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Burundi: Time for Tough Messages
Burundi: Time for Tough Messages
Burundi: Charm Offensive or Real Change?
Burundi: Charm Offensive or Real Change?
Statement / Africa

Burundi: Time for Tough Messages

Amid continued violence and a dangerous polarisation between the Burundi government and opposition, a delegation of African Union (AU) heads of state will visit Bujumbura on 25-26 February. Mandated by the recent AU summit and led by South African President Jacob Zuma, the five heads of state need to deliver tough messages to both President Pierre Nkurunziza and the armed opposition. These should include insistence on a credible dialogue outside the country, an end to the armed opposition’s provocative attacks, a halt to impunity and ongoing killings, and respect for the Arusha Peace Agreement that brought an end to the country’s twelve-year civil war.

Recent Crisis Group research in Bujumbura, Kigali, Nairobi and Brussels, points to an increasingly volatile situation. Since the attacks on military installations in the capital on 11 December 2015, the regime is further cracking down on the few dissenting voices that have not fled the country, and its Imbonerakure militia is taking an ever more prominent position in the fracturing security forces. With no plan but to stay in power as long as possible, the regime and its hardline supporters are increasingly turning to an ethnic rhetoric that unjustifiably paints all opposition as a plot by the minority Tutsi community.

To contain the crisis and put the country on track to a sustainable peace, the AU, European Union (EU), UN and other international partners need to focus on four key demands, backed up by pressure in four key areas.

Four actions the AU High-level Delegation and international partners should insist on:

  1. Genuine dialogue.

The government of Burundi is persuaded that it does not need to talk to the opposition, the vast majority now driven abroad. It is therefore pushing ahead with a “national dialogue” in Burundi. This is dangerous and short-sighted. Both within the country and outside, there is anger at government corruption, lack of development and violence. Without real talks starting soon this will translate into further armed resistance. Because most of the opposition is afraid to go home, and with good reason, the dialogue should be held outside the country, without preconditions, and with appropriate security measures for all parties.

  1. An end to the incipient insurgency.

By militarising the crisis the armed opposition is fuelling the regime’s siege mentality and ensuring that hardliners keep the upper hand. Its members and backers need to understand that their actions could lead to even greater violence against the populations they purport to protect. The AU delegation and other international actors need to put pressure on the armed opposition to stop its attacks and provocations.

  1. A halt to impunity and an end to the killings.

The government made some cosmetic improvements in anticipation of various high-level visits this week, including that of the UN Secretary-General on 22 February. It cancelled international arrest warrants for those alleged to have taken part in the failed May 2015 coup, including fifteen political exiles. During the visit of the UN Secretary-General it promised to release 2,000 prisoners, though it is not clear if this means government opponents. It has also allowed two media outlets to reopen. However, killings on the streets of Bujumbura, which spiked following the mid-December attacks, have continued. The extent of the violence remains contested, but available evidence indicates a pattern of violence and counter-violence, with many dozens dead already this year. Aside from the need to clarify the scale of casualties and respective responsibilities, there is clear risk of a cycle of violence setting in, with killings driven by revenge and fear – a pattern Burundians are all too familiar with. A climate of impunity has been established, which can only lay the ground for more violations and atrocities.

  1. Protection for the Arusha Agreement and the gains of the peace process.

As in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo, the Burundi government is the result of a power-sharing agreement to end a civil war, enshrined in the 2000 peace deal struck in Arusha. The relative peace that the country has enjoyed since then is a result of this accord, which guarantees the Tutsi minority a significant place in the country’s institutions. Yet Crisis Group research has found that regime hardliners increasingly portray opposition as a Tutsi conspiracy to grab more power, and call for the compromises of Arusha to be undone. They mistakenly believe that through ever greater repression they can dismantle the political aspects of the peace deal, but keep the peace.

A national debate on how to adapt the Arusha peace deal to changing times would be perfectly legitimate (if freedom of expression could be ensured). But unilaterally dismantling the gains of the last fifteen years through demagogical rhetoric is inflammatory. Burundi’s international partners, who invested so heavily in the peace process, should be bold enough to say so.

Four pressure points for the AU and other international partners:

The Burundian government has already shown its determination to continue its repressive course in the face of international outcry. To stop the spiral of violence and bring about the changes needed, the AU High-level Delegation, as well as Burundi’s international partners, should use leverage in four key areas.

  1. Diplomacy: stronger, more consistent, better coordinated.

International pressure on Burundi has been inadequate, and attempts at mediation since the start of the crisis, have been fragmented and faltering. The government has been able to play one institution off another. It is therefore vital that the AU, the East African Community and the UN speak with one voice. Whoever plays the role of lead international mediator needs to have the full backing of all three organisations, devote considerable energy to the task, and be willing to pass tough messages to the government and the opposition.

  1. Sanctions: targeted and benchmarked.

Like the diplomatic effort, sanctions on Burundi have been uncoordinated and half-hearted. In particular, the AU, which has the greatest leverage given that regime and opposition leaders travel and have assets in the region, has delayed implementing the decision taken by its Peace and Security Council (PSC) in the communiqué of 17 October 2015 to impose targeted sanctions in the hope the situation would improve. Despite the government’s efforts to appear in full control, it is not. The AU should therefore revisit individual sanctions against those blocking negotiation or inciting violence – government and opposition alike. International partners should also find creative ways of shutting down the illicit economy controlled by hardliners and probably used to pay the Imbonerakure militia that has grown up around the country.

Burundi’s civil war in the 1990s was brought to an end only after strong pressure from African countries on the belligerent parties, including an exceptionally tough sanctions regime. Prompt action in a similar vein could help avoid prolonged pain this time. Sanctions must be clearly benchmarked against reducing violence, ending impunity and starting dialogue.

  1. International presence: increased, keeping an intervention force on the table.

The recent announcement that the small contingent of AU observers in Burundi will be increased is welcome. But it should be only a beginning. More observers are needed, at least the proposed 100 envisaged by the AUPSC in its 17 October 2015 communiqué. They should be fully empowered to travel freely and monitor events, which should help discourage violence and abuse of power. It is vital that they provide a clearer picture than is currently available of levels of, and responsibilities for, violence by regime supporters and opposition, in order to better inform international positions. A commitment to peaceful resolution necessitates welcoming the observers and facilitating their work. They should report fully to their superiors in Addis Ababa and the public should be made aware of their primary findings.

The option of a UN police component, considered by some UN Security Council members, should remain on the table. Collectively, the AU and UN must make clear that if violence escalates, they will be prepared for a rapid intervention of some form to stem the bloodletting.

In addition, the AU and UN should put in place robust monitoring in refugee camps in neighbouring countries, where reportedly most recruitment is taking place. Rwanda is alleged to be backing the armed opposition according to a recently leaked UN Group of Experts Report, as well as other research. The Rwandan government denies this, but is concerned about Tutsis being targeted in Burundi.

  1. Funding: responsible, accountable.

Burundi’s army makes a significant contribution to the AU’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and also contributes to the UN mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Funds for these missions are paid directly to the government, which takes a large share before paying its soldiers. This money provides a vital lifeline to the regime enabling it to resist international pressure – including from the organisations paying its troops. Crisis Group research indicates that the government is rewarding Imbonerakure militia for their participation in violent acts with posts in the police and even the army. The risk of them being further rewarded with much prized spots in AMISOM is apparent, reinforcing the need for effective vetting prior to deployment.

This situation, in which donors are funding the government as it restructures the security forces around its loyalist militia, is unsustainable. Preparations should be made immediately for the gradual and controlled withdrawal of Burundian military contingents from all AU and UN peacekeeping operations. To avoid leaving the mission in Somalia without sufficient forces, serious effort is needed to find other troop contributors. AU staff should also conduct a thorough review of the risks for stability in Burundi as a result of the repatriation of these AMISOM soldiers, which in any case should be gradual. The credibility of such efforts will be vital to ensure that the government gets the message – move to real dialogue, or have your last major source of licit funding cut off.

Nairobi/Brussels

Evariste Ndayishimiye, Burundi's elected President from the ruling party, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy - Forces for the Defense of Democracy, attends the swearing-in ceremony at Ingoma stadium in Gitega, Burundi, on 18 June 2020. ONESPHORE NIBIGIRA / AFP
Q&A / Africa

Burundi: Charm Offensive or Real Change?

In his year in office, Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye has shown an appetite for reform and re-engagement with international partners. In this Q &A, Crisis Group experts assess whether ruling-party hardliners will hold the country back from turning a corner.

A year ago, Ndayishimiye took office only days after the unexpected death of his predecessor Pierre Nkurunziza. Does the new president represent continuity or change?

Elected in May 2020, President Evariste Ndayishimiye assumed power over a deeply troubled country. He took the reins from his late predecessor Pierre Nkurunziza, who had led Burundi into a protracted crisis over his fifteen years in office and had died shortly after Ndayishimiye’s election.

The country is still reeling from the former president’s successful bid to stay on for a third term in office in 2015. Many saw Nkurunziza’s manoeuvre then as contrary to the 2000 Arusha Accords, which brought an end to a brutal civil war between the ethnic Tutsi minority that had ruled for decades and the Hutu majority. These machinations led in 2015 to street protests, a failed coup attempt, a crackdown and the exodus of over 400,000 people.

After winning flawed elections that year, Nkurunziza stepped up crackdowns on the media, opposition and civil society groups, and increasingly insisted on outlandish displays of public devotion: the ruling party formally referred to him as a “visionary” and the “supreme guide for patriotism”. Donors including the European Union (EU), concerned by mounting rights abuses, cut direct budget support to Burundi. As investor confidence tanked and standards of living plummeted, the ruling party’s Imbonerakure youth militia, key to Nkurunziza’s machinery of repression, began collecting forced financial contributions from the exhausted citizenry. Burundi’s relationship with neighbouring Rwanda also nosedived. Nkurunziza accused his counterpart Paul Kagame of supporting proxy armed groups against Burundi, and vice versa.

While Ndayishimiye’s rise to power marked the end of Nkurunziza’s personality cult, the new president will still have to placate powerful factions in the ruling Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie – Forces pour la défense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD), which started its life as a Hutu rebel group before turning into a political organisation in 2003. The CNDD-FDD’s selection of Ndayishimiye, who had previously held various government positions as well as the post of party secretary-general, reveals much about where power truly lies in the party. At first, it appeared that Nkurunziza was pushing for his ally Pascal Nyabenda, the former president of the National Assembly, to succeed him. It was only after intense lobbying by top generals that Ndayishimiye, himself a former senior army officer, finally won the candidacy. Having risen to power largely at the behest of powerful party security chiefs to whom he now owes his presidency, he will be under pressure to ensure they remain happy with him.

Indeed, after securing electoral victory for the CNDD-FDD, which now holds a majority in both the National Assembly (86 0f 123 seats) and the Senate (34 of 39 seats), Ndayishimiye has appointed generals and security hardliners to top positions. His fifteen-member cabinet includes Prime Minister Alain-Guillaume Bunyoni and Interior Minister Gervais Ndirakobuca, who are both under EU and U.S. sanctions for their role in crackdowns during the 2015 crisis.

Even with a majority in parliament, repression remains a key tool for governing Burundi.

Even with a majority in parliament, repression remains a key tool for governing Burundi. According to Human Rights Watch and the UN Commission of Inquiry on Burundi, the Imbonerakure and the intelligence services continue to commit human rights violations, cracking down on civilians and opposition members, though to a lesser extent than prior to the elections. State institutions target for abuse specific groups such as members of the Congrès national pour la liberté (CNL) opposition party, young Tutsis and members of the army’s old guard, mainly Tutsi, whom the CNDD-FDD sees as a security threat. The government is also stepping up its efforts to track down and punish those involved in the 2015 failed coup.

What reforms has the new president been keen to push?

Despite government repression, Ndayishimiye is trying to go on a charm offensive with the media and some civil society groups. To demonstrate his bona fides, he has taken some modest positive steps to reverse past harms. To begin with, authorities have released four jailed journalists who work for Iwacu, one of Burundi’s few remaining independent media outlets, following a presidential pardon in December 2020. They had been detained since October 2019 while reporting on clashes between security forces and an armed group in Bubanza province. While the journalists’ release has moved these cases in the right direction, rights organisations say it is not enough, arguing that authorities have yet to reverse the unjust convictions in the courts.

The government has also opened up more media space. In January, authorities reopened negotiations with national and international media outlets. They cleared local radio station Bonesha FM for operations in February 2021 after forcing it to close in 2015, and did the same for the BBC, whose license was revoked in 2019, in June. In April, the government also lifted sanctions against Parcem, which was one of the last human rights advocacy groups operating in Burundi until its suspension in June 2019.

Ndayishimiye has meanwhile tried to demonstrate that he is serious about improving governance and tackling corruption, albeit with mixed results. When installing his new cabinet, he warned his ministers he could easily replace them if they failed to perform adequately and that he would not tolerate people “diverting a single cent from the budget planned to improve the well-being of Burundians”. He also gave members of his government three weeks to declare their assets to the public. He later backtracked, however, reportedly under CNDD-FDD pressure, stating that senior state officials and public officials will not be forced to comply. The arrest of Commerce Minister Immaculée Ndabaneze for alleged embezzlement in May was also short-lived, as she was quickly released.

After years of no progress at all, even modest reform efforts are welcome.

After years of no progress at all, even modest reform efforts are welcome, although diplomats differ on how meaningful the steps Ndayishimiye has taken will prove to be. While one diplomat told Crisis Group that this administration and its predecessor are like “night and day”, others suggested that anti-corruption measures could be “political window dressing” and thus far do not indicate a commitment to comprehensive reform. Similarly, these sceptics tend to play down the arrests and convictions of a small number of police officers and Imbonerakure on criminal charges given that security force and militia repression and rights abuses reportedly still continue, even if at lower levels.

The president has also come out with a national strategy to handle the COVID-19 outbreak, which Nkurunziza had stated would be neutralised by God. Right after assuming office, Ndayishimiye began a national campaign against the virus’s spread, establishing a committee to sensitise the population about what preventive measures they could take while the government stepped up a national testing campaign. The country has also normalised relations with the World Health Organization (WHO), after expelling its representatives in May 2020, allowing the resumption of aid. Nevertheless, Burundi asked not to be included on the list to receive vaccines under the COVAX initiative pending their final WHO certification, and the government has repeatedly said acquiring doses is not a priority due to their elevated cost.

On foreign policy, Ndayishimiye has taken steps to re-engage Burundi’s partners. The new president has been keen to deliver on electoral promises of repairing relations with the country’ neighbours and international donors. He is acutely aware that the country’s shattered economy could benefit from better trading relationships with regional partners and direct financial support from influential donors, such as the EU. Since assuming office, he has visited eight countries on the continent, starting with Burundi’s key regional ally Tanzania and including Egypt, Kenya and Uganda. Foreign Minister Albert Shingiro, Burundi's former representative to the UN and previously an apologist for Nkurunziza’s isolationist foreign policy, has been instructed by Ndayishimiye to lead Burundi’s diplomatic offensive outside the continent. He also conducted a European tour in April and May, visiting Brussels at the invitation of the EU, France and Switzerland.

How have international and regional partners reacted to these developments?

Ndayishimiye’s domestic policies and diplomacy have won him gains in the halls of multilateral organisations.

Ndayishimiye’s domestic policies and diplomacy have won him gains in the halls of multilateral organisations. The Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie accepted Burundi back as a full member in November 2020 after suspending it following the 2015 political crisis. In December, the UN Security Council officially removed the country from its agenda. In February, the East African Community heads of state chose Ndayishimiye as rapporteur for the 2021-2022 term and as next chairman for 2022-2023. Even more significant were the closure of the African Union Human Rights Observers and Military Experts Mission as well as the Office of the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy in May, both established to monitor the situation in the country and find a way to end the violence. The special envoy’s office closed at the Burundian authorities’ request, stating that “in light of the country's progress in terms of peace and security, only UN presence of socio-economic nature is needed to support Burundi in its development efforts”.

Influential donors, in particular the EU, are also striking a different tone toward Burundi. In December 2020, the EU ambassador in Bujumbura stated that “Ndayishimiye’s new policy of openness constitutes a solid basis for the resumption of good cooperation”. In June, after only six months of talks between the Burundian authorities and the EU, the latter announced it would be willing to revoke its measure suspending financial aid, if and when Bujumbura makes certain additional reforms. But diplomats tell Crisis Group that the EU also decided to change its approach because the suspension of direct budgetary support and the application of sanctions against Burundian officials during Nkurunziza’s rule had not led to an improvement of the country’s situation. In fact, their governments worried that these measures may have simply provoked the authorites to turn to other partners, such as China, Russia and Turkey, thereby diluting Western influence further.

Relations with Rwanda have also started to improve, with important implications for regional security. When in office, Nkurunziza had openly accused Kigali of supporting the Burundian rebel group RED-Tabara, active in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and reportedly led by a Tutsi opponent of the Hutu-dominated Burundian regime. Rwanda had denied this allegation and in contrast stated that Burundi was supporting the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), a remnant of the Rwandan Hutu militia involved in the 1994 genocide, and also active in eastern Congo. The two presidents have yet to meet in person, but working-level meetings between government officials from the two countries are taking place. Greater cooperation between Rwandan and Burundian intelligence officials has also led to a de-escalation in tensions despite skirmishes involving armed groups on the border. Rwandan authorities have arrested at least nineteen RED-Tabara rebels, while Burundi’s government has promised to fight the FDLR.

Tensions persist, however, over Burundi’s request to hand over those responsible for the coup attempt in 2015 who found refuge in Rwanda. Kigali has so far refused but appeared sensitive to Bujumbura’s demands in March when three Burundian opposition radio stations operating from the Rwandan capital had to suspend their broadcasts.

What are the main risks and challenges moving forward?

A key challenge for partners and putative partners looking to see whether Burundi really is turning a corner is that international monitoring capacity has diminished and will continue to do so. After the closure of both the UN special envoy’s office and the African Union mission, the UN Commission of Inquiry is the only remaining internationally mandated body active in the country monitoring human rights abuses and the risk of further conflict. While briefing the UN Human Rights Council in March, the Commission stated that the situation is still “too complex and uncertain to be referred to as genuine improvement”. But despite the continued need for its analysis, its mandate will likely not be renewed in September. As a result, the responsibility to keep on top of the human rights and security situations in the country will be left in the hands of local organisations and donor country embassies, which may have reason to keep shining a light on the situation in the country.

As for risks, despite some signs that Ndayishimiye is trying to create a break from the damaging legacy of his predecessor, the CNDD-FDD has already signalled it is likely to monopolise power as hardliners from the party also entrench their bases. By appointing mainly Hutu politicians into government, Ndayishimiye has already disregarded provisions for proportional representation in the Arusha Agreement, which included power-sharing arrangements between Hutu and Tutsi political factions. In addition, the president tightened his grip on the legal system in January by approving the amendment to a law governing the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature, an institution officially mandated to guarantee the judiciary’s independence from the executive branch, but which in practice is headed by the president. The new law gives the president even more power, essentially by allowing him to do a quality check of all court judgments. An international monitor working on Burundi told Crisis Group that “everything is in place for full and total control” by the CNDD-FDD government.

Efforts by Ndayishimiye to push a reformist agenda that would dismantle the machinery of repression created by his predecessor may well meet resistance from the bowels of the ruling party, including those who were not necessarily in favour of his selection as the party candidate in 2020. Even those who did support him may not want to see him advance certain policies. Several generals, for example, are not in favour of rapprochement with the EU and any conditionality that may come with resumption of budgetary aid, having enriched themselves during Nkurunziza’s fifteen years in power. By the same token, a failure to reform may expose the country to an even more prolonged economic crisis and the political tensions that may go with it.