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Chad’s North West: The Next High-risk Area?
Chad’s North West: The Next High-risk Area?
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Rebel Incursion Exposes Chad’s Weaknesses
Rebel Incursion Exposes Chad’s Weaknesses
Briefing 78 / Africa

Chad’s North West: The Next High-risk Area?

Chad’s North West may become the next stage for insurgency, drug-running and religious extremism in the Sahel if the government continues to actively neglect the poorest of the violence-plagued country’s poor regions.

I. Overview

For more than five years, public attention relative to Chad has been focused on the armed rebellion in the east and the crisis in the Darfur region of neighbouring Sudan, while totally neglecting the country’s North West. However, there are serious risks that the rise of trans-Sahara drug trafficking and terrorism, emergence of radical Muslim movements in neighbouring countries, development of inter-communal violence, decline of local traditional justice systems and lack of state governance will destabilise that ignored region. The authorities in N’Djamena need to move to change the governance system there and defuse the multiple roots of potential conflict before a crisis explodes.

Historically, the North West has played an ambivalent but pivotal role between the Arab-Islamic culture of North Africa and the sub-Saharan African cultures. Presently, its strategic position makes it increasingly the target of infiltration attempts by armed groups and criminal networks that take advantage of the no-man’s-land areas of the Sahara Desert to expand their activities. Islamic terrorist groups from Northern Nigeria (the Boko Haram sect) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) operating in the Sahel region are making their diffuse but real influence felt. Up to now, this dangerous neighbourhood has not produced instability, but greater vigilance is definitely needed.

Since the end of the 1990s, the government has not been able to reconcile the communities, despite the improved regional security context following the progressive dismantling of the two main rebel groups operating in the region: the Movement for Democratisation and Development (Mouvement pour la démocratie et le développement, MDD), and the Movement for Democratisation and Justice in Chad (Mouvement pour la démocratie et la justice au Tchad, MDJT). The continuous decline of the local traditional justice systems and environmental degradation contribute to the precarious quality of the region’s stability.

In such a context, inter-communal political manipulation is likely to awaken old resentments and aggravate local grievances. Moreover, N’Djamena neglects the North West, as shown by its reactions to the very predictable food crisis that began in 2009 and the flood that destroyed the city of Faya Largeau in July 2010. Instead of implementing a sustainable development policy, the authorities make empty promises and prolong the old colonial mode of governance, based on tight regional control via traditional leaders and security forces.

Although major trouble is still unlikely in the short term, there is already a high level of tension between pastoralists and farmers. The North West, which provided many fighters during Chad’s earlier civil wars, thus has the potential to become the country’s new hot spot. To prevent this, the government needs to promptly improve the way it runs the region, focus on the attempts by international criminal and terrorist networks to expand their influence and tackle inter-communal tensions by:

  • setting up a regional development plan to improve governance in the North West and build social infrastructure and roads. This plan should be based on the demands of the local communities and include financial incentives for civil servants to work there, rational administrative coverage of the territory and appropriate rules for integrating traditional leaders into the new local governance system. N’Djamena must treat development and security as inter-linked issues, given that significant development programs could contribute to calming the situation in the region;    
     
  • updating and implementing local and national justice systems with respect to the role of traditional leaders and the relationship of natural resource issues to conflicts, especially those between pastoralists and farmers, which require reform of the land tenure system, a disarmament program and dispute resolution mechanisms run by neutral authorities;
     
  • creating a regional police unit with adequate legal powers and logistical resources (communication equipment, cars, and helicopters) to monitor and secure the North West border. External partners of Chad like France and the U.S. should offer training and operational mentoring to the unit that will be under the authority of the interior ministry; and
     
  • pursuing involvement in pan-Sahel and Sahara initiatives that seek to improve international cooperation and exchange of information on countering terrorism and drug trafficking and promoting joint operations with the neighbouring countries, especially Niger, Nigeria and Libya.
French mirage 2000-D from the Barkhane force lands after a tactical mission in N'Djamena on 22 December 2018. French president is on visit to meet with Chadian president and with soldiers from the Barkhane mission in Africa's Sahel region. Ludovic MARIN / AFP
Q&A / Africa

Rebel Incursion Exposes Chad’s Weaknesses

Une incursion de l’Union des forces de la résistance (UFR) en territoire tchadien depuis la Libye, début février, a été arrêtée par des frappes aériennes françaises, en coordination avec l’armée tchadienne. Cette menace sécuritaire inédite depuis plusieurs années met en relief les fragilités du Tchad et du pouvoir en place.   

What happened?

On 3-6 February 2019, at the request of N’Djamena, planes from the French Operation Barkhane proceeded with a series of strikes against a group of Chadian rebels in the north east of the country. According to rebels’ spokesperson Youssouf Hamid Ishagh, the Union of Resistance Forces (Union des forces de la résistance – UFR), a coalition based in Libya, intended to reach the capital N’Djamena in order to overthrow President Idriss Déby and “set up a transitional government uniting all of the country’s forces”. The plan was aborted following the French intervention. Composed mainly of Zaghawa fighters from Déby’s own ethnic community, this rebel movement is directed by Timan Erdimi, the president’s nephew, who lives in Qatar. He first tried to overthrow his uncle in 2008, and again in 2009 after forming the UFR.

According to a statement released by the Chadian army on 9 February 2019, “more than 250 terrorists, including four leaders” were captured, and over forty of their vehicles destroyed. These figures were refuted by Ishagh, who described them as fanciful.

The Chadian political opposition has criticised the French military intervention, the first in Chad since 2008, which it views as new proof of France’s unconditional support for Idriss Déby, while expressing its opposition to any takeover of power by force. These incursions took place as other Chadian armed groups are increasingly active at the country’s borders, and as the president is under pressure from an economic crisis and several years of social unrest.

By asking France’s military forces to intervene on his territory for the first time since 2008, President Déby showed that he took the risk very seriously.

Paris defended its intervention, conducted “in response to a request from Chadian authorities”, and justified it by the need to preserve stability in both Chad and the sub-region. The French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves le Drian declared in front of parliament on 12 February that “France intervened militarily to prevent a coup d’Etat”. French authorities added that Chad is a strategic ally whose army is deployed in operations against terrorism in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.

What is the link with Chad’s domestic context?

By asking France’s military forces to intervene on his territory for the first time since 2008, President Déby showed that he took the risk very seriously. This is due to a domestic situation marked by growing social upheaval, but also to burgeoning dissent within his own ethnic community, which the rebels hope to exploit.

The capture of state resources has long generated tension among the Zaghawa and even within the presidential family. When Déby came to power in 1990, Zaghawa military and political leaders, including the president’s nephews, Timan Erdimi and his brother Tom Erdimi, helped organise a strong autocratic system around a new political party, the Patriotic Salvation Movement (Mouvement patriotique du Salut – MPS). Timan and Tom both served as chief of staff to the president before taking up strategic positions – respectively director of Chad’s cotton parastatal company, at that time a public entity, and head of national oil projects. But in the early 2000s, Déby’s plan to revise the constitution in order to stand for re-election in 2006 led to a break with the Erdimi brothers, who saw themselves as his “natural” successors. This resulted in large-scale defections of Presidential Guard officers and senior administration officials, and the creation of rebel groups in Sudan. Later, the presidential family made unsuccessful attempts to reconcile Idriss Déby and Timan Erdimi.

Other events provoked clashes among the Zaghawa. In 2009, his rapprochement with Sudan caused tension between the president and some of his clan who supported the rebellion in Darfur. Finally, in recent years, the growing influence of Déby’s wife, Hinda, an ethnic Arab from the Ouaddaï region in the east of the country, and the appointment of her relatives to positions of responsibility, has generated new disputes among Idriss Déby’s family members.

The UFR’s recent incursion sought to take advantage of these tensions in order to encourage defections within the army, promote an internal uprising and provoke a reversal of alliances among the president’s entourage.

On 6 February 2019, Timan’s brother Tom Erdimi, living in exile in the U.S., addressed an audio message in Arabic to the Chadian military, calling them to join the UFR and overthrow Déby. “We call on you to join us. We are not far... We do not want to kill you; we do not wish to die either. The blood of Chadians has flowed too much already”, he said. A few days later, he echoed a complaint from soldiers’ families when he added in a further audio message: “[the government] sends Chadian soldiers to die abroad without honour and without money for their families”.

Aside from strong support from part of the Zaghawa, at one time the Erdimi brothers also had good relations with politicians and intellectuals from the rest of the country, including the south. Many Zaghawa fear that their influence and interests will be threatened and that they could be the target of violence once President Déby is replaced or dies. The Erdimi brothers promise, should they come to power, to safeguard their interests while also undertaking to open a transitional period involving non-Zaghawa. But most Chadians are opposed to yet another violent coup d’Etat, and the UFR’s attempts to attract a broader consortium of discontented citizens to their movement did not prove successful.

The incursion started out in Libya, and the UFR has support in the Darfur region of Sudan. How is the situation in these two countries related to recent events in Chad?

This crisis has come about in a particular geopolitical context. In Libya, Marshal Khalifa Haftar is trying to change the strategic picture by leading a major offensive on southern cities, putting pressure on Chadian rebel groups in the area. In Sudan, President Omar al-Bashir, who forged an alliance with Déby in 2009, appears weakened by months of popular uprisings.

Like other Chadian rebel groups, including the Front for Change and Concord in Chad (Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad – FACT), the Military Command Council for the Salvation of the Republic (Conseil de commandement militaire pour le salut de la République – CCMSR) and the Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (Union des forces pour la démocratie et le développement – UFDD), the UFR shifted to southern Libya following its expulsion from Darfur in western Sudan by Khartoum in 2010. These groups do not agree on what strategies to adopt, they are divided along ethnic lines and by personal ambitions, and have even competed against each other. Their fighters engage in various forms of trafficking and sometimes work as mercenaries for Libyan militias.

Although Chad’s security situation seems to have stabilised, Déby’s call for help from France shows that the Chadian army, often portrayed as strong, also has its weaknesses.

The UFR’s incursion into Chad was likely precipitated by the offensive launched in mid-January by the Libyan National Army (LNA) of Khalifa Haftar, seeking to extend his hold over southern Libya. While the UFR spokesperson insists that the incursion of fighters into northern Chad was planned for a long time and has no connection with the LNA’s operation, other members of the group recognise that the pressure exerted by Haftar’s forces pushed them to promptly cross the border.

The LNA’s operation is officially aimed at combating terrorists, criminal gangs and foreign armed groups operating in the region. Although alliances in the Libyan civil war fluctuate constantly, the UFR was at one time close to the Misrata militia and the Benghazi defence brigades, Haftar’s rivals. Close to Paris, and an ally of N’Djamena in the region, Haftar often targeted the positions of Chadian rebels in southern Libya. It is possible that among other objectives, his advance aims to weaken them further.

In the 2000s, armed insurrections against Déby from Darfur, then in the grip of a civil war, twice reached N’Djamena and came close to overthrowing him. Since the signing of a peace agreement between N’Djamena and Khartoum at the end of 2009, al-Bashir ended his support to Chadian rebel groups, including Timan Erdimi’s UFR. Nevertheless, the UFR maintains close ties with Darfuri groups, including the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), and some of its fighters continue to move back and forth between Libya and Sudan. If al-Bashir’s power was to be threatened, so would be the agreement between the two countries, which ultimately relies on the good will of the two presidents. That said, although the situation remains unstable following months of demonstrations, al-Bashir still appears to have the support of his security forces.

What are the prospects and what risks can be identified?

As in 2008, France’s military intervention came in support of the Chadian authorities and President Déby. While most Chadians reject any attempt to grab power by force and condemn the incursions of rebel groups into their territory, many also criticise the support given by France and the international community in general to the country’s current leadership. It is true that international actors have thus far failed to exert enough pressure on Chadian authorities to push them to engage in a truly inclusive political dialogue.

Although Chad’s security situation seems to have stabilised, Déby’s call for help from France shows that the Chadian army, often portrayed as strong, also has its weaknesses. According to several officers interviewed by Crisis Group, the army, present in several theatres of operation (in Mali, in the countries of the Lake Chad region and on several home fronts including Tibesti, at the border with Libya), is overworked and some soldiers are demoralised. The situation is made worse by cuts in soldiers’ allowances implemented in recent years (up to December 2018) to cope with the financial crisis following a fall in oil prices. In this context, groups like the UFR will undoubtedly continue to encourage desertions. More generally, recent events call into question the strength of Déby’s rule, which largely relies on the army, and underline the fragility of a country led by the region’s “strongman”.

Contributors

Project Director, Central Africa
richmoncrieff
Consulting Senior Analyst, Central Africa