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Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts
Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts
Table of Contents
  1. Executive Summary
It’s in Uganda’s Interest to Keep Supporting South Sudan Peace Efforts
It’s in Uganda’s Interest to Keep Supporting South Sudan Peace Efforts
A boy returning to this burnt family house in Leer. CRISIS GROUP/Jérôme Tubiana
Report 223 / Africa

Sudan and South Sudan’s Merging Conflicts

Talks led by East Africa’s IGAD offer the best chance to end South Sudan’s spreading war. International partners must put aside their disillusionment and rally to the regional body’s new IGAD-PLUS mechanism to help mediators reach a deal.

Executive Summary

For more than eighteen months, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the regional body mediating peace negotiations to end South Sudan’s civil war, has struggled to secure a deal in the face of deep regional divisions and the parties’ truculence. To overcome these challenges, it announced a revised, expanded mediation – “IGAD-PLUS” – including the African Union (AU), UN, China, U.S., UK, European Union (EU), Norway and the IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). The initiative is designed to present a united international front behind IGAD to the warring sides but so far it has failed to gain necessary backing from the wider international community, much of which is disillusioned with both IGAD and the South Sudanese. Rather than distance itself from IGAD, the international community needs to support a realistic, regionally-centred strategy to end the war, underpinned by coordinated threats and inducements. Supporting IGAD-PLUS’ efforts to get the parties’ agreement on a final peace deal in the coming weeks is the best – if imperfect – chance to end the conflict and prevent further regionalisation.

South Sudan’s war has brought underlying regional tensions to the fore. It is part of yet another chapter of the historic enmity between Uganda and Sudan, while rivalry between Uganda and Ethiopia over their respective influence on regional security has coloured the mediation process. Ethiopia, Kenya and Sudan have dedicated envoys mediating the process while Uganda is only involved at the IGAD heads of state (HoS) level. Kampala’s military deployment in support of Juba creates facts on the ground and precluded it sending an envoy to the talks, while Addis Ababa seeks to control the mediation and eventual balance of power in the region. One of IGAD’s achievements has been to manage these tensions, thus contain the conflict, but rivalries prevented the HoS from agreeing on final aspects of power-sharing and security arrangements, enabling the warring parties to continue without agreeing.

Three major factors limited IGAD’s mediation and remain a challenge: 1) regional rivalries and power struggles; 2) centralisation of decision-making at the HoS level and related lack of institutionalisation within IGAD; and 3) challenges in expanding the peace process beyond South Sudan’s political elites. Following the oft-violated January 2014 Cessation of Hostilities agreement, the HoS mediation strategy focused on deploying a regional force to create conditions for peace negotiations. When the wider international community stymied the prospective regional force and the situation stabilised by June 2014, leaders could not overcome their divisions to agree on an effective alternate strategy. This undermined the IGAD special envoys, and the warring parties opted instead to engage directly with individual HoS in a series of initiatives in Kampala, Khartoum and Nairobi. IGAD itself had little leverage. For example, despite public threats, the warring parties understood some member states were reluctant to support sanctions, repeatedly called IGAD’s bluff and refused to compromise.

IGAD is important as a forum to regulate the regional balance of power, but it needs high-level support if the region is to reach a unified position on peace. IGAD-PLUS should become a unifying vehicle to engage the ever-shifting internal dynamics in South Sudan more effectively and address the divisions among IGAD members that enable the parties to prolong the war. In particular, the AU high representative might lead shuttle diplomacy within the region to gain consensus on the way forward. A dedicated UN envoy for South Sudan and Sudan should represent the UN in IGAD-PLUS and coordinate the various UN components’ support to the process.

IGAD-PLUS is the proposed bridge between an “African solution” approach and concerted high-level, wider international engagement. If it is to overcome the challenges that bedevilled IGAD, its efforts must be based upon regional agreement and directly engage the South Sudanese leaders with greatest influence through both pressure and inducements. To end this war, a process is needed that seeks common ground, firmly pushes the parties to reasonable compromises, builds on rather than is undermined by the Tanzanian and South African-led reunification process within the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM, the dominant political force in South Sudan), and whose outcome is guaranteed by IGAD, the AU, the U.S and China. The coming weeks will require concerted international action, coordinated with IGAD, to take the final, necessary steps to secure an agreement. Failure to do so will lead to further violence and fracturing in South Sudan and leave the region without an effective mechanism to mediate its own internal divisions, with devastating consequences for the people of South Sudan and the region.

Op-Ed / Africa

It’s in Uganda’s Interest to Keep Supporting South Sudan Peace Efforts

Originally published in Daily Monitor

President Museveni will naturally defend Uganda’s short-term interests, but he should also work towards longer-term stability by supporting President Salva Kiir’s pledge to bring peace through ARCSS implementation, negotiations and national dialogue.

Uganda has a crucial role and interest in supporting South Sudan’s efforts to forge a more inclusive transitional government

Reducing South Sudan’s internal strife would not just benefit the South Sudanese but is also critical for Ugandan interests, including the security of its citizens and border, reducing refugee flows and the protection of its economic investments and trade.

President Museveni and other Ugandan leaders should encourage their South Sudanese counterparts to prioritise political rather than military solutions to ongoing conflicts; support national dialogue to increase the transitional government’s inclusivity; and encourage better relations between Juba and Khartoum over key bilateral issues.

Uganda is a long-time supporter of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), rooted in its decades-long struggle against the Sudanese government prior to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

When South Sudan’s civil war broke out in December 2013, Uganda sought to prevent the government falling to what it saw as rebels. Fearing that these rebel forces would ally with long-term regional rival Sudan, Ugandan forces intervened, securing Juba before retaking Bor alongside the SPLA.

Hostilities have driven more than 400,000 South Sudanese refugees into Uganda since July 2016

Uganda thus became a party to the conflict – although it was perhaps the only one that largely abided by the laws of war. Uganda paid a diplomatic price for becoming party to the conflict. Uganda was not asked to participate as a mediator in the peace talks led by the Horn of Africa’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad), even though Museveni was actively involved in Igad Heads of State summits that oversaw the mediation process.

Uganda negotiated a withdrawal of its troops in October 2015 as part of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) that ended the war. The two-year military deployment was costly – both financially and politically. Active diplomatic engagement now can both prevent the need for another deployment and at the same time secure Ugandan interests in South Sudan.

Fighting in Juba in July 2016 and an insurgency in South Sudan’s Equatoria region on the Ugandan border has once again brought the country’s conflicts to Kampala’s attention. Hostilities have driven more than 400,000 South Sudanese refugees into Uganda since July 2016. This is far more than arrived during the 2013-15 civil war, when fighting was more intense in northern regions and Ethiopia and Sudan bore most of the humanitarian burden.

Rebel groups in the Equatorias have engaged in deliberate provocations against Ugandan civilians and targeted commercial vehicles from Uganda. Yet, Uganda’s response has been more restrained than in December 2013. It deployed a military convoy to rescue civilians during the July 2016 fighting in Juba and subsequently agreed to joint South Sudanese and Ugandan police deployments patrols along key roads to protect vehicle transport. 

President Museveni will naturally defend Uganda’s short-term interests, but he should also work towards longer-term stability by supporting President Salva Kiir’s pledge to bring peace through ARCSS implementation, negotiations and national dialogue.

In particular, President Museveni should use his influence on his South Sudanese counterpart and his experience of regional and international relations to shape a more sophisticated approach from Juba to resolving conflicts and bringing political opposition into the transitional government. President Museveni’s counsel to Kiir has helped smooth the way for the deployment of a regional force approved by the region and operating under the United Nations. Uganda should continue to work with the region to ensure that the force helps set security conditions that enable dialogue and an inclusive government.

Uganda should further deepen its recent rapprochement with Khartoum

Uganda should further deepen its recent rapprochement with Khartoum. Improved relations – noticeable since 2014 when both sides sought to tackle antagonism resulting from their long involvement in South Sudan’s conflicts – have already reduced regional tensions and, in doing so, allowed for more effective cooperation over South Sudan. 

This is facilitated by bilateral visits by both heads of state and broader diplomatic engagement. Uganda has also committed to end its support for Sudanese rebels and should push for Juba to make good its commitment to Khartoum that it will do the same.

President Museveni’s recent attempts to get Sudanese rebels to participate in the African Union-backed peace process has also been a positive move towards finding a lasting solution to Sudan’s enduring conflicts.

While Kampala cannot solve the internal political problems of South Sudan, it can, in conjunction with other Igad members, continue to reduce the danger of an escalation in regional tensions.

As a major regional actor with considerable experience in mediation and a close relationship with the South Sudan government, Uganda can leverage these advantages to help the country overcome its political crisis through national dialogue and negotiations rather than perpetual conflict.

This will also serve as the most effective method of protecting Uganda’s own long-term security and economic interests in its neighbour.