sup> Crisis Group interview, entrepreneur, Antananarivo, 30 August 2010. See "TGV's untimely interventions", *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 19 September 2009.

<sup>108</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Antananarivo, June and August 2010. Bank accounts frozen by SAMIFIN because of suspected irregularities have all been unfrozen.

<sup>109</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Antananarivo, 31 August 2010.

regime,<sup>110</sup> but they are more problematic because the decisions are taken by an illegitimate regime.<sup>111</sup> The origin of funds is less transparent than under the preceding regime, when many resources were contributed by donors.

The lack of international funding has pushed the authorities down the path previously trodden by former President Ravalomanana towards regular authorisation of the export of rosewood.<sup>112</sup> The large-scale trafficking of this wood has been well documented by international organisations and the local and international press.<sup>113</sup> However, the authorities have still not shed light on the people behind this trade. Although they have created a “task force” to restore order<sup>114</sup> and have arrested some individuals, those arrested are not the main players in these illegal activities but rather villagers involved in cutting the wood down or transporting it on behalf of the operators. Although the government wants to appear inflexible and has a lot to say when some entrepreneurs break the rules, it is silent about any affairs

involving those close to the authorities.<sup>115</sup> Many observers believe that the money from rosewood goes some way to compensating for the government’s lack of other resources,<sup>116</sup> in an extra-budgetary sense, as this source of income is not officially included in the budget. It could also explain why some members of the regime and their supporters have become extraordinarily rich.<sup>117</sup>

After criticising the monopolistic management style of the former president, who monopolised all lucrative sectors of the economy, the current regime restricts competition by preventing certain companies from gaining a foothold in the market.<sup>118</sup> Despite the positive contribution they could make to the national economy, these companies are excluded to protect the position of the well-established and influential groups – in which the state has shares. The resignation/dismissal of the minister of telecommunications, after he announced there was no reason to refuse a licence to a fourth telephone operator, in August 2010, illustrated the political dimension of these cases.<sup>119</sup> One diplomat said: “this is a money-making regime, that’s all”.<sup>120</sup>

When they came to power, the authorities announced a review of important mining contracts such as the Ambatovy<sup>121</sup> and QMM<sup>122</sup> projects. They said these projects were

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<sup>110</sup> As a World Bank document notes, “the paradox of Madagascar’s economic backwardness lies in the almost chronic incapacity of its political and financial elites to take economic policy decisions that benefit the whole population rather than private interests”. Jacques Morisset, “Vers un agenda de relance économique à Madagascar”, in *Vers un agenda de relance économique à Madagascar*, World Bank, June 2010, p. 8.

<sup>111</sup> Given the discretionary powers at the disposal of the regime, the question of whether the rules still exist in a period of transition is more acute in this type of nepotistic regime. Bratton and Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa”, op. cit.

<sup>112</sup> Rosewood is a precious wood found mainly in the Sava region in Madagascar. Although exports are controlled, especially to preserve the region’s biodiversity, successive regimes have authorised and prohibited exports of rosewood on several occasions, often in accordance with electoral cycles. In 2009 alone, 52,000 tonnes of rosewood and ebony were cut down from 100,000 trees and exports generated around \$220 millions. The arrival of the Chinese mafia and the criminalisation of the rosewood sector could become a problem if the authorities allow massive exports to continue. Hery Randriamalala and Zhou Liu, “Rosewood of Madagascar: Between Democracy and Conservation”, *Madagascar Conservation & Development*, 1 March 2010.

<sup>113</sup> See, for example “Investigation into the Illegal Felling, Transport and Export of Precious Wood in Sava Region Madagascar”, Global Witness and Environmental Investigation Agency, August 2009; Randriamalala and Liu, “Rosewood of Madagascar”, op. cit.

<sup>114</sup> This task force never made any impact and was called “tax force” by many villagers because it charged a levy on every tonne of wood intercepted rather than seizing it. Randriamalala and Liu, “Rosewood of Madagascar”, op. cit. Task force members recently complained about not being paid their salaries. “Leurs épouses haussent le ton”, *madagascar-tribune.com*, 20 August 2010.

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<sup>115</sup> Journalists are often called, for example, when frauds are discovered at Toamasina port. Crisis Group interview, journalist, Toamasina, 29 June 2010. See also the publicity orchestrated when rosewood was found at the warehouses of the former president Ravalomanana’s company in July 2010. “Saisie de bois de rose – Tiko Sambaina Manjakandriana”, communiqué issued by the transition presidency, 13 July 2010.

<sup>116</sup> A tax of more or less \$35,000 is levied on each container, but was reportedly not paid on many occasions. Exports of precious wood in 2009 generated about \$20.5 million in revenue for the government. Randriamalala and Liu, “Rosewood of Madagascar”, op. cit. Crisis Group interview, entrepreneur, Antananarivo, 27 October 2010.

<sup>117</sup> At the height of its exploitation, \$460,000 worth of precious wood was allegedly harvested every day. The fraud is valued at \$4.6 million, while the amount banked abroad could be as much as \$52 million. “Investigation into the Illegal Felling, Transport and Export of Precious Wood in Sava Region Madagascar”, op. cit.; Randriamalala and Liu, “Rosewood of Madagascar”, op. cit.

<sup>118</sup> “Secteurs porteurs: un lobbying puissant empêche la concurrence libre”, *La Gazette de la grande île*, 11 November 2010.

<sup>119</sup> See the “telecomms memo” of September issued by the former minister of telecommunications, Iharizaka Rahaingoson, in which he gave three reasons for his resignation: the illegality of refusing a licence to Madamobil; suspension of the “3G” invitation to tender; and not being allowed to carry out regulatory reforms.

<sup>120</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Antananarivo, 27 May 2010.

<sup>121</sup> Ambatovy is a nickel-cobalt mining joint-venture between Sherritt International Corporation (40 per cent of the shares), Sumitomo Corporation and Korea Resources (each 27.5 per cent) and the SNC-Lavalin Group Inc. (5 per cent). It is a \$4.5

not bringing sufficient benefit to the population. They commissioned an audit firm, chosen by a presidential adviser, to analyse the eligibility decree of Sherritt, and this audit firm concluded there had been some irregularities. It then requested payment to correct them. A diplomatic incident between the authorities and Japan was narrowly avoided (the Japanese company Sumitomo Corporation owns 27.5 per cent of the shares in the project) and the authorities stopped asking for payment.<sup>123</sup> It is however possible that the authorities will once again demand renegotiation of this contract.<sup>124</sup> Meanwhile, Rio Tinto allegedly receives incessant demands from the authorities or from those close to power.<sup>125</sup>

The authorities are also on the lookout for new partners, often in particularly opaque conditions. Having failed in their attempt to renegotiate the mining contracts, they placed their hopes on new contracts to increase their resources. The \$100 million contract signed between the government and the Chinese company Wisco<sup>126</sup> for mining Soalala iron deposits was the subject of intense publicity efforts by the authorities, who explained that this type of contract could compensate for the lack of international financing.

However, the agreement with the Chinese company is shrouded in mystery because it has remained secret. Many observers ask themselves why the Chinese company has advanced \$100 million and there have been rumours ques-

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billion investment and should begin activities in 2011. It is one of the world's largest mining projects.

<sup>122</sup> QIT Madagascar Minerals is 80 per cent owned by the Canadian company Rio Tinto and 20 per cent owned by the Madagascar state. It mines ilmenite at Fort Dauphin. It will invest close to \$1 billion in Madagascar over 40 years. The mine began production in 2009. [Riotintomadagascar.com](http://Riotintomadagascar.com).

<sup>123</sup> Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Antananarivo, 4 August 2010.

<sup>124</sup> Crisis Group interview, HAT minister, Antananarivo, 3 September 2010.

<sup>125</sup> Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Antananarivo, 4 August 2010.

<sup>126</sup> In September 2009, a joint-venture between Wisco (42 per cent), Guangdong Foreign Trade Group (38 per cent) and Kam Hing International Holdings (20 per cent) obtained the Soalala iron exploration rights and signed the final contract with the Malagasy authorities in May 2010. Wisco is one of the most important Chinese public sector companies active in the exploitation of iron and plans to invest \$8 billion in the Soalala project. It is the first mining company to have obtained a licence since the creation of the HAT. Mining is due to start in 2014 and exports in 2019. "WISCO nodded by NDRC to buy iron ore mining rights in Madagascar", Xinhua, 24 May 2010; [www.wisco.com.cn/09shzr/site/gsgm01.html](http://www.wisco.com.cn/09shzr/site/gsgm01.html). Other important contracts are reportedly being negotiated with Chinese companies. There are rumours of an agreement between Madagascar and a Chinese company that could be worth \$2 billion and include many contracts, especially for infrastructure and natural resources.

tioning whether the authorities have received this amount.<sup>127</sup> Meanwhile, the revised Finance Act published on 6 September 2010 allocated the entire sum to the presidency, which will then decide the amounts it distributes to the ministries for projects that "benefit the population".<sup>128</sup> For some months now, Rajoelina has been regularly visiting the provinces and he announces the construction of new infrastructure every time.<sup>129</sup> Furthermore, he presents this as a gift from the president even though the projects will be financed from the money earned by the contract with the Chinese company.<sup>130</sup> He already seems to be involved in an election campaign. This kind of income stream is presented as a godsend for the country but it is also a godsend for the politicians in the government.

In this context, some companies have delayed investments because of their lack of confidence in the authorities or even after being blackmailed by them.<sup>131</sup> The more imprudent ones who choose to invest are increasingly from countries, notably from South Asia, who do not care so much about the political nature of the regime. Although the country's commerce had already begun to diversify under the preceding regime, there has been a notable increase in investors from South Asia.

### 3. The deterioration of the state

While the main actors seem to have an interest in prolonging the crisis and nobody seems in a hurry to end it, the state and the Malagasy people have been hit hard. One diplomat said that Madagascar has become a "non-state".<sup>132</sup> The regime's illegitimacy does not allow it either to assert

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<sup>127</sup> The press says that several figures in the government received large commissions. A total amount of \$30 million is often mentioned. "Déclat et des claques: WISCO, et le monde devient beau!", *La Gazette de la Grande île*, 17 June 2010; Crisis Group interview, HAT minister, Antananarivo, 14 June 2010.

<sup>128</sup> This only reinforced the methods of the former regime, which multiplied the presidency's budget by thirteen between 2003 and 2008. Jacques Morisset, "Au coeur des ténèbres: le renouveau des institutions et de la gouvernance", in *Madagascar: vers un agenda de relance économique*, World Bank, June 2010.

<sup>129</sup> Notably the construction of a hospital, a stadium and prisons.

<sup>130</sup> However, some senior officials think that the allocation of this sum to the presidency is due to mismanagement by the ministries, which have not achieved very much. Concentrating resources on important projects could improve control of expenditure because all eyes are turned on the presidency and how it uses these funds. The president seems to have realised the need to increase control over public finances. Some expenditure has apparently been blocked because it has been judged to be inappropriate. Crisis Group interview, Antananarivo, 9 September 2010.

<sup>131</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Antananarivo, 31 August 2010.

<sup>132</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Antananarivo, 27 May 2010.

its authority or respond to the elementary needs of a population that is still amongst the poorest on the planet.<sup>133</sup>

The political crisis has caused a significant reduction in the government's budget. It fell from 3,167 billion ariary<sup>134</sup> (around \$1,583 billion) in 2009 (73 per cent of which was spent),<sup>135</sup> to 2,786 billion<sup>136</sup> (around \$1,378 billion) in 2010 and was revised to 2,515 billion (around \$1,243 billion) in September 2010.<sup>137</sup> The withdrawal of donors that contributed close to 50 per cent of the government's total budget and 70 per cent of its investment budget has had a major impact.<sup>138</sup> This loss and the loss of AGOA<sup>139</sup> eligibility combined with an understandable nervousness on the part of investors in a period of crisis greatly slowed down economic activity in the country.<sup>140</sup> This slow-down led to a significant reduction in government revenue, especially customs and taxes.<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Madagascar is ranked 145th out of 177 in the United Nations Human Development Index. More than two-thirds of the population live below the poverty line, with an income of less than \$1 a day and 90 per cent now live on less than \$2 a day. "World Human Development Report 2009", UNDP.

<sup>134</sup> Order n°2008-026 of 18 December 2008. Finance Act, 2009.

<sup>135</sup> Crisis Group interview, Ministry of Finance, Antananarivo, 1 September 2010.

<sup>136</sup> Order n°2009-014 of 31 December 2009. Finance Act, 2010.

<sup>137</sup> Order n°2010-006 of 6 September 2010. Revised Finance Act, 2010.

<sup>138</sup> All the more so because the Finance Act 2010 planned for a return of international aid. Many donors had suspended their aid contributions to the budget but continued to fund projects, without going through the public sector.

<sup>139</sup> The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) facilitated the access of African exports to the United States market for countries willing to follow free market policies.

<sup>140</sup> According to Toamasina port officials, economic activity has slowed by 25-30 per cent since the beginning of the crisis with a 30 per cent reduction in the volume of imports. Monthly customs revenues fell by more than 25 per cent between 2008 and 2009/2010. Several forwarding agents experienced a 25-50 per cent reduction in activity and had to reduce the wages of their staff or make them redundant. Crisis Group interviews, Toamasina, 30 June, 1 and 2 July 2010.

<sup>141</sup> A gap of 302.9 billion ariary (\$151.5 million) was calculated in June 2010, following a reduction in tax revenues and the continued absence of donors (although this was partly compensated for by an increase in non-fiscal revenues). This forced the authorities to revise the Finance Act. Council of Ministers, Budget Meeting, government palace, Iavoloha, Wednesday 21 July 2010, press release. The most affected sectors were those that depend on public expenditure and foreign markets, especially construction and tourism. Textile exports to the United States fell by 53 per cent between January 2009 and January 2010. "Madagascar – Economic Update: What's Going On?", World Bank, 12 April 2010. Exports fell by 31 per cent between 2008 and 2010. The World Bank indicated that a weak recovery was under way but the situation is still far from what

Public expenditure therefore fell by 47 per cent between 2008 and 2010, before falling again by 18.8 per cent in September 2010.<sup>142</sup> For the moment, the government continues to pay civil service wages and the debt, but is no longer able to invest. Its capacity to provide basic services to the population has experienced a worrying deterioration. In general, the regime has shown financial rigour<sup>143</sup> and has ordered ministries to reduce spending on several occasions.<sup>144</sup> However, the lack of funds handicaps many sectors and, despite improvements having been made during the preceding regime, public administration now lacks a sense of direction and often functions slowly.<sup>145</sup> There have been major strikes in many sectors, including education, health and justice, which the government finds difficult to hold in check.

The Ministry of Education's budget for 2010 was 20 per cent lower than for 2009 and it was cut again by 13 per cent in September.<sup>146</sup> In July, the universities had still not received the funds to cover their operating budget and could not therefore function normally, which led to major strikes across the country.<sup>147</sup> The withdrawal of donors also contributed to a fall in spending on education because donors funded some teachers' wages.<sup>148</sup> At the beginning

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it was before the crisis and remains very fragile. "Madagascar – Economic Update: Why has the Malagasy Economy not yet Collapsed?", World Bank, 26 July 2010.

<sup>142</sup> "Madagascar – Economic Update: Why has the Malagasy Economy not yet Collapsed?", op. cit. Order n°2010-006 of 6 September 2010 revising the Finance Act 2010.

<sup>143</sup> Responsible management without recourse to the central bank or printing money and by limiting ministry spending. Crisis Group interview, economist, Antananarivo, 15 June 2010. However, the World Bank notes that was not always the case in 2009. "Madagascar – Economic Update: What's Going On?", op. cit. In August 2010, the central bank began to sell its reserves on the InterBank Currency Market to increase the exchange rate to satisfy the oil importers who were threatening to increase the price of petrol, which could cause a social explosion. These operations could be dangerous because the Central Bank's international reserves fell by around \$30 million in one month. "Madagascar – Economic Update: A Closer Look at Three Strategic Areas", World Bank, 14 October 2010.

<sup>144</sup> In April, only about 10 per cent of the annual budget had been committed in operational costs. Crisis Group interview, economist, Antananarivo, 27 May 2010. The revised Finance Act of 6 September 2010 reduced the budget of the ministries by an average of 47 per cent.

<sup>145</sup> Even though this improvement remained limited and the results uncertain. See Morisset, "Au cœur des ténèbres", op. cit.

<sup>146</sup> Order n°2010-006 of 6 September 2010, revising the Finance Act 2010.

<sup>147</sup> In September, strikes resumed for several weeks as Antananarivo University had not received its entire operating budget. Its administrative personnel were not paid their salary and the lecturers were not paid their fees for overtime.

<sup>148</sup> Some teachers are no longer paid enough, which means that parents have to contribute financially if they want them to con-

of the school year in September, pupils did not receive a school kit, as they had done in previous years. Three times as many children as usual dropped out of school between May and November 2009<sup>149</sup> and enrolments have fallen since 2009, despite having been on the rise before then. Parents are finding it increasingly difficult to pay for the education of their children.<sup>150</sup> Examination entries follow the same worrying trend. UNICEF fears this will have a negative long-term impact and threaten the provision of basic education for all in Madagascar.

The health sector is also under-funded; its budget fell by 30 per cent in 2010, compared to 2009 and was reduced again by 13 per cent, in the revised Finance Act, in September 2010. Hundreds of basic health centres have been closed for several months and many others do not have enough funds to obtain medical equipment and medicines.<sup>151</sup> The Intensive Recovery and Nutritional Education Centres (Centres de récupération et d'éducation nutritionnelle intensifs), which provided free health care to those suffering from severe malnutrition, are no longer able to ensure a service. The entire national nutritional programme is not functioning properly because of the lack of capacity of the National Nutrition Office (Office national de la nutrition). The south of the country, already more subject to emergency situations because of difficult climatic conditions, is facing serious shortages.<sup>152</sup> UNICEF says that nineteen of the region's 309 health centres have closed and another 71 are only operating because of its support.<sup>153</sup>

There has also been a deterioration in infrastructure, notably the roads, in which the former president had invested heavily. In 2009, investments in sanitation and water supply infrastructure were also significantly reduced and could scarcely cover 2 per cent of the amount necessary to

achieve national objectives for the year.<sup>154</sup> In addition, several public sector companies are reportedly in a difficult situation, because the authorities have drawn too heavily on their resources.<sup>155</sup>

The weakening of the state is also apparent from the situation of the armed forces, who no longer impose order on the country.<sup>156</sup> Many military personnel have been allocated to ensuring the security of members of the regime, while some senior figures also use private militias that are regularly guilty of inflicting a disturbing level of violence. The military hierarchy hardly exerts its authority on its own troops, as shown by the fact that some military personnel have not obeyed orders to transfer to other regions, preferring to wait for a change in government, in the knowledge that they will not be punished.<sup>157</sup>

The living conditions of much of the population have deteriorated, especially in Antananarivo. Conservative estimates indicate that at least 70,000 people have lost their jobs,<sup>158</sup> 25,000 of them following the suspension of AGOA,<sup>159</sup> while some studies have put the number of jobs lost in October 2009 at 200,000.<sup>160</sup> The number of workers in the informal sector, estimated at 70 per cent of the population,<sup>161</sup> has increased and their income has fallen.<sup>162</sup> The impact of job losses is much more widespread than these figures suggest. It is generally acknowledged that every person at work in Madagascar supports an average of four others. Informal activities have taken over, while the primary sector remains relatively intact, allowing a population used to a subsistence economy to sur-

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tinue working. The indiscipline that reigns in the administration also encourages some of them not to report for work because they know they will not be punished.

<sup>149</sup> "Newsletter on the Situation of Children and Families in Madagascar", UNICEF Madagascar, February 2010.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid, no. 2, May 2010.

<sup>151</sup> Crisis Group interviews, economist, Antananarivo, 27 May 2010; and humanitarian worker, Antananarivo, 28 May 2010. Patients in some hospitals are now obliged to pay for oxygen. "L'accès à l'oxygène devient payant", madagascar-tribune.com, 19 August 2010. UNICEF notes that health centre orders for medicines are no longer fulfilled at the national level. "Draft du compte rendu de la réunion de l'équipe humanitaire", United Nations System, 5 August 2010.

<sup>152</sup> "Système d'alerte précoce – N° 141: Spéciale nouvelle actualisation du Pronostic Provisoire 2010", World Food Programme, August 2010. Some communes are experiencing emergency situations in which the populations can only feed itself once a day after a significant reduction in their usual income.

<sup>153</sup> "Draft du compte rendu", op. cit.

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<sup>154</sup> "Newsletter on the situation of children and families", February 2010, op. cit.

<sup>155</sup> Crisis Group interviews, economist, Antananarivo, 27 May 2010; lawyer, Antananarivo, 4 August 2010.

<sup>156</sup> Crisis Group interview, colonel, Antananarivo, 6 September 2010.

<sup>157</sup> Crisis Group interview, ibid.

<sup>158</sup> Figures supplied by the Ministry of Labour.

<sup>159</sup> Figures supplied by the Groupement des entreprises franches et partenaires.

<sup>160</sup> "BIT: près de 200,000 emplois perdus à Madagascar", Linfo.re, 23 October 2009. However, these figures should be put in perspective. Many companies have not officially closed but have laid off workers (for example, 659 in 2009, in the Analamanga region alone according to the Ministry of Labour). Some directors have even been threatened to prevent them from declaring their bankruptcy. Crisis Group interview, business representative, Antananarivo, 12 August 2010.

<sup>161</sup> Crisis Group interview, Ministry of Labour official, Antananarivo, 10 August 2010.

<sup>162</sup> The number of workers in the informal sector has increased by 116,000 since 2006 and purchasing power has fallen by 15 per cent during the same period. INSTAT survey quoted in "Newsletter on the Situation of Children and Families", op. cit., no. 3, September 2010.

vive.<sup>163</sup> The country is therefore in a precarious situation, with a high risk of social unrest. For one entrepreneur, “the population is the adjustment factor”<sup>164</sup> and it will take a minimum of one to two years after the political crisis before the economy really takes off again.<sup>165</sup>

Criminality has increased sharply (estimated by some at 400 per cent)<sup>166</sup> but the security forces are not in a position to contain it. There is an acute sense of insecurity and the number of firearms in circulation has risen.<sup>167</sup> Some attribute this increase in crime to the looting that took place at the beginning of 2009, which left its mark on the security forces by accentuating indiscipline and a sense of impunity.<sup>168</sup>

The increase in criminality has had an especially severe impact because the judicial process has almost come to a complete standstill. Although the system has always been manipulated, lawyers have noted a “total relaxation” since 2009. Many of those found guilty are not punished, which gives the public a sense of powerlessness. Meanwhile, the slow-down in the judicial system has led to a reduction in the number of conditional and provisional releases, thus perpetuating the longstanding problem of overcrowding in prisons.<sup>169</sup>

### III. THE IMPOSSIBLE INCLUSIVE SOLUTION

The lack of a coherent strategy and pressure, combined with the lack of any real will to resolve the crisis, resulted in another failed attempt at mediation. Andry Rajoelina handled the various pressures skilfully and periodically announced sham measures when he was threatened or criticised in order to better keep the process under control.

#### A. FAILURE OF INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION

As attempts at international mediation seemed to have ground to a halt,<sup>170</sup> France and South Africa intervened more directly and drafted a new roadmap. They aimed to put all their weight on the leaders of the movements to ensure their cooperation. However, once again, a lack of coordination, preparation and common strategy turned the Pretoria summit of 28-30 April into another failed attempt at international mediation.

##### 1. A common objective but a lack of coordination

Although South Africa had always been involved in the mediation process, notably through SADC, the direct involvement of President Jacob Zuma was new. There were various reasons for his involvement, which contradict the popular view in Madagascar that South Africa supports Marc Ravalomanana. First, the country found itself in a delicate situation after it welcomed the former president. The idea that South Africa had become the destination for heads of state and other officials fleeing from their own country concerned its leaders because they felt this could harm its interests.<sup>171</sup> Involved in the Zimbabwean crisis

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<sup>163</sup> The stable price of rice, a staple food in Madagascar, during the first years of the crisis was a “safety valve” for the regime. Crisis Group interview, economist, Antananarivo, 15 June 2010.

<sup>164</sup> Crisis Group interview, entrepreneur, Antananarivo, 2 September 2010.

<sup>165</sup> Crisis Group interview, economist, Antananarivo, 27 May 2010.

<sup>166</sup> Crisis Group interview, colonel, Antananarivo, 6 September 2010; “Madagascar: State of denial”, Al Jazeera, 18 August 2010.

<sup>167</sup> Criminals are increasingly using kalashnikovs, some of which disappeared from arms stores in March 2009 and during the FIGN mutiny in May 2010. Some soldiers do not hesitate to rent their weapons out for the day.

<sup>168</sup> Crisis Group interview, journalist, Toamasina, 29 June 2010.

<sup>169</sup> Crisis Group telephone interview, NGO representative, 28 September 2010.

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<sup>170</sup> A national initiative began at the same time but did not succeed. At the beginning of April, representatives of Andry Rajoelina and Marc Ravalomanana met to bring the positions of the two political movements closer and discuss an agreement. The other two movements did not welcome this initiative. The agreement proposed an assembly that would include HAT members and former deputies. However, the document did not mention national reconciliation. Part of the Ravalomanana political movement thought this omission was treason. The HAT president was at the same time in discussions with France and agreed to go to Pretoria. This initiative was not welcomed by some members of his team and one of them eventually resigned. Crisis Group interviews, members of the Ravalomanana political movement, Antananarivo, 19 April 2010 and 18 June 2010. The Sant’Egidio community, a Catholic organisation specialising in mediation, organised a meeting between Rajoelina and Ravalomanana representatives in Rome at the same time, but this also failed.

<sup>171</sup> The National Prosecution Authority opened an investigation (suspended for the moment) into Marc Ravalomanana for violating the Foreign Military Assistance Act, the law on merce-

for years and anxious to obtain a seat on the United Nations Security Council,<sup>172</sup> South Africa wanted to restore its image as a regional mediator and show its commitment to democracy by helping to resolve the Madagascar crisis.<sup>173</sup> In addition, South Africa had played an important role in the appointment of Joaquim Chissano as SADC mediator in June 2009 and wanted to support him.<sup>174</sup>

France also decided to intervene openly and bilaterally and no longer through the intermediary of international and regional organisations. It felt that mediation had stalled despite the urgency of reaching an agreement.<sup>175</sup>

Although both countries seemed to have the same objective, their joint initiative began on a shaky foundation. President Zuma mandated members of his information services to negotiate a roadmap with the Elysée, sidelining the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ministry had until then been responsible for dealing with the affair and thought it inappropriate to take new initiatives outside the framework of the mediation attempt conducted by Joaquim Chissano.<sup>176</sup> Zuma therefore set up a parallel diplomatic effort. Although an informal initiative by the two countries might have been judged acceptable, this particular initiative was seen as clumsy. France was perceived as opposing the mediation effort conducted by Chissano and South Africa could not support that position.<sup>177</sup>

## 2. The problematic “sufficient consensus”

The French and the South Africans formulated the notion of “sufficient consensus”. They focused on the two main actors in the crisis, Ravalomanana and Rajoelina, on the

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nary activities. Crisis Group interviews, Pretoria, 1 and 3 June 2010.

<sup>172</sup> It finally obtained this in October 2010.

<sup>173</sup> Crisis Group interview, researcher, Pretoria, 3 June 2010.

<sup>174</sup> Crisis Group interview, adviser of the mediator, Pretoria, 2 June 2010.

<sup>175</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomats, Antananarivo, 12 April 2010. Rajoelina was seen as increasingly isolated and the spectre of a military-civilian government had begun to take shape.

<sup>176</sup> The ministry was only informed about the discussions between the two countries a few days before the summit in South Africa was announced, too late to turn back. Crisis Group interviews, Pretoria, 1-3 June 2010. The idea of sidelining South African official diplomacy seems to have already been tried a few months earlier. In February, Andry Rajoelina wrote to Jacob Zuma asking him to intervene in the Malagasy crisis, but he approached him in his capacity as president of his party, the African National Congress (ANC) and not as President of the Republic, which would have allowed him to short-circuit official procedures. Crisis Group interview, South African officials, Pretoria, 1 June 2010.

<sup>177</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomats, Pretoria, 1 June 2010; Crisis Group telephone interview, South African official, 2 June 2010.

grounds that the crux of the crisis rested on the opposition between these two actors. Participation of the other two former presidents was felt to be secondary and the latter were only to be brought into the discussions once the two main protagonists had reached agreement, but only as *Raiamandreny* (wise elders), a role that the mediators had wanted to give them when they first became involved in 2009. This new approach met fierce opposition, especially from former presidents Zafy and Ratsiraka, who had returned to the forefront of the political scene through the creation of the concept of the four political movements.<sup>178</sup> Joaquim Chissano and South African diplomats also felt it was inconceivable to sideline the two former presidents, especially because of their coastal origin.<sup>179</sup>

The roadmap proposed a transition not exceeding twelve months,<sup>180</sup> a consensus government with a caretaker role, the election of a constituent assembly,<sup>181</sup> and the creation of a National Electoral Commission (Commission électorale nationale, CENA). It also stipulated observance of the spirit of the Maputo and Addis-Ababa Agreements and provided for confidence-building measures between the protagonists.<sup>182</sup> After legislative elections, the party winning the most seats would nominate a prime minister,

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<sup>178</sup> One member of the Ratsiraka political movement saw it as a “fool’s bargain”. Such an agreement could mean supporting Rajoelina, while the four political movements option allowed differences to be ironed out “even hypocritically”. Moreover, Rajoelina’s supporters might also reject an agreement between him and Ravalomanana on the grounds that they had not joined a protest movement against him in order to see the former president return. An agreement of the four political movements could be seen as being necessary for the country. Although Ravalomanana rejected this idea, members of the Zafy and Ratsiraka opposition movements suspected he would disassociate himself from their joint positions if his interests were satisfied. They did not welcome his insistence on an amnesty rather than reconciliation during the discussions in Pretoria. Crisis Group interviews, members of the three political movements, Antananarivo, 19 April 2010, 18 June 2010 and 12 July 2010.

<sup>179</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomats, Pretoria, 1 June 2010; Crisis Group telephone interview, mediator, 4 June 2010.

<sup>180</sup> “The first phase will begin with the appointment of a new transitional government and end with legislative elections (between July and September). The second phase will begin with the inauguration of the new Parliament and the new National Unity government and end with the presidential election”. Draft agreement protocol.

<sup>181</sup> The logic behind the election of an assembly, supported by France, was to identify the balance of forces and broaden the debate beyond the four movements. Crisis Group interview, diplomats, Antananarivo, 12 April 2010.

<sup>182</sup> The decisions about Ravalomanana’s goods made since March 2009 must be reversed and an international audit of goods acquired between 2002 and 2009 should be conducted. The agreement also provided for the creation of a mediation office, based in Antananarivo.

who would have the task of forming a government reflecting the political composition of the assembly.

### 3. Disagreements about the summit's objective

The Pretoria summit failed because its instigators disagreed about the parameters of the discussions. Although France persuaded Rajoelina to accept the agreement protocol<sup>183</sup> (he accepted it on the basis that it moved away from the Maputo Agreements),<sup>184</sup> South Africa acknowledged it had “overestimated (its) capacity to persuade the former president”<sup>185</sup>. While Paris envisaged that the meeting between the HAT president and the former presidents was called only for them to sign a prepared document, Pretoria thought that the protagonists were there to negotiate and use the draft as a starting point for discussions.<sup>186</sup>

Moreover, Joaquim Chissano's role posed a problem. The Elysée tried to put the meeting under the aegis of Jacob Zuma and presented it as such to Rajoelina, but it was clear to South Africa that SADC was still in charge of the mediation.<sup>187</sup> So when Chissano sent letters of invitation to the heads of the four political movements for discussions “as in Maputo”, Rajoelina threatened not to travel to Pretoria. The French and South African embassies in Antananarivo hastened to write a communiqué that put Zuma at the centre of the invitation. It also said that the meeting's objective would be “to finalise an agreement, the main points of which had already been accepted by the two parties”. The Ravalomanana political movement contested this.<sup>188</sup>

The summit therefore ended in failure. When the meeting took place, Rajoelina refused to discuss the text,<sup>189</sup> while Ravalomanana wanted to discuss several contentious issues, such as the amnesty and the sequence of elections.<sup>190</sup> Here as well, the South Africans thought they had “underestimated the overwhelming desire of the protagonists to put their own personal interests first” rather than prioritise the task of finding an end to the crisis.<sup>191</sup> While the heads of the four political movements agreed to return to Pretoria two weeks later to continue the discussions,<sup>192</sup> Rajoelina announced the end of the negotiations as soon as he got back to Madagascar.

Although the Pretoria summit did not end in agreement, it nevertheless sparked a new dynamic. It highlighted the problems in finding a solution through international mediation, as all options had been tried, and through the heads of the four political movements, who refused to compromise. This failure led to a change in SADC's position. It no longer seemed dogmatically attached to the implementation of the Maputo Agreements and it demonstrated a new willingness to be flexible.<sup>193</sup> For the Malagasy people, it was one failure too many. However, it ushered in a

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<sup>183</sup> France tried to spare Rajoelina the need to renounce what he had announced in preceding months in order not to disavow him and therefore tried to allow him to keep his prime minister, Camille Vital, until the elections. Crisis Group interview, diplomats, Antananarivo, 12 April 2010.

<sup>184</sup> Crisis Group interview, presidential adviser, Antananarivo, 23 August 2010.

<sup>185</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Pretoria, 3 June 2010.

<sup>186</sup> Crisis Group interview, South African officials, Pretoria, 1-3 June 2010.

<sup>187</sup> France believed that the distrust between the HAT and SADC meant it was important to use an intermediary. The South Africans tried to limit France's influence, for example by preventing it from doing backstage work and by rejecting the presence of French representatives at the discussions. South Africa believed that the process should remain regional in nature. Crisis Group telephone interview, South African official, 2 June 2010.

<sup>188</sup> “Joint Press release by the French Embassy and the South African Embassy in Madagascar”, Antananarivo, 23 April 2010. It seems that the South African embassy did not have Pretoria's support for this initiative. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Pretoria, 1 and 3 June 2010. “Aucun accord pour l'instant mais des principes et cadre de discussion”, *madagascar-tribune.com*, 24 April 2010. There was a misunderstanding because France seemed convinced that Ravalomanana had given his agreement

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to South Africa while he later claimed he had not received the text. Members of the political movement suspected that France was attempting to put moral pressure on the protagonists. It seemed that the former president had not accepted the text given and that he had asked for the presence of twelve experts to advise on changes. Moreover, all the movements arrived at Pretoria with delegations composed of several people, which according to them indicated that negotiations were expected to take place. Crisis Group interviews, diplomats, Antananarivo, 12 April 2010 and Pretoria, 1 June 2010; member of the Ravalomanana political movement, Antananarivo, 19 April 2010.

<sup>189</sup> Observers commented that by making the HAT president agree to the accord, France allowed him to blame Ravalomanana for the initiative's failure. Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Antananarivo, 27 May 2010.

<sup>190</sup> Ravalomanana insisted on holding the presidential election before the legislative elections, because the assembly would be responsible for voting the amnesty law, which could eliminate him from the political scene. However, he believed that he had a chance of winning a presidential election. Ravalomanana's counter-proposals were a “bluff”, and his movement knew they would never be accepted, but the objective was to open a debate on these issues. Crisis Group interview, member of the Ravalomanana political movement, Antananarivo, 18 June 2010.

<sup>191</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Pretoria, 3 June 2010.

<sup>192</sup> Crisis Group telephone interview, mediator, 4 June 2010.

<sup>193</sup> Crisis Group interview, diplomat, Antananarivo, 4 July 2010. In March, Joaquim Chissano said “it is time to put into practice what they (the movements' leaders) have decided. The international community will observe its rules”. “Rajoelina snobe l'UA”, *L'Express de Madagascar*, 5 March 2010.

new attempt at mediation, this time national in scope. This was the only way that previous crises had been resolved.<sup>194</sup>

## B. A MALAGASY PROCESS UNDER CONTROL

The failure of the latest round of negotiations strengthened the president's resolve to seek a solution at the national level. He nevertheless agreed to make some concessions requested by the international community, but they were not decisive for putting in motion a process acceptable to all, especially because they were not concerted. France asked him to make a significant gesture – to resign or announce he would not be a candidate in the presidential election.<sup>195</sup> On 12 May, Rajoelina chose the second option and announced an electoral timeline.<sup>196</sup> Although the announcement of his decision to not stand as a candidate was welcomed by many political actors, civil society and the international community,<sup>197</sup> the announcement of the election dates was a missed opportunity to accommodate the opposition, who were still demanding inclusiveness and consensus and would not accept a unilateral initiative. Two weeks later, the president of the HAT also announced he was resigning his leadership of the political

movement and would henceforth play the role of a *Raiamandreny* and no longer defend any particular point of view.

One constant feature of these announcements was an attempt to discard the framework provided by “the four political movements”<sup>198</sup> and redefine “inclusiveness” to embrace other political forces (a recurring theme whenever the regime was on the back foot) or change it into “neutrality”.<sup>199</sup> The government's weakness was exposed by the initial problems associated with implementing a national process and its willingness to proceed in a neutral way was belied by its resumption of control of the process.

### 1. Civil society and the parties take the process in hand ...

After the president announced a national dialogue (planned for the end of May but postponed several times) as part of his electoral timeline, civil society organisations formed a “Coalition” and proposed to take responsibility for organising this national dialogue.<sup>200</sup> In order to offset the unilateral appearance of his initiative, Rajoelina quickly made the coalition responsible for organising the dialogue. It was joined by a group of “wise elders”, the *Raiamandreny Mijoro*.

Although the use of respected figures to persuade the public and promote unity around the civil society initiative was justified in the context of the crisis,<sup>201</sup> this group quickly lost credibility. The authorities had reportedly sidelined some individuals and imposed others.<sup>202</sup> Their close rela-

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<sup>194</sup> In 1991, civil society, especially the churches, played an important role in resolving the crisis. Sylvain Urfer, “Quand les Eglises entrent en politique”, *Politique africaine*, no. 52, December 1993. However, divisions and the instrumentalisation of the different churches prevented them from playing a role in resolving the crisis in 2009. The transition in the 1990s also involved a National Forum and the drafting of a new constitution. This ushered in the Third Republic but did not guarantee the country's stability. On the various crises, see Solofo Randrianja and Stephen Ellis, *Madagascar – A Short History* (London, 2009); *Politique africaine*, no. 52 (December 1993); Jean-Loup Vivier, *Madagascar sous Ravalomanana. La vie politique malgache depuis 2001* (Paris, 2007). On political practices, see Didier Galibert, *Les gens du pouvoir à Madagascar. Etat post-colonial, légitimités et territoire (1956-2002)* (Paris-Saint Denis, 2009).

<sup>195</sup> Crisis Group telephone interview, diplomat, 4 May 2010.

<sup>196</sup> The timeline was as follows: national dialogue, 27-29 May 2010; constitutional referendum, 12 August; legislative elections, 30 September; and first round of presidential elections, 26 November. The resolutions of the *Teny ifampierana* workshop have been forgotten because the idea of holding a constituent assembly was dropped. This announcement received strong support from France, notably from the Secretary of State for Cooperation, Alain Joyandet, who quickly issued a press release welcoming Rajoelina's announcement. However, the mediator, Joaquim Chissano had not been consulted. Another opportunity to promote coordination was once again missed. Crisis Group telephone interview, diplomat, 19 May 2010. “Madagascar ‘sur la voie d'un retour à l'ordre constitutionnel’”, Agence France-Presse, 13 May 2010.

<sup>197</sup> Many observers were sceptical about this promise and felt that, if it is kept, the president might ally himself with another candidate, who would then appoint him as prime minister.

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<sup>198</sup> Crisis Group interview, HAT minister, Antananarivo, 13 April 2010.

<sup>199</sup> The idea of neutrality was put forward at the time of the cabinet reshuffle in May, when several military representatives joined the government.

<sup>200</sup> Civil society had never played a decisive role in the process. The Civil Society Alliance had attempted mediation between the four political movements after the failure of the second round of negotiations in Maputo, but the international community had resumed control of the process in October 2009. Several large meetings of civil society organisations were nevertheless held in the following months, but the non-conciliatory position held by some ended this quest for unity. Crisis Group interview, member of civil society, Antananarivo, 16 July 2010. This weakness of civil society is often inherent in patrimonial regimes and renders a successful outcome of a political transition problematic. See Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa”, *World Politics* 46, no. 4 (July 1994), pp. 453-489.

<sup>201</sup> Initially, the idea was to guarantee the neutrality and proper conduct of the process. Civil society gave the group the mission of convening the public in order to avoid the authorities having to take responsibility for this.

<sup>202</sup> Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Antananarivo, 13 July 2010.

tionship with presidential advisers and their sometimes partisan positions also raised questions.<sup>203</sup> Their increasing number and financial demands also raised questions about their motives. Meanwhile, a decree created a Consultative Constitutional Committee, which was made responsible for drafting a constitution for submission to the population in a referendum after regional and national consultations.<sup>204</sup>

The authorities viewed Coalition members as “more open” than other civil society groups, especially because they did not ask Rajoelina to step down.<sup>205</sup> This raised a question mark over their neutrality. Many of them were former politicians, which revived the debate about the very nature of civil society.<sup>206</sup> The three political movements distrusted them and suspected them of taking sides.<sup>207</sup> To counter this image and ensure broad support, the Coalition reached an agreement with organisations known to represent other viewpoints, the Civil Society Alliance (Alliance de la société civile)<sup>208</sup> and the KMF/CNOE.<sup>209</sup> Despite pressure from the authorities to reach an agreement with-

out compromise<sup>210</sup> the Coalition formed a new structure, the National Coordination of Civil Society Organisations (Coordination nationale des organisations de la société civile, CNOSC). The international community welcomed this rapprochement and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Norway and Switzerland even went so far as to fund their attempts at mediation, while SADC also announced its support for the national process.<sup>211</sup>

While the different perspectives in civil society were seeking rapprochement, the political parties were also trying to reach a basic political agreement. Meeting within the framework of a Forum for Political Dialogue (Espace de Concertation Politique, ESCOPOL)<sup>212</sup>, their leaders claimed they wanted to unite ahead of the national dialogue. They felt politicians were best placed to deal with political problems. In fact, fearing CNOSC decisions and the prospect of facing elections in the current circumstances,<sup>213</sup> they tried to impose an agreement before the meeting had even started in order to ensure their place in the transition process.

Having identified the political movements’ leaders as responsible for the deadlock, they chose a new approach based on political parties, pointing out that each political movement included several parties while many parties were not attached to any of the movements. The number of parties increased from about 20 to 80 in two weeks, mainly representing groups close to the HAT and those generally classified under the heading of “other sensibilities”, who were not affiliated to any of the three political movements. Some members of the parties led by the former presidents went along with the initiative but without the support of their leaders.

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<sup>203</sup> For example, the pastor Paul Ramino, member of the party of one of Rajoelina’s special advisers, Norbert Ratsirahonana. Others helped bring Rajoelina to power and continued to support him. The *Raiamandreny* status of some was questionable given that this status normally involves collective social recognition.

<sup>204</sup> Some lawyers were sceptical about their work because they suspected the HAT had already prepared a draft. Crisis Group interview, lawyer, Antananarivo, 13 July 2010.

<sup>205</sup> Crisis Group interview, adviser to the president of HAT, Antananarivo, 6 July 2010. Some coalition members had already tried to mediate before the Maputo summit meetings in August 2009.

<sup>206</sup> See, for example “Classe politique dévoyée, société civile instrumentalisée”, press release issued by SeFaFi (Public Life Observatory in Antananarivo), 3 September 2010; “La société civile et sa fonction d’interpellation”, SeFaFi press release, 21 October 2009. Aristide Velompanahy and Pascal Rakotomavo were ministers under Ratsiraka, while André Rasolo was a minister under Zafy.

<sup>207</sup> The three opposition movements believed that the national dialogue and civil society participation in the transition were part of the Maputo agreements. This initiative therefore represented the selective application by the authorities of the provisions of Maputo. Crisis Group interviews, member of the Ravalomanana political movement, Antananarivo, 18 June 2010; member of the Ratsiraka political movement, Antananarivo, 15 July 2010.

<sup>208</sup> The Civil Society Alliance, which previously called itself the Civil Society Alliance for the Maputo Agreements openly supported the Maputo process. This posed a problem for the Coalition, which refused to commit itself to any particular solution. Crisis Group interview, member of civil society, Antananarivo, 14 July 2010.

<sup>209</sup> National Committee for Observation of the Elections and Civic Education (Comité national d’observation des élections et d’éducation des citoyens).

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<sup>210</sup> In the form of threats and financial inducements. Crisis Group interview, member of civil society, Antananarivo, 16 July 2010. The Coalition fell apart after this agreement because some members close to the government refused to distance themselves from it, which once again illustrated the fragility of civil society.

<sup>211</sup> “Communiqué final du sommet du 30ème Jubilé des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement de la SADC”, 17 August 2010.

<sup>212</sup> At first, a simple meeting of political parties discussing how to resolve the crisis. It did not want a rigid structure but rather a “forum for dialogue” where people could participate when they wanted.

<sup>213</sup> A position within transitional structures improved their chances at the next elections, which, moreover, they were in no hurry to organise (they wanted more time to organise themselves first). Crisis Group interviews, ESCOPOL members, Antananarivo, 16 August 2010 and 7 September 2010. For the problems related to this type of coalition of convenience and the proliferation of political parties, see Richard Sandbrook, “Transitions without Consolidation: Democratization in Six African Cases”, *Third World Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (March 1996).

## 2. ... but the government will not let go

Although the new national initiatives led the country to believe there was a genuine willingness to resolve the crisis, this enthusiasm did not last long. The authorities maintained control of the process, for example, by delaying payment of the funds needed to organise it. The authorities also wanted to limit the national dialogue to discussions about elections and the constitution. CNOSC on the other hand wanted to broaden the debate and engage in genuine mediation.<sup>214</sup> Meanwhile, with ESCOPOL members seemingly close to political agreement, the HAT president took a harder line, announcing he would never accept a “parallel transition” and that “Draconian measures” would be taken against those who acted differently.<sup>215</sup>

However, only a few days later, Rajoelina changed his strategy. He convened a meeting with all these parties for 6 August 2010 and announced three days of meetings with the goal of reaching a political agreement with them. The parties in his own platform, the Union des démocrates et des républicains pour le changement (UDR-C), till then opponents of ESCOPOL, joined in to boost the president’s support and increased his weight in the discussions. Those responsible for the initiative also played the numbers game by including as many parties as possible, but their strategy worked against them because the small parties were easier to manipulate in exchange for seats on transitional bodies, while no provision had been made for weighting votes.<sup>216</sup> In addition, with virtually no chance of being elected because of their lack of a political base, they were in no hurry to go to the polls and welcomed the chance to draw on sources of income that would otherwise not be open to them.<sup>217</sup>

ESCOPOL’s initiative was then taken over by the president, who imposed his terms on the agreement signed at Ivato on 13 August and presented it as the consensual

solution to the crisis called for by the opposition and the international community. With around 150 parties and associations as signatories,<sup>218</sup> Rajoelina seemed to have a solid base from which to impose the agreement, without including other political movements.<sup>219</sup> The biggest difference with the Maputo agreements was the definition of “new inclusiveness”,<sup>220</sup> which was no longer restricted to the movements but included those who till then had been excluded from discussions potentially improving the overall sense of ownership felt by the actors involved. The provisions of the agreement nevertheless showed that the authorities had taken control of the process. The content and form of the draft prepared by the parties<sup>221</sup> was altered in the documents signed one week later, to take account of what the president wanted.<sup>222</sup>

Described as “an alibi agreement” by some commentators,<sup>223</sup> it kept Andry Rajoelina at the head of the state and gave him a lot of power such as the power to appoint the prime minister, members of the government and parliament (with a higher and lower chamber) from among nominations made by the political parties.<sup>224</sup> Although the politicisation of the CENI was denounced, the agreement increased the number of political party representatives on it.<sup>225</sup> The signatories protected the agreement by inserting a clause specifying that no impeachment procedure and no motion of censure or dissolution could be taken against the transitional bodies. A new electoral timeline was also announced, ending the transitional period by June 2011.<sup>226</sup>

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<sup>214</sup> It wanted to reorganise power from the grassroots upwards and not by negotiating agreement between political movements outside Madagascar. Crisis Group interview, member of civil society, Antananarivo, 14 July 2010.

<sup>215</sup> “Il n’y a pas de nouvelle transition”, *L’Express de Madagascar*, 26 July 2010; “Conseil des Ministres – 03 August 2010”, press release, 3 August 2010.

<sup>216</sup> A clause in the Ivato agreement specified that all signatories would be represented in Parliament, even though the list of parties included many that had neither structures nor activists and that had never had any members elected. This clause guaranteed the support of many groups, but it was also a source of tension within ESCOPOL, especially when it was time to allocate the seats in the transitional bodies.

<sup>217</sup> More than 20 parties were reportedly formed in August so that they could sign the Ivato agreement. The problem of the proliferation of political parties was not new. A law on political parties had already been drafted but never adopted.

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<sup>218</sup> 22 parties and associations signed the minimum agreement but this number had increased to 88 by 13 August. Other parties signed up later.

<sup>219</sup> The mechanism was similar to that used in July 2009, when many parties signed the Panorama Charter to avoid negotiating with the three opposition movements under the aegis of international mediators in Maputo.

<sup>220</sup> As defined in article 1 of the Ivato Agreement: “based on the identity of each political party and based on a reiterated, interactive, interdependent and indebted initiative, attentive to the proposals made by the participating parties”.

<sup>221</sup> “Accord politique minima”, 3 August 2010.

<sup>222</sup> His advisers allegedly even changed the text at the last moment without informing the political parties. Crisis Group interview, ESCOPOL member, Antananarivo, 7 September 2010.

<sup>223</sup> “L’accord alibi?”, *madagascar-tribune.com*, 16 August 2010.

<sup>224</sup> Proposed by the prime minister among the personalities chosen by the signatory parties. Article 7.1 of the political agreement.

<sup>225</sup> The appointed members were confirmed in their posts “subject to possible complaints duly confirmed by the organisations that proposed them”. Article 7.4 of the political agreement.

<sup>226</sup> National dialogue of 30 August to 3 September (finally postponed to 13-18 September), constitutional referendum on 17 November, legislative elections on 16 March 2011, presidential election on 4 May 2011. Some small changes were made to the agreement a few weeks later during the failed round of media-

However, the agreement did not break the political deadlock. The three political movements and other influential politicians did not sign up.<sup>227</sup> The three movements signed a counter-agreement, confirming their support for the Maputo Agreements and recognising CNOSC's mediation role, but insisting that Chissano should continue as mediator.<sup>228</sup>

### 3. The national conference and the legitimisation of power at any price

Rajoelina nevertheless chose to continue down this path. The national conference took place on 13-18 September and was organised by the *Raiamandreny mijoro* and a few Coalition dissidents who refused to participate in CNOSC and boycotted by the three political movements. The authorities masterminded the conference, showing their refusal to relinquish any control. They now tried to give a semblance of legitimacy to their acts.<sup>229</sup> As legitimacy was not going to come from the outside, the government hoped to obtain it by using the people.

However, it seemed clear that public opinion, as noted during the *Dinika santatra* (the preliminary dialogues) in the country's 119 districts, 29-31 July, was not taken into account.<sup>230</sup> The opinions gathered at the consultations were different to those gathered at the national conference according to some participants, although a large proportion of participants were supposed to have been chosen in the districts. However, the invitation list was apparently changed. Many participants were added to the list, apparently to the HAT's benefit. Moreover, the proposals put to the plenary session were different to those adopted by the commissions.<sup>231</sup>

The results of the national conference strengthened Rajoelina, who remained in power, while the minimum age required for presidential candidates was lowered from 40 to 35.<sup>232</sup> It was also decided to remove the mayors, the only elected representatives that had not all been replaced since March 2009, removing the last remaining shred of

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tion with the three political movements, but no fundamental changes were made.

<sup>227</sup> Such as AREMA's national secretary, Pierrot Rajaonarivelo, and Rajoelina's former prime minister, Monja Roindefo.

<sup>228</sup> "Résolutions des trois mouvances (Albert Zafy – Didier Ratsiraka – Marc Ravalomanana) Fiaraha-mientana hivoahana amin'ny krizy 13-14 August 2010 Carlton Madagascar".

<sup>229</sup> The international community refused to fund the conference. Crisis Group interviews, diplomat, Antananarivo, 20 September 2010; party leaders, Antananarivo, 21 and 23 September 2010.

<sup>230</sup> The results of the *Dinika santatra* indicated that the public wanted a consensual transition and that the minimum age for presidential candidates should be 40.

<sup>231</sup> Crisis Group interviews, party leaders, Antananarivo, 21 and 23 September 2010.

<sup>232</sup> Andry Rajoelina is 36.

democratic legitimacy from the regime. Experts were disappointed by the bill drafted by the Consultative Constitutional Committee on the basis of popular consultation. They felt it did not resolve the Third Republic's fundamental problems. The November referendum therefore risked doing no more than legitimising the current government.<sup>233</sup>

Shortly after the conference, the HAT created the institutions proposed by the Ivato agreement: the referendum campaign was launched on 2 October<sup>234</sup> and parliament was installed the following week. The HAT gave itself 41 of the 90 seats on the Superior Transition Council (Conseil supérieur de la transition, CST) and 99 of the 256 seats in the Transition Congress (Congrès de la transition, CT) but tried to demonstrate openness by giving 25 CST and 73 CT seats to former members of the three political movements.<sup>235</sup> With the holding of a referendum on 17

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<sup>233</sup> Especially as article 166 on transitional provisions indicated that the authorities would remain in post until the creation of new institutions after the election. Presidential powers remain very broad, local authorities remain dependent on central government and the independence of the judiciary is not strengthened. Moreover, many practical details remain to be dealt with by future legislation. See "La Haute Cour de Justice (HCJ) ne suffira pas ...", madagascar-tribune.com, 5 October 2010; "Projet de Constitution: y a-t-il vraiment changement?", madagascar-tribune.com, 4 October 2010. The KMF/CNOE also warned about the inadequate distribution and understanding of the proposals, as well as the lack of an overhaul of the electoral list and the local branches of the CENI. "Le KMF/CNOE interpelle la HAT", madagascar-tribune.com, 8 October 2010.

<sup>234</sup> At the beginning of September, a CENI member said it could not get on with its work because it was always having to ask the government for funding and because its members needed more training. He also said the authorities clearly wanted to remain in control of the process. The idea of inviting international representatives into the structure was raised as a way of increasing its neutrality. Crisis Group interviews, Antananarivo, 26 May and 1 September 2010.

<sup>235</sup> The HAT president personally appoints six members of the CST. His party, the Tanora malaGasy Vonona (TGV), appoints a further ten representatives. The alliance of parties close to him, the UDR-Fanovana, has a further 25 representatives. The three other political movements have, respectively, two seats for Zafy's Hery politika mitambatra (HPM), two seats for Ratsiraka's AREMA and 21 for Ravalomanana's Tiako I Madagasikara (TIM). ESCOPOL was allocated eighteen seats. The HAT president directly appoints 18 members of the CT, the TGV 52 and the UDR-Fanovana 29. The TIM appoints 52, the HSPM 7 and AREMA 7. ESCOPOL was allocated 62 seats and other groups 7. The idea of promoting the participation of the largest number of parties possible in the transition was the focus of the Ivato Agreement. However, when the institutions were created, some of the names proposed by ESCOPOL were reportedly replaced by others close to the government. Crisis Group interview, ESCOPOL member, Antananarivo, 19 October 2010.

November,<sup>236</sup> the HAT's process for resolving the crisis was well and truly launched.<sup>237</sup>

#### 4. A new attempt at mediation but the same old problems: divisions and ill-feeling

Although the authorities have always tried to stay in control of events, the lack of unity and organisation and private interests of civil society and political parties have also contributed to the failure of the national mediation process, for example in the case of CNOSC's attempt to bring together ESCOPOL and the three movements between 25-27 August 2010 in Vontovorona.<sup>238</sup> The first disagreements within ESCOPOL emerged on the eve of the meeting, when UDR-C members disassociated themselves from the Ivato Agreement. They said they wanted Camille Vital to remain as prime minister and that they did not agree there was a need for a full cabinet reshuffle. Close to Rajoelina as they were, this step indicated his fear of a rapprochement between the political parties and movements and therefore a loss of control over the process. He also contacted several party leaders to try to persuade them to block the process.<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>236</sup> The referendum campaign was dominated by those recommending a "yes" vote. Supporters of a "no" vote were limited to the more restrained intellectual circles. The "yes" campaign did not comment on the constitution but put forward the idea that a "yes" vote expressed a desire to resolve the crisis. In the middle of the campaign, Andry Rajoelina launched an initiative to create *Tsena mora* (literally, cheap markets), selling basic goods at low prices. He toured the country, officially to call on people to vote, but also announced the construction of stadiums, swimming pools and hospitals, which were again presented as personal gifts. The opposition called for a boycott but political demonstrations were banned one week before the referendum and several opposition figures were arrested. "Les manifestations politiques interdites", *L'Express de Madagascar*, 10 November 2010. Fraud also took place during the campaign. Voting papers with "yes" already ticked were reportedly distributed. "La CENI porte plainte contre X", *madagascar-tribune.fr*, 8 November 2010.

<sup>237</sup> The authorities followed the Mauritanian scheme, in which those involved in the putsch organise the elections, very controversially, and the man behind the coup is elected, before receiving recognition from the international community. Some members of the regime would genuinely like to organise elections quickly because they are the only ones able to finance their campaigns and can use state resources to position themselves. According to this logic, their chances of election become less as time goes by.

<sup>238</sup> See also "Rapport sur la première phase de la médiation nationale" by CNOSC, 1 September 2010. This meeting produced very few concrete results. Most of the transitional institutions were confirmed but it was agreed to review the composition of some of them.

<sup>239</sup> Crisis Group interview, ESCOPOL member, Antananarivo, 24 August 2010.

Given that the only common objective of the Ivato Agreement signatories seemed to be sharing out the seats, cooperation was going to be difficult. The HAT also refused to take any measures to calm down the situation. Its insistence that the trial of Marc Ravalomanana for the affair of 7 February 2009<sup>240</sup> would go ahead during the discussions radicalised the political movements and put an end to the discussions.<sup>241</sup>

Meanwhile, the CNOSC has struggled to assert its authority. Its attempt at mediation was poorly prepared and its members divided over the correct strategy to adopt. Some members wanted simply to note the absence of the three opposition movements and carry on without them, while others condition the continuation of mediation on their presence.<sup>242</sup> It is accused of bias in favour of the three movements because it insisted on their presence. This coalition of organisations remains very fragile and lacks credibility, largely because it is felt that some of its members are purely interested in advancing their own political interests.<sup>243</sup>

The political movements also adopted a counter-productive attitude that led people to question their willingness to find a solution and that *in fine* can only isolate them. They set completely unrealistic conditions before agreeing to negotiate, such as Marc Ravalomanana's return to the country or an immediate amnesty. This made dialogue impossible. While the opposition movements continued to criticise the government's unilateralism, it was however clear that they were not helping by refusing to compromise and therefore helped legitimise Rajoelina. All sides seemed to find it convenient to carry on blaming opponents for the failure to find a solution. Finally, developments that one month earlier would have heralded positive changes in

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<sup>240</sup> Rajoelina's supporters answered his call and that of his "prime minister", Monja Roindefo, and marched on the presidential palace. The security forces opened fire leaving around 30 people dead and more than 200 wounded.

<sup>241</sup> On 28 August 2010, the former president was convicted in his absence to life in prison with hard labour for murder and accessory to murder. He rejected the verdict and did not recognise the court's authority. He said he should have been tried by the High Court of Justice. However, he refused this treatment to political opponents convicted during his government. This eagerness to convict Ravalomanana for this affair is explained by the terms proposed for the amnesty, which would exclude anyone guilty of the misappropriation of public funds and murder. By preventing Ravalomanana from returning to the country, Rajoelina and his entourage ensured their future, in the knowledge that the former president's return would undermine their position.

<sup>242</sup> Crisis Group interview, CNOSC member, Antananarivo, 25 August 2010.

<sup>243</sup> Crisis Group interviews, Antananarivo, August-September 2010.

the process to resolve the crisis were negated by ill-feeling and refusal to compromise and risk losing control of events,<sup>244</sup> particularly in a context in which no party can claim to have majority support and must therefore at all costs use the machinery of state for their campaign.

#### IV. ENDING THE CRISIS

After more than a year and a half of crisis, the transition has reached deadlock. All attempts at mediation have failed and no element of pressure has been sufficiently decisive to promote genuine change to the unilateral process led by the HAT. The main actors seem, in various ways, to be satisfied with this stalemate. The problems have been the same since the beginning of the crisis: the protagonists argue about sharing power and refuse to compromise, as the most recent attempts at mediation again showed. Meanwhile, the international community has had to face the fact that there is no chance of an agreement imposed from above and negotiated by the leaders of the four movements. The Ivato Agreement was certainly to some extent representative of the Malagasy political class, but was not, however, totally inclusive. Although it is clear that the three opposition movements led by the former presidents cannot eternally exercise what appears to be a right of veto, it is also clear that the opportunistic involvement of a hundred or so political parties in this agreement does not mean it represents a consensus.

The HAT is pushing through a unilateral process seemingly bereft of obstacles and it is confident of finding parallel financial backing for its plan. However, this scenario presents grave risks. The regime will use the victory of the “yes” vote in the referendum to claim legitimacy and will consider itself well-placed to win the elections that it alone will be responsible for organising in 2011 and which will certainly be boycotted by at least part of the opposition. However, if they persist with the unilateral organisation of elections, the international community will refuse to recognise the new regime and the crisis could last for several years, with disastrous results for the country and the population and a great risk of instability. Madagascar cannot afford to be isolated internationally.

As things stand at the moment, there is no need for yet another attempt at mediation between the parties to move towards an inclusive transition or create new transitional bodies. The focus now must be on trying to obtain an agreement with the authorities on the conditions for international assistance with the electoral process. The priority must be to ensure credible and neutral elections to restore constitutional order and revive the economy as quickly as possible. SADC, backed by the International Contact Group, should reach such agreement with the HAT.

This backing must depend on the regime fulfilling certain commitments. These should include Andry Rajoelina’s confirmation that neither he nor his ministers will stand at

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<sup>244</sup> See “Classe politique dévoyée, société civile instrumentalisée”, SeFaFi press release, 3 September 2010. For discussion of the problems involved in agreements between elites in a neopatrimonial regime, see Bratton and Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa”, *op. cit.* The authors say that such transitions tend to witness an intensification of confrontations until one of the parties loses definitively. But they also note that, in the absence of compromise, there is little chance of establishing a democratic regime. In addition, the weakness of political institutions reduces the representativeness of political leaders, who are consequently more interested in their access to resources than in real change.

the elections,<sup>245</sup> revision of the electoral timeline, transparency on contracts signed by the authorities and an audit of state finances by international financial institutions. The government should reshuffle the cabinet on the basis of the broadest possible consultation and must not exceed its caretaker mandate. The amnesty measures that formed part of preceding agreements should be implemented to calm the situation, and should guarantee to safeguard Marc Ravalomanana's property. The lawsuit relating to the 7 February affair should be dropped and referred to international investigators.

If these commitments are violated, the European Union, the United States and others (if possible through the United Nations Security Council) must join the African Union in imposing individual sanctions (refusal of visas, freeze of assets in foreign banks and refusal of accreditation).<sup>246</sup>

The electoral process must be totally independent of the authorities to pre-empt protests criticising its lack of neutrality. The CENI should be fully in charge and given the resources and expertise necessary to organise credible elections. It should, however, be reconstituted to make it acceptable to all parties, especially opposition parties, which should take up their seats on the CENI.

The United Nations Secretariat should quickly send an electoral assessment mission to determine when credible polls can be held and amend the timeline accordingly. Based on its assessment, the UN should then deploy a team of advisers to strengthen the CENI. This team should give robust support, especially on the revision of the voter registry, logistics, the training of all involved in the process and civic education. Consideration should also be given to appointing international commissioners to the CENI to reinforce its credibility and neutrality. The UN should coordinate with other international organisations that can provide electoral help. International observers should also deploy early.

However, the same old questions remain: why would the various parties accept such a scenario? The three opposition movements are increasingly marginalised, while it is clear that the HAT will not back down from its plan. If they want to be able to campaign freely and on an equal footing before the next elections and take the place they deserve in the institutions of the new Republic, their only option is to accept this solution. The strict conditions for

international support and the measures to remove the elections from the control of the authorities provide them with guarantees for impartial elections. In exchange, the opposition should undertake not to destabilise the process and Marc Ravalomanana should fulfil the commitment he made at Maputo of not returning to the country until conditions are favourable. The HAT says it wants credible elections. This is the only conceivable option for such elections to take place, for the necessary resources to be available and for international recognition to be granted.

The international community must be especially firm and, for once, remain united. It should press upon the HAT that a unilateral process will not be recognised. The International Contact Group should meet as soon as possible so that the international community can act in a coordinated manner. China, a member of the group, should be prevailed upon to align its economic position with its official political stance. The opening of SADC's office should be accelerated to monitor the process at close hand and its special envoy should work closely with a United Nations political team.

It would be naive to believe that the elections will solve Madagascar's deep-rooted problems, such as the concentration of power, corruption and governance in general. Although reconciliation may not take place under the transitional regime, it should begin from the moment the new elected government is in place. The causes of the country's chronic instability must not be forgotten and they should be a priority for the new leaders of the Fourth Republic. However, the current situation requires urgent action and there is no more time for equivocation about the sharing of posts, which in any case only benefits some individual personal interests. The peace that is indispensable for the transition to proceed in a serene climate that would allow the government to undertake genuine reform is today compromised. The current situation is first and foremost a crisis rather than a transition, and it should be resolved as quickly as possible, before going on to deal with the problems that caused it and laying new foundations for the Fourth Republic.

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<sup>245</sup> This corresponds to the principle in the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (article 25): "The perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government shall not be allowed to participate in elections held to restore the democratic order or hold any position of responsibility in the political institutions of their State".

<sup>246</sup> It will, however, be necessary to revise the list of individuals sanctioned, to reduce it and to include entrepreneurs.

## V. CONCLUSION

As with all previous regimes in Madagascar, nepotism and wheeler-dealing have led elites that are profiting from this transition to block all attempts at reform. Demands for change have been turned into a resistance to any questioning of the newly acquired advantages. Andry Rajoelina, too weak and too quickly caught up in a system that he had previously denounced, has missed the opportunity to distance himself from this system, install the rule of law and break with previous practices. The expected progress did not happen and the conclusions drawn by some after the 1991-1993 transition are strikingly current:

The transition draws to a close amid disenchantment, because the governing class's mode of reproduction has become clear and its behaviour has not changed in any fundamental way since the 19th century, ever since control of the government apparatus became the most efficient instrument for economic exploitation . . . . The Third Republic therefore risks being no more than a transition towards the Fourth and the real 'transition' is only just beginning.<sup>247</sup>

The same thing is happening in 2010: the "real" transition has not yet begun.

Since March 2009, no actor has managed to put enough pressure on the authorities to make them radically change their path. There have been plenty of complaints about the abuses of the transition but their impact has been reduced by the lack of will, cohesion and organisation of those able to influence the course of events. On the other hand, the main protagonists have gradually found a place in this ungoverned transitional regime, as it moves towards a Fourth Republic that risks being no more than a mirror image of the preceding one.

Andry Rajoelina's period of grace is over, but no other figure has emerged to take his place. Although he wants to be remembered as a president of renewal, by taking the risk of following his predecessor's path, but this time without the international support received by the latter, Rajoelina could, on the contrary, plunge his country into a yet more profound crisis. There is a real risk he will create illegitimate and unrecognised institutions that will only perpetuate the practices that have impoverished the country for so long and that always end in violence.

**Antananarivo/Nairobi/Brussels,  
18 November 2010**

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<sup>247</sup> Françoise Raison-Jourde, "Une transition achevée ou amorcée?", *Politique africaine*, no. 52, December 1993.

## APPENDIX A

### MAP OF MADAGASCAR



## APPENDIX B

### GLOSSARY

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AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act. Facilitates access by African countries to the United States market if they follow free market policies.
ANC	African National Congress
AREMA	Avant-garde de la révolution malgache. Former president Didier Ratsiraka's political party.
AU	African Union
BIANCO	Bureau indépendant anti-corruption / Independent Anti-Corruption Office
CAPSAT	Corps d'armée des personnels et des services administratifs et techniques / Administrative and Technical Personnel and Services Army Corps
CENA	Commission électorale nationale / National Electoral Commission (proposal in the France-South Africa agreement protocol)
CENI	Commission électorale nationale indépendante / Independent National Electoral Commission
CNOSC	Coordination nationale des organisations de la société civile / National Coordination of Civil Society Organisations
COI	Commission de l'océan Indien / Indian Ocean Commission
COMESA	Common Market for East and Southern Africa
CSMME	Conseil supérieur mixte de la médiation et de l'éthique / Superior Joint Mediation and Ethical Council
CST	Conseil supérieur de la transition / Superior Transition Council
CT	Congrès de la transition / Transition Congress
<i>Dinika santatra</i>	Preliminary dialogues organised in 22 regions in July 2010.
ESCOPOL	Espace de concertation politique / Forum for Political Dialogue
EU	European Union
FIGN	Force d'intervention de la gendarmerie nationale / National Gendarmerie Intervention Force
FIS	Force d'intervention spéciale / Special Intervention Force
HAT	Haute autorité de la transition / High Authority of the Transition
HPM	Hery Politika Mitambatra. Part of the Zafy movement.
ICG	International Contact Group
IOF	International Organisation of la Francophonie
INSTAT	Institut national de la statistique / National Statistical Institute
JMT	Joint Mediation Team
KMF/CNOE	Comité national d'observation des élections et d'éducation des citoyens / National Committee for Observation of the Elections and Civic Education
PDS	Président de délégation spéciale / Special Delegation President
QMM	Qit Madagascar Minerals, mining company, joint-venture between the government of Madagascar and Rio Tinto.
<i>Raiamandreny</i>	Literally "mother and father" in Malagasy. Used to indicate "wise elders".
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community

SAMIFIN	Service de renseignements financiers / Financial Information Services
SeFaFi	Observatoire de la vie publique à Antananarivo / Public Life Observatory in Antananarivo
TGV	Tanora malaGasy Vonona (literally, “determined young Malagasy”)
TIM	Tiako I Madagasikara (literally, “I love Madagascar”)
UDR-C	Union des démocrates et des républicains pour le changement (Rajoelina movement)
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund

## APPENDIX C

### ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

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Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and made available simultaneously on the website, [www.crisisgroup.org](http://www.crisisgroup.org). Crisis Group works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

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**November 2010**

## APPENDIX D

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