

**INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER:
JIHAD IN CENTRAL SULAWESI**

3 February 2004



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INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER: JIHAD IN CENTRAL SULAWESI

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Recent violence in Poso (Central Sulawesi) suggests a need to revise assessments about the nature and gravity of the terrorist threat in Indonesia. While the shorter term prospects are somewhat encouraging, there is an under appreciated longer term security risk.

In October 2003, masked gunmen attacked Christian villagers in the Morowali and Poso districts of Central Sulawesi, killing thirteen. The attacks took many outside the area by surprise. In December 2001, after three years of bitter sectarian conflict in which hundreds of Muslims and Christians had been killed, leaders of the warring parties had signed a peace agreement, the Malino Accord, which produced a dramatic decline in communal clashes. However, systematic, one-sided violence – bombings and “mysterious killings” by unidentified assailants, with overwhelmingly non-Muslim victims – continued. The October 2003 attacks thus continued a well-established pattern.

The difference was that with the heightened attention to terrorism in Indonesia and the wealth of information available to the police from captured Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members about activities in Poso, security authorities moved quickly. Many of the eighteen people arrested as of January 2004 appear to have had some contact with JI through involvement in a militia called Mujahidin KOMPAK, an organisation whose leaders were sometimes drawn from JI, but which remained institutionally distinct.

This report explores how Mujahidin KOMPAK was created, how it came to Poso, and how it cooperated and competed with JI. It concludes that both organisations aimed to build the capacity of local

groups to wage jihad without outside assistance. Since almost all those arrested for the October violence are local, they may have succeeded. (One suspect killed by police is believed to have been from Java and an alumnus of Pondok Ngruki, the religious school in Central Java from which many JI bombers have come.)

The two organisations had very different approaches to capacity-building, however. JI focused on religious indoctrination as an absolute prerequisite to war. Mujahidin KOMPAK was more interested in getting its recruits into battle as quickly as possible. JI was seen as slow and bureaucratic, Mujahidin KOMPAK as leaner, meaner, and quicker.

The impatience of some Mujahidin KOMPAK leaders (themselves also JI) with JI’s approach reflected a deeper split within JI over how, where, and when to wage jihad. A key fault line was between those associated with Hambali, including most of the people involved in the Bali and Marriott bombings, who have been particularly influenced by al-Qaeda’s 1998 *fatwa* urging attacks on Western targets, and what appears to be the majority faction in the organisation. That faction sees the *fatwa*’s implementation as inappropriate for Indonesia and damaging to the longer-term strategy of building a mass base through religious outreach.

The prevailing assumption has been that JI is the only organisation with the expertise, international ties, and ideology to constitute a likely partner in South East Asia for al-Qaeda or another international terrorist group. Analysis of the Poso conflict indicates that this risk analysis of radical Muslim violence in Indonesia needs to be revised. The rift within JI described in this report suggests that if the men

associated with the Hambali faction can be captured – and several key figures are still at large – the immediate threat of another Bali or Marriott-style attack by JI in Indonesia could substantially ease.

Jl's majority faction, however, will continue to constitute a longer-term security threat for Indonesia. This is not only because its leaders believe that military force is necessary to achieve an Islamic state, but also because the religious indoctrination and recruitment efforts they are engaged in are likely to produce at least some cadres more hot-headed than their teachers, who look beyond Indonesia to a more international agenda.

At the same time, it is increasingly clear that there are many smaller, local groups in Indonesia, some of whose members have Afghan or Mindanao training, whose deep-seated grievances could lead them to draw inspiration from the bin-Laden *fatwa*. It is, of course, one thing to draw inspiration and another to work with a group like al-Qaeda to pull off a major attack. But it could be precisely the shorter, “results-oriented” training and the attraction of martyrdom that could make men like those who joined Mujahidin KOMPAK in Poso more dangerous than the “bureaucrats” of JI.

It remains important to keep the threat of terrorism in perspective. Indonesia is not about to be overrun with jihadists. They remain the radical fringe of a radical

fringe. Their capacity to do damage, however, continues to be cause for serious concern.

The counter-terrorism lessons from Poso include:

- ❑ Far more attention needs to be paid to understanding recruitment methods of jihadist organisations, not just JI but also local groups with more parochial concerns.
- ❑ More attention also needs to be given to the religious indoctrination these groups undertake, while understanding that the same material taught by different teachers can lead in very different directions.
- ❑ Top priority should be to prevent the emergence of the kind of international training center that Afghanistan provided in the past. The personal bonds established there are almost certainly more important than ideology or money in facilitating partnerships among jihadist groups.
- ❑ Democratic reforms, especially an impartial, credible legal system, a neutral and competent law enforcement agency, and better access to justice, remain absolutely essential to preventing the kind of vigilantism that radical groups can manipulate.

Jakarta/Brussels, 3 February 2004



INDONESIA BACKGROUNDER: JIHAD IN CENTRAL SULAWESI

I. INTRODUCTION

The October 2003 attacks by masked gunmen on Christian villagers in the Morowali and Poso districts of Central Sulawesi left thirteen villagers and six suspects killed by the police dead. The spasm of violence surprised many people outside the area since after three years of bitter sectarian conflict during which hundreds of Muslims and Christians had been killed, leaders of the warring parties had signed a peace agreement, the Malino Accord, in December 2001 that led to a dramatic decline in communal clashes.

But without much attention from the Megawati government or the national media, systematic violence continued. It was largely one-sided, the victims overwhelmingly non-Muslim, and it mostly took the form of bombings and “mysterious killings” by unidentified assailants.

The October 2003 attacks were less a sudden eruption of violence than continuation of an established pattern, but with the difference that because of heightened attention to terrorism and the wealth of information available from captured Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) members about the organisation’s activities, police quickly arrested eighteen local men. Many appeared to have had some contact with South East Asia’s best-known terrorist organisation but the nature of it was not completely clear.

ICG looked into JI’s presence in Poso – how it got there and what its impact was – in order to learn more about the post-Malino violence, including the October attacks.¹ It found that those responsible for

much of the recent violence were local members of a militia called Mujahidin KOMPAK, an organisation spawned by but independent of JI. Examination of relationship between the two, first in Ambon and then in Poso, sheds new light on the internal workings of JI and on the complexity of its alliances with local organisations. It revealed a serious rift within JI that appears to be widening over how, when, and where to wage jihad.

It also suggested that equating JI with the Bali bombers is probably wrong. All its members are radical jihadists but not all view attacks on Western targets as an appropriate strategy. The men responsible for the Bali and Marriott bombs represent one, probably minority faction within JI. The majority appear to be much more focused on religious indoctrination aimed at building a mass base in support of an Islamic state in Indonesia and the military capacity to further that aim. The two factions present very different dangers.

The Poso example also suggests that terrorism analysis in Indonesia has focused too much on JI to the exclusion of smaller groups with local grievances that have enough structure and support base to make them potentially attractive to international jihadist partners.

¹ Several excellent studies have been produced on the Poso conflict as such, including Lorraine V. Aragon, “Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish

and Fish Eat People,” *Indonesia*, N°72 October 2001; Human Rights Watch, “Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi”, Vol.14, N°9C, December 2002; George Junus Aditjondro, “Kerusuhan Poso Dan Morowali, Akar Permasalahan Dan Jalan Keluarnya” for a seminar on “Application of Military Emergencies in Aceh, Papua and Poso?” conducted by ProPatria, Jakarta, 7 January 2004.

II. PRE-POSO SPLITS WITHIN JI

Ji established a presence in the Poso area after what most analysts refer to as the third phase of the conflict, a series of attacks on Muslims in May and early June 2000 that left more than 200 dead. The worst of these, which became a rallying point for Muslims across Indonesia, was a massacre at the Walisongo Pesantren in Sintuwulemba village where villagers had sought refuge from a Christian attack.²

Phase I began in December 1998 and involved the burning of mostly Christian homes. Phase II began in April 2000 and resulted in further casualties and damage to mainly Christian communities. Both escalated from street fights during high-stakes local political campaigns. A Poso resident told ICG, "During the first two phases, it was just gang warfare. After the third phase, it was jihad".³

Ji moved quicker into Poso than into Ambon, Maluku (Moluccas) where the first major post-Soeharto outbreak of communal violence erupted in January 1999. That was not saying much, however. It took the Ji leadership six months to decide to send forces into Maluku, by which time many other groups were already operating. The slow response deepened a rift between two of Ji's main regional divisions, Mantiqi I and Mantiqi II.⁴ That rift became even more pronounced in Poso.

To understand the differences, it is important to understand the structure of Ji. It has generally been described as having four main divisions: Mantiqi I, covering peninsular Malaysia and Singapore; Mantiqi II, based in Central Java and covering Java, Sumatra, and most of eastern Indonesia; Mantiqi III, covering Sabah, East Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and

Mindanao; and Mantiqi IV, covering Papua and Australia.

When Ji was first set up, however, it was divided only into Mantiqi I and Mantiqi II. Singapore and Malaysia were to be responsible for fund-raising, and Indonesia the focus of jihad.⁵

Mantiqi III was only created in 1997, after one member argued that it was too difficult logistically for Sabah in eastern Malaysia to report to Johor, and for Nunukan in East Kalimantan to report to Solo. In 2002, the same person put forward a proposal to establish a Mantiqi IV that would consist only of Sulawesi, leaving Mantiqi III responsible for Sabah and Mindanao. While this was not done, the proposal implies that a *mantiqi* based in Australia was never really a going concern, although Australia continued to be seen as a fund-raising area.⁶

Mantiqi I included many of the top leaders of Ji. Hambali, perhaps Ji's best-known operative, was its first head, and Mukhlas, a key figure in the October 2002 Bali bombings, was his successor. From the formal creation of Ji on 1 January 1993, a date now confirmed in writing, Ji leaders had focused on consolidating and strengthening the organisation to prepare it for action in Indonesia.⁷ Military training (*tadrib*) in Afghanistan and Mindanao was very much part of that agenda, but so were religious education and indoctrination. The religious study sessions conducted by Ji across Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia in the mid to late 1990s were a way of attracting potential recruits, but they were also seen as essential preparation for a coming war.

When Soeharto fell, Ji's Malaysia-based central command decided that Indonesia was ripe for jihad. Indeed, in 1999 during a trip to Jakarta, Abdullah

² In fact, the killings took place in several villages over a period of several days, but the Walisongo massacre became a shorthand for Christian attacks on Muslims.

³ ICG interview, December 2003.

⁴ According to Ji's organisational guidelines known as PUPJI, each *mantiqi* [literally region, but used more in the sense of brigade] was divided into a *wakalah*, *sariyah*, *katibah*, *kirdas*, *fiah*, and *thoifah*, but in practice, the command structure seems to have been simplified to *wakalah*, *kirdas*, and *fiah*. See ICG Asia Report N°63, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged But Still Dangerous*, 26 August 2003, p.11. As of early 2004, after hundreds of arrests of Ji members, it was not clear whether this structure was still functioning.

⁵ The decision to make Indonesia the focus of jihad goes back at least to 1996 and likely earlier.

⁶ ICG interview, January 2004.

⁷ The date 1 January 1993 appears in a document entitled "Official Statement of al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah" (*Pernyataan Resmi al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah*) of 6 October 2003, which ICG has authenticated. In Achmad Roihan's testimony as a witness in the case of Thoriquddin alias Abu Rusydan, he says, "[Abu Fatih] served as head of Mantiqi II from June 1993 onwards, six months after the declaration that he was breaking with Ajengan Masduki. On 1 January 1993, Jemaah Islamiyah separated itself from Darul Islam led by Ajengan Masduki, but even earlier, I had delivered a letter from Malaysia, written by Abdullah Sungkar, to this effect." Roihan testimony, p.6, in Thoriquddin dossier, N°Pol: BP/16/VIII/2003, Dit-I, 5 August 2003.

Sungkar asked Achmad Roihan, a Mantiqi II leader, why it had not yet begun. Roihan, reflecting the views of the more cautious Mantiqi II leaders, said that human resources were insufficient, and there were no clear operational targets.⁸ JI needed to step up education and training inside Indonesia and get a stronger local support base before it could act. Sungkar complained that Mantiqi II's training program would take too long.⁹

Mantiqi II leaders also questioned whether there was a clear enemy to fight in Indonesia, which was very different from Afghanistan, for example, where Muslims had clearly been attacked by the Soviet Union. They believed it would be a mistake to expend scarce resources on waging a jihad under such circumstances, and argued instead for a long-term strategy to build up cadre and a target date of 2025 for establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia.¹⁰

Mantiqi I leaders pointed to the 1996 *fatwa* from Osama bin-Laden, reinforced by another in the name of the World Islamic Front in 1998, that authorised a war against the U.S. and its allies.¹¹ Mantiqi II leaders argued that these *fatwas* were inappropriate for Indonesia, a stance they said was shared by Salamat Hashim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines. They also were reportedly irritated that Mantiqi I seemed to be ignoring JI's own *fatwa* council (*majelis fatwa*), which was rarely convened.¹²

⁸ Interrogation deposition of Achmad Roihan alias Sa'ad alias Mat Uchang alias Hariyono alias Mohammad Nuh, 9 May 2003, Denpasar, Bali.

⁹ Interrogation deposition (continued) of Achmad Roihan alias Sa'ad alias Mat Uchang alias Hariyono alias Mohammad Nuh Ibid, 12 May 2003, Denpasar Bali.

¹⁰ ICG interviews, November 2003.

¹¹ The *fatwa*, issued on 23 February 1998, stated in part, "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim. This is in accordance with the words of Almighty God, 'and fight the pagans all together as they fight you all together', and 'fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevails justice and faith in God'". It was as part of this statement that Osama bin-Laden announced the creation of the "Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders". See www.atour.com/news/international/20010928b.html.

¹² ICG interview, Bali, January 2004.

Mantiqi II was almost certainly not a united bloc in its reluctance to follow the Malaysia-based leadership. It is not clear, for example, where Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, who succeeded Sungkar as JI *amir* (leader), came down (or how much his opinion mattered).

From August 2000, another major fault line was over Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's decision to accept the leadership of the Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI), the Yogyakarta-based organisation set up to promote adoption of Islamic law. The MMI was the brainchild of Irfan Awwas Suryahardy, a long-time associate of Ba'asyir's who was never a member of JI. Many JI leaders were upset by Ba'asyir's decision. Some believed that it was dangerous for a clandestine organisation like JI to exist side by side with an open one, particularly when there was some overlapping membership.

Others were more worried that Ba'asyir would have too many demands on his time, and could not devote adequate attention to running JI.¹³ (Indeed, he became so busy with MMI that he was forced to turn over day-to-day running of JI to Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusydan, currently on trial in Jakarta.)¹⁴

In some cases, the JI divisions over creation of MMI ran parallel to those over strategy. Mantiqi I's Hambali reportedly encouraged Ba'asyir to work within MMI, whereas Mantiqi II leader Abdullah Anshori, better known as Abu Fatih, was so upset that he relinquished leadership to Zuhroni alias Nu'im, another Afghanistan veteran.¹⁵

While it is a mistake to see JI views as monolithic, it is also a mistake to see the divisions as immutable, and cross-cutting fault-lines in the organisation can sometimes bring two people on different sides of one debate into the same camp on another.

¹³ ICG interview, Bali, January 2004.

¹⁴ Testimony of Achmad Roihan, op. cit.

¹⁵ We do not know the details of this transition but Nu'im is mentioned as the successor to Abu Fatih in the 9 May 2003 testimony of Mohamad Nasir bin Abas al Khairudin alias Sulaeman alias Leman Alias Maman alias Nasir Abas alias Husna alias Abu Husna alias Eddy Mulyono alias Malik in the dossier of Thoriquddin, op. cit. Also, ICG interview with Nasir Abbas, January 2004.

A. DEBATES OVER AMBON

The outbreak of violence in Ambon in January 1999 deepened the differences between the two main factions. Ambon fell within Mantiqi II's jurisdiction, but several influential voices within Mantiqis II and III were worried that the violence there had been engineered by outside parties, smelled too much of politics,¹⁶ and JI should, therefore, be cautious. In the view of Mantiqi I members, whether or not there was political manipulation was irrelevant: Muslims were being slaughtered, while Mantiqi II did nothing.

In June 1999, Zulkarnaen, head of military operations for JI and a prominent hawk, convened a meeting of Afghanistan alumni at a religious institute known as Mahad Ali in Solo.¹⁷ About twenty people were present, representing Solo, Lamongan, Central Java, East Java, Manado, and Jakarta.¹⁸ Abu Fatih, the head of Mantiqi II, was reportedly lambasted by several of those present, including the Lamongan contingent (convicted Bali bombers Amrozi, Ali Imron, and Mubarok), for being too slow and bureaucratic. The group decided to send a team to Ambon immediately under the command of Zulkarnaen, a decision endorsed by Abdullah Sungkar.¹⁹

But even before this decision, some of the more impatient JI members had joined Mujahidin KOMPAK, a group organised by one of their colleagues, Arismunandar. It had been set up through the Solo branch of KOMPAK (Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis, roughly Action

Committee for Crisis Response), a Muslim charity established in 1998 under the Islam Propagation Council of Indonesia (Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia, DDII) to assist Muslims affected by natural disasters, conflict, and poverty.²⁰

Arismunandar was the head of the Solo branch. A native of Boyolali, just outside Solo, he was a 1989 alumnus of Pondok Ngruki, the *pesantren* founded by Abu Bakar Ba'asyir and Abdullah Sungkar outside Solo that has become notorious as the alma mater of many JI bombers.²¹

From the beginning, KOMPAK had one foot in radical violence and one foot in the Muslim establishment.²² After Ambon exploded, it became a conduit for funding jihad activities, purchasing arms, and producing videos of Muslim victims of violence that were then used to raise funds among Muslims abroad, reportedly with the help of men with al-Qaeda connections.²³ At the same time, its genuine assistance to Muslim victims of floods and conflict-related displacement drew the support of senior politicians such as Minister of Justice and Human Rights Yusril Ihza Mahendra.²⁴

KOMPAK's funding became a source of speculation in the domestic and international press, particularly after the third phase of the Poso conflict erupted in mid-2000. Agus Dwikarna, now imprisoned in

¹⁶ ICG interview, Bali, January 2004.

¹⁷ Mahad Ali is a generic term for a tertiary religious school open to graduates of Islamic high schools known as madrasah aliyah. The Mahad Ali in question, however, was run by the al-Ikhlas foundation, a JI-linked charity in Gading, Solo, and was dominated by Pondok Ngruki alumni. It may have become the headquarters for JI's central command after 1999.

¹⁸ Solo is in the province of Central Java, and Lamongan is in the province of East Java, but JI's presence was so strong in both places that there appear to have been separate JI administrative structures for Central Java outside Solo, and East Java, outside Lamongan. At the meeting, Amrozi and Ali Imron were assigned to find arms and explosives for the Ambon operation; Mubarok and Zaenal (both from Manado) and Sarjio alias Sawad were assigned to raise funds for weapons purchases; Nu'im was put in charge of recruiting; and the Jakarta contingent was tasked with making (as opposed to purchasing) weapons. "Kesimpulan Hasil Pemeriksaan Terhadap Rekening dan Keterangan Utomo Pamungkas alias Amin alias Mubarok", undated document

¹⁹ ICG interviews, November 2003.

²⁰ As noted in earlier ICG reports, the relationship between DDII and JI goes back to the involvement of JI's founder, Abdullah Sungkar, in DDII in the late 1970s and early 1980s. See ICG Report, *Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Organisation Operates*, op. cit. Arismunandar was also head of cadre recruitment for DDII's Central Java branch as of mid-2002.

²¹ ICG Indonesia Briefing, *Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The Case of the "Ngruki Network" in Indonesia*, 8 August 2002.

²² KOMPAK at the national level was headed by Tamsil Linrung, a businessman from Makassar who until late 2003 was also the national treasurer of the National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional or PAN). He came to national attention when he was arrested in Manila together with Agus Dwikarna in March 2002 but was eventually freed and allowed to return home.

²³ One of these was Reda Seyam. See Moritz Kleine-Brockhoff, "An Entry in the Diary of Reda S.", *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 November 2002; a second article by Kleine-Brockhoff published in the same newspaper, 17 July 2003; and Ken Conboy, *Intel* (Jakarta 2003), pp. 237-238.

²⁴ Mahendra welcomed a joint project between KOMPAK and PT Telkom, Indonesia's largest telecommunications company, to assist families affected by the disastrous 2002 floods in Jakarta. See "Peduli Banjir," *Media Dakwah*, March 2002, p. 15.

Manila, was simultaneously head of the South Sulawesi branch of KOMPAK and of Laskar Jundullah, one of the prominent militias in the Poso conflict. In an interview shortly before his March 2002 arrest, he was asked about KOMPAK funding and replied:

As far as I know, KOMPAK has always been fully transparent, and at any time, one can know how much funding it has received and from what sources. KOMPAK's sources are legal, from official institutions as well as individuals, both here and abroad. Within Indonesia, KOMPAK raises funds openly, the results of which are reported in the media, particularly Media Dakwah. In terms of funds raised abroad, KOMPAK has been able to work with popular international institutions such as Muslim Aid in London; al-Haramain in Saudi Arabia; the International Islamic Relief Organisation; and Mulhaqini, the religious attaché of the Saudi embassy in Jakarta.²⁵

B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MUJAHIDIN KOMPAK

KOMPAK's ideological lineage and funding made it a logical host for Muslims who sought to go to the defence of their brethren in Ambon and needed contacts and logistical support. Arismunandar was the driving force behind the creation of Mujahidin KOMPAK, an organisation for "freelance" mujahidin from all over Indonesia, although most recruits were from Java and Sulawesi.

But he was reportedly strongly supported in this initiative by other JI members unhappy with the ponderous response of Mantiqi II, including Jibril, an Afghanistan veteran (not to be confused with Abu Jibril, now detained in Malaysia), and Farihin alias Ibnu.²⁶ Both went to Ambon without institutional sanction before JI decided to send forces.

The immediate result of the June 1999 decision was that Zulkarnaen, Abdul Ghoni alias Sawad alias Umar Wayan, Dulmatin, and other Afghan veterans, all associated with Mantiqi I, set up a three-month

camp on Buru Island in the Moluccas to train Mujahidin KOMPAK and local fighters in basic military skills and religion.²⁷

Throughout the conflict, JI may never have had more than twenty people in Ambon at one time, unlike Laskar Jihad, which at its height had upwards of 3,000.²⁸ But JI's impact was far greater than its numbers would suggest, in part because of its links to Mujahidin KOMPAK and other groups that provided the foot soldiers. In this way, Mujahidin KOMPAK became a non-JI vehicle for achieving JI ends.

The most important of those ends, from JI's point of view, was to defend local Muslims in a way that would increase the capacity of mujahidin forces to take on larger enemies and pave the way for the eventual establishment of an Islamic state. Ambon was a training ground for a much larger enterprise.

One Darul Islam fighter who joined JI training told ICG:

When we were in Maluku we were exposed to the teachings of Abdullah Azzam who wrote, "*Tarbiyah terbaik adalah waktu jihad*" (The best education is at the time of jihad). Afghan and Moro alumni came to help in the training and religious instruction of the next generation of mujahidin, and fighters from the Arab world, Spain and Kuwait came to join the battles.²⁹

The Darul Islam connection in Ambon is interesting, because it is evidence that whatever the wounds left by Abdullah Sungkar's split with the DI leadership in 1992, they had healed enough seven years later to permit close DI-JI cooperation in Ambon and later in Poso.

The DI contingent, mostly from Java and Sumatra, included men who had been trained in Mindanao, not in JI's Camp Hudaibiyah, but in completely separate camps. There were a few dozen in Ambon at any one time, and while they lived separately from JI, they often fought together. Like JI, they also relied on Haris Fadillah alias Abu Dzar, better known as Omar

²⁵ "Agus Dwikarna: KOMPAK Selalu Transparan", *Media Dakwah*, February 2002, p. 11.

²⁶ Farihin was arrested in October 2002 for smuggling ammunition into Poso and is currently detained in Palu, Central Sulawesi.

²⁷ ICG interviews, November 2003. The Buru camp is mentioned in passing in Ken Conboy, *Intel*, op.cit, p. 237. Conboy says that Buru camp and another on Ceram were financed by Omar al-Faruq and a Saudi national named Rashid, apparently through the al-Haramain Foundation.

²⁸ ICG interview, November 2003.

²⁹ ICG interview with Darul Islam member, November 2003.

al-Faruq's father-in-law, for arms.³⁰ He was also reportedly the coordinator and strategist for battles fought by combined mujahidin forces. One Ambon veteran said:

It wasn't all that clear to us whether Abu Dzar was DI and JI both or a DI who also helped JI. What we knew was that the key mujahid from outside Ambon was Abu Dzar.³¹

In earlier reports, ICG described Abu Dzar as the commander of Laskar Mujahidin (mujahidin militia), which is indeed how some Mujahidin KOMPAK detainees have referred to him. However, the term "Laskar Mujahidin" refers not to a specific organisation but to a coalition of ideologically like-minded forces that probably included a few JI and DI, Mujahidin KOMPAK, and some local groups – but not Laskar Jihad.

The main ideological difference between the much more numerous Laskar Jihad forces and those allied with JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK was that the latter never recognised the Indonesian state as legitimate. Laskar Jihad, by contrast, saw the purpose of jihad, particularly in Maluku, as defending that state against Christian separatists. As early as 1997, Jafar Umar Thalib, head of Laskar Jihad, had made clear his disagreements with Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir. But despite the differences at the top, Laskar Mujahidin welcomed the arrival in Ambon in April 2000 of Laskar Jihad, on the theory the more Muslims, the better. One former mujahid said that when friends asked him in mid-2000 how they could help in Ambon, he encouraged them to make donations (*infaq*) to Laskar Jihad.

A brief period of joint operations in Maluku in 2000 included the 21 June attack on the mobile police brigade (Brimob) complex in Tantui that resulted in two warehouses' worth of arms falling into the hands of the attackers; the attack on Christian villages in Kairatu subdistrict, Ceram Island on 14 October; and the battle of Sirisori, Saparua Island on 26 October in which Abu Dzar was killed. Some of the videos produced by KOMPAK for indoctrination

and fund-raising during this period were also joint projects with Laskar Jihad.

But the relationship soon soured, and by early 2001, it was actively hostile. For one thing, Laskar Mujahidin's guerrilla-style hit-and-run attacks were often blamed on the much more visible Laskar Jihad, in some cases leading to wrongful arrests by police or misdirected retaliation by Christian forces. Laskar Jihad also began to refer publicly to Laskar Mujahidin as *khawarij*, by which they meant religious deviants who rebelled against established authority.³² To make it even more pejorative, they called Laskar Mujahidin "KGB" an obvious play on the initials for the Soviet spy organisation but in this case meaning *Khawarij Gaya Baru* (New Style Khawarij).

In a speech in Ambon, according to a mujahid who was present, Jafar Umar Thalib told his followers that once the secessionist Republic of the South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan or RMS) movement was destroyed, Laskar Mujahidin would be next.³³ He singled out Abu Jibril by name, a JI member who travelled back and forth repeatedly between Malaysia and Ambon and whom Laskar Jihad saw as a senior mujahidin leader.³⁴ As he said "Abu Jibril", he reportedly drew a finger across his throat to illustrate his likely fate.³⁵

An article on the now defunct Laskar Jihad website in April 2001 about four Laskar Mujahidin who were killed making a bomb refers to "Laskar Mujahidin (another name for NII/Negara Islam Indonesia, the Islamic State of Indonesia), which has attached itself to KOMPAK." It goes on to say:

³² The *khawarij* were a radical, puritanical sect, active beginning in the seventh century, that rejected any man-made law and rebelled against (and killed) Ali, the prophet Mohammed's son-in-law and fourth caliph. To strict salafi adherents, the term "khawarij" is a damning epithet, since it evokes comparisons to men who broke with the Prophet's practices and murdered some of his companions. Jafar Umar Thalib used the same term to refer to Osama bin-Laden and al-Qaeda after 11 September 2001.

³³ ICG interview, January 2004.

³⁴ Fihiruddin alias Moh. Iqbal alias Abu Jibril, a native of Lombok in eastern Indonesia, was detained under the Internal Security Act in Malaysia in June 2001, released into Malaysian immigration detention two years later, and nearly deported to Indonesia in December 2003. At the last minute, Malaysian authorities extended his detention and as of this writing he remains in Malaysian custody.

³⁵ ICG interview, January 2004.

³⁰ One source claims that Haris Fadillah had been an officially licensed arms dealer since 1997-1998 and had colour brochures on European standard weapons for his clients to review. See "Masa Depan Indonesia Baru dan Gerakan Islam", undated political tract, probably written in 2003. ICG could not verify the allegation.

³¹ ICG interview with Darul Islam member, November 2003.

As is well known, NII is a group that tried to conduct a rebellion against the legal government of the Republic of Indonesia during the New Order. Their coming to Ambon, they say, was motivated by their desire to help the Muslims of Ambon. But as long as they have been in Ambon, the Laskar Mujahidin movement has operated secretly, so that people do not know exactly what it is. Maybe this is because they only have about 50 people. In fact, in some places, Laskar Mujahidin tries to pass itself off as Laskar Jihad Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah. Indeed in the [bombing] accident described above, people in Ambon thought at first that victims were Laskar Jihad because they looked just like them.³⁶

In early September 2001, a fight broke out between Laskar Jihad and KOMPAK members at a mosque in the Muslim area of Kebon Cengkeh, Ambon, with the former calling the latter “traitors” and then trying to attack a Laskar Mujahidin command post. At a forum held to attempt a reconciliation among all concerned, Laskar Jihad accused KOMPAK members and other mujahidin of making death threats against its members and against Jafar Umar Thalib. The mujahidin present demanded that Laskar Jihad produce witnesses and told Laskar Jihad not to confuse them with KOMPAK. The KOMPAK members said they had no structural links to the mujahidin but only cooperated with them in Islamic outreach activities and humanitarian relief.³⁷ There was no reconciliation.

III. THE MOVE INTO POSO

When Phase III of the Poso conflict broke out in May 2000, JI reacted much faster but as in Ambon, the focus was less on sending many of its own members than on training local mujahidin. It was in the course of that training that some JI leaders decided Poso was particularly appropriate for strengthening JI’s mass base through *dakwah* (proselytisation) and expanding an Islamic community committed to both strict interpretation of Islamic law and jihad.

But JI’s internal rifts resurfaced, with mainstream leaders insisting that local recruits be properly indoctrinated through religious instruction before being sent to fight, and a few renegades becoming impatient with prolonged training and turning to Mujahidin KOMPAK to provide immediate action.

A. THE INITIAL STEPS

Poso fell within the jurisdiction of JI’s Mantiqi III, led until April 2001 by Mustofa, one of the organisation’s most experienced leaders, who divided his time between Manado and Kudus, in Central Java.³⁸ Mantiqi III already had several members in Palu, the provincial capital of Central Sulawesi, though not yet in Poso, and better local contacts than in Ambon. It also had longstanding relations with jihadist groups in Makassar, South Sulawesi, some of whose members had trained under JI instructors in Afghanistan, Mindanao, and Ambon, and many of whom were familiar with the situation in Poso.³⁹

All this facilitated a relatively speedy response. KOMPAK moved first and in mid-June, already had people on the ground helping with the evacuation of bodies and documenting everything with video cameras. In the initial stage of emergency response, it worked closely with the community assistance post (Pos Keadilan Peduli Umat or PKPU) of Partai Keadilan, a Muslim political party.

Shortly thereafter, the JI central command sent Achmad Roihan alias Saad to Poso to meet with Haji Adnan Arsal, a local Muslim leader known for his militancy. Roihan, reportedly without revealing

³⁶ “Empat Anggota KOMPAK Tewas Saat Merakit Bom”, www.laskarjihad.or.id, 25 April 2001.

³⁷ “Penyerangan Laskar Jihad Kepada Mujahidin”, *Kronologis Kejadian*, September 2001.

³⁸ He was arrested in July 2003 in Semarang, Central Java.

³⁹ For information on the Makassar connections, see ICG Report, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia*, op. cit., pp. 19-22.

that he was from JI, asked whether Aرسال needed preachers or fighters, and Aرسال told him both. He apparently expected mujahidin to arrive by the hundreds and was palpably disappointed when JI delivered less than ten.⁴⁰

They were top-notch trainers, however, and included two prominent alumni of Afghanistan: Adi Suryana alias Mohamed Qital from East Java, arrested in January 2004, and Ichsan Miarso, arrested in September 2003 and believed to be head of the JI *wakalah* in Solo.⁴¹

Their mission was to set up training to turn what one source referred to as “situational mujahidin” or fighters by force of circumstance, to “educated mujahidin” (*mujahidin tertarbiyah*), who truly understood the religious basis for jihad and had the military skills to wage it. JI wanted to ensure that there would be no long-term dependence on outside fighters, and that if mujahidin from Java or Sumatra were expelled or called back, a core of well-trained local men could carry on.⁴²

Another top JI member, Farihin alias Ibnu, arrived in Poso in August 2000 as head of a team that also included Ali Fauzi (Amrozi’s brother) and three Mujahidin KOMPAK members who were veterans of the Maluku fighting. Their mission was to distribute KOMPAK aid and recruit mujahidin.⁴³

⁴⁰ ICG interviews, November 2003.

⁴¹ Ichsan was the head of al-Alaqa publishing house, near Pondok Ngruki, that published JI training materials as well as jihadist literature such as the complete works of Abdullah Azzam, al-Qaeda’s chief ideologue.

⁴² ICG interviews, September 2003.

⁴³ Sometime after the first JI training had been completed in late 2000, three more top JI people arrived: Bambang Setiono alias Saiful Suroso, arrested in December 2002 in connection with sheltering Mukhlas and his family after the Bali bombs; and Eko, a Javanese from Solo, suspected of hiding three sacks of explosives and 2,645 bullets that were found by police in September 2003. Herlambang alias Tholhah, a Mindanao alumnus also arrested in connection with sheltering some of the fugitives in the Bali bombs, was also in this group. In addition, in November 2000, five JI members arrived from Malaysia, including Zulkifli alias Musa bin Abdul Hir. Zulkifli who is a senior JI leader from Mantiqi I and the alleged head of the radical mujahidin group in Malaysia, the KMM; he is also the older brother of the man convicted of the Atrium Mall bombing in Jakarta in August 2001. The Malaysians brought some cash to Farihin, stayed a week, and returned. See testimony of Farihin Ibnu Ahmad alias Yasir, 4 November 2002, in dossier of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir No:BP/01/I/2003/Dit-1.

But both JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK faced several problems. One was that most of the initial group of young men recruited for training with the help of local Muslim leaders turned out to be *preman* (thugs), many of them heavily tattooed and more at home going on drinking binges than studying Islam. Those most eager to sign up as mujahidin were youths whose families had been directly affected but who also had a history of violence – thus, the preponderance of young gang members. One thug-turned-mujahid said that in an earlier phase of the Poso conflict, when he and his friends had conducted raids on places selling alcoholic beverages, they saved the alcohol they looted to drink it at a post-Ramadan party. They swore off liquor only after their participation in JI-led training.⁴⁴

The teams had focused their recruitment efforts on Palu, the provincial capital, and other areas to which Muslims had fled. Farihin, for example, spent a month at the Pesantren Hidayatullah in Tondo, on the outskirts of Palu, which had taken in many students from the Poso branch of the same *pesantren* network who had been displaced by the conflict.⁴⁵ The *pesantren* obtained a local residence/identity card for him; an employee said he just included Farihin’s name when the *pesantren* applied for cards for the school staff.⁴⁶

The approaches of JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK were very different. JI trainers insisted on a full month of religious indoctrination before a second month of military training, followed by further religious preparation through smaller *halaqah* study sessions.⁴⁷ They had an initial class of 45, but some students did not take kindly to the lengthy preparation. One source described the general attitude as “Enough Quran reading, when’s the war?”⁴⁸

⁴⁴ ICG interview, September 2003. The source also said that the Tanah Runtuh area of Poso, now a stronghold of Muslim militants, used to be known as a gathering place of thieves and gang members.

⁴⁵ The Hidayatullah network has 127 *pesantrens* across Indonesia; several of its schools in Sulawesi and Kalimantan have housed JI suspects at different times.

⁴⁶ Testimony of Mohammad Arasy in dossier of Farihin Ibnu Ahmad alias Yasir, N°Pol: BP/46/XII/2002/Ditserse, 20 December 2002.

⁴⁷ For more on the *halaqah*, see ICG Report, *Indonesia Backgrounder: How the Jemaah Islamiyah Terrorist Network Operates*, op. cit.

⁴⁸ ICG interviews, Palu, November 2003.

The Mujahidin KOMPAK program, which as in Ambon was backed by funding from Arismunandar of KOMPAK-Solo, proved much more popular. It was shorter than the JI course, three weeks to a month, and much more focused on military training. Also, the graduates were sent straight into action in what one source called a “learning by doing” approach.

Shortly after the first Mujahidin KOMPAK recruits “graduated”, they attacked Christians in Sepe village on 23 December 2000 – just as JI was finalising plans for the Christmas Eve bombings. Farihin, who had apparently been instrumental in the planning, was arrested, tried, and convicted. He spent the next year in Palu prison under minimum-security conditions and near the end of his term was allowed out during the day to give religious instruction to employees of Hotel Central in Palu. He was released on 16 December 2001.⁴⁹

In practice, Mujahidin KOMPAK in Poso ended up being the catch-all force that any mujahidin could join. It included young men from the Pesantren Hidayatullah network, particularly in Sulawesi and Kalimantan; from Darul Islam offshoots; and from other *pesantrens* across Java. It also incorporated some smaller local groups in the Poso area, including from the Kayamanya, Gebang Rejo, and Monginsidi neighbourhoods.

Not surprisingly, tensions ran high between JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK, with JI believing that Mujahidin KOMPAK was undercutting its work and stealing its recruits, which was particularly galling when senior JI members were involved. Both groups also had to work with local leaders who aided or impeded their efforts according to where their own sympathies lay.

The most important of these were Adnan Arsal and Srie Handono Mashudi alias Abu Hakam, an engineer and civil servant in Palu. Adnan Arsal was probably the most influential at recruiting local fighters. He worked in the Poso district office of the ministry of religion, had his own *pesantren* (Pesantren Amanah in Poso), held a senior position

in the local office of the Indonesian Religious Scholars Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), and headed a religious endowment foundation called Yayasan Badan Wakaf Ulil Albab that raised funds across Indonesia for the Muslims in Poso.⁵⁰ Adnan Arsal also appears to have used some of his recruits to crack down on alcohol consumption, conduct “sweepings” (searches in public places) of women not wearing headscarves, and root out places of vice in Poso.

Srie Handono alias Abu Hakam was born in Blora, East Java, in 1959 and worked in Palu as a civil servant in the provincial office of the Ministry of Settlements. He received an engineering degree from Brawijaya University in Malang in 1985 and a master’s degree in Sydney, Australia in 1992. He was closely associated with Pesantren Walisongo, the site of the May 2000 massacre, and later served as chair of its development committee.⁵¹ Abu Hakam, who apparently did some work in Palu for the charity KOMPAK, became a key figure in the local development of Mujahidin KOMPAK.

B. FUNDING DISPUTES

KOMPAK-Solo undertook to raise funds for both JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK, on the understanding that all contributions would be divided equally, but money inevitably became a source of friction, not only between the two organisations but between individuals within those organisations and some of their local allies.

One problem arose in connection with a major fund-raising effort for Poso that took place through the efforts of Ustadz Mohamad Yunus, a teacher at Pesantren Istiqomah in Sempaga, Samarinda, East Kalimantan. Yunus, who was sentenced in October 2003 to four years in prison for hiding Ali Imron and Mubarak alias Utomo after the Bali bombs, turns out to have been a key figure in the JI network in East Kalimantan, and he reportedly

⁴⁹ Dossier of Farihin Ibnu Ahmad alias Yasir, op. cit. The local police almost certainly had no idea of the background or importance of the prisoner; it would be interesting in light of what we now know to find Farihin’s original interrogation deposition following the December 2000 arrest and see what kind of questions the police asked him.

⁵⁰ One way of raising funds was through the Internet. An appeal appeared on a chat group called Isnet Budi Luhur from a user who suggested that Indonesians should be more concerned about problems in their own back yard than in Palestine, and gave the bank account number for Badan Wakaf Ulil Albab and Arsal’s telephone numbers. See <http://groups.yahoo.com/group/isnet-bl/message/3026>.

⁵¹ Biographical details from Srie Handono’s interrogation deposition 21 October 2002, in dossier of Farihin Ibnu Ahmad alias Yasir, op. cit.

mobilised employees of oil companies there to make substantial contributions to the war effort.

All funds raised were to be channelled through Arismunandar, in consultation with local Muslim leaders. The employees of the oil companies wanted to be sure that their donations were well spent, however, so they designated one of their own, Ahmad [not his real name] to act as auditor and work alongside Arismunandar and KOMPAK.

Until Ahmad arrived, the transfer of funds from KOMPAK to JI had gone smoothly. Afterwards, anything that was sent to JI through KOMPAK from East Kalimantan had to be cleared with Ahmad. Since much of the funding went for jihad operations or to buy arms, and the accounting was less than top-notch, Ahmad raised questions. He apparently had had little contact with JI leaders before his designation as auditor, did not appreciate their standing, and annoyed them by his bureaucratic demands. For his part, Mustofa, as head of Mantiqi III, was irritated by KOMPAK's sudden and inexplicable interest in accountability. When Arismunandar, at Ahmed's behest, questioned one request from Mustofa for Rp.40 million, Mustofa exploded, and relations between JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK deteriorated.

Before the explosion JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK had freely borrowed weapons from each other, but a strict procedure was now put in place requiring that the top commander of the organisation lending the weapon had to receive a formal request from his counterpart in the borrowing group.⁵²

It is worth recalling how much JI activity was going on at once in late 2000. In five months, August to December, the following had taken place:

- the bombing attack at the Philippine ambassador's residence in Jakarta (August);
- training and jihad activities in Maluku and Mindanao;
- the establishment, under Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's leadership, of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (August), with resulting problems for the JI leadership;
- training arranged by Hambali in Afghanistan for five people including Thoriquddin alias Abu

Rusydan (presently on trial in Jakarta) and Dr. Azhari, (wanted in connection with the Bali and Marriott bombings);

- JI and MK's arrival in Poso for jihad;
- The visit (October) to Poso of Parlindungan Siregar and the head of an al-Qaeda cell in Spain (see below);
- The Christmas Eve bombings across Indonesia;
- The 30 December Rizal Day bombings in Manila in which Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi was directly involved; and
- JI's steady expansion across Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

The sheer variety of activities suggests a large and well-financed organisation, but it was one to which most Indonesian authorities, and virtually all Indonesia watchers, were completely oblivious.

⁵² ICG interview, November 2003.

IV. POSO IN 2001

The already complex picture of JI, Mujahidin KOMPAK and their local partners became much more complicated in late 2000 and 2001. The militias from outside the Poso-Palu area that were on the ground there by late 2001 included:

- Jemaah Islamiyah;
- Mujahidin KOMPAK;
- Laskar Jundullah, led by Agus Dwikarna and with local headquarters in Pendolo, Pamona Selatan;
- Laskar Wahdah Islamiyah, a Makassar-based group affiliated to Wahdah Islamiyah and led by Zaitun Rusmin;⁵³
- Laskar Bulan Sabit Merah (Red Crescent Militia), led by a Darul Islam figure from West Java and which worked closely with Laskar Jundullah;
- Laskar Jihad, led locally by Mohamed Harits and Abu Ibrahim, and sent to Poso around July 2001; and
- Laskar Khalid bin Walid, a tiny militia associated with Partai Keadilan.

The local groups involved on the Muslim side included:

- Forum Perjuangan Ummat Islam, led by Adnan Aرسال and from which many local Laskar Jundullah members were recruited;⁵⁴
- Majelis Dzikir Nurkhaerat Poso, led by Habib Saleh al-Idrus;
- Gerakan Anak Monginsidi, led by Mohammed Dong;⁵⁵
- Anak Tanah Runtuh, a small militia led by Adnan Aرسال and based in the Gebang Rejo neighborhood of Poso city; and

⁵³ Agus Dwikarna had been a member of Wahdah Islamiyah but split off after differences with Zaitun Rusmin over whether or not to wage jihad in Ambon.

⁵⁴ Arianto Sangaji, *Rumput Kering di Balik Anyir Darah: Konteks dan dinamika tragedy kemanusiaan Poso*, Palu, October 2003.

⁵⁵ Gerakan Anak Monginsidi translates as Movement of Monginsidi Youth. Most of the members were part of a gang that operated around Monginsidi Street in Poso.

- Brigade Pemuda Hisbullah Sulteng, a small force linked to the local office of Partai Bintang.

Laskar Jundullah was formally set up in Makassar in September 2000 as the security force of the Committee to Prepare for the Upholding of Islamic Law (Komite Persiapan Penegakkan Syariat Islam, KPPSI), under the command of Agus Dwikarna. It quickly established branches across South and Central Sulawesi and began systematically recruiting people to fight in Poso, as well as engaging in more mundane activities such as attacking sellers of alcoholic drinks. A main donor and fund-raiser was Tamsil Linrung, national head of KOMPAK.⁵⁶

A. TRAINING CAMPS

Laskar Jundullah offered military training to its members, some fairly rudimentary, some more sophisticated. One man from Luwu, South Sulawesi, arrested in connection with the Makassar bombings of December 2002 testified that he had taken part in a three-day military training session in June 2001 in the forest outside Suli, a subdistrict of Luwu. He then was invited to join the jihad in Poso.⁵⁷ Another of the Makassar bombers testified that he had taken part in a one-month explosives training course in 2001 on the shores of Lake Towuti in the district of North Luwu.⁵⁸

More rigorous training was conducted at a camp set up in Pendolo in Pamona Selatan, on the shores of Lake Poso in 2001. Used by JI, Mujahidin KOMPAK, and Laskar Jundullah, it was designed to replicate the military academy at JI's Camp Hudaibiyah in Mindanao, but had shorter courses: three months for trainers, one month for recruits.

It is not clear whether the Pendolo camp was one of the three in Poso mentioned by men captured by Spanish authorities in 2001 and detained as al-Qaeda suspects. One suspect, Jusuf Galan, reportedly told

⁵⁶ Linrung's role is discussed in a March 2002 assessment by an Indonesian intelligence operative of the capacity of Laskar Jundullah, entitled "Laporan Telaan", a copy of which was obtained by ICG.

⁵⁷ Interrogation deposition of Arman alias Gala alias Galaxi bin H. Abd. Samad, 15 March 2003. Although Arman was from Luwu, he owned a plot of land in Pendolo, Pamona Selatan. A major training camp used by JI, Laskar Jundullah, and Laskar Mujahidin KOMPAK was set up in Pendolo.

⁵⁸ Interrogation deposition of Ilham Riadi, 15 January 2003.

police that he had received military training in a camp in the Poso area in July 2001. Agus Dwikarna's arrest in Manila in March 2002 led to press reports, based on Western and Philippines intelligence sources, that dozens of men from the Philippines and Malaysia and "scores from other parts of the world, including the Middle East, Europe and North Africa" trained in the jungles outside Poso city in late 2000. The report was treated with extreme scepticism within Indonesia, and local police at first denied there was any such camp. However, Hendropriyono, Indonesia's intelligence chief, said in December 2001 that he was told by the Spanish the camp was in Kapompa village, Tojo subdistrict, to the east of Poso, and suggested it was dismantled after 11 September 2001.⁵⁹

Later, videotapes seized at the Jakarta home of a freelance German-Egyptian photo-journalist, Reda Seyam, confirmed that a camp with some foreign instructors had been operating in Poso but it was not clear which camp the videotapes portrayed or how many foreigners had been involved.

A recent account of the Poso camp, based on Indonesian intelligence sources, notes that Parlindungan Siregar, an Indonesian with ties to the al-Qaeda cell in Spain, went to Poso in October 2000, about the same time that Mujahidin KOMPAK sent its first team there.⁶⁰ Siregar's contact was a local mujahid named Omar Bandon – another name, according to Poso sources, for Mohammed Dong, a key figure behind the October 2003 violence.⁶¹ In May 2001, according to this account, Siregar accompanied the head of the Spanish al-Qaeda cell, Imad Eddris Barakat Yarkas, to Poso. As a result of his visit, Yarkas agreed to arrange funding for an international training camp.⁶²

A video either made or edited by Reda Seyam shows a training camp with about twenty Indonesians running an obstacle course, learning how to move in the jungle at night, and crossing a rope bridge with their weapons (mostly sticks carved to look like rifles). The instructor is an Indonesian with a South Sulawesi accent. The end of the video shifts to a night ceremony where the instructor hands out real weapons to about 60 young men. It appears to be the prelude to an attack, also documented on the video, on the village of Tangkura, Poso Pesisir subdistrict, which was burned to the ground in late November 2001.

One of the attackers killed in Tangkura was Abdullah, a native of Dumai, Riau, who had been living in Kayamanya. His name appears in the dossiers of the men arrested in connection with a police raid on a JI weapons storehouse in Semarang in July 2003. When Mustofa, the former Mantiqi III leader who was one of those arrested, was asked where the money came from for the astonishing variety of guns, ammunition, and explosives found there, he replied that it came from donations (*kotak amal*, literally, charity box) to aid the humanitarian situation in Poso – and that Abdullah, who died in Poso at the end of 2001, had delivered the money to Semarang.⁶³

The phrase *kotak amal* conjures up the image of people dropping coins in small wooden boxes, but in fact, it covers a much more systematic effort to raise funds, including through collections at mosque rallies organized for the purpose (sometimes coordinated across the country), and through opening bank accounts and then disseminating the account numbers through print and electronic media. Proof, through video documentation, of JI involvement in Poso facilitated fund-raising abroad. It is likely that some weapons purchased or otherwise obtained for use in Poso remain available for future use.

B. THE INDONESIAN RED CRESCENT

A particularly interesting group that joined forces with Mujahidin KOMPAK in Poso and is still there is Laskar Bulan Sabit Merah Indonesia, the Indonesian Red Crescent militia. Although in many Muslim-majority countries, Red Crescents are the

⁵⁹ Coen Hussein Pontoh, "Dari Sintuwu Maroso ke Sintuwu Molonco", *Pantau*, March 2002.

⁶⁰ Ken Conboy, *Intel*, op.cit. pp. 224-225. Conboy gives no details about the specific location of the Poso camp. According to the coordinator of the Central Sulawesi Protestant Church's Crisis Center, Siregar had been active in the Salman mosque on the Bandung Institute of Technology's campus. He worked briefly at the airplane manufacturing company, ITPN, then went to Spain for graduate study. Rinaldy Damanik, *Tragedi Kemanusiaan Poso*, Jakarta 2003, p. 118.

⁶¹ ICG interviews, November 2003. Omar Bandon's nickname was said to have been "Madon". Damanik, op.cit, p. 118. ICG was not able to verify that Bandon and Dong are in fact the same person.

⁶² Ken Conboy, *Intel*, op.cit. pp. 224-225.

⁶³ Testimony of Imron alias Mustofa alias Pranata Yudha, 9 September 2003 in dossier of Siswanto alias Antok bin Supeno, N°Pol. BP/221/IX/2003/Reskrim. He also said that all the weaponry belonged to the people of Poso and Ambon because it was paid for with money collected on their behalf.

equivalent of national Red Crosses and linked to the international network of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Bulan Sabit Merah is not. It is a private organisation believed to be connected with a West Java-based faction of Darul Islam led by Tahmid Kartosoewirjo, son of Darul Islam's founder.

Bulan Sabit Merah is based in Banten and seems to be synonymous with "Kelompok Banten", the Banten group that has worked in the past with JI.⁶⁴ It had particularly close ties to convicted Bali bomber Imam Samudra (who comes from the Banten area), convicted Atrium Mall bomber Edy Setiono alias Usman, and the Malaysian JI member Zulkifli bin Hir, who remains at large. A military training camp discovered in Saketi subdistrict, Pandeglang, Banten in September 2001, just after JI's bombing of the Atrium Mall in Jakarta, was in fact run by the Banten group, even though some of the instructors were JI.

The organisation sent dozens of men for training to Mindanao, often under JI instructors, and took part in the fighting in both Maluku and Poso, where it worked very closely with Laskar Jundullah as well as Mujahidin KOMPAK. Like the latter, Bulan Sabit Merah functioned almost as a labour recruiting agency for mujahidin (in this case almost exclusively from West Java) who wished to join the war in Poso.

Bulan Sabit Merah set up a militia (*laskar*), in Poso, and it was members of that body who were reportedly responsible for the shooting of Lorenzo Taddei, an Italian tourist, in August 2002. In that much-publicised incident, Taddei had been with his girlfriend on a bus going from Toraja, in South Sulawesi, to Palu. Gunmen fired on the bus in Mayoa, Pendolo, Pamona Selatan, killing Taddei and wounding four other passengers. Sources in Poso told ICG that Bulan Sabit Merah members had been following Taddei, since he and his partner had made several trips into a protected forest area in Mayoa where about 200 Torajan families lived. The trips convinced the militia members that Taddei was a spy for the Christians.⁶⁵

Bulan Sabit Merah operates openly as a humanitarian organisation and maintains offices in Banten, Makassar, and Poso, and possibly elsewhere in Indonesia. Like Wahdah Islamiyah in Makassar,⁶⁶ it

is an interesting example of an organisation which has an ideology very similar to JI's, cooperates closely with JI, but does its own recruiting, training, and fund-raising. If JI were to disappear as an organisation tomorrow, there would still be groups like Bulan Sabit Merah with a commitment to jihad as armed struggle and the potential to wreak havoc, although on a much smaller scale than JI.

C. THE BUYUNG KATEDO KILLINGS AND THE ARRIVAL OF LASKAR JIHAD

From late July 2000, when the alleged leader of the Christian group responsible for the Walisongo massacre was arrested (a Catholic immigrant from Flores named Fabianus Tibo), until June 2001, the violence in Poso declined somewhat, aided by significant reinforcements from the police and military. Elements of both had been involved in the earlier violence, through direct action, such as supplying ammunition, as well as what many believed to be deliberate inaction.⁶⁷ But the reinforcements seemed to prevent clashes on the scale of May-June 2000, although the death toll steadily climbed.

June 2001 saw an upsurge in violence, with victims on both sides, some killed by security forces opening fire on angry mobs. On the night of 3-4 July, assailants burned or hacked to death fourteen Muslims, mostly women and children, in the hamlet of Buyung Katedo in Sepe village. They were never caught.

KOMPAK was on the scene immediately, taking video footage of the bodies and burials that was soon turned into a compact disc entitled "The Tragedy of Bloody Poso" ("*Tragedi Poso Berdarah*"). Like similar VCDs produced on Ambon, it became a recruiting and fund-raising tool. It shows Muslim protesters holding a poster demanding that two men

⁶⁴ See ICG Report, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia*, op. cit.

⁶⁵ ICG interview, November 2003.

⁶⁶ On Wahdah Islamiyah, see ICG Report, *Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia*, op. cit.

⁶⁷ Human Rights Watch, "Breakdown: Four Years of Communal Violence in Central Sulawesi", Vol.14, N°9C, December 2002. Both Christians and Muslims alleged that security forces aided the other. For example, see the 6 June 2000 report of the Crisis Center of the Central Sulawesi Protestant Church, to which was appended the handwritten admission of a police sergeant from Tojo subdistrict that he had gone to Palu to pick up bullets supplied by the police command in Donggala. The sergeant in question was later forced to leave the police. See also George Junus Aditjondro, "Kerusuhan Poso Dan Morowali, Akar Permasalahan Dan Jalan Keluarnya", for a seminar on "Application of Military Emergencies in Aceh, Papua and Poso?" conducted by ProPatria, Jakarta, 7 January 2004.

be captured dead or alive for their role in the massacre. But many in Poso believed, without strong substantiating evidence to ICG's knowledge, that military elements were involved.

The Buyung Katedo killings led to the arrival in Poso of Laskar Jihad, first a reconnaissance mission in July, then between 100 and 150 fighters. As in Ambon, the government made no move to prevent their deployment – indeed, actively supported their arrival – and attacks on Christian villages increased.⁶⁸ Unlike JI, Laskar Jihad sought a high profile, and meticulously recorded its version of events on its website as well as in a locally circulated news bulletin, *Berita Laskar Jihad*. Its self-promotion, in contrast to JI's secrecy, may be one reason that many observers both inside and outside Indonesia saw Laskar Jihad as the primary outside party involved in the conflict.

From the moment Laskar Jihad arrived, they were on a collision course with the loose coalition of JI, Mujahidin KOMPAK, and Laskar Jundullah, although some local Muslim leaders managed to work with both camps. The hostility peaked in what amounted to a pitched battle in September 2001 in Kayamanya, Poso city, with several dozen fighters on each side. The fight started when Laskar Jihad tried to set up command posts (*posko*) in the neighbourhood and Mujahidin KOMPAK, backed by local groups, objected. Mujahidin KOMPAK members reportedly got out their weapons and began firing into the air, but no one was actually shot.

Mujahidin KOMPAK referred to Laskar Jihad contemptuously as “Mujahidin Pilox” (“spray paint warriors”) because they always made up the rear of attacking forces but carried cans of spray paint with which to write “Laskar Jihad Poso” on the ruins of buildings, as if to claim credit for the destruction.⁶⁹

V. THE MALINO ACCORD

It was in this highly complex environment and amid ongoing violence in late 2001 that the Megawati government decided to intervene in Poso. Dr. Farid Husain, deputy to Jusuf Kalla, the Coordinating Minister for People's Welfare, met separately and confidentially with three Muslim leaders (Adnan Arsal, Haji Hasanuddin, and a man named Abdul Wahid Lamidji) and two Christians (Rev. J. Santo and Rev. Rinaldy Damanik) in Makassar in November 2001.⁷⁰ All were asked to invite persons they felt represented their religious communities to participate in negotiations in Malino. Adnan Arsal initially rejected the idea but was persuaded by government negotiators and some of his JI associates to take part.

JI as an organisation had few reservations about Malino. While there were those who wanted to continue the jihad, many had begun to see Poso as fertile ground for the kind of intensive proselytisation (*dakwah*) that could expand the community prepared to live by *salafi* principles.⁷¹ Local people appeared to be receptive to JI preaching, and JI leaders in Poso had decided they could operate freely because local authorities appeared to have no control over the Muslim organisations.⁷² They also saw community leaders as sharing a commitment to Islamic law and believed a period of peace could transform Poso into a place where that law could be applied. At the very least, Poso could become what JI called a secure base (*qoidah aminah*), a refuge much like that which Medina became for the Prophet.⁷³

⁷⁰ *Suara dari Poso: Kerusuhan, Konflik, dan Resolusi*. Jakarta: YAPPIKA, 2003, p. 71 and ICG interview, Palu, 3 November 2003. Haji Hasanuddin was the treasurer of the Central Sulawesi office of Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, the parent body of KOMPAK.

⁷¹ The term *salafi* refers to those who wish to return to the Islam as practiced by the Prophet Mohammed and his Companions but also connotes an “ultraconservative, rigid, and exclusivist worldview”. See John L. Esposito, *Unholy War* (New York, 2002), p. 106.

⁷² An anthropologist who has worked in the area suggested to ICG that those most receptive were more likely to be relative newcomers to the area, such as Bugis immigrants, rather than the indigenous Muslim population. It is not clear that JI made the distinction.

⁷³ ICG interview, Bali, January 2004. Sources said that some JI leaders also see North Maluku in this light.

⁶⁸ Lorraine Aragon, “Communal Violence in Poso, Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish Eat People”, *Indonesia* 72, October 2001. For a good account of the effect Laskar Jihad had on the conflict, see Human Rights Watch, “Breakdown”, op. cit., pp. 23-29.

⁶⁹ ICG interview, January 2004.

The pro-negotiation side won, and Aرسال and Srie Handono became two of 25 signatories on the Muslim side.

The Indonesian government had made a serious effort to get to the table those who were actually in command of militias or were otherwise parties to the conflict, and several such people were indeed represented. But some NGOs and community leaders in Poso were critical of the Muslim side, saying that with the exception of Aرسال, most signatories lived and worked in Palu and were not representative of the Poso Muslims who lived and worked in the area where the conflict was actually being fought. They may not have realised how important some of the Palu-based signers like Srie Handono were in providing financial and logistical support for the jihadists.

The Christian side, which had been urging such negotiations for some time, had a more bottom-up approach. In a forum in Tentena, members of the public representing villages and subdistricts were asked to choose delegates to the peace process and suggest agenda items. Those chosen met twice as a group before their first session with government officials.

On 5 December 2001 the Muslim and Christian delegations met separately in Makassar, each unaware of the other's presence.

Agus Dwikarna led the Muslim meeting at the Hotel Sahid that included the official delegation, plus other leaders, totalling some 50 in all.⁷⁴ (He was not among the final signers, but he noted that he received a letter of appreciation for his efforts from Jusuf Kalla.)⁷⁵ It was reportedly a heated debate. Some delegates said they were being forced to participate, others threatened to leave. As the meeting went on into the night, Dr. Sulaeman Mamar, a respected intellectual and an official delegate, suggested that it focus on the most important items that must be communicated to the Christian delegation. The result was the Joint Statement of the Muslims of Poso in Malino (*Permufakatan Muslim Poso di Malino*).⁷⁶ It included the following points:

1. Stop all forms of provocation and attacks on the Muslim community that result in death, property damage, and displacement.
2. Accept the presence of security forces stationed to create a more secure situation.
3. Respect the supremacy of the law.
4. End all intervention from foreign parties.
5. Reject civil emergency and other repressive responses to conflict.
6. The GKST Synod and the Crisis Center [the two most active Christian institutions] must immediately stop all forms of propaganda and misrepresentation of data regarding Muslims.
7. Restore all rights of Muslims.
8. Indonesians have the right to live anywhere within the country, including Poso.
9. If these points are violated, then the Muslim community is prepared for jihad.

Most of these points were incorporated into the final Malino declaration. The main differences were in the removal of reference to the GKST Synod and Crisis Center and of the final point justifying jihad. Point 8 on the right of all Indonesians to live anywhere within the country, including Poso, was included in the final declaration, but with a slight change to read, "The Poso area is an integral part of the Republic of Indonesia. Therefore, every citizen has the right to live there, to immigrate there and live in peace, respecting local customs". It thus accommodated Muslim interests by recognizing the rights of Muslim migrants to live and work in Poso, but while also addressing the concerns of the indigenous Christian community, who believed they were being displaced culturally, economically, and even physically, by Muslim migrants.

Some senior JI leaders were pleased with the outcome, reportedly seeing the final declaration as the product of successful Muslim diplomacy, since all their major points were incorporated.⁷⁷ But many local militias, including those associated with Mujahidin KOMPAK, were deeply unhappy. Their key demands had been for investigation and prosecution of the killings of Muslims in May-June 2000 and the arrest of sixteen men they believed

⁷⁴ *Suara dari Poso*, op. cit., p. 74.

⁷⁵ "Agus Dwikarna: KOMPAK Selalu Transparen", *Media Dakwah*, February 2002, p. 11.

⁷⁶ *Suara dari Poso*, op.cit. p. 75.

⁷⁷ ICG interviews, November 2003.

responsible, in addition to the handful in custody.⁷⁸ Many of the discontented, including several of the men arrested in connection with the October 2003 violence, had friends or relatives who were among the victims, and they believed that the Malino Accord simply papered over a massive injustice.

Some of the Javanese members of Mujahidin KOMPAK were also unhappy but for different reasons. They saw the agreement as government sabotage of the jihad effort more generally, at a time when some were convinced that the routing of Christians from Tentena was just a matter of time.⁷⁹

The government's failure to prosecute the sixteen alleged masterminds resurfaced as a grievance of those involved in the October 2003 attacks. Ironically, the names first emerged in a 25 March 2001 letter to the Palu district court written by Fabianus Tibo, the man arrested for masterminding the killings, who was subsequently sentenced to death, and two of his co-accused. In their own defence, the three urged the court to investigate and interrogate the sixteen, mostly retired army officers or civil servants, who they said, "knew about or were responsible for" the third wave of violence.⁸⁰ Militant Muslims believed Tibo was a field commander, not the mastermind. They seized on the sixteen names as proof of the guilt of those concerned and have been demanding their arrest ever since.

VI. VIOLENCE AFTER THE MALINO ACCORD

The combination of local unhappiness with the Malino Accord, presence of large numbers of mujahidin, and need for a refuge from government crackdowns elsewhere made the Poso-Palu area increasingly important in JI's calculations. While the leadership continued to see Poso as a place where support for Islamic law, and eventually an Islamic state, could be nurtured, it was also in its interests to have a low level of violence continue in order to keep the jihad spirit strong.

The violence after Malino differed from what preceded it. There were very few clashes between communities. Most attacks were reported as "mysterious shootings" and "bomb explosions", and officials frequently blamed them on "outside elements" that wanted to sabotage the peace process.⁸¹ The victims were overwhelmingly non-Muslim, but for the most part, the perpetrators remained officially unknown.

One exception was the bombing of four Protestant churches in Palu on 31 December 2001, less than two weeks after the agreement was signed.⁸² The alleged culprit, Jono Priyandi, better known as Jono Osama, who was caught within hours, was a signatory. He was quickly tried and served seven months in prison because explosives were found in his home that police linked to the church bombings.⁸³

But Jono may have been saving the explosives for other projects and preferred to accept responsibility for the December bombings rather than give a fuller explanation. By November 2002, he was going around Makassar with Agung Hamid, head of the

⁷⁸ The list of sixteen was widely circulated at the time and printed in the local media. It included Tungkunan, Limpadeli, Ladue, Erik Rombot, Theo Manjaya, Edy Bungkundapu, Yahya Patiro, Sigli HX, Obet Tampai, Rungadison, Yanis Simangunsong, Vence Angkoku, Angki Tungkunan, Heri Baribi, Sarjun ailas Gode, and Guntur Tarinje.

⁷⁹ ICG interviews, November 2003.

⁸⁰ Photocopy of handwritten letter to the council of judges of Palu district court, signed by Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus, and Marinus Riwu. All three were found guilty and sentenced to death in April 2001.

⁸¹ "Menko Kesra: Orang Luar Pelaku Peledakan Bom di Poso", *Republika*, 18 July 2002; "Petrus Beraksi di Poso, Dua Orang Tewas Ditembak", *Republika*, 22 July 2002; "Panas Poso, Merembet ke Morowali, Dandim Poso: Bukan Konflik Agama; Aparat Rampas Senjata Rakitan", *Fajar*, 20 August 2002; "Pelaku Pembantaian Poso Masih Misterius", *Koran Tempo*, 15 August 2002; "Perusuh Poso dari Kelompok Tak Dikenal", *Koran Tempo*, 4 October 2003; "Bukan Masalah Agama", *Radarsulteng*, 14 October 2003; "Mereka Tidak Mau Poso Aman", *Radarsulteng*, 17 October 2003.

⁸² The Church of Masehi Advent, Setiabudi Road; Indonesian Church for Jemaat Palu, Pattimura Street; Pentecostal Church on Thamrin Road; and the Church for Jemaat Gajah Mada on Gajah Mada Road.

⁸³ ICG interviews, November 2003.

Makassar branch of Laskar Jundullah, trying to raise capital for a project that became the Makassar bombings of December 2002.⁸⁴ Bombs went off on 5 December at an automobile showroom belonging to a company owned by Jusuf Kalla and at a McDonald's restaurant at a mall in Makassar. Three people were killed including a man believed to have been a suicide bomber. Jono was briefly detained.

For most of 2002, there were few arrests, and when there were, there was studious effort to portray the crime as devoid of communal elements. However, ICG found that Mujahidin KOMPAK was responsible for many, if not most, of the violent acts committed in the Poso area between the signing of the Malino declaration on 20 December 2001 and the Makassar bombing of 5 December 2002. The police seem to have identified the perpetrators in some cases, because they had 38 men on a wanted list, but it was only after the Bali bombings that they began to give serious attention to arrests. They may have been concerned that naming names or prosecuting would undermine the Malino Accord, but their failure to act only encouraged JI and its local allies. A full list of the post-Malino crimes and their perpetrators is at Appendix B.

A. JI EXPANDS IN THE PALU-POSO AREA

As national attention drifted away from Poso, even though attacks continued, JI moved to consolidate its structure. In April 2002, at an executive meeting in Puncak, the hilly resort area south of Jakarta, Nasir Abbas, brother-in-law of convicted Bali bomber Mukhlas, replaced Mustofa as head of Mantiqi III, while Mustofa was appointed to the central command (*markaziyah*) and put in charge of JI's special operations unit.⁸⁵

At the time, Mantiqi III had only two full-fledged *wakalah* with a combined membership of about 300. One was Wakalah Badar, headed by Nasir Abbas, which covered the so-called SALAT area: Sandakan, Labuan (both in Sabah, Malaysia), and Tarakan, East

Kalimantan. The other was Wakalah Hudaibiyah, covering Mindanao.

From 1997, until his appointment as head of Mantiqi III in April 2001, Nasir Abbas had been based in Sandakan. From there, he facilitated the movement of JI arms and recruits back and forth between Sulawesi and Mindanao.⁸⁶

Nasir Abbas continued to head Wakalah Badar even as he took on the leadership of Mantiqi III. At the same time, the activity in the Poso area after Malino led to the gradual formation of three new *wakalahs*:

- Wakalah Uhud, based in Palu and led by Nizam Khalid, arrested in April 2003 and brought to trial in late November. It had three subdivisions (*kirdas*), one led by Aang Hasanuddin, the other by a man named Sugeng, both arrested at the same time as Nizam. A third was led by a man named Ibrahim. Wakalah Uhud had 45 members in early 2002, and an estimated 60 to 70 by the time of the April arrests.⁸⁷
- Wakalah Khaibar, based in Poso and headed by the son-in-law of Adnan Arsal, a man named Hasanudin alias Hamzah. It reportedly had about 70 members.
- Wakalah Tabuk, based in Pendolo, Pandanjaya, led by Huzaifah. It had some 50 members.

The latter two were formally recognised by JI's central command only in October 2002.

ICG obtained a copy of the work plan for Wakalah Uhud for February 2002. It is a fascinating example of both the bureaucracy that caused so many complaints and the organisational skill that allowed JI to expand so rapidly. The program is divided into

⁸⁴ Testimony of Ahmad Ali, 17 December 2002, in dossier of Haerul [Makassar bomb suspect], N°Pol:BP/19/III/2003 DitReskrim, South Sulawesi Police.

⁸⁵ Testimony of Mohamad Nasir bin Abas al Khairudin alias Sulaeman alias Leman Alias Maman alias Nasir Abas alias Husna alias Abu Husna alias Eddy Mulyono alias Malik in the dossier of Thoriquddin, op. cit.

⁸⁶ After his arrest in April 2003, he told interrogators that Abu Bakar Ba'asyir had informed him in 2001 that he was going to take over Mustofa's position, but that for a probationary period, he would be accompanied around Mantiqi III by Mustofa. He spoke of visiting Abu Bakar Ba'asyir at Pondok Ngruki in April or May 2002 to report on developments in Camp Hudaibiyah in the Philippines Ibid.

⁸⁷ ICG obtained an organisational chart of Wakalah Uhud and its three *kirdas* (*kirdas* Abu Bakar Assidiq, *kirdas* Umar bin Khattab and *kirdas* Utsman bin Afan), complete with a list of members. Each *kirdas* has two *fiah* (squads) consisting of between three and seven men. The document appears to date from February 2002.

four main areas: administration, religious instruction and outreach, fund-raising, and military training.⁸⁸

For each area, specific programs are listed with the goals and targets set, as well as the methods to be used and the time required. Under administration, for example, the programs included:

- setting a schedule of meetings for the *wakalah* leadership to facilitate control;
- meeting community leaders and Muslim organisations to facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation;
- developing a communications system to facilitate internal and external communication and improve the accuracy of information received;
- conducting training in administrative skills;
- improving the system for receiving guests, in the interests of better serving the guests as well as ensuring their security; and
- putting an accounting system in place so that all purchases are recorded.

The religious instruction and outreach (*dakwah*) program was by far the most elaborate. It focused heavily on managing the *halaqah* system, the religious study circles that have served as a recruiting mechanism for JI. Typically, JI preachers lead religious discussions for the community in a local mosque or *pesantren*, without the participants knowing their organisational affiliation. From these larger meetings, likely candidates for recruitment are invited to join much smaller *halaqah*, each of which is led by an instructor (*murobbi*), who guides the participants through four stages: *tabligh*, *ta'lim*, *tarbiyah*, and *tamhis*. In the *tamhis* stage, students are assigned specific *dakwah* tasks to test their abilities. Successful completion leads to formal induction into JI through an oath (*baiat*). Religious knowledge is an absolute prerequisite. (Not all mujahidin who completed the JI training course in Poso and fought under JI command could have become members.)

Members of the *wakalah* were known as *multazim*, and each was encouraged to recruit at least one other person into the organisation within the time frame of

the work plan. The plan also included a survey and data-gathering project to understand “geographically and demographically” where the most suitable places for outreach were in Palu and the surrounding area.⁸⁹ The plan noted that local mosques should be the starting point for outreach efforts. It also set a target for bringing at least five students from each faculty of local college campuses and high schools into the outreach program and disseminating an Islamic bulletin that would help the general community understand *salafi* principles (*salafus sholeh*, in JI’s terminology).

The finance and fund-raising (*khozin*) and military training (*tajnid*) parts of the plan are short and unilluminating. The suggested method of fund-raising is dissemination of written appeals, and the training section merely states that the goal is to have all members physically fit (able to run ten kilometres and – a not very onerous requirement – swim 30 metres) and have enough basic military training to be able to carry out the mandate of the organisation.

An example of an appeal for funds was included in the documents ICG obtained. It was written as the second holiest day in the Muslim calendar, Idul Adha, approached, during which Muslims traditionally sacrifice an animal. A JI member wrote to a well-known energy drink company called Extra Joss requesting the donation of funds to buy animals to share with families displaced by the Poso conflict. The appeal was in the name of a local organisation, Yayasan Islam Sabilillah Palu, and included a bank account number to which funds could be transferred.⁹⁰

The workplan underscores how much JI needs to be seen first and foremost as a religious organisation, and one whose strength in Indonesia ultimately depends more on its ability to recruit members through preaching than on its capacity to blow up buildings.

B. STRENGTHENING MILITARY CAPACITY

That said, JI was also enhancing its military capacity. In Poso, immediately after the Malino Accord, it set up a ten-man special operations unit called Kelompok Sepuluh (Group of Ten), according to

⁸⁸ “Program Kerja Wakalah Uhud, Periode Jumadil Akhir s/d Dzul Qoidah 1423 H”, photocopy of document dated February 2002.

⁸⁹ Ibid. JI documents seized by police in Semarang showed a similar “mapping” project by the Central Java *wakalah*, including an assessment of 141 *pesantrens* and their leaders in terms of recruiting prospects.

⁹⁰ Letter N°45.B/YISPA/II/2002 dated 13 February 2002.

Nasir Abbas, former head of Mantiqi III, now detained.⁹¹ One of the ten was Andi Ipong, who was eventually arrested in March 2003 and deemed by the police to be a “pure criminal”. He and his accomplices were unquestionably responsible for a string of at least twelve crimes, including the robbery and murder of a Balinese named Anak Agung Ketut Pujawan on 11 January 2002 in Malakosa village, Sausu subdistrict, Parigi Mourong district and the 6 July 2002 shooting of Yos Tompodung in Poso city.⁹² But they were in fact engaged in *fa’i*, robbing non-Muslims to raise funds for the defense of Islam. In both cases mentioned above, Andi Ipong was joined by three others from Mujahidin KOMPAK.⁹³ (One reason the police gave for saying Ipong was criminally rather than religiously motivated was that he had clashed in the past with Laskar Jihad – as if fighting a fellow Muslim was an indication that he could not have belonged to a jihadist organisation).⁹⁴

In August 2002, Mujahidin KOMPAK set up its own special forces unit and proselytisation initiative, working along the *JI* premise that the Poso-Palu area was particularly ripe for both jihad and Islamic law. Arismunandar reportedly took charge of the proselytising, bringing as many as 200 preachers in from Java. Several of the Poso men involved in the October 2003 attacks were reportedly KOMPAK special forces members, including Syafrî alias Aco GM, now under arrest. Syafrî’s brothers had been killed in front of the North Pamona police headquarters in Tentena, and he was reportedly determined on revenge.⁹⁵

In October 2002, Farihin, the *JI* and KOMPAK leader, was arrested for smuggling ammunition into Poso. According to witness testimony, he purchased the bullets from a man named Nyong Ali in Jakarta – who under the name of Firdaus would be arrested

and detained briefly in connection with the bombing of the Marriott hotel in Jakarta on 5 August 2003.⁹⁶

Bombings and shootings by the special forces units of *JI* and Mujahidin KOMPAK, as well as by ordinary members of Mujahidin KOMPAK, continued through early December 2002. With the exception of two bombs reportedly placed by Mujahidin KOMPAK’s special forces at a Pentecostal church and a post of the Mobile Police Brigade (Brimob) in the village of Malaeli, subdistrict Lage on 25 and 28 December 2002 respectively, violence halted after the Makassar bombings of 5 December. Attacks on Christians did not resume until May 2003.

There may be several explanations for the pause. The Makassar bombs sparked an enormous manhunt in Sulawesi, and the various military units may have decided to lay low. *JI* and its allies were hit by the dramatic increase in arrests that followed the October 2002 Bali bombs and may have needed to attend more to protecting their own ranks. The Palu-Poso area in particular became a refuge for Java-based members of *JI* fleeing justice after Bali, and Mantiqi III was preoccupied with trying to help.

Nasir Abbas told his interrogators in May 2003 that he ran into Dul Matin, by accident, outside Adnan Arsal’s home in Poso on 23 March 2003. Dul Matin, perhaps worried about organisational sanctions, urged him not to tell Abu Rusydan, who by then had taken over as caretaker head of *JI* from Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. He had come to Poso under the name of Muhsin, pretending to be a KOMPAK member trying to get more people to join Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia. Nasir told the police that he felt duty-bound to mention Dul Matin’s presence to Abu Rusydan, which he did at an executive meeting of *JI*

⁹¹ ICG interview, January 2004.

⁹² “Daftar Penembakan Orang”, *Gatra*, 15 March 2003, pp. 42-43.

⁹³ One of the Mujahidin KOMPAK was a man named Pian. His name was almost certainly on the wanted list from 2002 but he was only arrested in late June 2003 at a hotel in Palu.

⁹⁴ “Daftar Penembakan Orang”, *Gatra*, 15 March 2003, pp. 42-43.

⁹⁵ Police said in late October 2003 that they were seeking five men who had been involved in the 12 October assault on Christians in Poso Pesisir: Musa, Musaf, Ramlan, Ilham, and Basri. Two may have been special forces members. “Polisi Ungkap Identitas Lima Penyerang Poso”, *Kompas*, 31 October 2003.

⁹⁶ Firdaus, an Afghanistan veteran, had a long connection with Darul Islam prior to his brush with *JI*. In the late 1980s, after his return from Afghanistan, he had been a participant in a religious study group in Ancol, Jakarta, many of whose members later moved to Lampung where they became involved in a politico-military movement along the lines of Darul Islam and clashed with the Indonesian armed forces in February 1989. Firdaus reportedly was asked to take part in the Lampung movement but declined. ICG interviews, December 2003. Firdaus reportedly got the bullets from his elder brother, who was the former police chief of Ternate, in North Maluku. Deposition of Farihin Ibnu Ahmad alias Yasir, op. cit.

that he attended in Puncak in April 2003. He said Abu Rusydan already knew.⁹⁷

At the same Puncak meeting, participants agreed to raise money from their respective *mantiqis* for the families of people already in custody, since the word from the JI central command was that no funds were available from headquarters.⁹⁸ The need for fund-raising may have led to a resumption of *fa'i* attacks in the Poso area.

A final possible explanation for the lack of violence from December 2002 to May 2003 is that the JI leadership may have decided that it was better to have a period for consolidation, especially with the new *wakalah* just formed. But consolidation and expansion suffered a major setback when twelve JI members were arrested in Palu in April 2003, including the leadership of Wakalah Uhud.

Three developments appear to have resulted from the arrests.

- JI sent new cadres to Palu to replace those arrested, including a medical doctor named Idris who replaced Nizam Khalid as head of Wakalah Uhud;
- it began quietly to arrange the transfer to other parts of Indonesia – and perhaps other countries – of members it believed might be threatened with arrest; and
- it continued to proselytise and recruit to replenish its ranks, including through outreach programs in mosques in the Palu-Poso area.

⁹⁷ Interrogation of Nasir Abbas in case of Thoriqudin alias Abu Rusydan, 9 May 2003.

⁹⁸ Ibid. In the deposition, Nasir Abbas reports that he had a meeting in Palu in February 2003 with Achmad Roichan alias Saad, a member of the central command. Saad told him there had been a meeting just before Mukhlas's arrest attended by Abu Rusydan, Saad, Abu Dujana, Mustofa and Mukhlas himself. They talked about getting Mukhlas to Sulawesi, but Mustofa vetoed it and said it was better to keep him in Java. As a result, he stayed in Klaten, where he was arrested.

VII. THE OCTOBER 2003 ATTACKS

While the violence in October 2003 finally attracted Jakarta's attention, it had been preceded earlier in the year by a number of "mysterious killings" and bombings: a farmer hacked to death on 30 May in Kayamanya, two more killed in Madale on 2 June, another farmer killed in Pinedapa on 9 July, another in Lembomawo village two days later, and another murder in Pandimi village, Poso city on 1 October. Several bombings took place during the same period, including one on 7 August in which a young man named Bachtiar alias Manto, believed to have been recruited as a suicide bomber by JI, was killed in Kayamanya when a bomb he was making exploded prematurely. Had these incidents (and all the killings in 2002) been examined more closely, perhaps the October attacks could have been averted. At the very least, they would not have come as such a shock.

On the night of 9-10 October 2003, a group of gunmen attacked the village of Beteleme, in Lembo subdistrict, Morowali.⁹⁹ Two people were killed; three others were wounded. A bomb had reportedly gone off before the gunmen arrived, causing many villagers to flee in panic, so many houses were empty when the gunmen arrived.¹⁰⁰

In Saatu village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict, two nights later, the gunmen appeared to be more intent on deliberate executions. They surrounded houses, ordered the inhabitants out, and then shot them. Four villagers were killed, one was wounded. The attackers moved on to nearby Pinedapa village, where they entered houses, ignored pleas for mercy, and wounded a man and two women.

Proceeding to Pantangolemba village, they first shot the night watchmen, injuring five, then two schoolgirls, aged nine and eleven. Five other villagers, three men and two women, were executed.

On the night of 12 October, a fishmonger, Djafar Susanto, disappeared after leaving his house on a

⁹⁹ Morowali was a new district, carved out of Poso district in 1999.

¹⁰⁰ Information on the different incidents in October comes from "Morowali Investigation Report October 2003" by a local human rights organisation, LPS-HAM Sulteng, and in particular an annotated list entitled "Names of Victims Injured/Killed as a Result of Attacks and Shootings in Beteleme and Poso Pesisir 10-31 October 2003" (Nama Korban Luka/Tewas Akibat Penyerangan dan Penembakan).

motorcycle in response to an order from a customer; his body was found four days later in the Poso River. His body had been stuffed into a sack and weighed down with rocks. He was believed to have been beaten before being drowned. On 27 October, a farmer from Pinedapa, where one of the earlier attacks had taken place, was shot and killed in the morning as he was clearing his fields.

On 16 November, a Christian theology student was killed by an angry mob in the centre of Poso (see below). On the same day, the bodies of Oranye Tajoja, treasurer of the Christian Church of South Sulawesi and his nephew, Buce, were found in Ratolene, Kasiguncu, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. They had apparently been dragged from their car and murdered. On 17 November, a public bus from the Alugoro company was stopped by three armed men in Kuku village, Lage subdistrict. One passenger, a civil servant from Palu named Husain Garusu, who had stepped down from the bus, disappeared. Police, who believe he may have been kidnapped by the gunmen, said they were extending the search to Manado, North Sulawesi.¹⁰¹ He remains missing.

A. POLICE AND PUBLIC RESPONSE

Unlike the 2002 attacks that went largely unpunished, police action was swift. A Brimob unit hunting for the gunmen came across a group of suspects on 16 October in a forest of rubber trees (*hutan karet*) outside Bintangor, in Lembo, Morowali. They shot and killed Ali Lasawedi, from Ampana, Poso, and a Javanese named Sahdan alias Saddam, as they were saying prayers at sundown. (Saddam was widely reported to be from Lamongan, the home town of Bali bombers Amrozi, Mukhlas, and Ali Imron. In fact, he was from Pondok Ngruki.) Hearing the shots, Ari alias Taufik alias Jefrianto raised his gun, and himself was shot and killed. Rahmat Jeba alias Romo was also killed in the same incident, although his body was not found until the following day. On 19 October, police shot and killed Aswan, from Gebang Rejo, Poso city, and on 21 October, they killed the man named as the ringleader, Mohammed Dong, in Mahoni village, Lembo.

Police also arrested eighteen others, an initial group of fourteen, followed by another four. The first fourteen are all believed to have been members of

Mujahidin KOMPAK, and most were former gang members.¹⁰² They fell in the category of “situational mujahidin”, forced by circumstances into the role. Most had not gone beyond junior high school, and some had only an elementary school education.

A source who knew most of those arrested, however, cautioned that a low level of education should not be equated with poverty. “Look at me”, he said, “I barely finished junior high school and had to change schools five times because I was a troublemaker. It wasn’t because I was poor. My family had ten hectares of cacao!”¹⁰³ The family, however, had lost all their land to Christians in the aftermath of the Phase III violence in May-June 2000.

Another source in Poso close to those arrested said that three reasons motivated the attacks:

- **Revenge:** most had lost family members in the May-June 2000 killings and had been seeking it ever since. Many had also seen family farmland seized by Christians. “Is Malino going to bring back relatives or land?” he asked. He also pointed out that the desire for vengeance had not suddenly appeared in October 2003; many of those arrested had been involved in the ongoing violence after the Malino accord was signed.
- **Martyrdom:** most had been convinced by Mujahidin KOMPAK that dying as a martyr was glorious. “They saw it as the toll road to heaven”, he said (toll roads in Indonesia being free of traffic jams and therefore the speediest way to travel). Many would have been willing suicide bombers.
- **Available means:** they had weapons and ammunition, so why not use them?

As former gang members, they were fearless; as young men – most were in their twenties – with little

¹⁰¹ “Polisi Buru 3 Orang yg Diduga Meculik Warga Poso ke Manado”, Detik.com, 31 Desember 2003.

¹⁰² Seven were caught between 17 and 19 October 2003 in Bintangor village, Lembo subdistrict: Iwan; Aco alias Gajamada; Andang; Abid alias David; Ridwan; Ardianto [also seen as Ardiansyah] alias Oky; and Hasyim alias Iwan alias Armed alias Tarzan. Four others were arrested on 19 October after a shootout in Masara village, Lembo: Hendra bin Tajudin; Suhardi bin Andi Kemal; Rahmat bin Aminah; and Abbas. In Muahino village, Bungku Barat subdistrict, Morowali, police arrested Abdul Haer Pantau and Hamdan. Ishak alias Malboro was arrested on 19 October (not clear where) and Iwan, from Poso Pesisir, was arrested on 20 October in Lawuon village, Luwuk subdistrict, Banggai.

¹⁰³ ICG interview, December 2003.

schooling, they did not think far ahead; and as graduates of KOMPAK's military training, they were determined to use their skills.¹⁰⁴

At the same time, rumours apparently had been circulating some time before the October attacks that a few of the sixteen men named by Fabianus Tibo as the masterminds of the Walisongo massacre were now occupying land seized from Muslims. One, a retired military officer named Tungkunan, was said to have "looted" 183 hectares of land from Muslim transmigrants in the area of Pendolo Utara; two others, Heri Baribi and Sarjun alias Gode, were alleged to be occupying Muslim land in the Mori area.¹⁰⁵ In this case, hard facts mattered less than what the mujahidin in question believed to be true. It was no coincidence that the first village attacked in October was Tibo's hometown.¹⁰⁶

The attackers appeared to have strong support in the city of Poso. This was evident during the funeral there of Mohammed Dong on 22 October 2003 at the Bone Sompe Mosque. Thousands turned out to accompany the procession; if to the police he was a violent criminal, in the eyes of much of the Muslim community, he was a hero.¹⁰⁷

Public reaction to the arrest three weeks later of two more Mujahidin KOMPAK members, Irwan bin Rais and Zukri, was equally strong. They had been arrested on 15 November 2003 on suspicion of involvement in the killings in Poso Pesisir, at the same time that their colleague, Hamid Sudin, was killed by police. Zukri was released a few hours later, but Irwan was detained. The next day, an angry mob of about 1,000 marched on the Poso police station, demanding his release.

As the protest was underway, members of the mob seized and hacked to death with machetes a young Christian man, Delfis Limungkiwa, in front of Poso's central market, about 100 metres from the police station. They claimed he was a military intelligence agent, although a local conflict resolution group said

he was a student at the Theological High School in Tentena who had never been in the military.¹⁰⁸

The police capitulated and citing "security reasons", released Irwan (according to one report, later that same afternoon, according to another, early the following morning). They required only that he check in with the police on a weekly basis. A local Muslim leader in Poso Pesisir, Zainul Garusu, swore that Irwan had been with him at the time of the attacks and could not have been involved.¹⁰⁹

The reaction to Dong's death and Irwan's arrest may offer some insight into why the police were not more diligent in investigating the post-Malino violence or curbing the activities of local militants. (Police themselves admitted that of 92 incidents of violence in Poso in 2003, including 19 bombings, they were only able to resolve nine.)¹¹⁰ It also underscores why the city of Poso has become such fertile recruiting ground for JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK.

All indications are that the recruiting is continuing particularly through local mosques. Residents continue to house Indonesian mujahidin from outside the area, many with no independent source of income, although there is some evidence that the initially warm reception toward the outsiders is cooling. Local leaders with known ties to JI remain untouchable. As one source said, "If the police touched Adnan Aرسال, Poso would go up in flames."

B. WHO DECIDED ON THE ATTACKS?

Although many of the attackers appear to have had training under JI instructors and some Javanese were involved, it seems unlikely that the decision to undertake the attacks was made by JI, either at the central command or local *wakalah* level. It had too much to lose, especially after the April 2003 arrests had taken the *wakalah* leadership out of circulation. If the remaining JI members wanted to pursue the idea of Poso as a place of refuge for their beleaguered colleagues and expand their outreach activities,

¹⁰⁴ ICG interview, December 2003.

¹⁰⁵ ICG interview, December 2003.

¹⁰⁶ "War Hero from Ampana," *Tempo* (English edition), 3 November 2003, p. 16. *Tempo* asserts that Mohammed Dong alias Madong targeted Beteleme for revenge because of its association with Tibo.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ *RKP News*, "Poso Masih Mencekam", 18 November 2002.

¹⁰⁹ Detik.com news wire, <http://www.detik.com/printing/index.html?idArtikel=214413>, 19 November 2002 and *RKP News*, "Poso Masih Mencekam", 18 November 2002 (a newsletter of Kelompok Kerja Resolusi Konflik Poso, Working Group for Conflict Resolution in Poso).

¹¹⁰ "Kasus Poso Tetap Jadi Prioritas Polda Sulteng", Detik.com, 31 December 2002.

staging large-scale attacks on Christians was not likely to help.

Local motivation, however, was strong, and Mohammed Dong reportedly was a very charismatic leader. The operation did not require a major financial outlay, since the group already had guns and ammunition, although the perpetrators did reportedly purchase walkie-talkies. And plenty of foot-soldiers were eager to take part.

The involvement of a few KOMPAK special forces members, however, suggests two possibilities. One is that some of the same dissident JI members involved in setting up the special forces unit in Poso could have given support or encouragement. The other is that JI succeeded in doing precisely what it set out to do: raise the capacity of local mujahidin to the point where they no longer needed to depend on outside assistance.

C. THE QUESTION OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

Despite some of the evidence that has emerged about Mohammed Dong and the links of those arrested to Mujahidin KOMPAK, many activists and NGO workers, as well as some community leaders, were convinced that the military or police had been involved. In most cases the reasoning was based on highly circumstantial evidence: the attackers were well-trained, they were efficient, they had walkie-talkies, they used automatic weapons, and some of their ammunition was army issue. All that was true, but there were other explanations for the training, and virtually anyone in Indonesia can get access to weapons and ammunition for a price. (In fact, however, some of the weapons used are believed to have been smuggled in from the Philippines.)

In some cases, the effort to point the finger at the military and police and away from jihadist Muslims was self-serving. The conservative Muslim magazine *Sabili*, for example, interviewed Adnan Arsal, who said:

The Muslim side has never conducted training. How could we do any training with so many security forces here? How could we bring in

arms and ammunition, when everywhere you go, you have to be checked?¹¹¹

Others interviewed for *Sabili* said the perpetrators could not be Muslim because Muslim leaders had signed the Malino Accord and because certain Muslim organisations had dissolved themselves (Laskar Jihad did so in October 2002).¹¹²

But one reason many were so quick to believe that security forces were involved was because there was a history of such involvement in earlier phases of the conflict. As one NGO leader pointed out, every time a security operation in Poso was going to end and troops were about to be pulled out, there would be a spike in violence.¹¹³ The implication was that both police and military forces have benefited financially, as they have from virtually all conflicts in Indonesia, a claim that others have made more explicitly.¹¹⁴

The involvement of Mujahidin KOMPAK in the violence does not exclude the possibility of some level of backing or support from the security forces. ICG believes, however, that it is possible to explain the attacks without such support.

¹¹¹ "Tangkap Ninja Penyerang Poso", *Sabili*, N°8 Th.XI, 6 November 2003, p. 19.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ibid, quoting Syamsul Alam Agus of Lembaga Pengembangan Studi Hukum dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia, the organisation that has done some of the most careful documentation of violence in the Poso area.

¹¹⁴ George Aditjondro, "Renungan Buat Papa Nanda, Anak Domba Paskah dari Tentena", prologue to Rinaldy Dimanik, *Tragedi Kemanusiaan Poso*, PBHI and LPS-HAM Sulteng, 2003, pp. xlvi-xlvi.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The story of JI's involvement in the Poso conflict is instructive on several fronts. It illustrates the complexity of the organisation's alliances at the local level. It also raises the question of how its involvement in any conflict is defined. If JI leaders are involved in Mujahidin KOMPAK, does that make Mujahidin KOMPAK a proxy of JI? Not necessarily. If local Muslim leaders are trained by JI, does that make what they do thereafter JI's responsibility? Probably not. What is the relationship between attacks by JI-trained locals and the religious outreach activities carried on by JI members in the same area? Not clear. If there are lessons to be learned, they are that nothing is black and white, and it is impossible to predict JI behaviour accurately based on the assumption that it is a monolithic organisation with a single set of goals. That assumption was misguided even at the height of JI's strength in 2000-2001. It is even more so after hundreds of arrests across the region have disrupted its communications and weakened its chain of command.

The Poso conflict suggests that the risk of radical Muslim violence in Indonesia needs to be reassessed. Until now, the prevailing assumption has been that JI is the only organisation with the expertise, international ties, and ideology to constitute a likely partner in the region for al-Qaeda or another international terrorist group. There are two very possibly flawed elements in this assumption: one is that JI as an institution is inclined to follow al-Qaeda's lead, the other is that JI is the most dangerous group around.

The rift within JI described in this report suggests that the men who masterminded the major bombings in Indonesia, including the Bali and Marriott attacks, may be a minority faction within the organisation. Hambali, Mukhlas and his brothers, Zulkarnaen, Imam Samudra, Dul Matin, Azhari and others were influenced by al-Qaeda *fatwas* and were determined to attack Western targets. If the remaining top leaders in this faction can be captured, the immediate threat of another Bali or Marriott-style attack may substantially ease.

The majority faction, however, will continue to constitute a longer-term security threat for Indonesia. It is much more focused on building up military capacity and creating a mass base through religious indoctrination to support what would effectively be an Islamic revolution in the country when the time is

right – and the members of this faction appear to have a very long time frame. The prospects of such a revolution succeeding are close to nil. The question is whether new leaders will emerge through the *dakwah* process and recruitment now being carried out who will be more inclined to the Hambali-Mukhlas view of the world.

That prospect could be particularly lethal if the kind of personal ties to other radical jihadists around the world that Afghanistan training provided in the late 1980s and 1990s are recreated. Preventing a similar international training centre from developing must be a top priority for those in the counter-terrorism field.

At the same time, it is increasingly clear that there are many smaller, local groups in Indonesia, some of whose members have Afghan or Mindanao training and whose deep-seated grievances could lead them to draw inspiration from bin-Laden *fatwas*. It is, of course, one thing to draw inspiration and another to work in partnership with a group like al-Qaeda to pull off a major attack. But it could be precisely the lack of lengthy training, the impetus to use the results of that training immediately, and the attraction of martyrdom that could make men like those who joined Mujahidin KOMPAK in Poso more dangerous than the “bureaucrats” of JI.

All this said, it remains important to keep the threat of terrorism in perspective. Indonesia is not about to be overrun with jihadists. They remain the radical fringe of a radical fringe. Their capacity to do damage, however, continues to be cause for serious concern.

The Poso study shows how important a thorough understanding of the conflict is to conflict resolution. How does one establish a workable peace if those brokering it are not fully aware of, or are unwilling to investigate, outside involvement in the violence and the extent to which local community leaders are implicated? It is not surprising that in the Palu-Poso area today, there is widespread disillusionment with the Malino process. Local activists committed to reconciliation noted at the end of 2003 that not a single point of the ten-point declaration had been realised.¹¹⁵ Granted, that disillusionment stems as much from the perceived corruption of the process, which has little to show from the extensive resources supposedly allocated for relief and rehabilitation, as

¹¹⁵ “Bom dan penembakan tertinggi, evaluasi kasus Poso 2003 versia Pokja-RKP”, *Radjar Sulteng*, 29 Desember 2003.

from the ongoing violence.¹¹⁶ But ICG did not meet a single person in Palu or Poso who thought that local authorities, particularly the police and army, had done enough to discover and stop attacks on both sides. Many also stressed the importance of a neutral law enforcement agency and an impartial, credible justice system as deterrents to further violence.

Finally, JI's involvement in Poso, its emphasis on religious indoctrination, and its willingness to work with various offshoots of Darul Islam in waging jihad, underscores the importance of understanding JI more as an heir of the Indonesian Darul Islam movement than as an al-Qaeda proxy. Darul Islam is the only radical Islamic movement in post-independence Indonesia that has tried to build a national structure using armed struggle to create an Islamic state. JI can be seen as the fourth attempt to build on that legacy.¹¹⁷ The break of its founder, Abdullah Sungkar, with the DI leadership in 1992 was in many ways a family spat. JI's ideology, recruitment, training, and in some cases even tactics, remain heavily influenced by DI. If a successor to JI emerges in Indonesia – that is, an armed radical group with a jihadist ideology, a national network, a determination to undermine or overthrow the Indonesian state, and international contacts – chances are it will have DI roots.



Jakarta/Brussels, 3 February 2004

¹¹⁶ Lorraine Aragon, "Political Economy, Ethnicity, and Religion in the Poso Conflict", presentation prepared for the conference on "Peace Education in Indonesia" sponsored by the U.S. Institute for Peace, Asian Institute of Management Conference Center, Manila, Philippines, 27-30 August 2003, p. 23. ICG interviews in Palu in November 2003 also elicited complaints about the extent to which corruption had undermined the peace process. In December 2003, a local NGO, the Working Group for Reconciliation in Poso, called on the governor of Central Sulawesi and the district head of Poso to open access to information about the amount of aid that had been channeled to Poso thus far and how it had been spent. "Bom dan penembakan tertinggi", *Radar Sulteng*, 29 Desember 2003.

¹¹⁷ The original Darul Islam rebellions in the 1950s and 60s in West and Central Java, South Sulawesi, Aceh, and South Kalimantan came together, at least on paper, in the early 1960s. The second attempt was the "Komando Jihad" effort to revive Darul Islam in the mid-1970s, in which the military intelligence agency BAKIN was deeply involved and which led to the arrest of virtually the entire top leadership of the Java-based DI. The third effort, undertaken in 1989 by a group of young men who were initially inspired by Abdullah Sungkar but became disillusioned with him, was cut short by the violence in Talangsari, Lampung in February 1989.

APPENDIX A

MAPS OF POSO & MOROWALI DISTRICTS AND CENTRAL SULAWESI PROVINCE



Adapted from the Central Sulawesi Government Website: <http://www.jakweb.com/id/sulteng/gov/>

APPENDIX B

MAP OF SULAWESI



APPENDIX C

POST-MALINO ACCORD VIOLENCE IN POSO¹

31 December 2001, four churches bombed in Palu (GKI Sulsel, GPDI, Gereja Adven, GKMI).

11 January 2002, robbery of Anak Agung Ketut Pujawan in Malakosa village, Sausu, Parigi Mouroung. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK and Jemaah Islamiyah.**

16 January 2002, A. Raemboto shot and killed in Malei village in Tojo subdistrict while picking durian by a group of unidentified attackers.

23 March 2002, bomb explodes in Poso social welfare office (DEPSOS) in Poso city, Poso Kota subdistrict. No victims.

30 March 2002, bomb explodes on a cacao farm in Betania village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. No victims.

4 April 2002, two bombs explode in office of state water company PDAM in Ratulene village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. No victims.

16 May 2002, two people killed in Masani village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. Agus Pasolle killed by stabbing and shooting, the body of Stefanus found a week later by the Masani River, chopped up and put in a sack. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

28 May 2002, two bombs explode in Poso city, Poso Kota subdistrict, one in the central market and one on Pattimura street. No victims. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

30 May 2002, bomb explodes 100 metres from armed forces battalion 711 post near a cacao farm in Betania village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

1 June 2002, bomb explodes in Pandajaya village, Pamona Selatan subdistrict. No victims. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

5 June 2002, four killed and seventeen injured after bomb explosion on public bus (PO Antariksa, Palu-Poso-Tentena route) in Tioni village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

8 June 2002, bomb explodes again in Pandajaya village, Pamona Selatan subdistrict. No victims.

9 June 2002, Risman Paontali alias Kosi, knifed to death by three men wearing ninja-like clothes and masks as he was going to his farm in Kayamanya village, Poso Kota subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

1 July 2002, home of pastor of Central Sulawesi Christian Church (GKST) bombed in Tagolu village, Lage subdistrict. No victims. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

3 July 2002, Iver Lengkono, 49, civil servant, shot riding his motorcycle from Poso city in the direction of Betania and Kasiguncu villages in Poso Pesisir subdistrict. He died four days later. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

¹ The sources for this chronology are media reports; compilations by LPS-HAM Sulteng, one of the best local human rights organisations, and other NGOs; and a list of post-Malino incidents in *Tragedi Kemanusiaan Poso* by Rinaldy Damanik. In all cases, ICG tried to get multiple sources for each incident. Basic information on names, ages, and places varied wildly among different sources, necessitating judgments on which seemed the most probable. Information on the suspected perpetrators comes from ICG interviews in the Palu-Poso area.

6 July 2002, Yos Tompodung, 50, shot in Kasintuwu bus station, Poso city, Poso Kota subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: members of Jemaah Islamiyah and Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

7 July 2002, Ones Lawara, 40, killed from bullet to the head while fishing in Wayura village, Pamona Selatan subdistrict.

11 July 2002, Albert Loadi, 32, shot in Silanca village, Lage subdistrict. Residents in Silanca then attacked Mohammed Mustari, 47, a passer-by headed for Poso.

12 July 2002, one killed and four injured after bomb explosion on a bus travelling from Palu to Tentena in Ranononcu village, Lage subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

19 July 2002, Nyoman Mandri alias Boi, 26, and Made Jabir alias Wi, 26, Balinese transmigrants, shot and killed in Masani village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict.

22 July 2002, Nisman Lasampa, Welem Remapelino, Rindu Lasampa and Norce Bungge were shot in their fields in Mayoa village, Pamona Selatan subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

22 July 2002, bomb explodes under Trans Sulawesi highway bridge in Kayamanya village, Poso Kota subdistrict, no victims. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

23 July 2002, Harber Rabeta and Agus Maula shot while riding their motorcycles in Bawulu village, Pamona Selatan subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

27 July 2002, attackers fired on bus PO Omega, Tentena-Palu route in Tiwaa village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. No victims. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

3 August 2002, Sukirman (also seen as Sukiman), a Muslim, hacked to death in Tegalrejo, Poso Kota subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.** (They apparently went after the wrong target. Returning from an attack on a Christian village, they ran into Sukirman on the road and asked him if he was “Kongkoli” (a derogatory term for Christian) or Muslim. Instead of responding, he ran. They caught up with him and killed him, believing he was a Christian.)

4 August 2002, attacks on Christian residents in Matako village, Tojo subdistrict, injuring Lemu Tagandi, 26, Padengka, 32, Mayonge Katuta, 75, Padea Paleba, 67, Nety Toeya, 49, Uce Doda, 21, Silas Makeo, 26. Z. Doda, 26, Olmas Daya, 27, Yohan Ewakloa, 21, and Cecen Mangiri, 20 were reported missing. The attackers also burned 27 houses, and both bombed and burned the Pentecostal Church and Central Sulawesi Christian Church. Some 1,200 villagers fled the area and took refuge in Tentena. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

6 August 2002, approximately 21 temporary houses were destroyed resulting in over 500 internally displaced persons when gunshots and Molotov cocktails were used to attack Malitu village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

8 August 2002, Lorenzo Taddei, 34, an Italian citizen, killed and Jirunimus, 36, Timutius, 52, Karangan, 21, and Alberting Montang, 42, injured in ambush of a public bus in Mayoa village, Pamona Selatan subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Laskar Bulan Sabit Merah.**

12 August 2002, five killed, Evras Labani, Padah Verdan, Tius, Sena Kange, J. Telelino, and two injured, Dama Tungkas, Inson Kangea, 472 houses and three houses of worship burned in attacks on Sepe, Silanca, and Bategencu villages, Lage subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Joint JI – Mujahidin KOMPAK operation.**

15 August 2002, Abner Malaka, 26, Dimin, 40, and Asmono, 21, all Christians, were injured after being attacked between the villages of Taliwan and Peleru in Mori Atas subdistrict, Morowali district. L Pitra, 67, and an infant, Erik, 3, were killed and almost all of the houses in Mayumba village in Mori Atas subdistrict,

Morowali district were burned to the ground after an attack by approximately 50 people wearing black masks and using automatic weapons and bombs. **Reported perpetrators: Joint JI-Mujahidin KOMPAK operation.**

28 August 2002, renewed attack on Sepe, Silance and Bategencu, Lage subdistrict, five people reported killed.

18 September 2002, Tadues, 25, and Arman, 25, and a police officer injured in a bomb explosion in the front yard of a bible school in Palu (Sekolah Alkitab Maranatha).

26 September 2002, car bomb explodes in Poso city central market, Posa Kota subdistrict. Second bomb explodes near the Poso courthouse Posa Kota subdistrict. Min Canda shot by unidentified attackers in Pandiri village, Lage subdistrict.

29 September 2002, Hamsi Laupa, 56, shot and killed in Saatu village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict.

30 September 2002, Ibu Sampei, 46, shot as she finished bathing near the Poso River (behind Marantha church) in Kawua village, Poso Kota subdistrict.

7 November 2002, Joseph Makahube, head of the local office for the Central Bureau for Statistics, killed by a gunshot wound to the head in Poso city, Poso Kota subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

1 December 2002, bomb explodes in the office of the Agency for Unity and Protection of Society (Badan Kesatuan Bangsa dan Perlindungan Masyarakat) in Poso city, and also damages the defence office (kantor Pertahanan) and revenue office (kantor Dinas Pendapatan) in Poso city. Nur Afiani, 12, defused an active bomb in a biscuit container on a bridge near Maranata market, Birumaru subdistrict, Donggala district. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

4 December 2002, Agustinus Baco, 57, of Kawende village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict, shot and killed on the Trans-Sulawesi highway as he was returning from his farm. **Reported perpetrators: JI and Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

5 December 2002, Martoni ("Tonny") Sango, 23, health service officer, and Oeter T., 23, entrepreneur, were shot in front of the pharmacy of the Poso Health Services office in Poso city, Posa Kota subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

24 December 2002, Ahmad Mahfud, 37, was shot and killed and his wife, Fitrah, was injured in an attack in Malei village, Lage subdistrict.

25 December 2002, bomb explodes near the fence of the Pentecostal Church in Maleali village, Sausu subdistrict, Parigi Moutong district. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

27 December 2002, Moh. Jabir, 42, shot and killed in Tokorondo village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. On the same day, Ronda Sadego was shot and killed in Kasiguncu village, Poso Kota subdistrict.

28 December 2002, bomb explodes close to the Brimob police post in Malei village, Lage subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

6 Januari 2003, Syafrudin Bua, resident of Mayo village, Pamona Selatan subdistrict, shot in the stomach when he was returning from his farm.

6 February 2003, Sulaiman alias Iwan, 30, resident of Toili subdistrict, Banggai district, shot in the head and killed apparently by a drunken Brimob constable.

13 February 2003, Ir and Ww (brothers) hacked a policeman in Poso Pesisir subdistrict from behind with an axe.

26 February 2003, Ajun, 17, shot in the stomach in Tentena, Pamona Utara subdistrict with what is suspected to be a homemade weapon.

10 May 2003, the body of Jasad Yuda found on the edge of the forest near Kuku village, Pamona Utara subdistrict. The body showed evidence of stab wounds to the neck. The victim was an employee at Depot Pertamina Poso and deposited Rp. 41,800,000 at the office. Another body was found near Sanginora village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict, cause of death unknown.

30 May 2003, Jabir, 22 (also reported as Jupri) shot and killed by two armed, masked men in Lembomawo village on the outskirts of Poso city, Poso Kota subdistrict. He was a farmer from Kayamanya village, Poso Kota subdistrict.

2 June 2003, Yepta Barumuju, 37, killed, and Dharma Kusuma, 35, seriously wounded in sniper attacks on Madale village, Poso Kota subdistrict.

9 July 2003, Yulius Ledo Pamimi, 32, shot and killed in Pinedapa village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. He was a timber dealer.

10 July 2003, Tini Alimin, 36, Vela, 2, Melky, 30, and Sutrisno, 30, injured in a bomb blast at Victoria Café, Sayo village in Poso city, Poso Kota subdistrict. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

11 July 2003, Fetri Malangi, 45, a police officer and Maslian Laponi, 43, teacher shot by masked men as they were riding a motorcycle in Lembomawo village, Lage subdistrict.

23 July 2003, bomb explodes in Gebangrejo in an abandoned house, no injuries.

7 August 2003, Bachtiar alias Manto, 20, a suspected suicide bomber, died instantly when a bomb exploded in his father's (Arsiah Ali) house on Pulau Sabang street in Kayamanya village, Poso Kota subdistrict. Bachtiar was a suspect in the bombing of Victoria Café in Poso on 11 July 2003 and the burning of the Linda Jaya bus in 2001. According to police reports he may have also been involved with the bomb explosion of the PT-PLN (state-owned electricity company) in Palu.

12 September 2003, Sucianti, 21, Syaiful, 13, Abdul Kadir (nickname "Ompeng"), 15, Joni Umurm, and Sunarti, injured after bomb explosion in front of the Kasiguncu village office in Poso Pesisir subdistrict.

1 October 2003, Sujono Miskun, 40, killed and Berti Salondeho, 35, injured in a drive-by shooting in Tampemadaro village, Lage subdistrict. They were attacked by four men on two motorcycles. Miskun was the treasurer for Pamona Utara elementary school and was planning to withdraw teachers' salaries from a BRI bank the day he was attacked.

Late 9 October 2003/Early 10 October 2002, attacks in Beteleme, Lembo subdistrict, Morowali District. Devina Mbai, 45, and Oster Tarioko, 45, were killed. Devina Mbai was an elementary school teacher and Oster Tarioko was the head of PLN Ranting Beteleme. Others injured included Hengki Malino, 38, and L Malo, 30. Material damage included 35 houses, three cars, and seven motorcycles burned. Four 5.56 mm bullets, one FN bullet, and one Molotov bomb were found at the crime scene. **Reported perpetrators: Mujahidin KOMPAK.**

12 October 2003, attacks in Poso Pesisir subdistrict, Poso District, on six villages: Saatu, Pinedapa, and Pantangolemba in Poso Pesisir subdistrict, and Madalae, Tegalrejo and Sayao villages in Poso Kota subdistrict. Lesman Yakup, 33, Tandi Matas, 55, Aco Matasak, 32, and Ayub Pamatai, 32, were killed in Saatu village. Sinta Lantigia, 8, Yohanes Malonta, 30, Narwas Kalinangi, 46, Patrian P., 32, and Martina, 32, from Pantangolemba village were also killed. Emilia, 32, Iya Ngayantina, 33, from Saatu village and I Wayan Harun Santosa, 32, Jonatan, 13, Ripka, 11, Usman Badui, 25, Alboi, 27, Andolia, 46, Rifka Korai, 28, Yohana, 35, Hepson Peatna, 43, from Pantangolemba village were injured. A resident of Saatu village, Papa Awan, 55, was reported missing.

13 October 2003, homemade bomb exploded in Kasiguncu village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. No victims. The bomb appeared to have been planted by an unidentified person on a motorcycle. At approximately the same time in Wayura village, Pamona Selatan subdistrict, Neles Mause, 39, and Chandra, 8, were injured when a bomb they were constructing exploded. The bomb was made from the shock absorber of a motorcycle filled with nails. Due to these incidents over 500 residents of the villages of Lembomawo and Rononuncu in Poso Kota subdistrict, and Maliwuk village in Lage subdistrict fled to safer areas in Tagolu and Pandiri villages in North Pamona subdistrict. Police chief of Central Sulawesi, Brigjen Pol Drs. Taufik Ridha reported an armed clash between security forces and a group of attackers in Korowu village, Lembo subdistrict (approximately ten kilometres from Beteleme village, site of violence on 11 October 2003). One attacker was shot, and his body fell into the river.

16 October 2003, the decomposing body of Susanto Jafar alias Yanto, 25, of Lawanga village, Poso Kota subdistrict was found dead on Bridge II, Lawang Kawua village. His legs were wrapped in sacks filled with stones. The body showed signs of heavy beating: neck and head was swollen and the jaw dislocated.

17 October 2003, three houses were burned and one truck was seriously damaged in an attack on Gebangrejo village, Poso Kota subdistrict. Police found twelve bullet casings from a 5.56 mm calibre weapon, a canister of oil and matches near the truck at the crime scene. Police and soldiers killed three suspects, Ari alias Taufik, 25, from Tegal Rejo, Poso; Ali Lasuedi, 31, from Ampena, Poso; and Syahdat alias Saddam, 30, in a forest near Bintangor village, Lembo subdistrict, Morowali district. Five more suspects, Ishak alias Abdul Galib, 39, from Kayamaya, Poso; Hardianto alias Tole, 21, from Rono Punco, Poso; Iwan alias Parjan, 31, from Moengkolama, Poso Kota subdistrict, Hasyim alias Acik, 30, from Ampana, Poso; and Arif, 21, address unknown, were arrested.

18 October 2003, Rachmat Seba alias Romo, 38, rumoured to be the leader of the attackers responsible for violence in Morowali and Poso districts, was killed by a joint military and police force in Pawaru village, Lembo subdistrict, Morowali district. Four others arrested in the same raid were H bin Tg, R bin HMA, 23, SAK, 21, and AB, 40. During the raid, the joint team of military and police forces seized two M-16 rifles with two magazines and 206 bullets, and another SKS rifle with one magazine and twenty bullets.

19 October 2003, the corpse of Aswan was found in a forest near Masara village, Lembo subdistrict. Aswan was one of the armed attackers involved in a fight with security forces near Pawaru village (neighboring Masara village) in Lembo subdistrict on 18 October 2003.

21 October 2003, Muhammed Dong alias Madong was shot and killed by a joint force of military and police as he reportedly attempted to flee into the forest between the villages of Mahoni and Beteleme, Lembo subdistrict, Morowali district. His body was paraded around the city of Poso where his death was cheered. His body was then flown to his hometown in Ampana.

27 October 2003, Fredy, 22, a resident of Pinedapa village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict, was killed by a sniper. He was shot twice, once in the chest, and once in the thigh while on the way to his farm in Pinedapa village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict.

11 November 2003, bomb exploded in the garage of the PO Omega bus company in Tentena, Pamona Utara subdistrict.

15 November 2003, police shot and killed Hamid alias Ami, 18, a suspect in the 12 October 2003 attacks in Poso Pesisir and resident of Tabalu village in Kasiguncu, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. Hamid's family protested and accused the police of failing to follow procedure (fire a warning shot). An angry crowd gathered in front of the Poso police station, burning tires and one motorcycle.

16 November 2003, Denis Limungkiwa, 27, from Wawopada village in Lembo subdistrict, Morowali district, was killed by a mob in front of the Poso central market, 100 metres from the police station. The body was thrown into the river behind the market and subsequently taken to the public hospital for an autopsy. He was identified as a member of the National Armed Forces (TNI) from Yonif 711 Raksatama. Unidentified

attackers shot and killed Drs. James Tadjaja alias Oranye Tadjaja, 60, resident of Tentena in Pamona Utara subdistrict and his driver Yohannes Tadjaja also known as Alubudje (Buce), 35, a resident of Tentena, Pamona Utara subdistrict. The former was the treasurer of the Christian Church of Central Sulawesi (GKST) and head of the Peace and Prosperity political party (Partai Damai Sejahtera, PDS) in Poso. The Alugoro bus was delayed by crowds in the village of Kuku, Lage subdistrict, approximately 25 kilometres from Poso city. Husain Garusu, 45, an employee at the mayor's office in Palu, was reported missing after he left the bus to urinate.

24 November 2003, bomb explodes in Kayamanya village, Poso Kota subdistrict. No victims.

25 November 2003, group of unidentified men opened fire in Bukit Bambu, Lawanga village, Poso Kota subdistrict. The police evacuated 53 families. Bukit Bambu is a border town between Muslim and Christian villages.

26 November 2003, early in the morning of the second day of Idul Fitri, a bomb exploded on Pulau Irian street in Gebang Rejo village, Poso Kota subdistrict, near a store empty since 1999. The police found another bomb, which did not explode, at the scene.

29 November 2003, I Made Simson, 30, and I Ketut Sarma, 55, Balinese migrants, were shot and killed by unidentified attackers in Kilo Trans village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict. Security forces reported only that the attackers rode motorcycles. A bomb exploded in Poso central market, Poso city, Poso Kota subdistrict. No victims were reported. Marowo-Rompi-Tobamawu village in Ulu Bongka subdistrict, Toja Una Una district was attacked, resulting in the death of Ruslan Terampi, 33 (also reported as Ruslan Tarapit), and Arifin Bode, 36, and injuries to four. The police reported that the attackers opened fire while the victims were praying in church. Two youth rode a motorcycle through So'e village, Pamona Utara subdistrict. They hit a police car and it rolled into the ditch. The police officer was angry and ordered members of Brimob to chase them. Shots were fired. Beny, 26, of Tentena was hit in the arm. Both youths fled to Tentena to tell their story. Local residents protested in front of the police station in Pamona Utara, throwing stones at patrol cars and the front window of the police station. One protestor was shot in the back.

30 November 2003, residents of Tiwa'a village, Poso Pesisir subdistrict heard gunshots which lead to widespread panic. No victims reported.

4 December 2003, Hidayat, 19, and Vivin, 21 were shot in an attack on Gatot Subroto street in Kasintuwu village, Poso Kota subdistrict, by two unidentified attackers on motorcycles.

APPENDIX D

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (ICG) is an independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with over 90 staff members on five continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

ICG's approach is grounded in field research. Teams of political analysts are located within or close by countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violent conflict. Based on information and assessments from the field, ICG produces regular analytical reports containing practical recommendations targeted at key international decision-takers. ICG also publishes *CrisisWatch*, a 12-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct regular update on the state of play in all the most significant situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.

ICG's reports and briefing papers are distributed widely by email and printed copy to officials in foreign ministries and international organisations and made generally available at the same time via the organisation's Internet site, www.crisisweb.org. ICG works closely with governments and those who influence them, including the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate support for its policy prescriptions.

The ICG Board – which includes prominent figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring ICG reports and recommendations to the attention of senior policy-makers around the world. ICG is chaired by former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari; and its President and Chief Executive since January 2000 has been former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.

ICG's international headquarters are in Brussels, with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York, London and Moscow. The organisation currently operates thirteen field offices (in Amman, Belgrade, Bogotá, Cairo, Freetown, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kathmandu, Nairobi, Osh, Pristina, Sarajevo and Tbilisi) with analysts working in over 40 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents. In Africa, those countries include Burundi, Rwanda, the Democratic

Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; in Asia, Indonesia, Myanmar, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Kashmir and Nepal; in Europe, Albania, Bosnia, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America, Colombia.

ICG raises funds from governments, charitable foundations, companies and individual donors. The following governmental departments and agencies currently provide funding: the Australian Agency for International Development, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Canadian International Development Agency, the Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the German Foreign Office, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese International Cooperation Agency, the Luxembourgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, the Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Taiwan), the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the United Kingdom Department for International Development, the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic Philanthropies, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William & Flora Hewlett Foundation, Henry Luce Foundation Inc., John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, John Merck Fund, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation, Open Society Institute, Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community Endowment Fund, the United States Institute of Peace and the Fundação Oriente.

February 2004

APPENDIX E

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* The Algeria project was transferred from the Africa Program to the Middle East & North Africa Program in January 2002.

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