About The Arab Stance Vis-à-vis Darfur
About The Arab Stance Vis-à-vis Darfur
Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
Op-Ed / Africa

About The Arab Stance Vis-à-vis Darfur

The Arab League has expressed concern over the violence in Sudan's Darfur, but, like individual Arab member states, it has failed to support international action to protect the Sudanese citizens of Darfur. Their inaction in the face of mass killings edges closer and closer to complicity every day.

Despite heavy-handed censorship on Arab media covering Darfur, knowledge of the massacres started reaching the Arab public by the end of 2003. In 2004, an Arab League Commission of Inquiry into Darfur publicly condemned the attacks on civilians as "massive violations of human rights". Yet the statement was later suppressed and removed from the Arab League website, after a negative reaction from the Sudanese government. Since that moment, the Arab League has consistently counseled international patience in dealing with Khartoum, despite more than 200,000 civilian deaths in Darfur as a result of the Sudanese government's military strategy of targeting of the civilian population.

The Arab League and Arab countries have supported - at least verbally - the under equipped African Union (AU) force deployed in Darfur (AMIS), which they regularly describe as the only viable security solution for the Darfur crisis. But practically, and for years, the Arab League's policy has been completely in line with the official Sudanese position rejecting any other international force to help stop the massacres of Muslim civilians in Darfur.

Two years later, in an unprecedented step and under heavy criticism for its lack of action, Arab League states used the opportunity of their March 2006 Khartoum summit to pledge a much needed $150 million to AMIS. One year on, however, Arab countries have contributed only $15m - just ten percent of their pledge.

It is worth mentioning here that the ongoing Darfur crisis that started in 2003 coincides with record high nominal oil prices that peaked at $74/barrel in July 2006 resulting in record high budget surpluses in Gulf countries. Unfortunately, transfers from the Gulf to help the Muslim civilian population of Darfur have been minimal.

Nor have Arab members of the African Union, like Egypt and Algeria, provided much support to AMIS. Though they continue to vocally support the African body in the international arena, there is no concrete action that follows, a position that comforts the Sudanese regime and helps it deflect international pressure for a more robust force that could more effectively protect civilian populations.

Thus AMIS remains today an overwhelmingly EU funded force. Since 2004, the EU and its member states have supported AMIS with more than $520 million. Canada alone has paid more in both humanitarian aid to Darfur and financial support to AMIS than all the Arab countries combined.

On the ground, Arab countries together have sent only 76 personnel out of the 7,000 troops constituting AMIS. Egypt was generous enough to send 34 military observers, while Algeria sent 13, Libya 9 and Mauritania 20 - this to monitor a territory the size of France.

At the UN, Arab countries have been active, though all their activity seems to be directed at obstructing Security Council resolutions that could have helped end the suffering of Sudan's Darfur population. Since 2004, the last two Arab non-permanent members at the Security Council - Algeria and Qatar - speaking and voting in the name of all Arab countries, either toned down resolutions in Khartoum's favour or abstained from voting in a clear message of non-support for the civilian victims.

The current Arab representative on the Security Council, Qatar, abstained from voting on an August 2006 resolution (1706) calling for the deployment of UN troops in Darfur. Arab countries said that more efforts should have been made to secure Sudan's "consent". At the UN General Assembly in September 2006, and in support of Khartoum's policies, its representative called on the international community to support "fraternal Sudan" in its efforts. The reference to Sudan as a "fraternal" neighbour is fair, but it is hard to understand why Arab solidarity should extend as far as defending a regime in its campaign of mass killing against its own citizens.

Arab countries supports the Sudanese government's rejection of a neutral UN peacekeeping force for Darfur, justifying their position by repeating, like Khartoum, that a UN force in Darfur represents a threat to the Sudanese sovereignty. Strangely, no Arab government has noticed the contradiction of this common position given that the same regime in Khartoum that is rejecting the UN peacekeepers in west Sudan welcomes a 10,000-strong UN force in south Sudan and views them as a vital component of preserving a freshly signed peace in this region. Why does no one ask why sovereignty is only an issue in the west of the country and not in the south?

Ignoring the UN mission in the south of the country, President Bashir has said Sudan is so opposed to UN peacekeeping in Darfur that he has called for "resistance and jihad" if the second UN force steps one foot into the country. The Arab world's acceptance of Khartoum's double standard does not do service to their well-placed critique of U.S. double standards in the Middle East. Furthermore, supporting Sudan's opposition to the UN and relaying accusations of the UN's alleged lack of neutrality will prove short-sighted: supporting the description of UN troops as "invaders" can only undermine the efforts of thousands of UN troops in Syria's occupied Golan Heights, Egypt's Sinai and Lebanon's south that are monitoring peace treaties and fragile cessations of hostilities.

When American actor George Clooney went to Darfur to raise public awareness of the dire situation of raped Muslim women and suffering children living in fetid refugee camps, one Arab member chastised Clooney for misdiagnosing the Sudan conflict, dismissing the idea of an actor advising what to do in Darfur: "We must go to an excellent physician and not an outstanding actor so that this physician can prescribe to us the appropriate treatment" he said.

Paradoxically, when a good physician diagnosed Darfur wounds, Arab countries rejected him, too. In 2005, then-UN Security General Kofi Annan appointed a panel of experts to assess the situation in Sudan's Darfur region. The experts wrote in early 2006 a confidential report that identified 17 Sudanese as having committed crimes against humanity in Darfur. Their report said that all sides in Darfur had violated an arms embargo, with the government supplying weapons to militias and with rebels escalating the fighting. However, Arab countries blocked proposals to impose sanctions on both Sudanese officials and militia leaders singled out by the report.

When Algeria was representing Arab countries at the Security Council, it had even opposed the creation of the UN International Commission of Inquiry charged with determining whether genocide has been committed in Darfur. Algeria, justified its position "for the sake of effectiveness and in order to address the urgency and gravity of the crisis". Not that the urgency and gravity of the situation has moved the Arab world at all in the intervening years.

As the Ambassador of a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for two years, Abdallah Baali tirelessly reiterated, in the name of Arab countries, the Sudanese government's murderous positions on Darfur. In a September 2004 letter to the Council, Mr. Baali wrote that, the "the draft of UN resolution 1556 before us today (calling for the disarmament of the Janjaweed militia) poses problems (...) in our view, it does not really do justice to the Government of the Sudan - which has taken initiatives and carried out actions that go in the right direction".

Indeed, since resolution 1556, the Sudanese government's "right direction" has only led to an increase in the number of innocent deaths in Darfur, partly at the hands of its air force, which bombarded civilian villages. And Arab governments continue to support the massacres perpetrator rather than the civilian victims.

Sudan’s Imperilled Transition: Policy Recommendations for the U.S.

In a 1 February 2022 hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Crisis Group’s President & CEO Dr. Comfort Ero testified on the escalating situation in Sudan and outlined four main recommendations for the U.S. to help restore the civilian-led transition to democracy.

Good morning/afternoon, Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Risch and distinguished members of the Committee. My name is Dr. Comfort Ero, and I am the President and CEO of the International Crisis Group. Previously I served as the organization’s Africa program director and I have spent my professional and academic career focusing on peace and security issues in Africa. The International Crisis Group is a global organisation committed to the prevention, mitigation and resolution of deadly conflict. We cover over 50 conflict situations around the world and our presence in Sudan dates back more than two decades.[fn]Crisis Group Africa Report N°281, Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution, 21 October 2019; Jonas Horner, “After the Coup, Restoring Sudan’s Transition”, Crisis Group Commentary, 5 November 2021; Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°168, The Rebels Come to Khartoum: How to Implement Sudan’s New Peace Agreement, 23 February 2021.Hide Footnote

I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak to you about the deteriorating situation in Sudan today. The country is at a dangerous crossroads. Not for the first time in its history, the military has turned its back on the demands of the Sudanese people for more just and representative rule by violently seizing power. The coup on October 25 brought a sudden halt to a civilian-military coalition that since 2019 has been charged with steering Sudan toward elections and full civilian rule.[fn]Crisis Group Report, Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution, op. cit.; Horner, “After the Coup, Restoring Sudan’s Transition”, op.cit. It was a major reversal in a transition that had brought hope to so many in the Horn of Africa and beyond. I will share with you my analysis of the current situation in Sudan and recommendations for steps the United States might take to help guide it back on the path toward greater democracy and stability.


By way of background, the transition that was interrupted on October 25 followed 30 years of rule by the notorious strongman Omar al-Bashir.

  • After coming to office in a coup in June 1989, Bashir maintained his hold on power by repressing political opposition, fighting costly counter-insurgencies in the country’s peripheries and underwriting his factious security sector with patronage-driven expenditure that ate up, by some estimates, 70 per cent of the national budget.[fn]Shortly after taking office, Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, who was mandated to lead the civilian-military transition in August 2019, listed as an ambition driving down military expenditure to 20 per cent of the national budget. He said in some years, that budget line had stood at 80 per cent. “Sudan PM seeks to end the country’s pariah status”, AP, 25 August 2019.Hide Footnote
  • The patronage system that Bashir built eventually bankrupted the country and contributed to the strongman’s ouster. A small cabal of favoured cronies including Bashir’s Islamist allies from the National Congress Party, senior military officers (many of them drawn from the tiny riverine elite that has dominated Sudan’s military and politics for decades) and newly minted allies such as the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which was blamed for some of the worst violence in the western region of Darfur, benefited substantially from Sudan’s rigged, lopsided economy.[fn]“Who are Sudan’s RSF and their Commander Hemeti?”, Al Jazeera, 6 June 2019.Hide Footnote These same actors continue to try to preserve their privileges atop Sudan’s political, economic and security establishment.
  • Popular frustration over political repression, rising prices and a sclerotic economy that could not absorb Sudan’s ranks of unemployed youths helped trigger the protests that eventually drove Bashir from power. The uprising began in the south-eastern towns of Damazin and Sennar, where crowds took to the streets on 13 December 2018 in response to a tripling of bread prices. By the time the protests reached Atbara, the historic bastion of unionism in Sudan, demonstrators were demanding regime change. Against long odds and despite heavy repression, the protesters eventually overwhelmed the security forces, who staged a palace coup against Bashir on 11 April 2019.  
  • The military tried to maintain the upper hand but was forced under pressure both from the protest movement and external actors to compromise and accept to share power with civilians. International revulsion over a 3 June 2019 massacre of protesters encamped outside the military headquarters was particularly important in forcing the generals to cede to the will of the Sudanese people.[fn]“Sudan commemorates the June 3 Massacre”, Dabanga Sudan, 3 June 2021.Hide Footnote Under the terms of a 17 August Constitutional Declaration, the country would be governed by a hybrid civilian-military coalition for 39 months leading up to elections.
  • The task before that coalition was enormous. The new cabinet headed by the technocrat and diplomat Abdalla Hamdok was charged with breathing new life into Sudan’s anaemic economy, reforming political institutions to lay the ground for elections and delivering justice to the many Sudanese victims of atrocities during Bashir’s rule – and in the weeks following his fall. Despite the formidable obstacles the authorities faced, that coalition represented the country’s best hope for emerging into a stable, prosperous and democratic future and was a source of hope for those supporting democratic renewal in other countries in the region.
  • Always reluctant participants in the alliance, the generals barely disguised their opposition to the Hamdok administration’s reforms and were particularly opposed to efforts to deliver justice and to reshape the country’s economy. In defiance of the United States government and others who warned them against doing so, they seized power and ousted the civilians.

The October 25 Coup and Its Aftermath

Today, unfortunately, the picture looks grim. The military violently applied the brakes on the transition in the early hours of October 25 when they placed Hamdok under house arrest, rounded up numerous other civilian officials in the administration, declared a state of emergency and dissolved key institutions including the cabinet. Since then, Sudan’s military chief General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has taken a series of steps to reverse the reforms the civilian-led administration had rolled out, including by disbanding a committee charged with reclaiming public assets, by packing the Sovereign Council, which serves as the country’s executive, with his allies and by appointing Bashir-era figures into key posts including in the judiciary and security forces.[fn]Crisis Group EU Watch List 2022, 27 January 2022.Hide Footnote The military attempted some window dressing when it reinstated Hamdok on 21 November, a move Sudanese protesters rightly dismissed as an effort to legitimise their power grab. Some efforts to stimulate talks among Sudanese actors to find a way out of the crisis continue although the prospects of a resolution appear dim.

[Sudan] has been on a downhill trajectory since the coup.

Overall, the country has been on a downhill trajectory since the coup. On 2 January, Hamdok resigned in frustration after failing to persuade the generals to stick to their commitments under the August 2019 constitutional charter, and in particular to give him a free hand to appoint a new cabinet. In the meantime, the public’s frustration has been growing. For the past few weeks, Sudanese people across the country have taken to the streets to signal their revulsion at the military’s power grab. The general’s response to the protests has come right out of the Bashir playbook. The security forces have repeatedly fired into crowds, killing dozens, according to human rights groups and the UN.[fn]“Bachelet condemns killings of peaceful protesters in Sudan”, UN, 18 November 2021.Hide Footnote A late December decree by military chief Abdel-Fattah al-Burhan gave the police effective immunity for their actions. Still, the Sudanese people continue to risk their lives by staging protests, work boycotts and other strike actions.

While it is not yet clear who will come out on top in this contest between the security forces and the street, there is evidence to suggest that the generals have gravely miscalculated the strength of their hand. This is a different Sudan from the one in which the army captured control of the state at least five times in the past, including in 1989 when Bashir took office.[fn]"A history of Sudan coups”, Statista, 25 October 2021.Hide Footnote Sudan has one of the youngest populations in the world.[fn]“After the Uprising: Including Sudanese Youth”, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2020.Hide Footnote Six in ten Sudanese are aged between fifteen and 30 – and the current generation rejects the notion that the country should go back to being governed by an unaccountable, out-of-touch elite.[fn]Sudan’s Political Impasse”, The Horn (Crisis Group podcast), 26 January 2022.Hide Footnote This mobilised, youthful population showed its power at the end of 2018 when it rose up in protest at Bashir’s repressive, kleptocratic rule. The protest movement captured the imagination of pro-democracy campaigners well beyond Sudan with its diversity, with the prominent role that women played – sometimes outnumbering men in demonstrations – with its tenacity, and ultimately with its success. Against what many viewed as tall odds, it brought a halt to Bashir’s rule. Since the coup, this movement has again shown its strength by mobilising millions of Sudanese to take to the streets and send a clear signal to the generals that they will not, as past generations of officers did, get away with imposing their will on the Sudanese people.[fn]“Deaths Reported in Sudan as ‘March of Millions’ Demands Restoration of Civilian Rule”, Voice of America, 30 October 2021.Hide Footnote

Getting the transition back on track would serve both the people of Sudan’s democratic aspirations and the interests of the United States.

Getting the transition back on track would serve both the people of Sudan’s democratic aspirations and the interests of the United States and other regional and international actors in the strategically important Horn of Africa – where Sudan sits between major regional powers Ethiopia and Egypt and shares a border with seven countries, several in the throes of conflict themselves. Support for Sudan’s transition would comport with the U.S. government’s stated commitment to champion democratic values and to “demonstrate that democracies can deliver by improving the lives of their own people”[fn]“President Biden to Convene Leaders’ Summit for Democracy”, White House, 11 August 2021.Hide Footnote . It would also be the surest pathway to medium- and long-term stability in the country.


The United States is one of Sudan’s most important external partners. It provides about half a billion dollars in assistance annually and was a champion of efforts to reconnect Sudan’s economy with international financial institutions. Given these ties and the United States government’s relations with all the main regional actors, the U.S. is well positioned to support efforts to reverse the military’s power grab and set Sudan back on a path toward elections and representative government. Specifically, it could:

  • Press the generals to immediately halt violence against protesters and coordinate targeted sanctions to hold them to account: As outlined, Sudan’s security forces have responded to peaceful protests by indiscriminately shooting into crowds and sometimes reportedly even pursuing fleeing and wounded demonstrators into hospitals.[fn]“Sudanese security forces ‘hunt down’ injured protesters in hospital”, France 24, 25 January 2022.Hide Footnote This pattern of behaviour, on top of its grave human cost, threatens to poison relations between the parties and render a resolution even further beyond reach. In coordination with partners including the African Union (AU) and the European Union, the United States should make clear that the generals will face consequences including asset freezes and travel bans if they continue to kill unarmed demonstrators. The White House should simultaneously convene an interagency process to design a targeted sanctions programs aimed at key figures in the military and outline that it is willing to deploy these against individuals that continue to sanction the killing of protesters or obstruct progress toward elections more broadly.
  • Support Sudanese-led efforts to rerail the transition: The United States has already signalled its backing for efforts to stimulate negotiations among the generals and civilian groups including the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), the coalition that spearheaded the protest movement and neighbourhood resistance committees, which play an integral role in the day-to-day organisation of protests and have proved a particularly effective channel of resistance to the military coup. The United States should warn the generals against taking precipitous measures that could derail these potential talks, including refraining from unilaterally appointing a new prime minister. It should further insist that these talks are maximally inclusive and in particular that they should take on board the views of the resistance committees. The 2019 power-sharing agreement should be the blueprint for a compromise that could restore civilian-military governance and lead to elections.
  • Withhold financial assistance until the military reverses its coup: In the immediate aftermath of the military takeover, the United states suspended $700 million in assistance to Sudan. This was the right step given the generals’ brazen decision to terminate the power-sharing agreement. The United States should make clear to the generals that this support will not resume unless they accept to return to the path toward elections laid out in the 2019 power-sharing agreement. In the meantime, the United States should advance with efforts to repurpose some of its support to civil society groups and also to work with partners including the UN to offer direct assistance to Sudan’s long-suffering people.
  • Urge all regional actors to back a return to a civilian-led dispensation: Many on the Sudanese street perceive some external actors, namely Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, as tacitly backing military rule.[fn]Sudan’s Political Impasse”, op. cit.Hide Footnote Such perceptions will ultimately be damaging to those countries’ standing in Sudan if it is able to reinvigorate its transitional process. But it is still possible for these key regional actors to play an important role in helping Sudan return to a civilian-led transitional process, thereby protecting their relations with the Sudanese people. Given his strong background in regional diplomacy, Special Envoy Satterfield should be well positioned to engage these actors and urge them to use their privileged relations with Sudan’s generals to convey to them that the power-sharing agreement they torpedoed remains Sudan’s best and perhaps only chance for stability, a goal they all profess to share. With the welcome appointment of a new ambassador to Khartoum, the United States could play a key role in marshalling a coalition of actors within and outside Sudan that can help steer the country back toward the path to elections.

Sudan is at a historic hinge-point. The military’s power grab has derailed a transition that was an inspiration well beyond Sudan, and still could be, if the generals step back and allow Sudan’s civilians to steer the country to elections. With a piling set of challenges – not least an economy in deep distress, resurging violence in Darfur and elsewhere, and a tottering peace deal with armed groups – the generals can hardly afford to stonewall the Sudanese people’s demands for change. The world – and the United States – should stand with Sudan’s people in their quest for a more democratic and accountable government, an outcome that represents the country’s best hope for achieving long-run political, social and economic stability.

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