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South Sudan’s South: Conflict in the Equatorias
South Sudan’s South: Conflict in the Equatorias
South Sudan’s oil sector needs to become more transparent
South Sudan’s oil sector needs to become more transparent
South Sudanese SPLA soldiers inspect a burned out car in Pageri in Eastern Equatoria state, 20 August 2015. AFP PHOTO/Samir Bol
Report 236 / Africa

South Sudan’s South: Conflict in the Equatorias

The 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan reached a milestone with the formation of a transitional government in Juba in April. Yet fault lines like those in the Equatorias remain outstanding. A committed, inclusive political response is vital to stop low-level conflicts continuing indefinitely.

Executive Summary

The formation of a transitional government following Riek Machar’s return to Juba in April marked the most significant milestone of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS) that ended the twenty-month civil war. Yet the ARCSS, designed to address a war primarily fought between the government and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army-In Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) in the Greater Upper Nile region, is an imperfect solution to other conflict fault lines, notably in the Equatoria region. Conflicts there are driven by a combination of national governance issues – federalism, security sector reform and a new constitution – that the ARCSS addresses – and localised grievances. Though the Equatorian conflicts appear to be on the wane, the agreement’s ability to address national political and security governance issues as well as regional-specific questions about the status of Equatorian opposition forces will determine if they revive.

Conflicts in the Equatorias, particularly in the west, intensified following the ARCSS signing, leading to persistent violence and displacing more than 100,000 people in eight of the region’s 23 original counties. The SPLA-IO capitalised on mounting grievances with a deliberate policy of support and incitement to rebellion, helping turn localised violence into low-level armed combat. This prompted retaliation from Juba that further escalated the situations. 

At its core, the multiple Equatorian conflicts are based on political differences and unresolved grievances between the national government and some local communities, not between the government and SPLM/A-IO. Many Equatorians believe the government and its army (the SPLA) serve a single ethnic group, the Dinka (who are cattle keepers, government officials, businesspeople and soldiers throughout much of the region); many Dinka believe they bore the greatest burdens of the independence struggle, including famine and the depredation produced by raids on their communities, while areas such as Western Equatoria were largely spared. Nevertheless, most Equatorians are not rebelling against the government, and where there is fighting, different armed groups have their own casus belli

Though they were not then a battleground, South Sudan’s civil war created the conditions for new conflicts in the Equatorias. After fighting broke out in December 2013, old suspicions about Western Equatorians’ commitment to the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) seemed vindicated, as the region struggled to meet a government recruitment quota, and many sought to keep out of what they saw as a “Dinka-Nuer war”. In 2015, Equatorian governors presented an independent position to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, the regional organisation). The September 2015 sacking and subsequent detention by President Salva Kiir of the popular elected Governor Joseph Bangasi Bakosoro, the strengthening of relations between Dinka cattle keepers and the SPLA against the agricultural majority and the harsh suppression of local rebellions are seen as consequences of Equatorian “neutrality”. 

Determinations over whether Equatorian armed groups are eligible to join the ARCSS cantonment process as “forces previously in combat” at the time of signing have been complicated by the warring parties. The SPLM/A-IO has claimed the Equatorian rebel groups and operations as their own, though they sometimes have not been. The government denies the SPLA-IO is active in the region, which would make Equatorian combatants ineligible for the cantonment, but some still allege SPLA-IO ceasefire violations in the Equatorias. Mutual obfuscation is compounded by the failure of ceasefire mechanisms to investigate peace agreement breaches in a timely fashion and identify armed groups’ relationships to the SPLA-IO. Failure to find a solution for forces which joined the fighting after the agreement was signed in August 2015 could lead to continued combat, a rift within the SPLA-IO and decisions by forces not deemed eligible to continue to fight in response.

Most Equatorians want the bloodshed to end; they do not want to fight the government or anyone else. Formation of the transitional government in Juba has furthered the move toward peace; Equatorians are well-represented in it, leading two of the three security ministries, and Bakosoro has been released. The tools to end conflict in the Equatorias are available, within the August peace deal and through church-led local peace efforts in conflict-affected communities. 

The process to draft a permanent constitution, based on the principle of a federal system and with an Equatorian, Dr Richard K. Mulla, in a key position as federal affairs minister in the transitional government, gives Equatorians opportunities to present their federalism positions. The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) will make recommendations about ethnic composition of the security sector, its structure and counter-insurgency responsibilities and approaches within an overall security policy framework. Beyond ARCSS processes, reconciliation between agricultural and pastoral communities, supported by a balanced approach from Juba, is necessary to prevent further violence and enable implementation of the agreement. Without a determined commitment by political leaders to peace, not war, however, such efforts will fail, and low-level conflicts could continue indefinitely.

Recommendations

To build sustainable peace in the Equatorias

To the Transitional Government of National Unity (TGoNU): 

  1. Ensure full implementation of the permanent ceasefire in the Equatorias.
     
  2. Resolve eligibility criteria for cantonment, specifically in the Equatorias and Bahr el Ghazal.
     
  3. Take steps to repair trust and badly damaged relationships with certain Western Equatorian politicians, building on ex-Governor Bakosoro’s release. 
     
  4. Address the escalation in pastoralist-farmer conflict by:
     
    1. implementing the presidential decree ordering cattle keepers to leave parts of the Equatorias; 
       
    2. providing impartial support for existing community-based structures used to negotiate cattle migration; and
       
    3. seeking to resolve conflicts in neighbouring states, such as Lakes and Jonglei, that drive cattle keepers from their homes in greater numbers.

To the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism:

  1. Investigate reported violations in the Equatorias, including military resupply of forces, in a timely fashion, paying special attention to the precise relationship between different Equatorian forces and the SPLM/A-IO.

To the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) and diplomatic community:

  1. Prioritise the following to stop conflicts in the Equatorias:
     
    1. support for the TGoNU in resolving eligibility criteria for cantonment in the Equatorias and Bahr el Ghazal; 
       
    2. formation and funding of the National Architecture for the Permanent Ceasefire and Unification of Forces to ensure implementation of the permanent ceasefire and oversee forces in cantonment; and
       
    3. making clear to the warring parties that continuing conflicts in the Equatorias would be a serious ceasefire breach.
       
  2. Ensure that Equatorian perspectives are given due weight during constitution drafting, the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and other political processes.

To the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) Board: 

  1. Consider, in the context of its effort to create a new security policy framework and defence policy, the problematic nature of insurgency and current counter-insurgency policy.

To South Sudan’s church leaders: 

  1. Facilitate local peace agreements as and when appropriate between the TGoNU, armed groups and armed youth, local communities and cattle keepers.

To avoid further humanitarian crisis

To armed actors:

  1. Provide security guarantees for humanitarian actors to access and serve displaced populations transparently and impartially.

To humanitarian agencies:

  1. Maintain impartiality and transparency in accessing and serving displaced populations.
     
  2. Ensure adequate staffing and effective risk management strategies are in place, so that, when humanitarian access is secured, agencies can deliver necessary services to populations where they are located, and those populations can feel comfortable accessing the assistance.

To the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS):

  1. Accept and assist civilians fleeing active armed conflict and seeking protection inside UNMISS bases.

Juba/Nairobi/Brussels, 25 May 2016

Op-Ed / Africa

South Sudan’s oil sector needs to become more transparent

Originally published in The African Report.

South Sudan’s fortunes have always been tied to its oil. The discovery of oil in the late 1970s deepened tensions between the South Sudanese and the regime in Khartoum and fueled violence after the outbreak of Africa’s longest-running civil war as both sides vied to control the region’s oil fields.

Oil then laid the groundwork for South Sudan’s secession. A landmark 2005 peace deal granted Juba half of the South’s oil revenues, pumping billions into the new semi-autonomous government.

But the sudden wealth gravely compromised the country’s stability. By 2013, only two years after independence, the elite scramble for South Sudan’s oil riches helped trigger a fresh war that may have killed 400,000 people while displacing millions.

Nowadays, despite a 2018 peace agreement and a government of national unity, Juba’s monopoly on oil revenue obstructs a broader political settlement the country desperately needs.

South Sudan’s leaders siphon off the bulk of the petrodollars, leaving much of the population starved of basic services and, in some parts of the country, on the brink of famine.

Pervasive corruption has become a huge source of frustration for donors, including the US, which allocates a billion dollars a year primarily to sustain humanitarian relief. South Sudan produces roughly 150,000 to 170,000 barrels a day. But because of the share owed to oil companies and fees paid to Sudan, it earns income from 45,000 barrels at most, according to the best estimates available. Little of that income reaches the national budget due to off-budget expenditures, undisclosed debt payments, and allocations to its opaque state oil company Nile Petroleum.

Those who still support South Sudan cannot ignore its rotten finances. Since oil underwrites the entire South Sudanese state, addressing the country’s deep troubles is impossible without a focus on its vanishing petrodollars. A first step in this direction is making the oil economy more transparent, not only in South Sudan, but also in Europe, host to many of the country’s commercial financiers.

Oil fuels tensions

Despite staggering poverty and underdevelopment, South Sudan qualified as a middle-income country at its birth thanks to its oil wealth. But instead of serving as a foundation for state-building, oil poisoned South Sudan’s politics. Before independence, rebel commanders enriched themselves through a mix of taxation, aid diversion, artisanal gold mining, deforestation, and outright looting. This culture of illicit self-dealing quickly came to resemble a free-for-all when the 2005 peace agreement unlocked billions of petrodollars.

After independence, oil money papered over the South’s ethno-political divisions until President Salva Kiir moved to consolidate power, tightening his grip on oil funds in the process. Only two years after secession, a leadership struggle between Kiir and internal challengers, led by his main opponent Riek Machar, burst into a civil war that drained state coffers, with oil production decreasing because of the conflict.

To stay afloat, South Sudan turned to a handful of commodity traders to purchase future deliveries of oil, including Swiss-Singaporean Trafigura, which bought South Sudan’s oil through secretive pre-payment arrangements. These high-interest cash advances worked like the petrostate equivalent of a payday loan scheme, piling up debt while hiding South Sudan’s finances ever further from sight.

Back to the books

South Sudan’s future would appear less bleak if the countries that foot the bill to alleviate the country’s humanitarian disaster focused on making sure Juba accounts for its oil revenue.

Donors should make a concerted effort to push Juba to comply with existing laws and provisions in the 2018 peace agreement to ensure that oil proceeds are paid into a single public oil revenue account. One source of leverage is through the IMF, which has given South Sudan $550m in the past year but with few strings attached. The IMF should condition future disbursements on the exclusive use of the public oil account.

Outside pressure on Juba should be supplemented with pressure on South Sudan’s financiers. European governments should urge trading companies with a strong corporate presence in Europe to disclose their payments to South Sudan and demand the funds be deposited into the official oil account.

They should also consider drafting regulations requiring commodity firms under their jurisdiction to certify compliance with South Sudan’s law. This could work. Following engagement by the UN Panel of Experts on South Sudan, Glencore has disclosed purchasing $950m of South Sudanese oil since 2018. Additional leverage could come from widening the regulatory net to the commodity firms’ insurers and bankers, many of which are also in Europe.

Declining output and global decarbonisation mean that South Sudan will not be in the oil business forever, and given the trouble it has caused there, the transition may provide as much opportunity as risk. Still, bringing the oil money back onto the books of the national budget could at least give the South Sudanese a chance to reset their bloody politics now, not when the oil pumps stop.