icon caret Arrow Down Arrow Left Arrow Right Arrow Up Line Camera icon set icon set Ellipsis icon set Facebook Favorite Globe Hamburger List Mail Map Marker Map Microphone Minus PDF Play Print RSS Search Share Trash Crisiswatch Alerts and Trends Box - 1080/761 Copy Twitter Video Camera  copyview Whatsapp Youtube
Al-Shabaab and Somalia's Spreading Famine
Al-Shabaab and Somalia's Spreading Famine
Interview / Africa

Al-Shabaab and Somalia's Spreading Famine

Originally published in Council on Foreign Relations

The famine declared in five areas in southern Somalia is expected to spread across all regions of the south in the coming four to six weeks, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. The UN estimates twenty-nine thousand children under the age of five have died in southern Somalia and 3.7 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance across the country. Rashid Abdi, a Nairobi-based analyst for the International Crisis Group, calls the crisis in Somalia "a collective failure of the international community," which failed to act on early warnings of a crisis, or to invest in sustainable agriculture to make local communities self-sufficient. Additionally, al-Shabaab, an Islamic militant group which controls most of southern Somalia, had banned several international aid groups from the region in 2009. Though they lifted the ban last month (al-Jazeera), restrictions remain. The priority now, Abdi says, is to reach people trapped inside al-Shabaab-controlled territory, and "if that means negotiating with al-Shabaab, so be it."

CFR: What is the scale of Somalia's humanitarian crisis, and how do you see it evolving

Rashid Abdi: The scale of the crisis is unprecedented in many ways. The closest example you have is the 1984 famine in Ethiopia. Because the population of Somalia is not that big, the numbers of people who have died are less, but there's no denying the fact that you have a huge humanitarian crisis in southern Somalia and you have tens of thousands of people who have died, mostly children. Now the famine has spread to regions that used to be the bread basket of Somalia, especially the Juba valley. The whole of south and central Somalia is now in the midst of this famine.

Do you fear this humanitarian crisis will spread beyond Somalia, beyond the Horn of Africa?

This famine is the outcome of many factors. One of them, of course, is ecological, environmental, and climatic. There hasn't been any significant rain for the last four years, so the wells have dried up. You have deforestation in southern Somalia, especially involving charcoal traders. You have poor land use and overgrazing. So environmental factors contribute to it. And this goes beyond Somalia--it extends to the whole Ogaden region of Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya. But in Kenya, and in Ethiopia especially, you have a more robust system of coping with disasters. You have a professional disaster management authority, and both these countries have learned how to cope with this crisis.

In southern Somalia, you don't have a government; you don't have a sense of any authority, except for al-Shabaab. So there has been a neglect of efforts to alleviate this kind of situation, and al-Shabaab has little experience in this aspect as well. So these regions are all closely tied together, and many of these so-called environmental factors are also close together. So in many ways, you can talk of a regional crisis, but at the moment the epicenter is Somalia.

What are the main problems in getting aid to the people in Somalia?

South-central Somalia is controlled by al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is paranoid about international NGOs and a year ago, they banned aid agencies from helping people in that region. A lot of the crisis is attributable to the fact that many people whose situation was very vulnerable did not get adequate help in time. That is why you see this crisis has reached this level. Al-Shabaab appears to have recently backtracked on that ban, but it's very difficult to tell who is in charge in al-Shabaab and very difficult to know their real motive. But you have flights going into Baidoa, which is controlled by al-Shabaab, and you have reports of aid agencies now reaching al-Shabaab-controlled territory in southern Somalia. This is a good step, but al-Shabaab has not opened all the humanitarian corridors in southern Somalia. There are still restrictions in place.

There are many other practical and logistical problems in delivering aid. You have only one port that is open to aid agencies, which is Mogadishu. Kismayo is not open because it is controlled by al-Shabaab. But you are talking of port facilities that are completely run aground; there is no machinery in place, and you have infrastructure that has not been rehabilitated in the last twenty years. You have checkpoints by militias extorting money. So the practicalities of delivery are enormously challenging in Somalia.

How do you interpret al-Shabaab's decision to leave Mogadishu (BBC) and how will it affect aid delivery?

We should be cautious in saying, "al-Shabaab did this; al-Shabaab said that." There' s no longer one al-Shabaab; you are talking of many al-Shabaabs. There was a faction that announced that "we are pulling out of Mogadishu." But the reports in the last two days clearly indicate that there are pockets of al-Shabaab presence in Mogadishu, and they have been conducting attacks against the AU peacekeeping forces. So, the picture is much more complicated.

Has the famine weakened al-Shabaab in any way?

Al-Shabaab has been enormously weakened by this crisis. Many are blaming al-Shabaab for catalyzing the [crisis] by locking out aid agencies. Al-Shabaab has been under enormous pressure from clan leaders in the region to act fast, but they have been dragging their feet, and when they reacted it was probably too late. Tens of thousands of children have already died. Tens of thousands of people have fled as refugees to eastern Kenya and southeastern Ethiopia. Many in Somalia, even those who initially supported al-Shabaab, are now blaming them and seeing them as culpable in this crisis.

Does this present an opportunity to stabilize the country?

If al-Shabaab was a cohesive organization and it was serious about averting humanitarian crisis in southern Somalia, then there would have been an opportunity. The problem is that you have a string of factions of al-Shabaab; you don't know who speaks for al-Shabaab. Even engaging them on the question of provisions of humanitarian supplies to the vulnerable populations in southern Somalia is no longer credible, because you don't know how senior or powerful that interlocutor is. Unless we know the power configurations within al-Shabaab, unless we know who calls the shots and who is in charge, it will be difficult for this crisis to have a peace dividend.

Potentially there is an opportunity that you may cut a deal with one faction or another. But what if you have a faction that doesn't like it, that creates its own challenges. As long as al-Shabaab is fragmented and deeply divided as a group, the possibilities of engagement for a positive result are very remote. Many had hoped that engaging al-Shabaab on humanitarian corridors and a ceasefire for a brief period [would] kick-start a positive dynamic. But I don't think we are there.

Do you think the international community is doing enough to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Somalia and the rest of the Horn? And what more can they do?

This is a failure of the whole international system of aid delivery. We had excellent analysis coming out of Somalia on a potential food crisis. We had all the early-warning systems many months ago, but perhaps everyone thought, "Things will not be that bad." This is a collective failure of the international community

What should be the main priorities of the international community in the short term?

Reach those people who are desperately in need, especially those who are trapped inside al-Shabaab-controlled territory in southern Somalia. Every effort must be made to reach out to those people. If that means negotiating with al-Shabaab, so be it. It is actually more moral to engage al-Shabaab in that than anything else, to save millions of lives.

Somalis' displacement will continue until there is a resolution of the crisis, a resolution of the political conflict, and that appears far away because of what's going on in south Somalia.

Beyond emergency aid, what would be your policy recommendations for the international community to prevent such crises in the future?

We need to learn from this crisis that there are many factors that contributed to it. One is conflict. And conflict resolution should be essential. The epicenter of this famine is southern Somalia, which traditionally used to be the bread basket of the country. So the question to ask is, "Why are we in this state?" And it's clear it is because the [international community has] not made the investment that needs to be made in those [famine-affected] communities in how to [improve] agriculture, how to build their coping mechanisms. We need to help those communities become self-sufficient because they are capable of it.

We don't act until the crisis is in full bloom and then we throw bags of wheat. That is not how to deal with crisis. We need to help communities to fend for themselves, to help themselves, to rebuild their traditional methods of coping. Somalia has had many severe droughts in the past, but why has this drought turned into a famine? There are reasons for it, and those are the lessons we need to learn. And we need to act fast when we get evidence that things are really serious.

So are you asking the international community to invest in agriculture?

Absolutely, and not only in agriculture. People have various methods of coping. For example, the Juba Valley and the Shebelle region are drained by two huge rivers: the Shebelle River and the Juba River. They drain massive volumes of water into the Indian Ocean. So if we build methods of water conservation in those parts, we will have enough water for human use, for livestock use, and for agriculture as well. And these systems used to exist. It's just that now there isn't any government.

We also need to criminalize and punish those who are involved in the charcoal trade, because they are contributing to this crisis. Much of southern Somalia has now turned into a lunar landscape because of the [deforestation] work of criminal mafia groups who are involved in the charcoal trade. We should criminalize the buying of Somali charcoal too, tightening the screws both on the supply end and on the demand end.

What are the implications of large-scale displacements of Somalis who are fleeing to Kenya and Ethiopia, countries also facing some level of drought?

Somalis' displacement will continue until there is a resolution of the crisis, a resolution of the political conflict and that appears far away because of what's going on in south Somalia. When we talk about the drought in northeastern Kenya and Ethiopia, these are places where despite a lot of hardships, you have governments in place, you have administrations that are in place, and they have better coping methods.

An Ethiopian member of the African Union (AU) peacekeeping force patrols the streets of Kismayo on November 15, 2016. SIMON MAINA / AFP
Briefing 158 / Africa

Ending the Dangerous Standoff in Southern Somalia

Firefights have broken out between federal Somali soldiers and troops from the Jubaland region. A heightened confrontation could embolden Al-Shabaab’s Islamist insurgency. The African Union should press Ethiopia and Kenya, which back Mogadishu and Kismayo, respectively, to coax the two sides into negotiations.

What’s new? Hundreds of troops loyal to the Federal Government of Somalia, on one side, and Jubaland regional state, on the other, are locked in a tense showdown in the Gedo region of southern Somalia. Clashes between them have already resulted in fatalities and uprooted thousands from their homes.

Why does it matter? Neighbouring Ethiopia and Kenya, which are both troop contributors to the African Union’s peacekeeping mission in Somalia, seek to avoid direct confrontation but respectively support the opposing federal and Jubaland administrations. The situation plays into the hands of the Al-Shabaab Islamist insurgency, which is further entrenching its presence in Gedo.

What should be done? The African Union, along with the eastern African sub-regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority for Development, and Somalia’s bilateral partners, should lean on Ethiopia and Kenya to push the two sides to de-escalate tensions. Talks would allow the sides to refocus energies on stemming Al-Shabaab’s gains.

I. Overview

A standoff between forces loyal to Somalia’s federal authorities and those allied to the southern state of Jubaland could trigger a wider Horn of Africa crisis. Clashes between the two sides in February and March 2020 displaced 56,000 people and killed at least ten, including civilians. The warring parties have since settled into an uneasy stalemate but discord is rife among clans in Jubaland’s Gedo region, the epicentre of the violence. Mogadishu and Jubaland leaders, and their respective backers Ethiopia and Kenya, need to compromise. The African Union (AU), working with the sub-regional bloc, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and in concert with others such as the UN, European Union (EU), United States and United Kingdom, should push for revival of tripartite talks among Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia. Those talks should aim to ease regional tensions and pave the way for the federal government and Jubaland leaders to end their dangerous altercation before it escalates further.

The frictions in Gedo reflect political fault lines that cut from national politics down to local clan tensions and constitute a major source of instability for Somalia. The principal conflict is a standoff between the Jubaland state, notably its leader, Ahmed Mohamed Islam “Madobe”, and the federal government led by Somalia’s president, Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo”. The dispute was triggered by Mogadishu’s refusal to recognise what it and Madobe’s local rivals argue was a flawed August 2019 vote that saw the Jubaland president win a second term. But it reflects deeper disagreement between Farmajo and Madobe over how Somalia’s political system should allocate power. Their differences have fuelled local tensions via clan and sub-clan alliances and rivalries that characterise the country’s often fractious politics. The bitter divisions are worrying, given the need for national and local consensus on key issues, such as how to organise Somalia’s next election, due by the end of 2020.

The frictions in Gedo reflect political fault lines that cut from national politics down to local clan tensions and constitute a major source of instability for Somalia.

The situation is worsened by tensions between external actors serving as part of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which is mandated to support efforts by federal and state governments to combat the Al-Shabaab insurgency. Ethiopia, which has a contingent of troops in the contested region of Gedo in the north of Jubaland, backs Mogadishu, the result of Addis Ababa’s pivot over the past two years in favour of a centralised Somali state. In contrast, Kenya, whose troops are based farther south in Lower Juba, supports Jubaland’s incumbent president. Nairobi sees him as critical to a buffer zone in that region protecting Kenya from militant incursions. Neither of the two regional heavyweights seeks a direct confrontation. But absent a resolution, their rivalry could feed a damaging conflict in Somalia that would have repercussions for regional stability.

It will take efforts by all sides to avert renewed hostilities. The AU should lean on Kenya and Ethiopia to back down and afford their Somali allies space to make concessions. As a first step, the AU Commission chairperson should urge the Kenyan, Ethiopian and Somali leaders to convene a tripartite summit they had called in March to de-escalate tensions but postponed due the COVID-19 pandemic. In turn, the AU, IGAD, the UN, the EU and Somalia’s key bilateral partners, chiefly the U.S. and UK, should press Farmajo’s government and Madobe to craft a compromise. Such a deal could entail Mogadishu recognising Madobe’s administration in return for Madobe pledging not to seek another term as Jubaland president, reconciling with other Jubaland leaders to address grievances over his re-election and his governance more broadly, and cooperating on national priorities, notably how to hold national elections due in late 2020. A bargain would allow them to dedicate troops and resources to their shared goal of rolling back Al-Shabaab’s insurgency.

II. A Divisive Vote and Its Fallout

Since coming into office, President Farmajo has moved to assert the central government’s control over semi-autonomous regions known in Somalia’s federalised system as federal member states.[fn]See Rashid Abdi, “Somalia’s South West State: A New President Installed, a Crisis Inflamed”, Crisis Group Commentary, 24 December 2018.Hide Footnote Though he has installed compliant allies as presidents in some states, Farmajo has struggled to do the same in Jubaland, where opposition to Mogadishu – both his administration and its predecessors – has been particularly pronounced over the years.[fn]In Hirshabelle in September 2017, South West state in December 2018 and Galmudug in 2019-2020, the government of Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” replaced incumbents with more compliant state administrations. Crisis Group interview, Somali diplomat, March 2020. The government could not do the same in Puntland and Jubaland, federal states in a stronger position due to their institutional development, external patronage and greater financial assets. Madobe in particular has weathered resistance from successive administrations in Mogadishu since 2012. Crisis Group interview, Jubaland politician, March 2020.Hide Footnote Ahead of elections for Jubaland’s presidency, held in August 2019, tensions accelerated, leading to a crisis that evolved into today’s military standoff.

Control of Jubaland, an economic centre of gravity in Somalia, has long been and will likely remain contentious. The country’s southernmost region is potentially one of Somalia’s wealthiest, with abundant seasonal rainfall, lush farm and rangeland, and possibly huge offshore oil and gas deposits.[fn]Claire Elder and Zakaria Yusuf, “Jubaland in Jeopardy: The Uneasy Path to State-Building in Somalia”, Crisis Group Commentary, 21 May 2013.Hide Footnote Its port of Kismayo is one of Somalia’s largest cities and a much sought-after asset. Previously held by Al-Shabaab, Kismayo is now controlled by troops loyal to Madobe. He and Farmajo, however, hail from two different clan groupings that have contested power in the region for decades.[fn]Madobe has Ogaden clan roots and has struggled to gain acceptance among many Marehaan, the dominant clan in the Gedo region, who complain about his failure to share power adequately or channel investment to Marehaan areas. Divisions also exist within the Marehaan, between those identified as guri (original inhabitants) and galti (newcomers). This division is reinforced by Farmajo’s background as a galti Marehaan, while Madobe has tended to favour guri Marehaan politicians, appointing many to official positions. Crisis Group interviews, Gedo youth activist, former Jubaland politician, Jubaland presidential candidate, March 2020.
Hide Footnote
The two men hold diametrically opposed visions of the proper balance of power between the centre and member states, with the more centralist Farmajo bitterly opposed to Madobe, who seeks greater regional autonomy.

Planning for the 2019 election proved heated from the start. Jubaland resisted attempts from Mogadishu to impose controls over the conduct of the poll organised by the Jubaland electoral authority, which opponents say was dominated by Madobe allies.[fn]Madobe appointed the Jubaland election commission’s seven members in March 2019. “Jubaland leader appoints a regional poll agency”, Halbeeg, 24 March 2019.Hide Footnote Mogadishu subsequently rejected the outcome, which saw Madobe re-elected to another four-year term.[fn]“Jubbaland suspends co-operation with the federal government”, Goobjoog, 25 July 2019.Hide Footnote Moreover, an anti-Madobe alliance under the banner of the Jubaland Council for Change (JCC) held its own parallel vote due to what it said were concerns regarding manipulation, despite pleas from the AU, IGAD and the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia to avoid competing polls.[fn]“AU, IGAD and UN Senior Representatives Engage with Stakeholders on Jubaland’s Electoral Process”, press release, UN Assistance Mission for Somalia, 15 August 2019.Hide Footnote This parallel process itself proved divisive: two rival opposition candidates, Abdirashid Mohammed Hiddig and Abdinasir Serrar, claimed victory. As a result, three men declared themselves Jubaland’s president-elect.[fn]A similar situation prevailed at the state’s formation in 2013, when Madobe, Barre Hirale and Iftin Hassan Basto all declared themselves president of Jubaland, leading to clashes among their respective militias.Hide Footnote

Tensions accelerated ahead of elections for Jubaland’s presidency, leading to a crisis that evolved into today’s military standoff.

The elections’ aftermath sowed further division. Mogadishu refused to accept the results, instead issuing on 7 October 2019 a set of conditions to guide the conduct of fresh elections.[fn]“Interior Ministry sets new procedures to form Jubaland Assembly”, Halbeeg, October 2019.Hide Footnote Madobe resisted. His administration held its inauguration ceremony in Kismayo, where he was sworn in as Jubaland president. The attendees included a cross-section of Somali political elites opposed to Mogadishu, revealing how the standoff between Jubaland and the federal government had been elevated to an impasse between Farmajo and his rivals.[fn]Participants included Puntland President Said Deni, former Presidents Sheikh Sharif and Hassan Sheikh Mohamud of the Forum for National Parties (FNP), Abdishakur Abdirahman of the opposition Wadajir party, and former South West and Galmudug Presidents Sharif Hassan Adan and Abdikarim Hassan Guled, as well as approximately 50 Somali MPs and senators. “MPs, former state presidents land in Kismayu ahead of Madobe’s inauguration”, Hiiraan Online, 5 October 2019.Hide Footnote

Although at first Mogadishu and Kismayo continued to cooperate on technical issues such as debt relief negotiations after Madobe’s inauguration, the federal government kept seeking influence in Jubaland at his expense.[fn]Cooperation on Somalia’s debt relief negotiations with the World Bank and IMF’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative continued until February, when Jubaland suspended further participation as the conflict over Gedo intensified. Crisis Group interviews, Jubaland politician, March 2020; Somalia-based researcher, May 2020.Hide Footnote Rather than contesting overall control of Jubaland by seeking support in Kismayo itself, Mogadishu moved to win over the northern Jubaland region of Gedo. This approach was logical, given Farmajo’s blood ties to Gedo’s dominant Marehaan clan. In addition, Gedo is a weak spot for Madobe and far from Lower Juba, where he has concentrated his security forces and does most of his politicking.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, former Jubaland official, March 2020; UN official, May 2020; academic specialising in Somali affairs, May 2020. A common claim among those opposed to Madobe’s rule is that his control is mainly limited to the two districts of Kismayo and Afmadow in the Lower Juba region. Crisis Group interviews, Gedo youth activist, March 2020; academic specialising in Somali affairs, May 2020.Hide Footnote Asserting federal government control in Gedo would help delegitimise Madobe’s claims to represent all Jubaland and thus strengthen Farmajo’s hand in his pursuit of new state elections or talks regarding the state’s future. Forthcoming national elections, which may suffer delays due to COVID-19, also colour calculations vis-à-vis Gedo.[fn]The onset of COVID-19 in Somalia may seriously affect the timetable and format for the planned 2020-2021 elections. See Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°155, COVID-19 in Somalia: A Public Health Emergency in an Electoral Minefield, 8 May 2020.Hide Footnote Farmajo’s chances at a second term in office would increase if he were to win local allies in the regional states.[fn]Local allies could help mobilise votes for Farmajo in those areas.Hide Footnote

Farmajo’s administration thus moved aggressively to bolster its presence in Gedo, primarily through the deployment of federal security forces and the replacement or co-optation of local officials. Federal deployments have allowed Mogadishu to assert control over the districts of Luuq, Doolow and Beled Hawo, in addition to deepening its presence in Garbaharey and Bardheere. By May 2020, Mogadishu had appointed new district commissioners in those five districts.[fn]Gedo comprises six official districts, but Burdhubo is sometimes considered a separate seventh district, and the federal government appointed a new commissioner there as well. The district of El Waq, historically exposed to greater Kenyan influence, has not been the subject of federal government attention. Crisis Group interview, UN official, April 2020. The appointments were made by Osman Nur Haji “Moalimu”, former Jubaland deputy governor of Gedo and now the federally recognised Gedo governor. Jubaland has rejected both Moalimu’s current position and the new appointments. Voice of America, 2 June 2020.Hide Footnote It had also enticed local officials to switch their loyalties, while harassing perceived opponents, including with threats of detention.[fn]Crisis Group interview, UN official, April 2020. The Somali National Army reportedly detained the district commissioners of Bardheere and Garbaharey in February and May 2020, respectively. “Guddoomiye ku xigeenka gobolka gedo iyo kan degmada Baardheere oo lagu xiray Muqdisho”, Radio Kulmiye, 7 February 2020; “Jubaland official arrested in Gedo, flown to Mogadishu by federal soldiers”, Garowe Online, 13 May 2020.Hide Footnote

Mogadishu has invoked national security to justify its actions, saying control over Gedo, which abuts both Ethiopia and Kenya, is essential to defending Somalia’s borders.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, former Jubaland politician, March 2020; Somali diplomat, March 2020; Western diplomat, April 2020; academic specialising in Somali affairs, May 2020.Hide Footnote  Federal officials say having sway over Gedo would also contribute to any eventual operation to retake Al-Shabaab-controlled territories farther south in Middle Juba.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, UN official, academic specialising in Somali affairs, May 2020. Bu’ale is officially Jubaland’s state capital, but it has been in Al-Shabaab’s hands since 2008.
Hide Footnote
Mogadishu has meanwhile availed itself of federal institutions like the Somali National Army and Somalia’s National Intelligence and Security Agency, and enlisted international allies such as Ethiopia to support its efforts on the ground.[fn]A senior national intelligence official from the Marehaan/Reer Dini, the same sub-clan as Farmajo, reportedly has coordinated federal activities in Gedo since February. Crisis Group interview, Jubaland politician, March 2020. Jubaland has written to UN Special Representative for Somalia James Swan, complaining about non-AMISOM Ethiopian troops in Gedo and their support for the federal government’s intervention there. Letter to James Swan, Jubaland State of Somalia Ministry of Interior and Local Government, 10 December 2019. On file with Crisis Group.Hide Footnote For its part, Kenya continues to back Madobe, whom it considers a key partner in its mission to hobble Al-Shabaab’s advance into Kenyan territory.[fn]Since Kenya intervened in Somalia in 2011, its objectives have evolved somewhat, but they centre around pushing Al-Shabaab back from the border and supporting the development of a Jubaland administration. Crisis Group Africa Report Nº184, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, 15 February 2012; Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan academic and government adviser, May 2020.Hide Footnote

III. From Confrontation to Precarious Standstill

It did not take long for hostilities between the parties to erupt. The trigger was the escape from detention in Mogadishu of Jubaland Security Minister Abdirashid Hassan Abdinur “Janan” under mysterious circumstances on 28 January 2020.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, UN official, Western diplomat, April 2020. Janan, a guri Marehaan from Doolow, is an influential but controversial figure in northern Gedo. He served as an important Marehaan member of Madobe’s administration, rising to the post of security minister in 2016, yet he has been dogged by accusations of involvement in the targeting of civilians and obstruction of humanitarian assistance in Gedo. Letter from the Chair of the Security Council Committee to the President of the Security Council on Somalia and Eritrea, 31 October 2016; letter from the Chair of the Security Council Committee to the President of the Security Council on Somalia and Eritrea, 2 November 2017.Hide Footnote Janan, a Madobe ally with particular influence in Gedo’s districts of Luuq, Doolow and Beled Hawo, represented a threat to Mogadishu’s plans to consolidate influence in the region. The minister was detained while transiting through Mogadishu on 31 August 2019, ostensibly on charges of human rights abuses levelled against him by the Banadir regional court, but also amid rumours that he had backed out of a deal to work with Mogadishu to undermine Madobe ahead of the regional election.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Jubaland officials, March 2020.Hide Footnote Tensions rose further after Janan’s escape. He resurfaced near his stronghold by the border town of Beled Hawo and began to mobilise forces in opposition to the federal government.[fn]“Jubaland security minister mobilises troops amid tensions in Gedo”, Garowe Online, 8 February 2020.Hide Footnote

Farmajo reacted swiftly by accelerating the deployment of federal forces in Gedo.[fn]The Somali National Army reportedly established a training camp in Bardheere in July 2019, helping facilitate additional forward deployments. Crisis Group interview, former military official, May 2020.Hide Footnote These troops, backed by pro-federal local militias, soon clashed with forces loyal to Jubaland and mobilised by Janan.[fn]Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, April 2020; two confidential third-party research findings, on file with Crisis Group.Hide Footnote On 8 February, a skirmish left between two and four combatants dead in Beled Hawo.[fn]Confidential third-party research findings, on file with Crisis Group.Hide Footnote On 2 March 2020, heavier fighting occurred around Beled Hawo and Border Point One, claiming six civilian lives and displacing 56,000 people.[fn]“Flash Update No. 1 on displacement in Gedo region, Jubaland”, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 5 March 2020. Crisis Group interview, Beled Hawo resident, May 2020.Hide Footnote

Both sides have exploited the lull in violence to consolidate positions on the ground.

No major violence has occurred since then, likely in part due to constraints that both sides face.[fn]A small confrontation on 22 April in Beled Hawo killed four, including a Somali National Army commander. Confidential third-party research findings, on file with Crisis Group.
Hide Footnote
For Jubaland, a limiting factor is the influx of Ethiopian forces – both with AMISOM, entailing troop rotations via Gedo toward Baidoa, and reportedly outside AMISOM’s auspices at the Ethiopian border and in Doolow since March.[fn]Confidential third-party research findings, on file with Crisis Group.Hide Footnote While Ethiopian troops have not specifically been involved in the Gedo standoff, Ethiopia’s political support for Farmajo may nonetheless cause Jubaland to hesitate before re-engaging militarily. On the federal side, Mogadishu has achieved its primary objective by asserting political and security control in much of Gedo. It is unlikely to further pursue opposition Jubaland forces mobilised by Janan in Mandera across the Kenyan border, where some now appear to be based.[fn]Crisis Group interview, academic specialising in Somali affairs, May 2020; “Roba: presence of Jubaland army threatens Mandera security”, Daily Nation, 19 June 2020.Hide Footnote Calls for restraint from regional and Western envoys may also have helped.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Western diplomat, UN and AU officials, April 2020.Hide Footnote The lack of further combat likely reflects a pragmatic assessment on both sides that the risks outweigh potential gains.

That said, both sides have exploited the lull in violence to consolidate positions on the ground. The federal government has sought to build on its overhaul of Gedo’s political leadership by undertaking quick-impact development projects and winning over local clans. Social media accounts linked to pro-Mogadishu Gedo leaders point to the federal government’s community consultations, clan outreach and infrastructure projects in Beled Hawo, Doolow and Luuq districts.[fn]The construction projects include new roads and buildings. Residents have shown their acceptance of the new authorities by giving them camels. Tweet by Osman Nooh Hajji, Mogadishu-appointed governor of Gedo, @GedoGovernor, 8:33pm, 16 February 2020; tweet by Osman Nooh Hajji, Mogadishu-appointed governor of Gedo, @GedoGovernor,  4:23pm, 19 February 2020; tweet by Ahmed Bulle Gireed, Mogadishu-aligned district commissioner of Luuq, @LuuqDC,  8:07pm, 16 February 2020.Hide Footnote Madobe, too, has sought to solidify his position. In late April 2020, his erstwhile opponents Serrar and Hiddig renounced their claims to the Jubaland presidency, while Madobe pledged to form an inclusive cabinet and forgo a third term. The deal shores up Madobe’s position in Lower Juba by eliminating sources of political competition.[fn]The opposition alliance is divided over the issue, with one faction maintaining that those party to the agreement defected from the organisation. “Letter of the Jubaland Council for Change to the UN Security Council”, SOM/JCC/12/2020, 29 April 2020.Hide Footnote Though opponents argue it entails limited representation, given that all main signatories hail from the Ogaden clan, the agreement does call for clan power sharing and a fresh round of reconciliation conferences to bring Jubaland together.[fn]“The Agreement between the Jubaland President and the Leadership of the Jubaland Council for Change”, Jubaland State of Somalia, 23 April 2020.Hide Footnote

The situation remains combustible. The political dispute between the parties lingers unresolved. Madobe rejected an offer in June by the federal government to recognise his presidency for a two-year interim period instead of the regular four-year term.[fn]Jubaland swiftly rejected a 14 June federal government statement recognising Madobe for a two-year interim period instead of his full four-year mandate, arguing it lacked constitutional legitimacy. “Jubaland officials rebuff Farmajo’s recognition of interim administration”, Hiraan Online, 14 June 2020.
Hide Footnote
 A slight provocation could generate a fresh round of violence. Many civilians remain displaced and worried, in the words of one resident from the region, that “fighting could resume at any time”.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Jubaland elder and Gedo resident, March 2020.Hide Footnote Further violence would only weaken all sides and give Al-Shabaab more opportunities to expand its own territorial control.

IV. National Implications

While centre-periphery tensions in Somalia predate Farmajo’s presidency, the fault line has sharpened under his tenure. The president came to power with a vision to restrain what he and his allies perceived as federal member states’ overreach, especially in the absence of a strong central government and clear rules outlining the division of power between centre and periphery. Where possible, Farmajo has aimed to replace state-level officials with figures more amenable to his agenda.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Somali diplomat, March 2020; regional analyst, May 2020. See also fn 2.Hide Footnote

The dispute with Jubaland is thus the latest flashpoint in the struggle between Mogadishu and the federal states, and an opportunity for Farmajo’s rivals to advance their opposition by backing Madobe. The standoff over Gedo has entered the national conversation relating to power sharing and given Madobe support that may otherwise have remained beyond his reach. For example, Puntland’s President Said Deni, a staunch defender of federalism in Somalia, is a firm Madobe backer.[fn]Deni and Madobe released a joint Puntland-Jubaland communiqué after meeting in January. Tweet by Garowe Online, @radiogarowe, 3:03pm, 20 January 2020. Also contributing to Deni’s support for Madobe and Puntland’s special relationship with Jubaland is a common clan dynamic, symbolised by an alliance known as the Kabalah. The Kabalah is an association between the Harti (Majerteen, Dhulbahante, Warsengeli) and Ogaden clans, within the larger Darod clan family grouping. The former make up the majority of Puntland, including Deni himself, and the latter are Madobe’s clan in Jubaland.Hide Footnote The Forum for National Parties (FNP), a coalition including two former Somali presidents, has also voiced criticism of Mogadishu’s tactics in Gedo.[fn]“Qalalaasaha ka aloosan Gobolka Gedo”, FNP, 15 February 2020.Hide Footnote

Al-Shabaab is the unambiguous beneficiary. The organisation replaced its Gedo shadow governor in February 2020, likely in a bid to intensify operations.[fn]Confidential third-party research findings, on file with Crisis Group.Hide Footnote On the evening of 24 February 2020, militants killed three local officials in Bardheere – the group’s first attack in the main town in years. Local residents blame Al-Shabaab’s secretive Amniyat (intelligence service) for this and other recent incidents.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, Jubaland official, Bardheere resident, March 2020.Hide Footnote They also note the group’s expanded presence into an area that was previously relatively insulated.[fn]Ibid.Hide Footnote Attacks on Ethiopian convoys along the Doolow-Baidoa route have also increased.[fn]See, for example, “Ethiopian troops kill 17 Al-Shabaab militants in Somali weeks after ambush in Doolow”, Garowe Online, 15 April 2020.Hide Footnote

The dispute with Jubaland is the latest flashpoint in the struggle between Mogadishu and the federal states.

Al-Shabaab benefits, as security forces that otherwise may have been deployed to tackle the militants are instead pinned down facing each other.[fn]Crisis Group interview, senior AU official, May 2020.Hide Footnote The situation has upset some of Somalia’s international partners, notably the U.S. and EU, which have made significant investments in the Somali army. These two powers have expressed frustration that AMISOM’s planned drawdown could be further delayed by Somali authorities’ infighting.[fn]The U.S. termed Mogadishu’s deployment in Gedo “unacceptable”, calling for an end to the “politically motivated offensive”. “Remarks at a UN Security Council Briefing on the Situation in Somalia”, U.S. Mission to the UN, 24 February 2020. The EU stated that the security build-up in Gedo diverts “assets and attention away from military operations against al-Shabaab”. “Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the European Union on the Latest developments in Somalia”, press release, European Council, 14 March 2020.Hide Footnote Federal and Jubaland officials each say they are preparing their own operations to rout Al-Shabaab from its strongholds in Middle Juba.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, academic specialising in Somali affairs, April and May 2020.Hide Footnote Any plans for two separate but simultaneous counter-insurgency operations, each involving rival forces, will have pitfalls. But even leaving these aside, it is doubtful that either side is serious about committing forces to fighting Al-Shabaab while the Mogadishu-Kismayo competition persists.[fn]“If anyone wanted to take [the Al-Shabaab stronghold of] Bu’ale, they could and should have done it by now”. Crisis Group interview, UN official, May 2020.Hide Footnote Neither is likely to want to sustain casualties that weaken its position vis-à-vis the other.

V. Ethiopia and Kenya Enter the Fray

Though allies in AMISOM, Ethiopia and Kenya now find themselves on opposing sides when it comes to local alliances in Somalia.[fn]For background on Ethiopian and Kenyan involvement, see Abdul Khalif and Zakaria Yusuf, “The Regional Risks to Somalia’s Moment of Hope”, Crisis Group Commentary, 22 February 2017.Hide Footnote The two countries have a deep history of cooperation in Jubaland, given the implications of cross-border security. They both bought into the 2013 Addis Ababa agreement that installed Madobe as the head of the emergent Jubaland state. But any sense of shared vision for the region appears to have evaporated, with Ethiopia backing Farmajo in Mogadishu and Kenya deepening its relationship with Madobe.[fn]The historical defence pact between Kenya and Ethiopia, signed in 1964, resulted directly from their shared perception of possible threats from Somalia upon that country’s independence. But Addis Ababa and Nairobi have at times pursued divergent paths in Jubaland. Ethiopian involvement in the 1990s-2000s was seen as more supportive of the Marehaan clan. Kenya leaned toward the Ogaden, making Addis Ababa wary, as its overriding objective was to prevent the Ogaden National Liberation Front from using Jubaland as a rear base from which to attack Ethiopia. Following Kenya’s invasion of Somalia in October 2011, the two countries’ goals aligned, culminating in the 2013 Addis Ababa agreement that led to Jubaland state’s establishment.Hide Footnote The rivalry is breaking down AMISOM’s cohesion and opening space for Al-Shabaab.[fn]Crisis Group interview, senior AU official, May 2020. Incorporating Kenyan and Ethiopian troops into AMISOM also enabled both countries to pursue their respective interests in Somalia, which further complicates the mission’s coherence.Hide Footnote The level of discord almost led to blows on 22 August 2019, the day of the Jubaland election, when a plane carrying Ethiopian forces attempted to land at Kismayo airport, but was prevented from doing so by Jubaland and Kenyan troops.[fn]Kenyan and Jubaland forces blocked the runway. Crisis Group interviews, Jubaland officials, March 2020; Kenyan government adviser, May 2020. According to one theory, Ethiopian forces were coming to arrest Madobe. “Frontier fracas”, Africa Confidential, 19 March 2020.Hide Footnote

The primary reason for the divergence between Nairobi and Addis Ababa relates to a policy shift in Ethiopia. Upon taking office in April 2018, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed sought to redefine Ethiopia’s relations with Somalia by prioritising cooperation with Mogadishu. He did so hoping to deepen regional integration and commercial ties, and believing that a stronger central government in Somalia could better address the country’s myriad issues.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, ministry of foreign affairs official, March 2020; regional analyst, April 2020. Abiy visited Mogadishu early in his tenure to discuss Ethiopian interest in developing four unnamed Somali ports. “Somalia, Ethiopia ink economic, diplomatic and security deals”, Radio Shabelle, 16 June 2018.Hide Footnote

Ethiopia’s tightening relations with Farmajo went hand in hand with a reversal of its support for various sub-national administrative units, including clan militias and other political and security actors in Somalia.[fn]Ethiopia’s past support for sub-national entities ranged from member states like Puntland to militias such as Ahlu Sunnah wal Jama and local clans. Ethiopian officials have been careful to assert that the current framework is not a complete shift toward the central government but rather a rebalancing of relationships in its favour. Crisis Group interview, ministry of foreign affairs official, March 2020.Hide Footnote The deployment of, and operations by, Ethiopian security forces in some regional states prompted Farmajo’s opponents to accuse him of relying on Addis Ababa to back his agenda.[fn]Both Jubaland and the FNP opposition have complained about Ethiopian involvement in favour of Mogadishu, with the latter expressing concern regarding interference and intimidation in the lead-up to national elections. “Joint Press Statement on Ethiopian Troops and AU Representative in Somalia”, signed by FNP, Wadajir, Hiigsi coalition and 1 July Alliance for Change, 20 May 2020; “Sheekh Shariif oo Sheegay in Heshiisyo Qarsoodi Ah uu Ka Dhaxeeyo Itoobiya iyo Madaxda DFS”, Goobjoog, 10 May 2020.Hide Footnote Such actions included the arrest of opposition candidate Mukhtar Robow in South West state in December 2018, the deployment of a small contingent of troops to Galmudug in late 2019, and reports of increased Ethiopian troop movement in Gedo and along the Doolow-Baidoa route since March 2020.[fn]After the seizure of Robow, AMISOM denied that the Ethiopian forces involved fell under its command, but the Galmudug deployment (along with a small contingent of Djiboutian soldiers) was part of the mission’s activities. Press release, AMISOM, 15 December 2018; Crisis Group interview, former Galmudug government official, May 2020.Hide Footnote Ethiopian activity in Gedo is thus also seen within the wider frame of Addis Ababa backing the federal government’s centralising tendencies.[fn]Jubaland officials allege that Ethiopia has aided the federal government, saying local Gedo leaders were taken to Ethiopia in November 2019 to convince them to change sides. First Deputy President of Jubaland Mohamud Sayid maintains that he was prevented from travelling to Beled Hawo by Ethiopian forces in November 2019. Crisis Group interview, Jubaland officials, March 2020; “Jubaland deputy president blocked by Ethiopian troops in Gedo as Madobe demands for withdrawal”, Garowe Online, 22 November 2019.Hide Footnote

The divergent postures of Kenya and Ethiopia, and their alliances with Somali parties that oppose each other, represent a serious challenge to AMISOM’s effectiveness.

Domestic factors also likely play a role in Ethiopia’s calculations over Gedo. Madobe enjoyed a good working relationship with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which was the dominant party in the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democracy Front coalition. Since Abiy Ahmed assumed power, and after an acrimonious split with his newly fashioned ruling front, the Prosperity Party, the TPLF has become an opposition party.[fn]Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°156, Bridging the Divide in Ethiopia’s North, 12 June 2020.Hide Footnote In addition, Madobe reportedly retains close ties with the leadership of the Ogaden National Liberation Front, a former Ethiopian rebel group that has become Abiy’s main opposition in the Somali region of Ethiopia.[fn]Madobe was reportedly close to former Somali region governor Abdi Iley, who resigned under pressure from Prime Minister Abiy in August 2018. Madobe and Iley are from the same Reer Abdille sub-clan of the Ogaden/Muhammad Zubeyr clan family, as is Ogaden National Liberation Front Chairman Abdirahman Mahdi. Crisis Group interviews, regional analyst, April 2020; Somali region opposition member and Somali region government official, May 2020. The regional Somali Democratic Party in charge of the Somali region of Ethiopia is a member of Abiy’s Prosperity Party coalition.Hide Footnote Madobe’s associations with some of Abiy’s rivals likely helped tilt the balance of support from Addis Ababa toward Farmajo.[fn]Mustafa Mohammed Omer, president of Ethiopia’s Somali state and an Abiy ally, has reportedly expressed concern about the potential for Madobe to interfere in the region. Crisis Group interviews, regional analyst, April 2020; Somali region opposition member and government official, May 2020.Hide Footnote

Kenya’s core goal continues to be to retain Jubaland as a buffer between it and Al-Shabaab. As such, Madobe continues to be its partner of choice, even more so since 2019 when Nairobi’s relations with Mogadishu nosedived due to renewed disagreements over the two countries’ maritime boundary.[fn]In Kenya’s view, there is no one better than Madobe to deliver security in the Kismayo area. Crisis Group interviews, Kenyan academic and government adviser, May 2020. Somalia referred the maritime dispute to the International Court of Justice in 2014. In May 2020, the court delayed hearing the case until March 2021, due to the COVID-19 pandemic.Hide Footnote Support for Madobe is not unanimous among Kenyans. Several politicians, including Governor Ali Roba from Mandera county, which borders Somalia, openly complain that the presence in that area of pro-Jubaland forces loyal to Madobe is destabilising.[fn]Tweet by Ali Roba, governor of Mandera county, @aliiroba, 12:33pm, 5 March 2020; tweet by Ali Roba, governor of Mandera County, @aliiroba, 12:27pm, 5 March 2020; tweet by Ali Roba, governor of Mandera County, @aliiroba, 11:09pm, 11 March 2020. The Kenyan government also interrogated eleven MPs upon their return from meeting Farmajo in Mogadishu on 1 March 2020; the government suspected them of promoting Farmajo’s interests in Kenya. Crisis Group interview, Kenyan government adviser, May 2020; “11 North-Eastern MPs held over unauthorised trip to Somalia”, Daily Nation, 1 March 2020.Hide Footnote Still, Nairobi continues to back the Jubaland president. Influential leaders from northern Kenya have also demonstrated their support; former National Assembly Majority Leader Aden Bare Duale, for example, led a delegation to attend Madobe’s inauguration.[fn]The Ogaden clan lineage of some influential Kenyan politicians may also play a role in promoting a pro-Ogaden stance in Kenya’s policy toward Somalia. Crisis Group interview, Kenyan academic, May 2020. “Kenyan delegation arrives in Kismayo for Madobe’s inauguration”, Garowe Online, 12 October 2019; Crisis Group Africa Report N°184, The Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia, 15 February 2012. Kenya also hosted Madobe’s reconciliation agreement with his Jubaland Council for Change rivals and previously served as a venue for talks between the Ethiopian government and the Ogaden National Liberation Front, all of which primarily involve the Ogaden clan.Hide Footnote

The divergent postures of Kenya and Ethiopia, and their alliances with Somali parties that oppose each other, represent a serious challenge to AMISOM’s effectiveness. The AU mission already suffered from deficiencies in command and control, as national interests often trump internal coordination, and the falling-out between the two key troop contributors has exacerbated this situation.[fn]It has, for instance, held up plans for a convoy to transport a large police contingent by road between Mogadishu and Baidoa. It has also put on ice a planned merger of AMISOM’s operational sectors 2 and 6. Kenyan forces run sector 2, which comprises Lower and Middle Juba, while Ethiopian troops are present in Kismayo by virtue of their participation in sector 6, but would lose this position if the merger occurred. Crisis Group interview, senior AU official, May 2020.Hide Footnote While both Ethiopia and Kenya certainly will want to avoid direct confrontation, tensions in their relationship raise concerns about how far they might go to militarily support their respective Somali allies.[fn]Crisis Group interviews, UN officials, Western diplomat, April-May 2020.Hide Footnote

Both Ethiopia and Kenya were preparing for a tripartite summit with Somalia’s federal government in order to de-escalate Mogadishu-Kismayo tensions after the 2 March 2020 clash in Beled Hawo. But the summit, originally scheduled for 16 March, was shelved due to East Africa’s coronavirus outbreak.[fn]A 5 March telephone call between Farmajo and Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and a 6 March visit by Kenyan Interior Minister Fred Matiang’i to Mogadishu preceded the summit proposal. External pressure from IGAD, the AU and UN contributed to de-escalating the situation after the Beled Hawo clashes. Crisis Group interviews, AU official, April 2020; IGAD official, May 2020. “MFA.REL.13/21A”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 13 March 2020; Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, April 2020.Hide Footnote The three parties have not announced a date to resume discussions, although there have been a series of bilateral diplomatic contacts among them.[fn]Somali Foreign Minister Ahmed Isse Awad visited Nairobi on 11 March to meet his Kenyan counterpart; on the same day, Matiang’i visited Abiy in Addis Ababa; and Somali Prime Minister Hassan Khaire met the Ethiopian premier in Addis Ababa on 19 March. “Matiang’i meets Ethiopia premier over Somalia security”, Daily Nation, 12 March 2020; “Somali PM holds talks with his Ethiopian counterpart in Addis Ababa”, Radio Shabelle, 19 March 2020.Hide Footnote Fresh efforts are required to get talks back on track.

VI. A Better Way Forward

The risks associated with failure to resolve the standoff over Gedo, or ignoring it and allowing it to fester, are considerable. Already the dispute over the Jubaland election has dragged on for nearly a year. Tensions between Mogadishu and Jubaland as well as several other regions are jeopardising the country’s planned elections and distracting from efforts to fight Al-Shabaab.

Any viable solution likely would occur in several phases and require sustained engagement from regional and other outside actors. Reconciliation is necessary at four levels: within the Marehaan clan, which in Gedo is divided between those who support Jubaland and those who favour Farmajo’s leadership; among Jubaland clans, principally but not only the Ogaden and Marehaan; between Jubaland and the federal government; and between Ethiopia and Kenya. For now, efforts should focus on the latter two in the hope of achieving a breakthrough that, in turn, could open space to address local dynamics.

To that end, the AU, IGAD, the UN, the EU and other bilateral partners invested in both regional and Somali security (such as the U.S. and UK) should press Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia to de-escalate tensions. As a first step, the AU Commission chairperson, in coordination with IGAD, should urge Addis Ababa, Nairobi and Mogadishu to resurrect their planned tripartite summit, virtually if necessary.[fn]Although Farmajo and Kenyatta discussed border security in a telephone call following the Beled Hawo clashes, a revitalised tripartite structure is necessary to more fully address the crisis in Gedo. “President Farmaajo, President Kenyatta hold telephone talks”, Office of the President, Federal Republic of Somalia, 5 March 2020.Hide Footnote Their message should be that political infighting – whether at the regional or national level – is benefitting Al-Shabaab and harming regional security. In particular, they should urge Addis Ababa and Nairobi to lean on their allies in Mogadishu and Kismayo to soften their positions and embrace dialogue.

Tensions between Mogadishu and Jubaland are jeopardising the country’s planned elections and distracting from efforts to fight Al-Shabaab.

Those same outside actors could also press Farmajo and Madobe to bring them to the negotiating table. Farmajo optimally would abandon his administration’s attempt to oust Madobe, which is likely to fail or involve significant bloodshed and financial cost. The federal government, having already offered to recognise Madobe’s presidency for a two-year interim period, should instead recognise it for its full four-year term. For his part, Madobe should recommit to steps to which he has hinted he is open. In particular, he should pledge not to seek a third term and should extend talks among key Jubaland communities to encourage internal reconciliation, address lingering anger at his re-election and his governance more broadly and foster greater cohesion within Jubaland. He should also agree to resume cooperation with the federal government on tasks like electoral preparations, constitutional review and continued progress on debt relief.[fn]Madobe has reiterated his willingness to engage in dialogue with Mogadishu on many occasions. Tweet by Jubbaland TV, @JLTVOfficial, 12:11pm, 7 March 2020.Hide Footnote

Such steps would represent concessions from the two sides, but breaking the deadlock would bring advantages to both. For Mogadishu, not recognising Madobe could jeopardise national elections and thus the Farmajo administration’s legitimacy. For Madobe, non-recognition risks hindering Jubaland’s development. Moreover, building trust and resuming working relations between Kismayo and Mogadishu would allow them to draw down their respective forces in Gedo and redirect them to fighting Al-Shabaab.

Somalia’s Western partners, which provide security support and financial aid to Mogadishu and to a lesser degree Kismayo, should signal that their continued backing depends on better cooperation between them and renewed joint planning to tackle Al-Shabaab. Improved coordination is in the two Somali actors’ interest: in itself, it will not defeat the resilient insurgency, but it will enable more effective operations against the militants. Even modest victories over Al-Shabaab could allow policymakers in Mogadishu and Kismayo to focus on social and economic efforts, potentially improving their popular standing and electoral prospects.

VII. Conclusion

The political standoff in Gedo has spiralled to a dangerous level. For the sake of avoiding a greater conflagration, all parties should take a step back. The many layers of conflict mean that reconciliation will have to occur sequentially. COVID-19 complicates efforts, and diplomats will have to be creative. But failure to act would give Al-Shabaab greater space and jeopardise regional stability.

Nairobi/Brussels, 14 July 2020