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Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security
Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security
Table of Contents
  1. Overview
Mass Deportations Only Fuel A Cycle Of Violence And Migration
Mass Deportations Only Fuel A Cycle Of Violence And Migration
A man rides in a donkey cart past Kenya policemen as he crosses from Kenya into Somalia at the border town of Mandera, 5 December 2014. REUTERS/Goran Tomasevic
Briefing 114 / Africa

Kenya’s Somali North East: Devolution and Security

Clan politics, poor services, growing corruption and disarray in the security forces are undermining Kenya’s newly formed north-eastern counties, allowing the violently extremist Al-Shabaab movement to infiltrate over the border from Somalia. To build security and capitalise on devolution’s potential, national government and county elites alike must become more pragmatic and inclusive.

I. Overview

Devolved government in Kenya’s newly formed north-eastern counties, designed to address decades of political marginalisation and underdevelopment, has been undermined by dominant clans monopolising power and growing corruption. Violent clan competition and antipathy between elected county elites and the remaining national administrative structures have allowed the violently extremist Al-Shabaab movement to expand and operate with relative impunity across large areas of the North East. Its attacks exposed security-service disarray and caused a sharp reversal of already stretched state services in this vast and poor region that shares a porous 680km border with Somalia. To end the violence and capitalise on devolution’s potential, county elites must be more inclusive of minorities, cooperate across local boundaries for inter-county peace and recognise the continued role for neutral national institutions. National government should recognise where pragmatism can trump convention and back new security approaches that combine national and county responses.

Rampant criminality, inter-clan animosities and small-arms proliferation stretch policing and render highly insecure the sprawling refugee camps that host more than 350,000 Somali nationals fleeing the conflict in their country. This is compounded by Al-Shabaab infiltration, radicalisation and recruitment – especially in a borderland region where the inhabitants’ national identity is historically contested and suspect. As relations between the refugees and their Kenyan Somali host communities fray, demands for the camps’ closure are becoming more strident.

After lengthy bureaucratic infighting and knee-jerk initiatives that smacked of political score-settling and risked alienating many Kenyan Somalis, a new security approach is finally in place, led by senior national security officers who vitally have local roots (ie, Somali heritage) but are directly accountable to the national executive. This has temporarily helped bridge a breakdown in cooperation, especially in local intelligence-sharing, between county commissioners appointed by the president and newly-elected county governments that resented their security oversight. Whether this approach is applicable to other insecure areas with historically-strained relations with the centre is yet to be seen.

A purely security-focused approach, however innovative, is in any event not a panacea. The new devolved county governments must share responsibility for chronic insecurity instead of continually deflecting blame to the centre. Most importantly, the inclination, with some notable exceptions, for a winner-takes-all approach to county politics will only generate further insecurity, as will the deepening problem of graft. With the second “devolved” elections in 2017 promising to be even more competitive than those in 2013, consensus on minimum provisions for cross-clan inclusion is needed now.

New county elites underutilise existing peace-making structures (“local peace committees”, community-based organisations and clerics) and prefer “county-owned” forums dependent on – often compromised – clan elders, while keeping the national government and its good offices at a distance and ignoring or sidelining women and youth networks. The government should establish an independent commission of national and local experts to offer solutions on the contentious issues at the core of the inter-clan frictions, such as borders, land, wells and justice and restitution for losses.

Finally, the national and county governments urgently need to reestablish social services (especially health and education) at the same time as they strengthen the security sector. Education can help reduce poverty, promote integration among ethnic and religious groups and fight extremism; and, at least in the medium term, more resources should be allocated to lift its standards. Donors, multilateral and bilateral alike, have clear incentives to give developmental aid that supports successful devolution and enhances Kenyan and regional security.

Nairobi/Brussels, 17 November 2015 

Mass Deportations Only Fuel A Cycle Of Violence And Migration

Originally published in Huffington Post

Every day a stream of anxious passengers disembarks at San Pedro Sula airport, weary from the flight and weighed down by a lifetime’s worth of luggage. But these passengers are not coming to Honduras by choice: They have been deported, from either Mexico or the United States.

Between January and April 2018, the reception center at the transport hub received 23,601 arrivals, about 64 percent from Mexico, which has for some time acted as the long arm of U.S. migration control. The country stops many Central American migrants before they ever reach the U.S. border. 

Now, across the U.S., some 57,000 Hondurans, along with 195,000 Salvadorans, are asking when they might face the same uncertain future. In early 2018, the Trump administration announced the termination of the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program for beneficiaries from both El Salvador and Honduras. The program allowed recipients to work and live legally in the U.S.

The administration decided that the conditions justifying the TPS for both countries – natural disasters that happened close to 20 years ago – no longer applied. This decision will pose challenges not just for the U.S. (It will cost taxpayers $3.1 billion to deport 252,000 TPS holders and their 245,000 children), but also for Central America. The increased deportations will put even more stress on countries struggling with economic hardship and rampant gang brutality.

Deportation will leave many feeling uprooted: Between 30 and 50 percent of TPS holders has lived in the U.S. for more than two decades. For many arrivals in the San Pedro Sula and San Salvador airports, home is Maryland, Los Angeles or New York. Their official “welcome back” to Honduras or El Salvador lasts for a few hours in a crowded airport annex, where functionaries shout instructions about getting national ID cards. “That is the last time you hear from them,” said one young Salvadoran deportee.

Most deportees will struggle to make a living without interacting with organized crime, which owes its prevalence in Central America partly to previous waves of U.S. deportations.

After that, deportees must fend for themselves. If they’re lucky, they get jobs in call centers, a booming industry in Central America thanks to generous tax incentives, low operating costs and a constant flow of newly arrived English-speaking employees. In El Salvador, call centers employ about 20,000 people.

However, most deportees will struggle to make a living without interacting with organized crime, which owes its prevalence in Central America partly to previous waves of U.S. deportations. In 1996, the U.S. Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, whereby non-U.S. convicts had to be deported to their home countries.

As a result, Central America absorbed 46,000 deportees with criminal record from the U.S. between 1998 and 2005. This prompted the expansion of U.S.-bred gang culture across El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras and midwifed such notorious groups as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18. El Salvador has the highest population of gang members – some 65,000 – with a further half a million people considered sympathizers or dependents.

Today, should new deportees want to start a business, most will have to deal with the local gang – the de facto authority in many barrios. Gangs are present in 247 of 262 of El Salvador’s municipalities and extort 70 percent of businesses there, according to the online newspaper El Faro.

“Every single thing that takes place in this neighborhood has the green light of the clique [the gang’s local cells],” said an NGO worker as we walked in a San Salvador district controlled by the MS-13. “You may not see them, but they are watching you right now.” The damage of gang activity to El Salvador’s economy is estimated at 16 percent of the country’s GDP.

Youths are perhaps the most vulnerable to gang influence. Many boys are asked to join the local gang and threatened if they refuse. Entire families are displaced trying to prevent their kids from being forcibly recruited, usually when they are 12 to 16 years old. Girls may face worse. A social worker in Tegucigalpa, the capital of Honduras, told me about a girl who an MS-13 gangster had made a sex slave. Every day for two years, he snatched the girl up after school, raped and abused her, and returned her home in the morning. She eventually ran away with her parents. Why didn’t the family report what was going on? The social worker replied: “Fear is a big thing here…. And where would they go? The police?”

Despite a recent fall in the murder rate and police reform efforts, Hondurans have ever more reasons to flee.

Despite a recent fall in the murder rate and police reform efforts, Hondurans have ever more reasons to flee. Security forces are understaffed and poorly trained – and very often corrupt. Their links to gangs scare many victims away from reporting crimes due to fear of retaliation. Meanwhile, the country’s chronic political crisis has intensified since the 2017 general elections, which sparked violent unrest following a dispute over the results. In the months following the clashes, the number of undocumented Honduran migrants apprehended in Mexico rose sharply.

Conditions in El Salvador are similarly inhospitable. The country’s murder rate rose slightly more than 15 percent in the first three months of 2018 compared to the previous year. In 2016, the country’s Congress approved of a set of “extraordinary measures” ― prison and law enforcement rules aimed at limiting inmates’ communication. The gangs’ violent response to these policies, as well as internal tensions inside the country’s largest criminal organizations, can explain much of the increase in violence.

And so ever more Central Americans flee northward, in spite of the manifest dangers and intensifying border control in Mexico and the U.S. In 2017, both countries received most of the 294,000 new asylum seekers – 58 percent more than the previous year – from Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, according to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. The U.N. agency attributes the increase to more cases of “forced recruitment into armed criminal gangs and death threats” in northern Central America.

And yet, last week, Attorney General Jeff Sessions said that victims of gang violence no longer qualify for asylum in the U.S. This decision closes the door to thousands fleeing life-or-death situations. It could force other countries in the region like Mexico, Costa Rica and Panama to absorb the burdens of a humanitarian crisis that, in the long-term, will only be worsened by another wave of massive deportations from the U.S.

Sure, the future wave of TPS deportees will not be made up of convicted criminals. But if the precarious security and political conditions awaiting them in their home countries are not addressed, many of these returnees are unlikely to stay long. This will only fuel a pernicious cycle whereby deportations swell the ranks of violent criminal groups in Central America with new recruits, in turn forcing more people to flee north, leading to still more deportations.

The U.S. could do more to support refugee reception, especially in Latin America, so that those who have credible fears meriting safe harbor can find it. Washington could also invest more in security, justice and development across Central America by funding rehabilitation programs for gang members who want to leave criminal life (approximately 70 percent of jailed gang members in El Salvador, according to one survey).

Against the backdrop of its inhumane zero tolerance migration policies, emphasizing these more supportive initiatives would be a good way for the U.S. to signal to its southern neighbors that it understands its stability is linked to theirs and to demonstrate its commitment to investing in their future.