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It’s in Uganda’s Interest to Keep Supporting South Sudan Peace Efforts
It’s in Uganda’s Interest to Keep Supporting South Sudan Peace Efforts
Sudan’s Interest in South Sudanese Peace
Sudan’s Interest in South Sudanese Peace
Op-Ed / Africa

It’s in Uganda’s Interest to Keep Supporting South Sudan Peace Efforts

Originally published in Daily Monitor

President Museveni will naturally defend Uganda’s short-term interests, but he should also work towards longer-term stability by supporting President Salva Kiir’s pledge to bring peace through ARCSS implementation, negotiations and national dialogue.

Uganda has a crucial role and interest in supporting South Sudan’s efforts to forge a more inclusive transitional government

Reducing South Sudan’s internal strife would not just benefit the South Sudanese but is also critical for Ugandan interests, including the security of its citizens and border, reducing refugee flows and the protection of its economic investments and trade.

President Museveni and other Ugandan leaders should encourage their South Sudanese counterparts to prioritise political rather than military solutions to ongoing conflicts; support national dialogue to increase the transitional government’s inclusivity; and encourage better relations between Juba and Khartoum over key bilateral issues.

Uganda is a long-time supporter of the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), rooted in its decades-long struggle against the Sudanese government prior to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement and South Sudan’s independence in 2011.

When South Sudan’s civil war broke out in December 2013, Uganda sought to prevent the government falling to what it saw as rebels. Fearing that these rebel forces would ally with long-term regional rival Sudan, Ugandan forces intervened, securing Juba before retaking Bor alongside the SPLA.

Hostilities have driven more than 400,000 South Sudanese refugees into Uganda since July 2016

Uganda thus became a party to the conflict – although it was perhaps the only one that largely abided by the laws of war. Uganda paid a diplomatic price for becoming party to the conflict. Uganda was not asked to participate as a mediator in the peace talks led by the Horn of Africa’s Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Igad), even though Museveni was actively involved in Igad Heads of State summits that oversaw the mediation process.

Uganda negotiated a withdrawal of its troops in October 2015 as part of the August 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) that ended the war. The two-year military deployment was costly – both financially and politically. Active diplomatic engagement now can both prevent the need for another deployment and at the same time secure Ugandan interests in South Sudan.

Fighting in Juba in July 2016 and an insurgency in South Sudan’s Equatoria region on the Ugandan border has once again brought the country’s conflicts to Kampala’s attention. Hostilities have driven more than 400,000 South Sudanese refugees into Uganda since July 2016. This is far more than arrived during the 2013-15 civil war, when fighting was more intense in northern regions and Ethiopia and Sudan bore most of the humanitarian burden.

Rebel groups in the Equatorias have engaged in deliberate provocations against Ugandan civilians and targeted commercial vehicles from Uganda. Yet, Uganda’s response has been more restrained than in December 2013. It deployed a military convoy to rescue civilians during the July 2016 fighting in Juba and subsequently agreed to joint South Sudanese and Ugandan police deployments patrols along key roads to protect vehicle transport. 

President Museveni will naturally defend Uganda’s short-term interests, but he should also work towards longer-term stability by supporting President Salva Kiir’s pledge to bring peace through ARCSS implementation, negotiations and national dialogue.

In particular, President Museveni should use his influence on his South Sudanese counterpart and his experience of regional and international relations to shape a more sophisticated approach from Juba to resolving conflicts and bringing political opposition into the transitional government. President Museveni’s counsel to Kiir has helped smooth the way for the deployment of a regional force approved by the region and operating under the United Nations. Uganda should continue to work with the region to ensure that the force helps set security conditions that enable dialogue and an inclusive government.

Uganda should further deepen its recent rapprochement with Khartoum

Uganda should further deepen its recent rapprochement with Khartoum. Improved relations – noticeable since 2014 when both sides sought to tackle antagonism resulting from their long involvement in South Sudan’s conflicts – have already reduced regional tensions and, in doing so, allowed for more effective cooperation over South Sudan. 

This is facilitated by bilateral visits by both heads of state and broader diplomatic engagement. Uganda has also committed to end its support for Sudanese rebels and should push for Juba to make good its commitment to Khartoum that it will do the same.

President Museveni’s recent attempts to get Sudanese rebels to participate in the African Union-backed peace process has also been a positive move towards finding a lasting solution to Sudan’s enduring conflicts.

While Kampala cannot solve the internal political problems of South Sudan, it can, in conjunction with other Igad members, continue to reduce the danger of an escalation in regional tensions.

As a major regional actor with considerable experience in mediation and a close relationship with the South Sudan government, Uganda can leverage these advantages to help the country overcome its political crisis through national dialogue and negotiations rather than perpetual conflict.

This will also serve as the most effective method of protecting Uganda’s own long-term security and economic interests in its neighbour. 

Op-Ed / Africa

Sudan’s Interest in South Sudanese Peace

Originally published in Sudan Tribune

Sudan and South Sudan’s relationship is of vital importance to resolving conflicts in both countries. Khartoum, and other countries in the region, clearly benefit from a stable South Sudan.

Once-fraught relations between the two countries have improved in recent years, helped by substantive discussions over shared interests, including oil exports, support for armed groups, and border security. Khartoum should now use its influence in Juba to seek better regional cooperation and a peaceful resolution of internal and cross-border conflicts.

Once-fraught relations between the two countries have improved in recent years

A more sophisticated Sudanese approach that ensures southern armed groups are part of a more inclusive, and thereby stable, government in Juba, is in Khartoum’s own best interests. A constructive Khartoum-Juba relationship is likely to be significant, for instance, in the U.S. government’s mid-2017 assessment of its recent decision to ease sanctions on Sudan.

Do not support South Sudanese armed groups

There is currently fighting in several parts of South Sudan, a disaster for those in the affected areas. But violence is not on the scale of the 2013-15 civil war, and is unlikely to escalate dramatically, partly thanks to Khartoum’s refusal to support rebel groups.

When the former First Vice President of South Sudan, Riek Machar, arrived in Khartoum after fleeing fighting in Juba in July 2016, the Sudanese government severely restricted his capacity to re-start his rebellion. He then left for South Africa, and was subsequently denied re-entry to Sudan in November 2016; he was eventually obliged to return to South Africa.

Khartoum should continue resisting requests from South Sudanese opposition leaders to arm or provide other forms of support to rebel fighters

Khartoum’s actions are central to determining whether South Sudan moves towards sustainable peace or falls back into a complex and multi-layered conflict. Ending armed rebellion in South Sudan is the primary responsibility of South Sudan’s transitional government who must reach out to armed groups to make peace. Yet violence in South Sudan is most deadly and protracted when warring parties receive support from neighbouring states.

Khartoum should continue resisting requests from South Sudanese opposition leaders to arm or provide other forms of support to rebel fighters.

Political rather than military support

Sudan can go further by using its influence with Juba to implement relevant parts of the Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS), to which Sudan was a signatory and guarantor in August 2015. Sudan should also work with other Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD, a regional body) member states – notably Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya – to support Juba’s commitment to conduct a national dialogue with opposition political parties and armed groups.

Sudan’s visible engagement with these processes is critical to overcoming the trust deficit between Juba and armed groups.

As well as supporting peace in South Sudan, Khartoum should accept that there is no military solution to its own domestic conflicts in in the Two Areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile states) and Darfur. These conflicts have cost billions of dollars and Sudan should seek a sustainable political resolution, supported by regional actors, including Uganda.

For recently improved relations between Khartoum, Juba and Kampala to translate into real regional harmony, Sudan should honour its commitment to a Cessation of Hostilities in both Darfur and the Two Areas and reconvene negotiations on humanitarian access to South Kordofan and Blue Nile states.

To help peace take hold in frontier areas, Sudan should also consider innovative approaches to border security that are based on the complex realities of armed groups and ethnic communities in both countries. Leaders are drawing from examples such as the 2010 agreement between Chad and Sudan which halted support for one another’s rebels.

Without such measures, improved relations with Juba will not be sufficient to resolve Sudan’s own internal conflicts, which have domestic drivers, require their own political solution, and are not simply the expression of a Sudanese proxy war with South Sudan.

The benefits of better relations with Juba

Overall, Sudan can benefit from improved relations with Juba in three ways.

First, by agreeing that it will not support South Sudanese rebel groups, it can continue to demand that Juba, in turn, deny support to Sudanese rebels in the Two Areas and Darfur.

Secondly, improved relations will bring much needed economic benefits. December’s three-year oil deal profits both sides and improves the terms of South Sudan’s transit fee regime. Production is also re-starting in Unity state which will increase exports. The new index-linked arrangement means that fees will reflect global oil prices, rather than simply being a fixed rate which, at a time of low prices and conflict-suppressed production, contributed to South Sudan’s economic challenges.

Diplomacy, not destabilisation, is Sudan’s winning strategy in South Sudan

Khartoum should understand that the oil agreement, together with support for security arrangements in South Sudan’s Unity state that favour stability, ties both countries more closely in a regime of economic interdependence - to their mutual benefit. This makes it less likely that conflict will break out again along the shared border.

Third, the conflict in South Sudan is a major preoccupation for the international community. Continuing to play a constructive role in its resolution and preventing further escalation, coupled with renewed efforts to resolve its own internal conflicts peacefully, will help Khartoum lock in its improving relations with the U.S. and the European Union. This will increase the chances for complete sanctions removal and debt relief.

Diplomacy, not destabilisation, is Sudan’s winning strategy in South Sudan.