Les tensions croissantes entre le gouvernement, les chercheurs d’or et la population teda du Tibesti font craindre une escalade sécuritaire au Nord du Tchad, dans un contexte régional fragile. Les autorités devraient desserrer l’étau autour de la localité de Miski, éviter les discours réducteurs et rechercher le dialogue.
Intercommunal violence intensified in east leaving at least 34 people dead, Boko Haram (BH) continued attacks in west and govt took steps to avert protests over high cost of living. In east, Arab nomadic herders and ethnic Ouaddaï sedentary farmers clashed: Arab herders 16 May attacked Ouaddaï farmers in Katafa, leaving nine Ouaddaï and three Arabs dead; herders raided and burned villages of Amkaroka, Amsabarna and Amsiriye in Dar Sila province 19-20 May, leaving 22 people dead from both sides. In Lake Chad province in west, BH militants 16 May attacked Ceilia village, killing thirteen people. BH militants 25 May attacked army base in Ngouboua, leaving 23 BH combatants and at least one soldier dead; convoy travelling to scene of attack same day detonated mine, killing four soldiers and one journalist. One month after protests over high cost of living led to ouster of Sudanese President al-Bashir, Chadian govt 10 May removed import taxes on staple foods including rice, flour, cooking oil and dates to reduce prices and calm growing anger over high cost of living. Chair of National Framework for Political Dialogue (CNDP) Mahamat Zene Bada 13 May informed diplomats that legislative elections, initially scheduled for May 2019, would take place later this year without specifying exact date.
Les relations entre une frange de la jeunesse sahélienne et le gouvernement tchadien se détériorent, ce qui risque de nourrir les insurrections tchadiennes hors des frontières. Pour y remédier, les autorités devraient lutter contre l’impunité, y compris s’agissant des proches du pouvoir, et éviter les amalgames entre émigration et rébellion.
Créée en février 2017, la Force conjointe du G5 Sahel est une force de nouvelle génération dans un espace sahélien où se bousculent des initiatives militaires et diplomatiques parfois concurrentes. Il ne suffira pas de fournir des armes et de l’argent pour résoudre les crises sahéliennes. Pour atteindre ses objectifs, la force doit gagner la confiance des populations et des puissances régionales et obtenir leur soutien.
Since 2015, the conflict between Chad’s armed forces and Boko Haram has destabilised the Lake Chad region in the west of the country. Defeating this resilient insurgency requires the state to go beyond a purely military campaign and relaunch trade, improve public services and reintegrate demobilised militants.
Regional armies in the Lake Chad basin deploy vigilantes to sharpen campaigns against Boko Haram insurgents. But using these militias creates risks as combatants turn to communal violence and organised crime. Over the long term they must be disbanded or regulated.
Ahead of Chad’s presidential election on 10 April popular discontent is rising amid a major economic crisis, growing intra-religious tensions and deadly Boko Haram attacks. The regime that portrays itself as spearheading the fight against regional jihadism could see all sorts of violent actors gain influence at home if it pursues exclusionary politics and denies its people a viable social contract.
[There are no] significant indications of other violent extremist activity [in Chad aside from Boko Haram], so in that respect, [the decision to include Chad in the U.S. travel ban] is completely baffling.
Rural insurgencies across the Sahel are destabilising the region and undermining local security and governance. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2018, Crisis Group urges the EU and its member states to continue support for the Alliance for the Sahel and promote local dialogue to buttress law and order.
The West sees Chad as a reliable ally in the fight against extremists in the African Sahel. But it needs to take more care. Chad is breaking prior agreements by spending much of its oil revenue on the military, while social services and good governance have suffered.
The Boko Haram insurgency is weakening in the Lake Chad basin, but its underlying socio-economic drivers remain to be addressed. In this excerpt from our Watch List 2017, we urge the EU and its member states to support regional governments with winding down vigilante groups, funding youth employment projects, rebuilding agriculture and trade, and restoring public services.