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Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?
Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
Somalia: Transforming Hope into Stability
Somalia: Transforming Hope into Stability
Report 95 / Africa

Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?

Nearly four years after 9/11, hardly a day passes without the “war on terrorism” making headlines, with Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia and now London holding centre stage. But away from the spotlight, a quiet, dirty conflict is being waged in Somalia.

Executive Summary

Nearly four years after 9/11, hardly a day passes without the "war on terrorism" making headlines, with Iraq, Afghanistan, Indonesia and now London holding centre stage. But away from the spotlight, a quiet, dirty conflict is being waged in Somalia: in the rubble-strewn streets of the ruined capital of this state without a government, Mogadishu, al-Qaeda operatives, jihadi extremists, Ethiopian security services and Western-backed counter-terrorism networks are engaged in a shadowy and complex contest waged by intimidation, abduction and assassination. The U.S. has had some success but now risks evoking a backlash. Ultimately a successful counter-terrorism strategy requires more attention to helping Somalia with the twin tasks of reconciliation and state building.

During the 1990s, jihadism in Somalia was synonymous with al-Itihaad al-Islaami, a band of Wahhabi militants determined to establish an Islamic emirate in the country. Al-Qaeda also developed a toehold, contributing to attacks on U.S. and UN peacekeepers in the early part of the decade and using the country as a transit zone for terrorism in neighbouring Kenya; some leading members of al-Qaeda's East African network continue to hide in Somalia.

Since 2003, Somalia has witnessed the rise of a new, ruthless, independent jihadi network with links to al-Qaeda. Based in lawless Mogadishu and led by a young militia leader trained in Afghanistan, the group announced its existence by murdering four foreign aid workers in the relatively secure territory of Somaliland between October 2003 and April 2004. Western governments, led by the U.S., responded to the threat of terrorism in and from Somalia by building up Somali counter-terrorist networks headed by faction leaders and former military or police officers, and by cooperating with the security services in Somaliland and neighbouring Puntland. The strategy has netted at least one key al-Qaeda figure, and as many as a dozen members of the new jihadi group are either dead or behind bars.

Despite these successes, counter-terrorism efforts are producing growing unease within the broader public. Few Somalis believe there are terrorists in their country, and many regard the American-led war on terrorism as an assault on Islam. Unidentified surveillance flights, the abduction of innocent people for weeks at a time on suspicion of terrorist links, and cooperation with unpopular faction leaders all add to public cynicism and resentment. Without public support, even the most sophisticated counter-terrorism effort is doomed to failure.

Militants have responded by assassinating at least a dozen Somalis working for Mogadishu's Western-backed counter-terrorism networks. Meanwhile, an Ethiopian intelligence network hunts Islamist militants and insurgents among Somalia's small, fearful community of Oromo migrants and refugees.

Since the formation of the new Transitional Federal Government (TFG) for Somalia, in October 2004, the dirty war between terrorists and counter-terrorist operatives in Mogadishu appears to have entered a new and more vicious stage that threatens to push the country further towards jihadism and extremist violence unless its root causes are properly addressed. Urban terrorism has claimed the lives of a female BBC producer, two young Somali footballers and a Somali woman working for an international NGO. Eager to earn the support of Western governments as an ally in the war on terrorism, the TFG leadership has attributed the attacks to Islamist extremists but some of the evidence appears to implicate supporters of the interim president instead.

The threat of jihadi terrorism in and from Somalia is real. But attempts by the new Somali leadership and its regional allies to exploit this threat for short-term political gain risk plunging the country into even greater crisis. Several key leaders in the deeply divided transitional government are notorious for smearing adversaries and critics with allegations of terrorist linkages -- conduct that threatens to deepen the schisms within the government. More alarmingly, the faction of the TFG aligned with the interim president has tried to use the threat of terrorism to justify deployment of a regional intervention force to Somalia -- a widely unpopular and deeply divisive proposition that would not only irrevocably split the government and trigger renewed conflict, but would also dramatically strengthen the jihadis.

Ultimately, the threat of jihadi terrorism from Somalia can only be addressed through the restoration of stable, legitimate and functional government. Dealing with that threat requires Somalia's friends to do more to assist in bringing Somali society together again and rebuilding the state. But such assistance must be carefully planned and finely calibrated in order to ensure that it does not empower one faction of the TFG at the expense of another or otherwise destabilise a fragile peace process.

A successful counter-terrorism campaign requires more engagement with the broader public, including civil society organisations and more moderate Islamist groups. Somalis must be persuaded not only that some individuals guilty of terrorism are indeed in their country but also that the counter-terrorism agenda does not involve subjugation by factional or foreign interests. At the same time, Somalia's partners must become involved with the peace process, helping to overcome the TFG schisms and to forge a genuine government of national unity. If they fail to do so, jihadis will gradually find growing purchase among Somalia's despairing and disaffected citizenry, and it will only be a matter of time before another group of militants succeeds in mounting a spectacular terrorist attack against foreign interests in Somalia or against one of its neighbours.

Nairobi/Brussels, 11 July 2005

Commentary / Africa

Somalia: Transforming Hope into Stability

Somalia has a genuine opportunity to promote needed political and security reforms following the election of a new president and renewed international interest. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2017 – First Update early-warning report for European policy makers, Crisis Group urges the European Union to seize the momentum by achieving consensus with its international partners on realistic goals ahead of the upcoming London Conference on Somalia in May. 

This commentary is part of our Watch List 2017 – First Update.

Somalia is at a tipping point. The election of a new president with cross-clan support, the emergence of a youthful and reform-minded parliament, and renewed international interest present a genuine opportunity to promote needed political and security reforms to combat Al-Shabaab and stabilise more areas. The London Conference on Somalia in May coincides with this moment and should be seized upon to mobilise international support. However, because the new federal cabinet was only approved in early March, conference organisers should be realistic about how detailed the government’s plans can or should be. More broadly, key international actors – the European Union (EU), African Union, Arab League, UK, Turkey and the U.S. – will need to coordinate and achieve consensus on realistic strategic goals, including creating an environment in which the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) can begin to draw down. If the new president fails to deliver on promised key reforms – including to rebuild the national army, revamp the constitution, curb corruption and strengthen federalism – both domestic and external support for the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) will inevitably wane and Al-Shabaab will be in a stronger position to rebuild its forces and support.

Al-Shabaab exploits humanitarian needs

Although international aid has picked up, its geographic coverage remains limited, not least because insecurity is rampant and the UN has so far managed to raise only 30 per cent of the $825 million it asked for in early March. As a result, the threat of famine is unlikely to diminish in the next six to twelve months and 5.5 million people (nearly half the population) will require emergency aid. The immediate priority is to mobilise more funds, prevent a repeat of the large-scale graft that marred past relief efforts and assist the hardest hit communities in remote regions which are increasingly turning to Al-Shabaab for assistance. Al-Shabaab is exploiting these needs to improve its image and attract public support, allowing people to move to relief centres run by local and international agencies, even as it gives no indication of its willingness to grant aid agencies access to areas it controls.

Al-Shabaab struggles to demonise diaspora Somalis’ crowd-funding campaign (collecting small amounts of money from a large number of people) and especially the Caawi Walaal campaign organised by youth volunteers to provide water and food to remote villages. International actors should therefore support such initiatives, given their potential to extend the reach of the relief effort to remote areas inaccessible to Western aid agencies.

Harnessing the diaspora

The recent elections produced Somalia’s most demographically diverse and youthful parliament ever. Nearly half its 283 members are younger than 50; over 90 hail from the diaspora; and 63 are female. President Mohammed Abdullahi Farmajo campaigned on reform and owes his victory to younger and well-educated diaspora MPs. However, efforts to push through needed reforms and national reconciliation will be complicated by the poor delineation of roles and authorities among the president, prime minister and speakers of the upper and lower houses, as well as by powerful vested interests that will want to maintain the 4.5 formula that apportions FGS positions among the four major and smaller minority clans. The president will not be able to rely solely on the diaspora bloc but will need to work with politicians more closely tied to the traditional clan leadership. In the same vein, the new administration will need to avoid giving too many positions to diaspora Somalis, which could aggravate deep societal divisions.

Economic regeneration (symbolised by upmarket hotels, restaurants and homes in Mogadishu) is largely underwritten by remittances from some two million diaspora Somalis, worth some $1.4 billion each year. The FGS has held meetings to mobilise more effective diaspora support for reconstruction, yet there is neither an agency entrusted with policy formulation nor a proper regulatory environment, a gap that could prove risky. For example, Mogadishu’s acute land crisis is fuelled by poorly planned investment exploiting local regulatory loopholes. One idea would be for the Somali Economic Forum, a donor-funded organisation fostering private sector development and economic growth, to use its upcoming conference in Dubai that will bring together diverse stakeholders to help the new administration create a rules-based regulatory environment to promote sensible investment.

Fostering peaceful federalism

Strengthening and broadening the fragile administrations of federal member states should be a priority for the government in order to stabilise areas far from Mogadishu. So far, the protracted and ad hoc devolution of power from the weak FGS to federal states has resulted in de facto blocs dominated by powerful clans which tend to monopolise power and resources. Minority clans, including smaller sub-clans within major ones, often feel sidelined, with dangerous implications: in Puntland, for example, successive mutinies by security forces occurred in February and March over unpaid wages, and several armed clan-based militias operate largely outside the control of Puntland President Abdiweli Gaas. Equally problematic are increasing Al-Shabaab attacks and targeted assassinations, as well as a growing, albeit small, Islamic State faction operating in Puntland.

Elsewhere, the ousting of Galmudug Interim Administration (GIA) President Abdikarim Guled by the state parliament has created a power vacuum and elections planned for late March were postponed due to the severe drought. A similar no confidence motion was initiated against Interim South West Administration (ISWA) President Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan in March. Pushing for genuine and viable political settlements at the intra- and inter-federal state levels must remain a priority. To that end, the FGS and international actors should focus on the following:

  • Setting up a permanent mechanism to help resolve disputes among federal states, such as Puntland, Galmudug Interim Administration, Juba Interim Authority and Interim South West Administration. In so doing, the government in Mogadishu and state presidents would address the reality that several inter-state borders are contested and, in almost all states, minority clans feel aggrieved by local power sharing, with the risk that such discontent could trigger wider violence within and between states;
     
  • Supporting the Independent Boundaries Review Commission (IBRC) to first demarcate contested state borders and then define their boundaries more generally;
     
  • Supporting efforts to finalise currently vague and unaddressed issues in the provisional constitution, including especially by clarifying legislation on resource and power sharing among federal states and the FGS;
     
  • Supporting constructive dialogue between Somaliland, which continues to seek independence, and the FGS. In this respect, Somaliland’s agreement with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to manage Berbera port and host a military base is likely to exacerbate simmering tensions between Somaliland and the FGS.
     

Security after AMISOM?

Al-Shabaab remains a resilient force that undertakes suicide bombings, targeted assassinations, ambushes and sweeps across south-central Somalia. After AMISOM played a key role in pushing Al-Shabaab’s conventional forces from most urban centres, most troop contributing countries (TCCs) are seeking to depart; at a March meeting in Nairobi, the TCCs began crafting a plan for the mission’s drawdown. AMISOM Commander General Soubagleh now says the withdrawal could start as early as 2018. But to make this possible, the FGS and federal states will need to improve governance dramatically and end local conflicts in liberated areas.

[T]he plan to draw down AMISOM needs a coherent framework to establish a sustainable national force that can take over responsibility for security.

Indeed, without a clearer and more institutionalised division of power, resources and security responsibilities between the FGS and federal states, as well as among federal state administrations, current security gains against Al-Shabaab will be difficult to sustain. In addition, the plan to draw down AMISOM needs a coherent framework to establish a sustainable national force that can take over responsibility for security and mitigate the negative effects of regional competition. The new administration’s further development of a national security architecture is a positive step, but the roles and responsibilities of the National Security Council and the president, notably in terms of command and control authority, will need to be clarified and institutionalised. Moreover, efforts to build the Somali National Army (SNA) could be improved through much better international coordination among the EU, U.S., UK, Turkey and Gulf states, which are all involved in troop training. There are growing indications that the U.S., under the Trump administration, is determined to up its direct military involvement. This carries risks. Although enhanced training and equipment would help, increased airstrikes could inflame public opinion and unwittingly drive communities into Al-Shabaab’s arms – especially if they cause civilian deaths.

Pursuing electoral reform

Somalia still has a long way to go before shifting from the 4.5 quota system to one-person-one-vote elections; in particular, it is unlikely that the requisite level of security will be achieved in the next four years. Recent elections were also marred by lack of transparency and accountability, which generated both corruption and electoral manipulation. Therefore, rather than focusing on the overly ambitious goal of one-person-one-vote, the London Conference ought to consider some of the inherited challenges, principally the 4.5 clan system. In particular, Somalis and international actors should:

  • Encourage the FGS to finalise the process of establishing functioning political parties;
     
  • Provide technical support to register citizens across the country;
     
  • Strengthen the capacity of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to organise and oversee future elections; and
     
  • Help the IEC organise smaller scale (eg municipal) elections.